This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NAIROBI FOR TPFLAUMER 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: MUGABE READY TO LEAVE, WITH CONDITIONS 
 
 
Classified By: political section chief Matt Harrington.  Reasons: 1.5 ( 
B) and (D). 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) In an April 16 conversation with the Ambassador, 
ZANU-PF spokesman and elder statesman Nathan Shamuyarira 
seemed concerned about the implications of USG actions in 
Iraq for Zimbabwe.  He deemed a U.S. or British invasion 
"unlikely," but thought attempts would be made to destabilize 
the country using the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC).  Shamuyarira insisted that Robert Mugabe is 
prepared to step down if the MDC withdraws its legal 
challenge of the 2002 presidential election and accepts the 
legitimacy of his presidency.  End Summary. 
 
Is Zimbabwe on post-Iraq list? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In an April 16 conversation with the Ambassador, 
ZANU-PF spokesman and elder statesman Nathan Shamuyarira 
expressed concern about a recent statement by a Pentagon 
spokesman that dictators around the world should take note of 
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.  Shamuyarira said there is 
apprehension in some quarters that the United States will not 
stop with Iraq, and he said Zimbabwe has to be concerned it 
might be on the target list.  The Ambassador noted Secretary 
Powell's comments of April 15 that the United States had not 
drawn up any list of countries to be invaded.  We do have 
concerns about many developments in Zimbabwe but prefer to 
resolve these through dialogue. 
 
¶3.  (C) Shamuyarira mused that a U.S. or British invasion of 
Zimabwe is unlikely, but he said ZANU-PF expects the British 
government to try to destabilize the country via the 
opposition MDC.  Shamuyarira claimed to have seen evidence of 
a growing willingness on the part of the MDC to use violence. 
 He said the opposition party had bombed ZANU-PF offices in 
Chinhoyi, had tried unsuccessfully to blow up a bridge in 
Kadoma during the mid-March stayaway, and had placed spikes 
in the middle of roads to prevent people from getting to 
work.  Shamuyarira thought the MDC had gained confidence in 
their capacity to elicit political change, not because they 
had the support of Zimbabweans but because they were 
acquiring "military capabilities."  ZANU-PF, he said, has the 
capacity to stop these sorts of activities but cautioned that 
this might cause bloodshed.  "Things could get pretty rough 
here," Shamuyarira warned. 
 
Recognize Mugabe's legitimacy 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  The Ambassador emphasized that violence from any 
quarter would not solve Zimbabwe's problems, and he expressed 
his hope that all parties would avoid resorting to it.  The 
solution to Zimbabwe's difficulties, Shamuyarira retorted, is 
very simple.  The MDC and the British government must accept 
the outcome of the 2002 presidential election; then the 
ruling party would be prepared to bring the MDC into 
government.  The Ambassador pointed out that the United 
States Government did not consider that election to have been 
free and fair.  A number of organizations had conducted 
extensive observations of the election process and found 
numerous and serious electoral irregularities, including 
widespread violence against opposition supporters, unbalanced 
access to the media, and the provision of voters rolls only 
to the ruling party.  The United States made clear to the GOZ 
prior to the election that a refusal to address and correct 
these problems would have a detrimental impact on our 
bilateral relationship.  The Government of Zimbabwe, however, 
had continued on the same path, and the result was a process 
which could not be considered free and fair. 
 
¶5.  (C) Shamuyarira dismissed the Ambassador's assessment as 
a "subjective, partisan view meant to support the MDC" and 
one "not based on an objective analysis of reality."  The MDC 
won the Harare mayoral election, recent parliamentary 
by-elections in Kuwadzana and Highfield, and 57 parliamentary 
seats in 2000. The ruling party, he insisted, conducts 
elections better than any country on the continent, except 
South Africa.  The bottom line, he said, is that "if people 
don't want Mugabe and ZANU-PF, they'll say what they want." 
The Ambassador reiterated that the USG had expressed its 
concerns well in advance of the voting days themselves, 
noting that the first phase of our targeted sanctions was 
announced in February 2002, several weeks before the 
election. 
 
