This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

051431Z May 03

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002903 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: FRIENDSHIP AND FEAR IN RURAL ANKARA 
 
 
(U) Classified by PolCouns John Kunstadter.  Reason: 1.5 
(b,d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In conversations at all levels during April 
visits to Ankara sub-provinces, poloffs encountered Turks 
eager to get U.S.-Turkish relations back on track. 
Nevertheless, we also noted the kind of suspicion and doubt 
from State authorities about the purpose of our trips that we 
normally encounter in the more sensitive Southeast.  Although 
we expect a certain level of natural curiosity, the extent of 
official wariness seems especially noteworthy given that 
these trips occurred so close to cosmopolitan Ankara.  End 
summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Poloffs have recently made trips to Ankara 
sub-provinces to engage local officials in open discussions 
about U.S.-Turkish relations and Turkish domestic politics. 
Visits included: sub-provinces in the Ankara conurbation; 
Kazan, a town of some 15,000 people, who rely on primarily 
agriculture to sustain the local economy; and Kizilcahamam, a 
poor, insular, conservative community capitalizing on nearby 
natural springs to grow its tourism. 
 
 
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Eager to reaffirm U.S.-Turkey ties 
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¶3. (C) In our visits to Kazan and Kizilcahamam, Turks at all 
levels -- from police chiefs and village leaders to 
sub-provincial governors (kaymakam) and teachers -- displayed 
a genuine affinity toward the U.S. and a desire to get 
U.S.-Turkish relations back on track.  We had lively, open 
discussions across the board with the mayors, both of whom 
are members of the ultranationalist MHP, normally suspicious 
of the U.S.  They blamed the media for creating and 
perpetuating any anti-U.S. sentiment in Turkey during the war 
in Iraq.  Both regretted that Turkey had not been part of the 
coalition.  During lunch in a small Kazan village, the local 
muhtar (village leader), imam, and the leader of the village 
elders all spoke positively of Turkey's long friendship with 
the U.S. 
 
 
¶4. (C) In a chance meeting, the Kazan police chief, who had 
spent 3 years in the U.S. as bodyguard to then-ambassador and 
current MFA Deputy U/S Baki Ilkin, was eager to praise the 
U.S., noting that he had seen real democracy in America.  He 
also praised the law enforcement system in the U.S., which, 
he said, demonstrates a level of politeness and flexibility 
alien to the Turkish system.  We witnessed his influence 
first hand.  While speaking with vendors at a vegetable 
market, we ran into a uniformed police officer, doing his own 
shopping, who then invited us for tea and arranged the 
meeting with the police chief. 
 
 
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Old Habits Die Hard 
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¶5. (C)  Although we encountered an overwhelmingly pro-U.S. 
attitude from the man on the street, we were struck by the 
high level of State suspicion concerning the purpose of our 
visits and our planned agenda.  The Kazan kaymakam, for 
example, claimed he had to notify the Interior Ministry, 
Foreign Ministry, and the Turkish National Intelligence 
Organization before agreeing to meet with us. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Our conversation with the garrulous Kazan mayor was 
quickly interrupted by an Interior Ministry inspector, who 
happened to be in town.  After seizing control of the 
meeting, he took the opportunity to deride U.S. Iraq policy. 
In a subsequent conversation, the mayor apologized for having 
to defer to the inspector and, using a very crude phrase, 
explained that his hands had been tied. 
 
 
¶7. (C) In Kizilcahamam, the kaymakam was alternately helpful 
in terms of arranging meetings and extremely nervous about 
our agenda -- to the point of visibly shaking in our meeting 
with him.  He questioned our motives in meeting with local 
political party offices and made sure that the sub-provincial 
police chief accompanied us to every location. 
 
 
¶8. (C) In planning an upcoming trip to Haymana, a 
sub-province south of Ankara proper, the local kaymakam tried 
to dictate which villages we could visit.  Wanting some 
insight into villages which have long been inhabited by 
Kurds, we indicated to the kaymakam that we intended to visit 
two Kurdish villages.  He angrily claimed that they are 
"centers of separatist activities" -- 50 kilometers from 
Ankara -- and tried to suggest another village that would be 
"safer." 
 
 
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Comment 
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¶9. (C) Our trips served to reaffirm that even close to Ankara 
there is a fundamental gap in Turkey.  On the one hand are 
ordinary citizens who, although pious and conservative, are 
very warm toward Americans.  On the other hand are the 
representatives of the Turkish State (sub-provincial 
governors), who continue to be stiff and wary toward 
outsiders. 
PEARSON