This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR TU
SUBJECT: THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF: A FRACTIOUS AND SULLEN POLITICAL COALITION 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 418 
     ¶B. ANKARA 1350 
     ¶C. ANKARA 2122 
     ¶D. ANKARA 2330 
     ¶E. ANKARA 1367 
     ¶F. 02 ANKARA 2914 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson.  Reasons: 1.5 (b, d, X6). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: As refs (A-E) note, Turkish General Staff 
(TGS) remains deeply involved in day-to-day political life 
and policymaking, with attendant strains and divisions among 
senior military leaders over domestic and foreign policy 
issues.  These divisions are more visible today than at any 
time in the past, according to our contacts, and will cause 
additional friction and delays on cooperation on operational 
political and diplomatic issues of concern to the U.S.  End 
summary. 
 
 
¶2. (S) Numerous long-time contacts across the political 
spectrum have recently shared their concerns at rivalries and 
unevenness in TGS decision-making and the detrimental effect 
these divisions are having on Turkey's willingness to work 
with the U.S.  These contacts (strictly protect) include, but 
are not limited to: (1) former Turkish NSC staffer and 
executive director of the XXXXXXXXXXXX, who in his previous career in military intelligence spent significant time with now-ranking TGS generals; (2) deputy chairman of the XXXXXXXXXXXX; (3) the leadership of XXXXXXXXXXXX (Islam-oriented but connected to the Establishment) XXXXXXXXXXXX group; (4-7) senior journalists, among them XXXXXXXXXXXX correspondent XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX columnist XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX columnist XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, who has excellent access to top-level GOT officials including P.M. Erdogan and F.M. Gul; 
(8) the owner-CEO of a major media conglomerate; (9) XXXXXXXXXXXX, chairman of the XXXXXXXXXXXX, a leading 
Establishmentarian NGO; and (10) a former member of 
Parliament with excellent access to parliamentary, Kurdish 
nationalist, and Islamist circles.  They consistently 
describe a TGS both riven by factionalism and projecting a 
heightened sense of suspicion toward the U.S. to degrees not 
previously seen. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Corporat(ist) Culture... 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶3. (S) Our contacts remind us that there are, of course, 
certain institutional instincts which bind the TGS despite 
personal rivalries.  These include: (1) an unwavering 
commitment to Kemalism (the worship of Ataturk and belief in 
the military's duty as the pre-eminent, intimidating 
guardians of the State, beyond civilian control); (2) a rigid 
corporate culture which does not tolerate individual 
initiative at lower ranks; (3) stiff adherence to 
"secularism" and fear of anything more than a cultural 
identification of Turkey as Islamic; (4) an inward-looking 
culture keenly protective of its ample subsidies, off-budget 
funds, large pensions and cushy sinecures (XXXXXXXXXXXX has given us concrete examples), and other privileges; (5) deep suspicion of Kurds; and (6) resistance to any practical Cyprus settlement.  Our contacts also emphasize (7) the cancer of corruption in the military and 
the TGS's shared unwillingness to clean up: 
 
 
-- procurement scandals (many contacts cite insistent stories 
of payoffs on the Israeli M-60 tank and F-4 fighter upgrade 
contracts; a senior expatriate rep for a major Western 
defense contractor also gave us details of a party for 
Turkish military officers, attended by numerous Russian 
call-girls and hosted by notorious pro-Russian businessman 
Ali Sen, the Turkey rep for Bell Helicopter rival Kamov and 
other Russian businesses, in August 2002 in the seaside 
resort of Bodrum); 
 
 
-- conflicts of interest involving Turkish military 
properties in Northern Cyprus and links to drug smuggling in 
Turkey's Southeast; XXXXXXXXXXXX also recounted to us his unwilling involvement, while in military intelligence, in a deal 
organized within the Turkish military to sell medicine to the 
PKK. 
 
 
¶4. (S) The TGS also harshly resents any implication that it 
is not united in its views: in reaction to a "Washington 
Post" story which looked at rivalries among the TGS 
leadership, TGS Chief Ozkok on April 10 issued through 
State-run TRT criticism of the story as inappropriate 
particularly "at a time when the country is going through a 
very serious period due to developments in Iraq."  Our 
contacts uniformly interpret Ozkok's statement as a general 
warning to Turks to avoid similar assessments.  However, 
three leading journalists (Akif Beki, foreign policy 
columnist Murat Yetkin, and CNN-Turk foreign policy reporter 
Barcin Yinanc) subsequently separately told Embassy press 
officer that they admired the Post story -- all the more so 
since, in each one's opinion, no Turkish journalist would 
have dared to write it.  In terms of military intimidation of 
journalists, both Lale Sariibrahimoglu of "Jane's Defence 
Weekly" and Cuneyt Ulsever of "Hurriyet" have recently told 
us they fear for their lives as a result of their public 
criticism of the military. 
 
 
------------------------- 
...But Personal Rivalries 
------------------------- 
 
 
¶5. (S) Despite this TGS profession of unanimity of views, 
there are now three main rival groups, according to our 
contacts.  First, the "Atlanticists," who accept, whether 
enthusiastically or not, that Turkey's strategic interest 
lies in maintaining firm ties to the U.S. and NATO.  Second, 
the rigid "Nationalists," who resent the need to maintain 
ties to the U.S., oppose Turkey's EU candidacy, prefer to 
trust no one (including the U.S., which they are convinced 
intends to support an independent Kurdish state carved out of 
Iraq), and insist on unbending maintenance of the Kemalist 
State.  Third, "Eurasianists," who, without understanding the 
Russia-dominated nature of the "Eurasia" concept, have long 
sought an alternative to the U.S. and are considering closer 
relations with Russia or some as-yet ill-defined grouping 
including Russia and Iran or Russia and China.  Part of the 
motivating force is the "Rappallo Syndrome," the sense that 
Turkey and Russia are alone, equally victims of mistreatment 
and disrespect by an arrogant West (ref F).  In addition, as 
XXXXXXXXXXXX has noted to us, another motivation for the livelier 
interest in Russia is the satisfaction among "Eurasia" 
advocates in the TGS that Russia shares the same preference 
for "stability" and will not press the Turkish State to 
continue to democratize.  In the intramural TGS political 
contest, the "Eurasianists" and "Nationalists" are 
provisional allies. 
 
