This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 002912 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2013 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ:  LETTERS FROM TGS CHOD OZKOK TO CJCS MYERS, 
CINCEUR JONES 
 
REF: ANKARA 2906 
 
 
(U) Classified by Political-Military Affairs Counselor Stuart 
Brown.  Reasons:  1.5 (B and D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) On May 5, 2003, the Embassy received copies of three 
letters from TGS CHOD Gen. Ozkok:  (1) an April 30 letter to 
CJCS Gen. Myers (see para two for text), (2) a May 1 letter 
to CJCS Myers (see para three for text) and (3) a May 1 
letter to SACEUR Gen Jones (see para four for text).  The 
first letter to CJCS Myers in large part focuses on northern 
Iraq:  it protests the treatment of the TU special forces in 
northern Iraq by US forces and seeks to explain and justify 
their presence.  It also says the US and Turkey together can 
discuss the re-deployment of TU forces once PKK/KADEK is 
eliminated and the region is secure.  The second letter to 
Gen. Myers (like the letter to SACEUR Jones) contains 
Turkey's offer to contribute to NATO-led operations in Iraq, 
and seeks NATO's support for use of a NATO HQs in Turkey for 
this purpose.  Finally, para five contains the text of a 
memorandum of record of an April 28, 2003 meeting between 
Commander CJSOTF-N Col. Cleveland and Deputy Commander of TU 
SF in Silopi. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
OZKOK-MYERS:  TU CONCERNS ON IRAQ 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) Begin text of letter from TGS CHOD Gen. Ozkok to CJCS 
Gen. Myers: 
 
 
Dear General Myers, 
 
 
The recent messages from the US Special Forces in northern 
Iraq are not encouraging.  Hence, I would like to convey my 
views to you. 
 
 
As is known, there have been limited Turkish troops in 
northern Iraq since 1997.  This action was fully coordinated 
with the KDP and PUK.  The main purpose of this limited troop 
deployment is to prevent any PKK/KADEK terrorist infiltration 
into Turkey as well as early warning and intelligence 
collection.  There are almost 5,000 terrorists in the region, 
which pose a serious threat to Turkey. 
 
 
For these reasons, we, together, can evaluate the Turkish 
military presence in northern Iraq after the PKK/KADEK 
existence is eliminated and full control is ensured in the 
region.  As assured, this contingent does not have any 
negative impact on overall US operations.  It is obvious that 
we can reach the desired end-state through bilateral talks on 
the basis of mutual understanding and objective criteria. 
 
 
With this in mind, I think, the recent incident experienced 
in Kirkuk was exaggerated.  Firstly, Gen. Osman,s HQs was 
informed of this activity.  Secondly, everybody tends to 
carry small arms in the region.  The team composed of Turks, 
Kurds and Turkomans were not carrying any additional weaponry 
other than ones for their own security.  When the convoy was 
stopped, others came to help settle the dispute.  However, 
they were misinterpreted and sent back to Turkey for very 
well known reasons. 
 
 
Turkish low profile attitude in this incident should be no 
means be taken as Turkish team was mal-practicing.  On the 
contrary, as stated above, the importance that we attach to 
the Turkish-US relations has been the underlying factor in 
the Turkish approach.  The misinterpretation and wrong 
assessments by the lower echelons should not be allowed to 
adversely influence our relations.  In this context, I 
consider this kind of tense and subjective approaches 
unacceptable for both sides. 
 
 
The ultimatum-like demands to be met in short time-frames may 
harm our friendly relations.  We are not against each other. 
Nor are our military contingents in the region.  I assume 
that such unfortunate statements are due to the sentiments of 
some officials who work under difficult conditions for a long 
time.  The repetition of such statements creates a worrisome 
atmosphere. 
 
 
For instance, the statements made by Col. Cleveland, 10th US 
Special Forces Group Com., during the 28 April meeting in 
Arbil were unacceptable.  Particularly, making any reference 
to revenge what was done to Iraq Special Representative Mr. 
Khalilzad and Special Forces teams at Habur Gate is 
unquestionably beyond the capacity of such an officer. 
 
 
As is known, some of the bodyguards of Mr. Khalilzad stayed 
in Iraq despite their written promises to return.  And the 
Turkish officials at the border gate needed to consult their 
higher authorities, which definitely took time.  During this 
process, Mr. Khalilzad and his associates were hosted by the 
Deputy Governor.  Consequently, he and his team were allowed 
into Turkey after a short time. 
 
