This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000794 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2013 
TAGS: PREL KDEM KPAO YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: TFIZ01:  YEMENI MIXED REACTION TO IRAQ DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: SANAA 606 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The Yemeni government continues to manage 
its anti-war credentials and cooperation with the U.S. by 
playing both sides, although the fall of Baghdad has spurred 
efforts by the ROYG to move cooperation forward with the U.S. 
 Citizen reaction to Saddam's regime collapse remains torn 
between relief that the bloodletting will now be limited, 
shock at its quick demise, anger at the "aggressors" and 
concerns over U.S. intentions in the region.  Parliamentary 
elections in less than two weeks offer a distraction from a 
public exhausted by regional developments.  End Summary. 
 
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ROYG Balancing Act Continues 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  The ROYG position before and during the war in Iraq 
has been one of straddling two camps:  1)  maintaining close 
cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism and protecting 
Americans in Yemen and 2) keeping in line with the Yemeni 
"street" and Arab opinion by opposing the war (ref).  The 
fall of Saddam's regime has left the ROYG struggling with how 
to shape their public position.  The ROYG understands that it 
has some ground to cover to move cooperation forward with the 
U.S.  At the same time, maintaining public support for the 
ruling party in the parliamentary elections on April 27 
forces the ROYG to continue balancing its anti-war 
credentials with the public while watching the way ahead for 
broader improvement in U.S.-ROYG relations.  Official press 
coverage reflects a shift in tone back to more low-key 
coverage.  Challenges by former Iraqi Vice President Ramadan 
had caused the ROYG to ratchet up the rhetoric around March 
24 (ref).  According to Presidential Advisor al-Iryani, this 
change is a direct result of directives from President Saleh. 
 
 
¶3.  (C)  Foreign Minister Qirbi on April 12 told Ambassador 
that the ROYG understands that fighting was near the end.  He 
said it was "sad to see incidents of looting and violence," 
it should be a U.S./UK priority to prevent it and it was 
"nice to see" Iraqis organizing to look out for security 
concerns.  Qirbi said people are watching to see if the 
coalition leaves, if a government selected by Iraqis takes 
power and if other promises by Bush and Blair in Belfast are 
upheld.  He noted that in Yemen the ROYG has avoided making 
statements because "this is a time for Iraqis to make 
decisions on their own."  He also cautioned that "softer" 
U.S. statements regarding Syria and Iran would be preferable 
to avoid inflaming opinion. 
 
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Yemenis Angry and Yet Relieved 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (U)  General Yemeni reaction to events in Iraq continues 
to be a mix of relief that the "killing is over" and Saddam 
is gone, shock at the speed of events and continued anger 
over the "aggressors."  Conspiracy theories are popular. 
Several FSNs explained the following typical sentiment: 
Yemenis believed Iraqi Information Minister al-Sahhaf when he 
said the Marines were not in Baghdad.  They had to.  Now, 
they cannot accept that the coalition forces overpowered the 
regime.  A conspiracy must have allowed Saddam to leave Iraq. 
 (The most popular conspiracy theory appears to be that Dr. 
Rice arranged for the Russians to spirit Saddam out of Iraq.) 
 
 
¶5.  (U)  Concerns over the humanitarian situation and looting 
have been supplemented by fear about U.S. plans for Syria. 
Press reporting has turned towards speculation about 
"American intentions" in the Middle East while toning down 
its rhetoric regarding the "invasion" of Iraq and 
concentrating increasingly on the upcoming elections. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Virulent Yemeni reaction to the war seems to have 
peaked early on at the beginning of hostilities -- near the 
time of the violent March 21 demonstration.  While resentment 
continues, our everyday interaction with the public gives 
indications of a lessening of tension as the period of major 
combat operations has receded.  The traditional Yemeni 
friendliness and openness seem to be slowly re-appearing 
after several weeks of cooler interactions. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Elections a Distraction from Regional Events 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U)  As the campaign for the 4/27 elections heats up, 
Yemenis are increasingly focused on internal matters.  Some 
independent and opposition newspapers had published reports 
that the war in Iraq has greatly affected the campaign for 
the elections by reducing the number of candidates, lowering 
citizen interest and creating opportunities for opposition 
parties to gain votes through anti-U.S./ROYG campaigning. 
However, according to a number of political observers, last 
week's fall of Baghdad (coming the day after the start of 
official campaigning here) and subsequent winding down of the 
war should lower the war's overall negative impact on the 
election campaign. 
 
¶8.  (U)  From press coverage of the campaign thus far, it 
appears that the war in Iraq and U.S.-ROYG CT cooperation 
have not yet become the big campaign issue that the ruling 
General People's Congress and international observers feared. 
 A few editorials in various newspapers -- encouraging 
citizens and political parties to contribute to making 
democracy work in Yemen -- have even suggested one reason: 
Yemen's democratic status being a "safeguard" against U.S. 
intervention. 
HULL