This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000955 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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STATE PASS OPIC FOR RCONNELLY AND DZAHNHEISER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN AF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S APRIL 6 MEETING WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. FINN FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador held a wide-ranging discussion 
with French Ambassador, Jean Pierre Guinhut, on April 6.  The 
Ambassadors reviewed Afghan security conditions in the 
aftermath of Iraqi Freedom, lingering obstacles to economic 
growth, and progress on the drafting of the Afghan 
Constitution, and other matters.  Highlights included a 
shared view that security conditions in Afghanistan had not 
deteriorated markedly since the war in Iraq began, the French 
Ambassador,s plea that an American economic advisor be added 
to Karzai,s retinue, and the sharing of preliminary news on 
the religious aspects of the new Constitution.  End summary. 
 
=============================== 
Isolated High-Profile Incidents 
But Overall Security Stable 
=============================== 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador Guinhut had just returned from visits to 
Jalalabad, ) for the inauguration of the Human Rights 
Commission Office, and Kandahar, to visit with his NGOs.  He 
traveled with the head of the Human Rights Commission, Dr. 
Sima Samar, as part of an effort to increase his/France,s 
&international presence.8  Ambassador asked if Guinhut had 
heard of the recent murder of Karzai associate, Haji Gilani, 
on April 5.  Guinhut responded that the killing appeared to 
result from a family quarrel rather than any general security 
breakdown, to which Ambassador concurred. 
 
¶3. (C) International assistance agency and NGO workers were 
still alarmed at the recent killing of ICRC employee, Ricardo 
Munguia, on March 27.  Ambassador cautioned that UN SRSG 
Brahimi called the ICRC killing a &qualitative change8 from 
earlier violence, and that a few more such attacks and all 
the NGOs would quit Afghanistan.  Guinhut noted that French 
NGO workers in most of Afghanistan were ¬ feeling 
threatened but remain cautious8.  Meanwhile, Kandahar-based 
NGOs were &very fearful8 and added that southern areas were 
very unstable. 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador noted that security forces based in 
Kandahar were weak and inactive, adding that President Karzai 
had told him that hostile forces could overrun Kandahar &in 
a day8 if U.S. forces depart.  Guinhut was surprised that 
Karzai would put things so starkly, but added that the Swiss 
Ambassador had told him that Pakistan-based extremists were 
openly infiltrating Afghanistan from Quetta, where the GOP 
did not even bother to cover up these operations.  Ambassador 
added that when the Dutch Ambassador told the Kandahar Police 
Chief about this infiltration, the Chief agreed to follow up 
) if only he could be provided names and addresses of the 
suspects. 
¶5. (C) Despite these incidents and trends, both agreed that 
general security conditions had not eroded in any systematic 
way after the start of U.S. operations in Iraq.   Guinhut 
summed up his view as &it is as bad as usual in the South 
and not much worse elsewhere8.  The Ambassador noted one 
area of continued concern, though, was Ismail Khan,s renewed 
call for Islamic Jihad against foreigners and the recent 
beating and expulsion of an Afghan Radio Liberty stringer ) 
whom Ismail Khan termed &a spy for the infidels8 - for 
reporting human rights violations in Herat.  Dostum, 
meanwhile, was dabbling in a &federalist8 plan for 
Afghanistan, said Guinhut.  Nonetheless, he pledged his 
strong support to the central government during a recent 
meeting with Guinhut in Mazar.  Ambassador replied that 
federalism was neither a popular nor a feasible option for 
the country. 
 
============================ 
Progress on Constitutional 
Commission, Carcassone Visit 
============================ 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador turned the discussion to progress on the 
Constitutional Commission,s work.  Guinhut noted that French 
constitutional scholar, Guy Carcassone, was arriving on April 
7 for a two-week stay to advise the Commission and meet with 
interested parties.  Guinhut noted that Carcassone has 
written 25 Constitutions to date, and that his assistance 
could greatly advance the effort.  Ambassador noted that he 
would like to see Carcassone, and later added that since SE 
Khalilzad would be arriving shortly perhaps a larger meeting 
would be appropriate. 
 
