This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KABUL 001029 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2013 
TAGS: PREL SNAR PINR PTER AF
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN ROHRABACHER'S APRIL 16 MEETING WITH 
PRESIDENT KARZAI 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. FINN FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On April 16, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher met 
with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.  Rohrabacher was 
accompanied by his spouse, Ambassador and Econ/Comofficer 
(notetaker).  Congressman Rohrabacher began by assuring 
Karzai that the war in Iraq had not diverted attention from 
Afghanistan.  Rather, his message in Washington was that both 
efforts were part of the same war on terrorism.  Rohrabacher 
added that even fiscally frugal members of Congress look upon 
funds in support of Afghanistan as war expenditures and not 
aid expenditures.  Rohrabacher noted, however, that he needed 
to speak frankly with Karzai about the pace of 
counter-narcotic efforts and the strategy for addressing 
warlordism.  Rohrabacher pointed out that pressure was 
building in Congress to link Afghan government poppy 
eradication efforts with levels of aid.  Karzai was surprised 
by this concern, as he was under the impression that poppy 
eradication was proceeding well.  Rohrabacher also pressed 
Karzai to integrate the warlords ) whom he referred to as 
ðnic leaders8 ) into the central government by pursuing 
a federalist decentralization of power.  Karzai strongly 
disagreed with both Rohrabacher,s premise of ðnic 
leaders8 as suitable local authorities and his conclusion 
that federalism was the appropriate solution for 
Afghanistan,s fractured polity.  End summary. 
 
========================= 
Pressure Building to Link 
Aid and Anti-Drug Efforts 
========================= 
 
¶2. (C) Rohrabacher indicated that aid to Afghanistan was 
still seen by Congress as a battleground in the war against 
terror.  This meant that, despite the intense global 
attention raised by the war in Iraq, Congress did not plan to 
divert funds or attention from Afghan reconstruction efforts. 
 After providing this reassurance, Rohrabacher said he needed 
to speak frankly about two issues of importance. 
¶3. (C) The first issue was the potential political liability 
of Afghanistan,s recent resumption of its place as number 
one producer of narcotics.  In a presidential election year, 
Rohrabacher was concerned that the administration would find 
it increasingly difficult to support funding the leading 
source country for the heroin reaching America,s streets. 
He was also concerned that political rivals of the 
administration would make an embarrassing election issue out 
of this situation.  President Karzai reacted with surprise, 
asking Rohrabacher if those with such views realized that the 
Afghan government was working hard to eradicate and reduce 
poppy production.  In his view, the poppy and heroin problem 
was under control.  The real key to solving this problem 
conclusively was finalizing road and alternative livelihoods 
projects.  Rohrabacher responded that the strong mood of 
Congress ) based largely on the notable increase in poppy 
production during the last year ) was to begin scaling back 
funding to Afghanistan. 
 
¶4. (C) Karzai, still taken aback by this sentiment, asked 
Rohrabacher,  &Is the war on terror even over, that we can 
now turn our full attention to the war on drugs?8 
Rohrabacher suggested that a poppy eradication program using 
planes spraying appropriate herbicides could wipe out half 
the existing poppy crop.  Not specifically responding to this 
proposal, Karzai replied that it was his impression that 
Afghan-British counter-drug efforts had already eradicated 60 
percent of this year,s poppy production ) resulting in 
substantial eradication of the first and second poppy 
harvests of this season.  Karzai said that the local 
populations of traditional poppy growing areas did not resist 
eradication efforts.  What worried Karzai far more were the 
new poppy cultivation regions, such as Takhar and Bamiyan, 
which began production only this year.  These new areas were 
a result of a policy error, Karzai said, noting that 
counter-drug efforts should never have included paying 
farmers to destroy their crops.  This had resulted in 
increased production in both traditional and new cultivation 
regions in anticipation of transfer payments for destruction. 
 We are paying for that mistake now, Karzai concluded. 
 
