This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001212 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/NGA, NEA/ARP, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2013 
TAGS: EAID ASEC MOPS PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: VISIT TO UMM QASR BY ORHA DIRECTOR AND SENIOR STAFF 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASON:  1.5 (A) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: ORHA Director Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.), 
accompanied by ORHA senior staff, visited the liberated Iraqi 
port city of Umm Qasr  on April 1.  The ORHA team met with 
the commanding officers of the British forces holding both 
the port facilities and the town.  The port and associated 
rail line are in relatively good shape; the town is in a 
highly degraded condition, due more to grinding poverty and 
recent looting than to military action.  British officers 
reported success in standing up the port's freight-handling 
facilities and restoring electric power and drinking water to 
the town.  The entire local administrative and government 
apparatus in Umm Qasr has dissolved, as local Baath officials 
have fled the town to avoid revenge and retaliation by 
citizens venting their fury.  The inhabitants suspect that 
coalition forces will not in fact stay the course, fear that 
the Baathist regime will survive in the end, and are 
consequently terrified of retaliation from the regime's 
security forces, should they opt to cooperate with coalition 
forces.  There has been no violence between Sunni and Shi'ite 
believers in the town, and both mosques are functioning 
normally.  ORHA leadership is considering deploying a team to 
Umm Qasr within a week to begin operations inside liberated 
Iraq.  END SUMMARY. 
¶2. (U) The Road to Umm Qasr: ORHA Director Garner and members 
of his senior staff visited the liberated Iraqi town of Umm 
Qasr (population: 20,000)  on the Shatt al-Arab on April 1, 
in the company of British General Albert Whitley.  British 
General Timothy Cross, a member of the ORHA senior staff, 
took part in the trip, as well as State Department Officer 
Michael Gfoeller and British Foreign Office representative 
Simon Elvy.  The trip from Kuwait City to the border was 
uneventful, as was the border crossing.  Numerous military 
vehicles were in evidence, including coalition convoys 
guarded by heavy machine guns.  The obviously peaceful border 
zone was full of large herds of sheep and camels accompanied 
by Beduin herdsmen. 
¶3. (U) Progress in the Port: The ORHA team was briefed by 
three senior British officers: the commander of joint force 
logistics for Umm Qasr, Brigadier General Sean Cowlam, the 
commander of the 17th Port and Maritime Regiment, Lt. Col. 
Paul Ash, and the comMander of the Royal Marines in Umm Qasr, 
Col. Steven Cox.   According to them, British forces have 
succeeded in clearing most of the port area of mines.  The 
entire area, including both the old and new ports and the 
town, are firmly in coalition hands.  In the old port, berths 
5 through 10 have been repaired, as have all berths in the 
new port.  A superficial examination of the new port revealed 
an apparently operational facility, currently hosting a large 
coalition military presence.  The Shatt al-Arab channel, 
however, is silting up, since dredging operations have been 
reduced sharply since the start of the war.  Before the war, 
it took eight dredging vessels working 24-hours a day to keep 
the channel clear; only two dredgers are in service now. 
Coalition forces are planning to bring in more from Kuwait. 
The local rail line lis undamaged, according to coalition 
officers. 
¶4. (U) Water and Electricity Restored: Coalition officers 
reported that they restored electricity to 75 percent of the 
town two days ago.  The power comes from a local generator 
bank. The voltage, normally 220 volts, is at present only 180 
volts.  The local population therefore has light, but cannot 
operate such devices as air conditioners or electric motors. 
 A 2.5 kilometer pipeline has been run from Kuwait to a point 
just inside the city and the Iraqi border, to a location in 
the old UN compound.  Tanker trucks are filled there with 
drinking water, at no charge.  The truck drivers then sell 
the water to city residents for 25 Iraqi dinars per liter. 
This arrangement has mitigated the formerly extreme lack of 
water in the town.  That said, water is "liquid gold" in Umm 
Qasr, according to the British forces there, and the drinking 
water terminal at the UN compound is heavily fortified to 
prevent rioting.  It is surrounded by a 12-foot fence topped 
by razor wire and guarded by heavy machine guns in sandbag 
emplacements and numerous troops.  Iraqis in ragged clothing 
could be observed just beyond the fence, holding empty water 
cans. 