 
¶6. (S) Our contacts see the main figures as follows: 
 
 
-- TGS Chief Gen. Hilmi Ozkok is more democratically-oriented 
and more of an Atlanticist than any of his recent 
predecessors.  A principled man who has upset people when he 
has stuck to those principles, Ozkok believes a 
democratically elected government needs to bear the 
responsibility for political decisions.  He is, however, 
largely isolated, with few if any real allies among the top 
brass.  In a bid to avoid confrontation with his more 
strong-willed and hard-line associates, Ozkok fails to assert 
his own views: one contact acknowledged that Ozkok exhibits a 
"Hamlet-like" uncertainty.  Examples of this were Ozkok's 
failures: (1) to overcome TGS delaying tactics against U.S. 
operational plans; and (2) to force TGS colleagues to inform 
the government of the military's own planning or the logic of 
U.S. strategy and plans in the crucial run-up to parliament's 
March 1 (failed) vote on the U.S. and Turkish troop 
deployment motion.  Ozkok did seek permission to go public 
asking that Turkey support the U.S. prior to the vote and was 
directed not to by President Sezer.  Only when the press, in 
uncharacteristic fashion, began to criticize him afterward 
did he make a public statement that the TGS supported the 
U.S. request.  Ultimately, however, Ozkok backing for the 
U.S. northern option was five days late and $6 billion short. 
 
 
-- Ozkok is opposed by a coterie of senior Army generals from 
the rigid-nationalist and Eurasianist camps, including most 
notably: (1) Deputy TGS Chief Gen. Yasar Buyukanit; (2) Gen. 
Aytac Yalman, the Land Forces Commander, the position from 
which future TGS Chiefs are usually elevated, though Yalman 
is likely to be retired; (3) First Army Commander Gen. Cetin 
Dogan; (4) Second Army Commander Gen. Fevzi Turkeri, who, 
according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, has long used the nationalist socialist 
weekly "Aydinlik" to leak scurrilous, anti-American stories 
(e.g., accusations that the U.S. materially supports 
PKK/KADEK); (5) General Tuncer Kilinc, the secretary-general 
of the powerful NSC and an outspoken advocate of stronger 
Turkish ties to Russia and Iran (ref F); (6) Gen. Sener 
Eruygur, Commander of the Jandarma -- an arm, the sources 
note, to which the TGS routinely resorts for investigative 
and "policing" purposes.  We have also heard that J-3 Lt. 
Gen. Koksal Karabay, touted as a possible future TGS Chief, 
is associated with this group.  Ozkok's most ardent and 
liberal supporters (typified by the J-5 Air Force Lt. Gen. 
Resat Turgut) tend to be less assertive than the 
Nationalists/Eurasianists. 
 
 
-- The hard-liners are supported from the outside by 
influential retired senior officers including Gen. Doga 
Aktulga (who participated in the 1997 "post-modern" coup 
d'etat against the then Islamist-led government); Gen. Teoman 
Koman, at one time director of the national intelligence 
organization (MIT); and Ozkok's predecessor Huseyin 
Kivrikoglu. 
 
 
-- The hard line is also carefully tended by the War Academy 
in Istanbul, the site for Kilinc's pro-Russia/Iran comments 
at the annual national security conference in March 2002 and 
for an extraordinarily bitter series of anti-U.S. comments by 
Kivrikoglu, Dogan and a dozen other senior Turkish officers 
in reaction against the presentation by the Dean of NDU's War 
College at the March 2003 conference. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
The TGS and U.S. Interests 
-------------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (S) The TGS's prolonged political opposition to the U.S. 
Iraq strategy, continued operational foot-dragging, and 
continuing accusations that the U.S. has an anti-Turkish 
agenda in Iraq have prompted more Turks to ask more questions 
about how committed the TGS is to relations with the U.S.  In 
addition, with the generals coming under more public 
scrutiny, TGS contacts have begun to admit to us what many 
other contacts have concluded: that "some" in the senior 
leadership are more interested in undermining AK party and 
the Kurds than in preserving the strategic partnership with 
the U.S. (ref E). 
 
 
¶8. (C) Given the current political environment, friction in 
the TGS will continue to compound the Turkish State's 
resentment toward the U.S. and reluctance to make helpful 
decisions on questions of central concern to us in the fluid 
period ahead.  Moreover, strains between the top brass and 
more fiery elements lower down the chain of command could, as 
they have done repeatedly in the past (most recently in 
1997), emerge as a political problem for the leadership.  We 
have some evidence that Ozkok wants to bide his time on 
reestablishing solid cooperation with the U.S. until his 
opponents in the TGS retire.  However, as so often in Turkey, 
biding one's time becomes an end in itself as outside events 
pass by at their own, swifter pace.  Our contacts thus expect 
that any fundamental changes to the current military 
domination of the Turkish State system, as well as the 
regaining of dynamism in the U.S.-Turkish relationship, will 
require both the retirement of the hard-liners and, 
especially, the development of a new cadre of modern, 
forward-looking officers. 
PEARSON