This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID KDEM BM NLD ASSK
SUBJECT: EAP DAS DALEY MEETS WITH AUNG SAN SUU KYI 
 
Classified By: CDA, A.I. RON MCMULLEN, REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  EAP DAS Matt Daley, COM, and note taker 
spent over an hour and a half with Aung San Suu Kyi at her 
residence April 27 discussing a host of political issues.  UN 
Special Envoy Razali's influenced was undermined, in the NLD 
leader's view, when Malaysian PM Mahathir bowed to the 
regime's insistence that he not meet with her during his 
August visit.  The regime's harassment of ASSK and 
intimidation of NLD members mounted after her travel to 
ethnic states showed her strong backing there, she continued. 
 On national reconciliation, ASSK said the NLD is willing to 
cooperate but not submit, adding, "cooperation can be carried 
just so far, if one side is not interested."  At the close of 
the long and productive meeting she said, "I rely on you to 
take a firm stand--they only respond to pressure."  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) RAZALI PROCESS:  When COM asked if Mahathir's upcoming 
retirement had weakened Razali's standing with the SPDC, Aung 
San Suu Kyi agreed that much of Razali's influence is derived 
from his close relationship with Mahathir.  ASSK added that 
when Mahathir "kowtowed" to Than Shwe during the August visit 
and agreed to cancel a planned meeting with her, "that hurt 
Raz and us.  It was after that that their attitude toward us 
began to harden."  She explained the SPDC thinking as, "If 
Mahathir can be faced down, why bother with Razali?" 
Regarding Razali's proposal that ASSK make suggestions to the 
SPDC on humanitarian assistance projects, she added, somewhat 
dismissively, "I've provided suggestions." 
 
¶3. (C) HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION:  ASSK said harassment 
began when her trip to Shan State in November showed she had 
widespread support among Burma's ethnic minorities.  She said 
the regime let her travel to Shan State because it gauged she 
had little support there, having only sampled opinion in a 
provincial capital populated by cautious civil servants. 
Outside the provincial capital the crowds were large and 
enthusiastic.  Harassment was bad in Arakan, she said, adding 
that the SPDC orchestrated "systematic harassment to ensure 
my trip would not receive popular support."  It did 
nevertheless.  Intimidation continued in Chin State, although 
the harassment lessened somewhat when the NLD directly called 
the regime on this and asked that it be stopped, she noted. 
 
COMMENT:  The generals often justify four decades of military 
rule by the need to "preserve the Union" from fragmentation 
by ethnic separatists.  Does ASSK's support in ethnic areas 
show that the Union could be preserved by democratic means, 
thus jeopardizing the regime's self-proclaimed raison d'etre? 
 END COMMENT. 
 
¶4. (C) DIALOGUE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION:  ASSK said the 
generals need to "get out of denial mode."  In Buddhism, she 
reflected, a good man admits his errors, but a wicked man 
does not.  She said the regime leaders "are not good 
Buddhists, having a congenital inability to confront their 
own mistakes and shortcomings."  She said that if the SPDC 
thinks the NLD will put up with continued harassment and 
intimidation for the sake of reconciliation, "they're 
mistaken."  "This is blackmail."  She mused, "How much more 
can we do?"  "We are prepared to cooperate but not submit." 
Regarding the lack of progress on dialogue, ASSK noted, "They 
have the responsibility to give more--we are the aggrieved 
party."  She urged the U.S. to maintain its supportive stand, 
saying "if they think you're going to act tough, they'll back 
down." 
 
¶5.  (C) RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES: ASSK appreciated DAS 
Daley's overview of recent developments in Thailand, and 
offered comments on various states' interactions with Burma. 
She was perhaps toughest on Australia and Japan, saying, 
"They are dishonest and self-deceptive when they say they are 
doing something to help democracy; they are really concerned 
about relations with the regime."  ASSK said that China and 
the ASEAN countries were more straightforward and therefore 
perhaps easier to deal with.  She singled out the ambassador 
of the Philippines as the instigator of an effort to close 
off all contact between her and the ASEAN ambassadors.  She 
admitted having a soft spot for India, explaining that 
India's warming with the SPDC was primarily a reaction to 
Chinese inroads in Burma. 
 
¶6.  (C) SANCTIONS, AID:  Regarding any prospective U.S. trade 
ban, ASSK said she intended to stay at arm's length from the 
issue, stating, "If it were to happen, it would be much 
better if it comes from you as your own decision."  Aung San 
Suu Kyi expressed strong interest in continued financial 
support for Prospect Burma, a scholarship program for Chin 
and other exiles in India.  She asked for two small favors: 
assistance in procuring a low-light camcorder to record 
evening events and incidents on her upcountry travels, and 
help in finding a second-hand Toyota SUV that she could 
purchase.  She also told of a village in Sagaing Division 
threatened by USDA supporters.  The USDA warned that if the 
villagers turned out to cheer ASSK, their village would be 
burned down.  They did and it was.  The NLD is investigating 
this incident.  If in fact the village was torched as 
reported, ASSK said it would be a powerful statement to 
supporters of democracy if this village could be rebuilt 
(stealthily, with NLD and USG help). 
 
¶7.  (C) Than Shwe's "Little Secret Weapon:" Aung San Suu Kyi 
said the regime had intended to turn the Union Solidarity 
Development Association (USDA) into a political party though 
which the generals could continue to run the country, perhaps 
in a more acceptable, quasi-democratic guise.  "I don't think 
this will work," ASSK opined.  She said that unlike Ne Win's 
socialist party, which was supported by some people on 
ideological grounds, there is no ideology associated with the 
SPDC or the USDA.  It is only patronage and repression that 
keeps the regime together, she said.  Some lower ranking 
military officers are disillusioned and want change, while 
others are awaiting their turn at the trough, she concluded. 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT:  Aung San Suu Kyi, who looked healthy and 
relaxed, was in a talkative, reflective, and strategic 
mood--she was perhaps drawn out by Daley's visit.  Somewhat 
uncharacteristically, she thanked him at length for a book he 
had given her on a previous visit, and said she hoped he 
would return soon.  He said he might be back in the region in 
June.  Often visitors see a harried, detail-driven, and 
determined (bordering on stubborn) ASSK, but on this occasion 
she had a broader picture in mind and seemed eager to talk, 
and to listen. End Comment. 
 
¶9.  (U) DAS Daley has cleared this message. 
McMullen