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Viewing cable 03ZAGREB669, TFIZ01: CROATIA'S PM DISCUSSES GOC IRAQ POLICY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ZAGREB669 2003-03-25 12:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 000669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2008 
TAGS: PREL KAWC PGOV MARR HR KAWC PGOV MARR HR KAWC PGOV MARR HR IZ IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: CROATIA'S PM DISCUSSES GOC IRAQ POLICY 
WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR LAWRENCE ROSSING FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.   (C) PRIME MINISTER RACAN "INVITED THE AMBASSADOR FOR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00669  01 OF 03  251246Z 
COFFEE" MARCH 24 TO CLARIFY THE GOC'S REASONS FOR ADOPTING A 
POSITION NOT ALIGNED WITH OURS ON IRAQ.  (THIS GOC POSITION 
HAS BEEN PLAYED OUT UNHELPFULLY IN THE PRESS OVER RECENT 
DAYS, AND THE AMBASSADOR CRITICIZED IT IN TWO INTERVIEWS.) 
ONE-ON-ONE, RACAN LAID OUT HIS MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE U.S. 
DECISION TO GO TO WAR WITHOUT A FINAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION.  HE SAID THE GOC'S OPPOSITION TO BEING INCLUDED 
IN THE COALITION OF THE WILLING WAS PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE 
SEVERE RISK OF A SPLIT IN THE GOVERNING  COALITION AND GOC 
LEADERSHIP.  THAT WOULD HAVE DESTABILIZED CROATIA AND 
ULTIMATELY THE REGION AND NOT BEEN IN THE U.S. INTEREST 
EITHER.  RACAN CONFIRMED THAT THE GOC WOULD CONSIDER NEW 
SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR COALITION OPERATIONS IF RECEIVED. 
(COMMENT: BUT WE CONSIDER IT VERY UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT MUCH 
MORE FROM CROATIA AND CERTAINLY NOT WITHOUT PROTRACTED 
POLITICAL DEBATE).  RACAN STRESSED THAT THE GOC REMAINS 
COMMITTED IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM, BUT HE BELIEVED THE IRAQ 
INTERVENTION WOULD COMPLICATE THAT EFFORT.  RACAN SAID THAT 
THE OPPOSITION HDZ, IN TAKING A PRO-U.S. STANCE, AIMED TO 
SCORE CHEAP POINTS WITH US WHILE IT CREATED NEW ARGUMENTS FOR 
CURBING COOPERATION WITH ICTY UNDER A POTENTIAL FUTURE HDZ 
GOVERNMENT.  RACAN'S PRESENTATION, HARPING ON FAMILIAR 
THEMES, UNDERSCORED ONCE AGAIN HIS LACK OF STRONG LEADERSHIP 
AND THAT DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE ALWAYS HIS 
CORE CONCERN.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS CONSTRAIN GOC POSITION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2.   (C) AFTER TEN DAYS OF EXTENSIVE MEDIA BACK AND FORTH BY 
CROATIA'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OVER ITS IRAQ POLICY, PM RACAN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  00669  01 OF 03  251246Z 
TOOK ADVICE FROM HIS AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON AND FROM HNS 
PARTY LEADER VESNA PUSIC AND INVITED THE AMBASSADOR FOR 
COFFEE MARCH 24 TO EXPLAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION 
DIRECTLY.  HE SAID HE WAS UNHAPPY WITH THE TONE OF THE PUBLIC 
POLEMIC.  CROATIA WAS IN A "VERY DELICATE" POSITION.  WHEN 
THE U.S. FAILED TO SECURE A FINAL UNSC RESOLUTION BEFORE 
STARTING HOSTILITIES, THE GOC WAS COMPELLED TO DECLINE OUR 
INVITATION TO JOIN THE COALITION OF THE WILLING.  RACAN SAID 
HE HAD NO CHOICE, AND THE AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 19 INTERVIEW 
STATEMENT THAT HE HAD NOT SHOWN LEADERSHIP FAILED TO 
APPRECIATE THE PM'S SEVERE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS.  THE GOC 
WAS DEEPLY DIVIDED, WITH HIMSELF AND FM PICULA AMONG THOSE 
SUPPORTIVE; THEY WERE PITTED AGAINST FERVENT ANTI-WAR WING 
LED BY PRESIDENT MESIC AND PARLIAMENT SPEAKER TOMCIC.  HAD HE 
TRIED TO FORCE A POSITION SUPPORTIVE OF THE U.S., RACAN SAID 
THE GOC WOULD HAVE SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE.  THAT WOULD HAVE 
DESTABILIZED CROATIA AND THEREFORE THE REGION AND THEREFORE 
DONE A DISSERVICE TO KNOWN U.S. INTERESTS.  "WHAT USE TO YOU 
WOULD CROATIAN SUPPORT ON IRAQ BE IF IN THE PROCESS CROATIA 
TURNED INTO A 'HOTSPOT?'" 
