This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003197 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2013 
TAGS: ECON OREP PGOV PREL TU US
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF APRIL 27-29 CODEL WEXLER 
 
REF: STATE 102777 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  During an April 27-29 visit to Ankara, 
Representative Robert 
Wexler visited with senior GOT leadership to assure continued 
support for 
the U.S.-Turkish relationship while simultaneously 
acknowledging there had been 
recent differences between the two countries. To mitigate any 
possible residual 
disappointment that could occur as a result of the Turkish 
parliament's 
decision not to support coalition efforts in Iraq, the 
Congressman urged the 
GOT leadership to demonstrate both substantive and symbolic 
gestures to the 
U.S. Congress to reaffirm this relationship.  End summary. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Representative Robert Wexler,s Message 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) Congressman Robert Wexler began his meetings with the 
GOT 
leadership by delivering a good news/bad news message.  First 
the good news: 
the first full House of Representatives debate on 
Turkish-American relations in 
memory (over the $1 billion supplemental grant) had come out 
three to one in 
Turkey's favor despite its taking place at the height of 
bilateral tensions. 
Then the bad: there was great disappointment with Turkey 
within the U.S. 
administration, and many questioned Turkey's overall policy 
direction. 
Throughout his meetings Wexler affirmed "Nothing is more 
important right now 
than continued good relations between Turkey and the U.S.  He 
stressed that 
Turkey must be pro-active in reinvigorating the relationship. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Prime Minister Tayyip Recip Erdogan 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) Prime Minister Erdogan emphasized the importance of 
Turkey's "strategic 
partnership" with the U.S.  In a long defense, Erdogan (1) 
expressed regret 
that the U.S. Congress had reacted so emotionally; (2) 
claimed that, after the 
U.K., Turkey gave the U.S. more support than anyone else on 
Iraq, including 
allowing Operation Northern Watch to continue for years and 
permitting U.S. 
special operations forces to enter Iraq through Turkey; (3) 
recalled that the 
GOT had warned the USG that it would be hard to pass the 
troop deployment 
resolution; and (4) averred that AK M.P.s were negatively 
affected by 
"insulting" anti-Turkish cartoons in the U.S. press.  In the 
end, Turkey's 
opening of its airspace -- which the GOT allowed because it 
was a requirement 
of its alliance with the U.S. -- was more significant than 
similar moves by 
Germany or Romania.  Now Turkey wanted to establish a common 
approach with the 
U.S. to help Iraq become a democracy. Moreover, AK party's 
parliamentary 
members had a positive attitude toward the U.S. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
General Staff DCHOD Buyukanit 
----------------------------- 
 
 
¶4. (C) Under questioning from Wexler, DCHOD Buyukanit 
admitted that mil-mil 
relations were not as solid as previously.  He argued weakly 
that the military 
had worked for parliamentary passage of the bill to support 
U.S. combat 
operations, claiming the military could not impose its will 
on Parliament. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Buyukanit claimed that misunderstandings between 
Turkey and the U.S. had 
arisen from "wrong assessments" the U.S. military had sent to 
Washington, but 
the Turkish military would now do its best to create a new 
atmosphere for the 
future. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Buyukanit then listed Turkish concerns related to 
Iraq:  (1) The Kurds 
could not be trusted; (2) The Iraqi Shi,a were a 
second-class majority who now 
wanted a major role; (3) Turkey did not have designs on 
Kirkuk or Mosul. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul 
----------------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) FonMin Gul stated there were disappointments and 
misunderstandings on 
both sides.  Claiming he was disappointed in the result of 
the 
resolution, Gul opined that Turkey did not cooperate fully, 
but it did 
cooperate.  Public opinion was strongly against the war. 
Secretary Powell,s 
 
SIPDIS 
visit was helpful. Turkey and the U.S. are "indispensable 
partners."  This is 
not only the view of the government, the man on the street 
feels this way as 
well.  The (March 1) resolution is not the only indicator of 
Turkish sentiment. 
There is no turning back on our pro-U.S., pro-E.U. policy. 
Except for that 
resolution, we (AK) have made progress on these fronts. 
 