 
Turning to the Special Forces issue, the authority to send 
such a unit to Iraq from Turkey rests with the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly.  Although I don,t have any power in the 
respect, I produced after talking to you some course of 
actions, which put the special forces under the scope of 
already politically accepted NILE teams.  On the issue of 
their prolonged stay in N.Iraq, I told that we need to 
&think8, which reflects a kind of flexibility. 
 
 
We previously made clear statements on the locations of our 
contingents in northern Iraq.  A written notification was 
also made to ODC on 23 March 2003 clarifying the coordinates 
of the locations.  Additionally, I personally informed 
Secretary Powell that the total number of Turkish soldiers is 
 
SIPDIS 
around 1500.  The detailed documentation, which included the 
number of soldiers, main weaponry and combat vehicles, was 
also provided upon request. 
 
 
I fear that minor misinterpretations and problems in the 
theatre be allowed to harm our overall relations.  I believe 
that we need to do our best to solve this kind of problems in 
a constructive manner. 
 
 
Our main purpose should be to prevent any deterioration in 
our relations.  I believe, as soldiers, we still have an 
important role to play in this respect.  In order to avoid 
similar incidents, what we need to do is to come together 
with military and civilian delegations and to talk about 
essential arrangements in N.Iraq.  CENTCOM involvement should 
follow such initiative in the theatre. 
 
 
As we have discussed previously, out activities should be 
transparent in order to avoid any misunderstanding.  This is 
what I also want to reiterate for this moment.  I am of the 
opinion that, ultimatum-like statements, sudden and 
unexpected requests are not constructive at all in promoting 
our bilateral relations. 
 
 
In conclusion, I would like to express my sincere wish that 
the recent developments would not create a difficult 
environment for our bilateral relations.  With this in mind, 
I would like to re-emphasize my firm belief that mutual 
understanding and cooperation can overcome any possible 
hurdles we may face.  Hence, we must not let past events 
dominate the future relations.  We stand ready for any talks 
and cooperation in this direction, including possible Turkish 
contribution to reconstruction phase of Iraq as well as the 
establishment of Stabilization Force. 
 
 
You may rest assured that I will continue to do my best to 
promote our bilateral military relations. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
CC:  General James L. Jones. 
 
 
end text. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
TURKEY OFFERS TO PLAY IN NATO-LED OPS IN IRAQ 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) Begin text of a letter dated May 1 from TGS CHOD Ozkok 
to CJCS MYERS: 
 
 
Dear General Myers, 
 
 
We are pleased that the war in Iraq, which is likely to have 
far-reaching implications both in political and military 
terms on a wider region, did not last long as a result of 
rapid progress of the Coalition forces. 
 
 
It is inevitable, however, that the post-war period in Iraq 
would bring new and demanding challenges.  This would 
certainly necessitate intensified, unified and coordinated 
effort by the international community, in which NATO could 
and should play a much-needed role, particularly in 
re-establishing durable safety, security and stability in 
this war-stricken country.  Needless to say, NATO, with its 
broad experience, is unquestionably capable of undertaking 
such a crucial and historic role.  As a neighboring country 
to Iraq that could serve as a proper line of communication, 
Turkey stands ready to take part in such an operation of NATO 
Council decides to. 
 
 
Turkey, while enjoying advantages of its geo-strategically 
unique location, inevitably remains exposed to many regional 
tensions and crises around its borders.  In the face of the 
unfolding circumstances in the region, we believe NATO 
headquarters in Turkey would gain even more importance in 
view of handling these potential crises as well as 
safeguarding and consolidating collective peace and stability 
throughout the NATO,s expanding area of concern. 
 
 
I would like to thank you for your firm support and 
co-operation in the Operation Display Deterrence, initiated 
within the framework of Article 4 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, to deter any possible hostile attempt by Iraq and 
reinforce Turkey,s self-defense.  We are very pleased that 
the operation has been conducted successfully with all its 
assigned objectives accomplished. 
 
 
I believe that the Operation Display Deterrence was also 
meaningful in proving and manifesting the solidarity within 
the Alliance as well as NATO,s increasing importance, as a 
deterrent military organization, both on regional and global 
scale. 
 
 
Taking this opportunity, both personally and on behalf of the 
members of the Turkish Armed Forces, I would like to extend 
my congtratulations for the "Armed Forces Day" to you and to 
the members of the friendly and allied USA Armed Forces.  I 
wish health and success to you all. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
end text. 
 