¶5. (C) Rohrabacher returned to his poppy spraying proposal, 
emphasizing to Karzai that he must be ready to take strong 
action to destroy poppies.  Rohrabacher asked Karzai for a 
letter of no objection ) which he could present to Congress 
if controversy arose ) to proceed with spraying.  This, 
Rohrabacher maintained, would demonstrate Karzai was willing 
to take whatever measures were necessary ) up to and 
including spraying ) to eradicate poppies.  Karzai,s Chief 
of Staff, Sayed Jawad raised the issue of environmental 
impact.  Rohrabacher agreed that the letter could contain a 
caveat regarding environmental impact. 
 
========================================= 
Warlords, &Ethnic Leaders8 and Federalism 
========================================= 
 
¶6. (C) Rohrabacher then turned to his second issue - which 
was finding an appropriate role for such figures as Jumbesh 
leader Abdul Rashid Dostum and Herat Governor Ismail Khan. 
Rohrabacher told Karzai that Operation Enduring Freedom was 
successful because Afghans were willing to fight hard to 
change the status quo.  Having reviewed the American 
military-only Afghan war plan, he was convinced that the 
coalition could not have prevailed without Afghan support. 
The Afghan leaders in the war effort were from different 
ethnic backgrounds.  &Warlords8 was an inappropriate term 
for these figures.  Rohrabacher preferred ðnic leaders.8 
   Rohrabacher concluded that Afghanistan had always had 
powerful provincial figures and that Karzai had to find some 
way to incorporate these ðnic leaders8 into the modern 
Afghan state. 
 
¶7. (C) Karzai was again surprised by this analysis.  He 
disagreed that Afghanistan had always been so decentralized. 
Rather, Karzai maintained, national institutions had enjoyed 
strong authority in the provinces before the past two decades 
of conflict.  Also, provincial tribal chiefs had 
traditionally maintained informal ties to the central 
government.  Karzai acknowledged that the central government 
did not interfere with local disputes, and left them to local 
councils to solve, limiting their interaction with the 
provinces to provision of roads, health and education and 
collection of taxes. 
 
¶8. (C) Rohrabacher told Karzai his challenge was to integrate 
the warlords, particularly Dostum, adding that the Afghan 
government &needs these people not to be a negative force 
but a positive force. 8  Rohrabacher offered the example of 
former king Zahir Shah, who had ruled for 40 years through 
compromise and co-optation of such figures in the past.  By 
decentralizing power in a federalist arrangement, the 
warlords would have an incentive to cooperate with the 
central government. 
 
¶9. (C) Karzai responded that the principal complaint of the 
Afghan people today was the TISA,s association with 
warlords.  Just a few days ago, Karzai added, a clash between 
Dostum and Atta,s forces in Mazar resulted in 17 dead.  The 
Afghan government, Karzai continued, is criticized because it 
allows the warlords to exist.  Karzai welcomed the continued 
presence of such figures in Afghanistan, but said they had no 
right to act outside the law, and must respect life and 
property.  Such &outlaw8 behavior had to end.  Rohrabacher 
replied that many of the Wild West,s most famous sheriffs 
were former outlaws, (e.g. Wyatt Earp), and that law and 
order was maintained in those times primarily by local 
militias. 
 
================================ 
Warlords and Fundamentalism: 
Two Sides of the Same False Coin 
================================ 
¶10. (C) Rohrabacher noted that Afghanistan still faced a 
major threat from radical Islam, which Rohrabacher concluded 
was allied with Pashtun Nationalism.  Therefore, cooperation 
with the Northern Alliance was essential as a counterforce, 
and the &Northern Alliance is not expendable.8  Karzai 
replied that conditions in Afghanistan, to the contrary, were 
much the same now as in 1994 before the advent of the 
Taliban, with local military commanders abusing and 
exploiting the population through force.  Rohrabacher noted 
that the decision to create the Taliban ) which Rohrabacher 
said included the Saudis, the U.S. and Pakistan ) was made 
to bring order to such chaos.  The decision at that time was 
between a return of the former King or the installation of a 
 &new force.8  This time, Rohrabacher concluded, it is 
important to do the right thing. 
 