¶7. (C) Guinhut shared with Ambassador information he 
qualified as rumor ) as VP Shahrani, the head of the 
Constitutional Commission had not actually disclosed such 
information yet ) that the new Constitution would call for 
an elected President, a Prime Minister selected from the 
parliament, and two legislative chambers, and that the King 
was not mentioned.  Ambassador added that he had heard that 
Islam would be designated the state religion, but without a 
sect being specified.  He and others he had spoken to wonder 
why Islam needed to be mentioned at all.  Guinhut replied 
that the 1964 Constitution had struck a balance between Islam 
and the Monarchy to avoid too much power devolving to either. 
 French jurist Carcassone reportedly favored a constitutional 
monarchy, Guinhut said, but Karzai reportedly opposed this 
idea and wants a more modern model.  Furthermore, Ambassador 
added, former king Zahir Shah did not want to be king and 
knew no one in his family was qualified to do so. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Ambassador met with Carcassone April 8 at a 
lunch for the EU Ambassador hosted by the French Ambassador. 
Carcassone confirmed his view that the King should serve as 
constitutional monarch and said the Afghans were pushing for 
a Prime Minister.  Ambassador said both were bad ideas and 
Afghanistan needed a strong President given all the vectors 
of power.  Carcassone said the U.S. system worked only 
because of compromises and a prime ministerial system would 
be better for Afghanistan.  Ambassador demurred, saying it 
would only lead to endless crises of power.  End Comment. 
 
============================== 
Guinhut Pleads for Appointment 
of American Economic Advisor 
============================== 
 
¶9. (C) The conversation turned to Karzai,s commitment to 
making needed Cabinet changes to the large and unwieldy 
government.  Guinhut saw the lack of a Minister of Economy as 
a problem.  Ghani was trying to do the job, and was the best 
possible Finance Minister, but he was &no economist8. 
Guinhut recommended that the USG appoint a qualified economic 
advisor to Karzai, at least until the Presidential election. 
This advisor could lay out stages and options for economic 
growth and should carry sufficient credentials to resist 
interference from Ghani.  Guinhut expressed his strong 
preference for an American advisor (he had already tried 
unsuccessfully to recruit a French advisor) rather than an 
Afghan or Afghan expatriate. 
 
¶10. (C) Guinhut then commenced a now familiar litany 
regarding the negative attributes of Ghani,s effective 
control of Afghan economic policy.  Guinhut said that Ghani 
and others &gave the impression they were economic liberals, 
but they are not.8  Guinhut offered the investment law as 
illustration of his point, saying it was &made for traders, 
not for investors8 due to its investment-limiting tax 
provisions.  Guinhut disagreed with Ghani,s purported view 
that economic renewal could come through trade.  The economy 
must create jobs, and money is needed from the budget to 
facilitate job creation.  Ambassador said that the TISA was 
not there yet, and was actually driving away investors with 
some of its policies.  Guinhut agreed, noting that taxes on 
investment were &a complete mistake8.  Guinhut also 
expressed surprise that Afghanistan had still not appointed 
an Ambassador to the UAE, which Guinhut regarded as a 
potentially huge investor in Afghan reconstruction.  The 
Ambassador doubted that Afghan Cabinet officials knew what to 
do to spur the economic growth Guinhut described, but Afghans 
may also chafe at a foreign advisor having such extensive 
control over the Afghan economy.  Guinhut feels that without 
such radical intervention, the whole Afghan reconstruction 
program will fail completely and &we8 (major donors) will 
&lose all our money.8 
 
¶11. (C) Comment: The French Ambassador,s points on economic 
matters closely track Embassy reporting of the past few 
months.  Afghanistan needs someone: first, to generate ideas 
for economic growth; second, to promote international 
investment; third, to coordinate funding to finance projects; 
fourth, to carry through on projects begun; and fifth, to 
tenaciously finalize projects by removing stubborn obstacles. 
 It may be difficult to find any one individual who can do 
all five things.  Ghani is excellent at the first, results 
have been mixed but improving with the third, and he has 
largely failed with the second and latter two items. 
Guinhut,s provocative points corroborate opinions expressed 
through much of the Cabinet and virtually all of the business 
community.  While his view may exaggerate the gravity of the 
situation, it is possible that the right advisor, who could 
bring rapid and visible results, would boost Karzai,s and 
TISA legitimacy enough to dispel concerns about foreign 
influence.  End Comment. 
 
FINN