 
------------------ 
OZKOK-JONES LETTER 
------------------ 
 
 
¶4. (C) Begin text of a letter dated May 1 from TGS CHOD Ozkok 
to SACEUR Jones: 
 
 
Dear General Jones, 
 
 
The last few weeks have witnessed a new hot crisis in the 
Middle East, which is most likely to have far-reaching 
implications, both in political and military terms, on a 
wider region stretching far beyond the Iraqi borders. 
Although it is early to contemplate a fully safe environment, 
it is apparent that Iraq is now almost under the military 
control of the Coalition troops.  This, the level of threat 
posed by Iraq against Turkey has diminished to an all-time 
low. 
 
 
It is inevitable, however, that the post-war period in Iraq 
would bring new and demanding challenges to be addressed 
urgently.  This would certainly necessitate intensified, 
unified and coordinated effort by the international 
community, in which NATO could and should play a much-needed 
role, particularly in re-establishing durable safety, 
security and stability in this war-stricken country. 
Needless to say, NATO, with its broad experience, is 
unquestionably capable of undertaking such a crucial and 
historic role.  As a neighboring country to Iraq that could 
serve as a proper line of communication, Turkey stands ready 
to take part in such an operation of NATO Council decides to. 
 
 
Turkey, while enjoying advantages of its geo-strategically 
unique location, inevitably remains exposed to many regional 
tensions and crises around its borders.  Additionally, the 
ongoing developments in Iraq have the potential to trigger 
off new crises.  In the face of the unfolding circumstances 
in the region, we believe NATO headquarters in Turkey would 
gain even more importance in view of handling these potential 
crises as well as safeguarding and consolidating collective 
peace and stability throughout the NATO,s expanding area of 
concern. 
 
 
Taking this opportunity, I would like to thank you for your 
firm support and co-operation in the Operation Display 
Deterrence, initiated within the framework of Article 4 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty, to deter any possible hostile 
attempt by Iraq and reinforce Turkey,s self-defense.  We are 
very pleased that the operation has been conducted 
successfully with all its assigned objectives accomplished. 
 
 
I believe that the Operation Display Deterrence was also 
meaningful in proving and manifesting the solidarity within 
the Alliance as well as NATO,s increasing importance, as a 
deterrent military organization, both on regional and global 
scale. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
end text. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Turkish Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶5. (C) Begin text of the memorandum for the record of a 
meeting betwen Col. Cleveland and TU SF Deputy Commander in 
Silopi: 
 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 
 
 
SUBJECT:  Turkish Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq 
 
 
¶1.  COL Charles Cleveland, Commander CJSOTF-N, met COL Hasan 
Ozdemir, Deputy Commander, Turkish Special Force Operations 
Base-Silopi, TU on 280715Z April 2003.  Also present were LTC 
Paul Skvarka, USSF, MAJ David Young, USSF, LTC Yasar Yildiz, 
TUSF, 1LT Murat Taner Karabulut, TUSF.  The purpose of the 
meeting was to relay instructions from the Commander of the 
Combined Forces Command concerning the Turkish military 
activities in Northern Iraq to the senior officer responsible 
for Turkish Special Forces (TUSF) in Northern Iraq. 
 
 
¶2.  TUSF representative was informed of the following: 
 
 
a.  Turkish military personnel will immediately terminate all 
non Coalition-approved activities in Northern Iraq. 
 
 
b.    Turkish General Staff is required to notify the 
Combined Forces Command of the number of personnel, location 
and activities, to include intelligence gathering, of all 
Turkish military units and organizations in Northern Iraq. 
This information will be submitted NLT 300600Z April 2003. 
 
 
c.    No future Turkish military activities in Northern Iraq 
will be concluded unless approved by Combined Forces Command 
through the JSOTF-N. 
 
 
d.    Turkish military personnel in Northern Iraq will only 
carry personal side arms (pistols). 
 
 
e.    Turkish military personnel in Northern Iraq will be in 
uniform at all times. 
 
 
f.    TUSF personnel already expelled from Northern Iraq will 
not be allowed to return.  All violators will be detained. 
 
 
g.    Turkish military personnel will not escort aid convoys 
into Iraq.  All humanitarian aid emanating from the Republic 
of Turkey will be coordinated through the International Red 
Cross/Red Crescent. 
 
 
h.    The previously accepted &Green Line8 border is no 
longer a recognized boundary and U.S. Forces in Northern Iraq 
are responsible for all activities in that region. 
 
 
i.    The above are initial and there may be follow-on 
instructions in the future. 
 
 
j.    COL Hasan Ozdemir, by signing this document, 
acknowledges receipt of the instructions to be relayed to the 
Turkish General Staff. 
 
 
 
 
Charles T. Cleveland                Hasan Ozdemir 
COL, SF                             COL, TUSF 
Commanding 
 
 
end text. 
PEARSON