Way Forward 
----------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  The only way forward for Zimbabwe, Shamuyarira 
stressed, was for the MDC to withdraw its legal challenge of 
the election result and acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
Government.  Once they take that step, "we can work with 
them."  The Ambassador asked whether Mugabe would be willing 
to retire before expiration of his term in 2008, and whether 
his early departure would create opportunities for political 
dialogue.  Without hesitation, Shamuyarira said Mugabe is 
willing to leave office but only in a "blaze of glory," not a 
"blaze of condemnation."  He would be prepared to leave if 
the exit were dignified; otherwise, he would stay put.  The 
often-made accusation that Mugabe is clinging to power is 
simply untrue, Shamuyarira claimed.  ZANU-PF, he continued, 
had agreed in 1999 to hold a special party congress in 2000 
to discuss presidential succession, but other developments 
intervened. 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Ambassador asked whether the MDC's withdrawal of 
its court challenge and recognition of Mugabe's legitimacy 
for a limited period, in exchange for an early retirement by 
the Zimbabean president, could form the basis of a political 
agreement.  Yes, Shamuyarira replied, if the MDC withdraws 
its election challenge and accepts the Government's 
legitimacy, Mugabe would be ready to go.  The Ambassador 
welcomed Shamuyarira's assurance on that point, stressing 
that an early retirement by Mugabe could help Zimbabwe avoid 
the collision course it appeared to be on.  Shamuyarira said 
Mugabe could not retire under UK condemnation.  The 
Ambassador suggested that Mugabe's resignation in order to 
resolve a crisis could be recognized as a "statesmanlike" 
gesture.  We believed that, subsequent to the retirement, the 
legitimacy question would have to be resolved definitively 
through the holding of elections recognized as free and fair 
by both sides, in contrast to the non-transparent elections 
held in 2002.  If there is international recognition that the 
election process was fair and transparent, there would be 
pressure on the losing party to accept the result.  The 
Ambassador added that the United States would accept the 
outcome of an election that conformed to SADC's electoral 
norms and standards. 
 
Land 
---- 
 
¶8.  (C) Shamuyarira freely acknowledged the problems in the 
Government's land redistribution program.  Many senior 
figures, including Ministers, had "cashed in" on this 
program, and a high-level "acquisitions committee" headed by 
Vice-President Msika had been formed to clean up the mess. 
The real problem with the land issue, in Shamuyarira's view, 
was the strong support given by commercial farmers to the 
MDC.  That support had piqued Mugabe's anger and had soured 
relations between the commercial farmers and the GOZ. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  In his mid-70's and a senior member of the ruling 
party politburo, Shamuyarira is Mugabe's contemporary and 
enjoys considerable access to the Zimbabwean President.  This 
is the first time we have heard from someone who enjoys such 
a close personal relationship with Mugabe that Mugabe is 
prepared to leave office.  Subsequent to this conversation, 
we learned that Shamuyarira, probably acting at Mugabe's 
behest, had earlier sent an emissary to MDC President Morgan 
Tsvangirai's special advisor exploring the possibility of 
 
SIPDIS 
dialogue and stressing Mugabe's willingness to retire early 
under the right conditions.  The director of the Central 
Intelligence Organization -- Happyton Bonyongwe -- also sent 
an emissary to the MDC on April 16 carrying a similar 
message. 
 
¶10.  (C) MDC leaders have previously indicated their 
willingness to withdraw the court challenge in exchange for 
genuine dialogue with the GOZ and real progress toward 
resolving Zimbabwe's interlocking crises.  We believe a 
dignified exit is an ironclad precondition for a willing 
departure by Mugabe, although it is unclear what elements 
would comprise such an exit.   At any rate, Shamuyarira's 
remarks to us and the two recent overtures to the MDC suggest 
a positive inclination toward dialogue that we ought to 
encourage. 
 
SULLIVAN