 
¶8. (C) As for relations with Turkey's eastern neighbors, Gul 
asserted that 
Turkey will influence them, not vice versa.  Regarding Iran, 
Iraq and Syria, 
Gul claimed "they cannot give Turkey anything; Turkey can 
give them something. 
Turkey has had problems with them in the past and is only 
trying to improve 
relations. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Gul concluded by promising to follow up with a visit 
of parliamentarians 
to the U.S. Congress and to assure significant AK party 
representation on 
Parliament's Turkish-American Friendship Committee.  He noted 
the Israeli 
President is planning to visit Turkey soon and that Turkey 
supported the Middle 
East roadmap and will contribute to peace in the region. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
MFA - Ambassador Ugur Ziyal 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under Secretary 
Ambassador Ziyal commented 
that many in the GOT incorrectly assumed the problems had 
passed and noted the 
U.S.-Turkish military relationship must be repaired. On the 
future of Iraq, he 
stressed, the U.S. and Turkey need to consult and work 
closely.  Observing the 
U.S. and Turkey have gone through worse crises before, and 
will weather this 
one, Ziyal confessed he is at a loss as to what Turkey can do 
right now. 
He wondered about a trip to Washington but asked how such a 
delegation would be 
received. 
 
 
¶11. (C) Ziyal dismissed concerns about the Turkmen, saying 
they are not 
warlike; they are doctors and tradesmen and will add to peace 
and stability. 
He thought it important to prevent Kurd-Arab clashes as well 
as to fight the 
PKK. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Wexler advised a well-coordinated parliamentary trip 
with the right 
message would be helpful and suggested that a visit to Israel 
by the FM and/or 
PM would also help. 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Central Bank Governor Sureyya Serdengecti 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶13. (C) Central Bank Governor Sureyya Serdengecti told 
Congressman Wexler that 
the AK government had taken office ill-prepared to address 
Turkey's economic 
problems, and its learning curve had been longer than 
expected.  After a brief 
post-election boost, confidence fell in December-February in 
the face of the 
government's lack of enthusiasm for reform and growing 
concerns about an Iraq 
operation. 
 
 
¶14. (C) The key issue, according to Serdengecti, is whether 
there will be 
sufficient political support to stick to the reform program, 
and an absence of 
political friction that could undermine confidence.  While 
the Prime Minister 
and some others in the Party now have a better understanding 
of the need for 
the IMF program, others in AK do not.  Moreover, there are 
other "power groups" 
in the country that oppose economic stabilization efforts 
because they want to 
see AK suffer and fall. 
 
 
¶15. (C) Serdengecti concluded by arguing that he and other 
technocrats had to 
convince the government (and the rest of the state) of the 
need to stick with 
the reform program and to continue to move closer to the 
West.  On the economy, 
he told PM Erdogan a week ago that the government could not 
make any more 
mistakes. 
 
 
---------------------- 
Parliamentary Meetings 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶16. (C) Wexler met with representatives of the Turkish 
Parliament's Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the U.S.-Turkish Friendship Committee, 
whose leadership 
consists entirely of CHP parliamentarians who had voted 
against the March 1 
resolution.  Interlocutors included AKP MP and Foreign 
Affairs Committee chair 
Mehmet Dulger, CHP MP AND retired AMB Onur Oymen, and Foreign 
Affairs Committee 
staffer Osman Ulukan.  Chairman Dulger thanked Wexler for his 
visit, saying, 
"Ours is a lasting friendship.  Any misunderstandings should 
be lifted."  Dulger 
advised shaping public opinion in Turkey and the U.S. in a 
positive way, noting "We 
do not want to give the impression to the Turkish people that 
Turkey-U.S. ties are 
weak.  Ambassador Oymen followed, asserting that there is no 
anti-American feeling 
in CHP.  Oymen applauded Wexler,s suggestion that Parliament 
demonstrate a show of 
support, while cautioning that it is not difficult to 
persuade Turkey, but you 
cannot force Turkey to do anything. 
PEARSON