¶11. (C) Again, Karzai disagreed.  Such warlords, which 
Rohrabacher suggested working with, were the very ones who 
facilitated the pre-Taliban disorder.  It was a fact that 
such warlords were able to operate in Afghanistan through 
U.S. support.  When the Taliban came, the people surrendered, 
as they wanted to be rid of the warlords.  Karzai warned that 
the Afghan government now has a chance to make the country 
better, or the Taliban would be back.  He added that he &was 
not giving the current situation another year.8  The 
warlords were killing, raping, looting, and stealing from the 
people ) including Ismail Khan and Dostum.  Already, the 
Taliban are back in Kandahar and the people are welcoming 
them.  Afghan government officials do not even feel safe 
traveling to the rural areas of Kandahar, Karzai reported. 
The reason Afghans in the provinces do not want federalism is 
expressly because the warlords will rule them in such an 
arrangement. 
 
¶12. (C) Karzai then turned his criticism to Rohrabacher,s 
perception that the Taliban were linked to Pashtun 
nationalism.  On the contrary, Karzai said, Pashtun 
nationalists were generally secular.  In fact, Karzai added, 
Pakistan had created the Taliban to fight against Pashtun 
nationalism.  When Pakistan was created 50 years ago, Karzai 
continued, the area inside Pakistan containing Pashtuns was 
divided from the Pashtuns on the Afghan side of the border. 
This Pashtun-dominated region was called &Pashtunistan. 8 
Fearing secession, Pakistan set out to destroy Pashtun 
nationalism by Islamicizing Pakistani Pashtuns and killing 
Afghan Pashtun nationalists.  Pakistan,s goal was to have 
Afghanistan dominated by radical Islam.  Pakistan also killed 
regional tribal leaders in the Pashtun areas.  To further 
this policy during the Soviet invasion period, Pakistan 
convinced the U.S. that radical Muslims were the ideal force 
to fight the Soviets.  As a result, the U.S. gave money to 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other radical Muslims to fight the 
Soviets, despite the fact that such radical Muslims had no 
Afghan following.  According to Karzai, &America realized 
its mistake in 1988,8 but it was too late. 
 
¶13. (C) Karzai noted that what the people really want is to 
live under law, and people are starting to complain that 
under the Taliban at least there was law and order. 
Rohrabacher said that whatever the ultimate division of local 
and central power in the Constitution, it is important that 
it provides for local elections.  Karzai reported that he had 
just received a report from Barnett Rubin, who had just 
completed a tour of the country.  This report stated that the 
people do not want federalism and that they fear the 
warlords.  The Hazaras were specifically cited as a community 
that fears a regional distribution of power.  Karzai 
concluded by saying that men like Dostum are not ðnic 
leaders8 - they are warlords.  They are fighting among and 
killing local people of their own ethnic community. 
Rohrabacher replied that, in any case, it was important to 
allow local people to vote freely in local or national 
elections.  Karzai agreed.  On one condition, he added, that 
they vote without having a gun to their heads. 
 
¶14. (C) Karzai said that the Afghan people have given us (his 
government) a chance to change things.  The way he saw it, 
there were only three ways to guarantee free elections in 
2004: 1) to train the ANA and have them disarm the warlords; 
2) to expand ISAF and have them disarm the warlords; and 3) 
to take all the current leadership ) Karzai here included 
himself, the warlords and all others associated with the past 
) out of Afghanistan and let the people start fresh with 
newly elected leaders.  Rohrabacher replied that the second 
option was &very doable.8  Karzai concluded that there was 
still a chance for Afghanistan to abandon warlordism and 
looting.  Upon learning that Rohrabacher was scheduled to 
visit Dostum in Mazar the following day, Karzai asked 
Rohrabacher to be blunt with Dostum ) and stress to him that 
Afghanistan had been given a second chance and it had to 
change. 
 
¶15. (U) Congressman Rohrabacher did not have an opportunity 
to clear this cable before his departure. 
FINN