This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
NSC FOR ZKHALILZAD, JDWORKEN, HMANN, RHANSON, DSEDNEY 
DEPT FOR SA/PAB, SA/AR, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER AF PK
SUBJECT: SE KHALILZAD'S APRIL 11 MEETING WITH NDS CHIEF 
ENGINEER AREF 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. FINN FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: SE Khalilzad met on April 11 with National 
Directorate of Security (NDS) Chief Engineer Aref to discuss 
current security conditions, his views on proposed 
US-Afghan-Pakistan trilateral discussions, and to review NDS 
reform.  Aref told SE Khalilzad that Pakistan was indeed 
promoting instability in Afghanistan and that trilateral 
discussions might offer a way to address these activities. 
Aref reported that security conditions were generally good, 
but that the central government still lacked authority in the 
provinces.  Also, the NSC, as a new institution on the Afghan 
scene, was struggling to find its appropriate role and assert 
its authority on security matters within the Cabinet. 
Finally, Aref noted that the appropriate strategy for NDS 
reform had been worked out with US assistance.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) SE Khalilzad met with NDS Chief Engineer Aref on 
April 11.  Khalilzad was accompanied by Ambassador, COS, 
NSC,s Rebecca Hanson, DOD/OSD,s Mustafa Popal and 
Econ/Commoff (notetaker).  Khalilzad said his perception was 
that the security situation was generally good, but that the 
Taliban was regrouping.  Khalilzad asked Aref his views in 
this regard, and solicited his views on Afghan security 
conditions and assessment of NDS reform.  Khalilzad also 
proposed a trilateral military-intel working group 
(Afghan-Pakistani-US) to address Taliban and extremist 
activities in Afghanistan. Engaging Pakistan to cease its 
support of extremist activities was one main goal of this 
working group, SE Khalilzad said. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Aref noted that ISI activities in Afghanistan were 
still a problem, and that such ISI officers are deliberately 
promoting extremism against Afghanistan.  Peshawar-based ISI 
Officers including Sultan and General Wahid were tasking 
Afghans to work against the Afghan central government.  Aref 
alleged that ISI agents/assets working in Kandahar and 
Jalalabad were providing free passage to terror elements to 
cross into and out of Pakistan in vehicles loaded with arms. 
Aref said this showed that Pakistan did not recognize Kabul 
as Afghanistan,s central authority.  (Note: Aref alleged 
that 6,000 &safe passage8 permits for Afghan commanders had 
been issued ) NFI.)  In light of these activities, Aref 
agreed that trilateral talks were a good idea, and could 
supplement other contacts planned with ISI ) NFI.  SE 
Khalilzad noted he would raise the possibility of opening 
this trilateral channel with President Karzai during 
discussions over NDS reform. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Aref said security had undoubtedly improved 
compared to the previous year.  The NDS had begun many new 
projects with American assistance.  According to Aref, 90 
percent of their efforts had been successful, but five to ten 
percent of enemy plans had succeeded (including sabotage and 
provoking provincial tribes against the central government). 
Aref noted that the enemy program to assassinate key leaders 
) including President Karzai and Minister of Defense Fahim 
) was still in place.  Aref noted that the war in Iraq had 
inspired the madrassas to increase propaganda for jihad 
against Americans and the &infidel8 Karzai government.  In 
addition to propaganda, the Taliban had attempted small-scale 
attacks (e.g., in Zormat and Kandahar).  Aref noted that NDS 
foiled these attacks, adding that the Taliban strategy was to 
find isolated pockets and manipulate the local population. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Aref said that the Afghan government had certain 
political weaknesses.  It has not been able to assert its 
control over the provinces, and is not even in the position 
to fire bad governors.  Aref said that, nonetheless, the 
government had many achievements ) especially in the 
security sector ) but more was needed to improve the lives 
of Afghans.  We cannot simply police them, Aref said, and 
nothing else.  Aref added that the National Security Council 
structure was a completely new experience in Afghanistan, and 
that it would take time to find is place and appropriate role 
in the system.  The NSC was discussing how to incorporate 
Ismail Khan and General Dostum into the government in Kabul. 
Aref thought a solution would help improve security 
conditions in the south as well.  In general, Aref continued, 
there are internal and external threats.  Of the internal 
threats, Aref emphasized the reluctance of certain prominent 
elements within the Cabinet to implement the decisions of the 
NSC.  Aref noted he had passed messages about this to both 
the President and ORCA, as U.S. lives were also at stake. 
Aref added that sometimes the government makes a decision 
that is not well communicated to other parts of the 
government. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Aref said that clashes within the government were 
not based upon ethnic or political differences ) as some 
thought.  He offered the example of Minister Jalali, who was 
an expatriate and a Pashtun, with whom he has quickly 
established a good working relationship.  Jalali is given 
broad license to interact with NDS elements without first 
receiving clearances through Aref.  Aref offered one solution 
to some of the problems discussed.  His suggestion was to 
make former King Zahir Shah more effective.  The former king 
enjoys respect and wants to help unify the nation, 
particularly with problems in the South. 
FINN