¶5. (U) The Local Administration Melts Away: State officer and 
Foreign Office representative Elvy spoke with two local 
inhabitants, both middle class professionals, who have 
stepped forward along with several other residents to 
cooperate with the British forces.   They explained that the 
entire government administrative apparatus in Umm Qasr 
dissolved as soon as the coalition forces moved in.  The 
entire 40-man police force deserted, both officers and 
rank-and-file policemen, and at present there are no local 
police in the town.  The rest of the government 
administration collapsed as well.  Nearly all Baath officials 
in Umm Qasr fled to Basra to avoid falling prey to acts of 
revenge by the citizenry. 
¶6.  (U) Omnipresent Poverty: The town in fact seemed full of 
impoverished people wandering aimlessly.  There was no 
organized market in evidence, although individuals could be 
observed selling drinking water by the side of the road. 
There were many beggars, mostly children. Though obviously 
poor, the population did appear adequately fed.  There is no 
shortage of grain locally, though meat and milk are in short 
supply.   Asked by ORHA staffers what level of salary would 
enable a local person to survive in an austere fashion, they 
replied that $50 per month is the minimum, while $100 per 
month would allow a more comfortable existence, if hardly an 
affluent one.  They stressed the fact that the local economy 
is at a standstill and will remain so until the port reopens. 
¶7.  (C) Terror of the Regime: The local citizens with whom 
ORHA officials spoke said that coalition forces should expect 
similar scenarios to develop as further towns are secured. 
The hatred of the local population for Baathist officials is 
so extreme that they will try to take vengeance on them, once 
the party's power has been broken.  The regime is striking 
back, they noted, by deploying members of many different 
security agencies: the Saddam Fedayeen, the Security Forces, 
the Special Security Forces, etc.  Members of these forces 
can infiltrate themselves easily into coalition-held 
territory, the local residents said, since they operate in 
civilian attire.  Such elements operating out of Basra have 
free access to Umm Qasr, they noted.   "The road to Basra is 
open," one resident said.  A resident who has cooperated 
actively with coalition forces reported that he has received 
death threats, and in fact he appeared deeply terrified by 
the possibility that he would soon be killed in retaliation 
for cooperating with the coalition. 
¶8. (C) The local residents added that the population of Umm 
Qasr is largely unwilling to cooperate openly with the 
coalition because they are gripped by terror.  People doubt 
that the US and the coalition have the staying power to 
achieve a final victory over the Baathist regime, and they 
fear that Saddam will somehow survive in the end and return 
to take vengeance on them if they work with us.  This fear 
can be reduced only once coalition forces take Basra, and it 
can be eliminated only after Baghdad has fallen, they said. 
 Nevertheless, the British forces have succeeded in hiring 
120 local men to work in the port, at rates of pay varying 
from $3 to $5 per day.  Some 60 men reportedly refused to 
work in the port because they were warned not to by the Iraqi 
security services. 
¶9. (C) Comment:  It is impossible to overstate the extent to 
which the local population in Umm Qasr still fears the 
regime.  The terror felt by local residents reminded the 
State officer present, who served several tours in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, of the deep fear Soviet 
citizens once had of the KGB.  Overcoming this psychological 
obstacle to re-establishing normal governance in Umm Qasr 
will require several things, further progress on the 
battlefield chief among them.  Once Basra is firmly in 
coalition hands, people in Umm Qasr and other towns and 
cities across Iraq will probably take heart and begin to 
believe that the regime will actually fall this time, and 
their readiness to work with us may well rise then.  The 
implementation of relief and recovery operations will also 
boost confidence.  The local inhabitants with whom ORHA staff 
spoke may represent hope for the future.  They and others 
like them will gradually emerge to take over the reins of 
governance, Deo volente.  While inexperienced, many of them 
will be largely untainted by the Baathist regime.  The 
challenge will be to work with such people and the surviving 
elements of the bureaucracy to re-establish order and lay a 
foundation for a democratic future in Iraq. 
JONES