 
3.   (C) ALTHOUGH HE PUT HIMSELF IN THE MORE SYMPATHETIC 
CAMP, RACAN EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE WAR WOULD HEIGHTEN 
INSTABILITY FOR CROATIA, THE REGION AND THE WORLD.  APART 
FROM HIS REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION ARGUMENT, RACAN WORRIED 
ABOUT HEIGHTENED GLOBAL ANTI-AMERICANISM STEMMING FROM THE 
CONFLICT -- BAD NOT ONLY FOR THE UNITED STATES BUT FOR THE 
WORLD.  RACAN ALSO ARGUED WITH PERSONAL CONVICTION THAT THE 
IRAQ WAR WOULD MAKE THE TERRORISM PROBLEM WORSE -- 
TRANSFORMING WHAT HE SAW AS A SERIOUS BUT FINITE THREAT INTO 
SOMETHING NOW MORE LIKELY TO BE "PERMANENT."  THIS HAD 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  00669  01 OF 03  251246Z 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CROATIA TOO BECAUSE CROATIA REMAINS A 
STEADFAST AND COMMITTED PARTNER IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
GLOBAL TERRORISM. 
 
HDZ OPPORTUNISM - HIDDEN AGENDA REGARDING WAR CRIMES 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
4.   (C) CLEARLY IRRITATED THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD HAD 
ANYTHING GOOD TO SAY ABOUT THE OPPOSITION HDZ PUBLICLY, RACAN 
BOTH DISMISSED AND WARNED US ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE 
PRO-U.S. POSITION TAKEN BY ITS LEADER IVO SANADER.  RACAN 
SAID THAT ONE REASON FOR SANADER'S STANCE WAS, OF COURSE, 
SCORING CHEAP POLITICAL POINTS AGAINST THE GOC AND WITH 
WASHINGTON; WE SHOULD NOT THINK SANADER OR THE HDZ SINCERE. 
BUT MUCH OF THE HDZ HAD A SECOND, TROUBLING AGENDA THAT HE 
HAD ALLUDED TO IN A MARCH 22 NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW: TO CREATE 
NEW POLITICO-LEGAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST COOPERATION WITH THE 
HAGUE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL (ICTY) FOR WHEN IT RETURNS TO 
POWER.  LET'S BE REAL, RACAN SAID: THE U.S., AS THE BIGGEST 
POWER, COULD CHOOSE WHICH UNSCRS IT FOLLOWED AND WHICH NOT. 
A SMALL COUNTRY LIKE CROATIA CANNOT, AND THUS THIS GOC IS 
ADAMANT THAT CROATIA MUST HONOR ITS OBLIGATIONS TOWARD ICTY. 
THE HDZ, HOWEVER, WILL ARGUE THAT WHAT'S PERMITTED TO THE USG 
IS PERMITTED TO CROATIA AND THUS IT NEED NOT, WITHOUT 
QUESTION OR QUALIFICATION, COMPLY WITH SO-CALLED 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ON WAR CRIMES.  RACAN SAID HE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ8326 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  00669  02 OF 03  251246Z 
ACTION SS-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   AMAD-00  ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00 
      DODE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EUR-00   FBIE-00  VC-00 
      H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   L-00     VCE-00 
      MFLO-03  AC-01    NEA-00   DCP-01   NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OMB-01 
      DHS-00   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00 
      SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  R-00 
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00 
      SWCI-00    /010W 
                  ------------------4A4A84  251247Z /38 
O 251246Z MAR 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9803 
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ZAGREB 000669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2008 
TAGS: PREL KAWC PGOV MARR HR KAWC PGOV MARR HR KAWC PGOV MARR HR IZ IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: CROATIA'S PM DISCUSSES GOC IRAQ POLICY 
WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
REJECTS THAT STANCE, BUT AVOIDING GIVING HDZ ARGUMENTS ANY 
LEGS WAS A FURTHER ELEMENT IN THE GOC DECISION TO STAY AWAY 
FROM THE IRAQ COALITION AND TAKE A STRICT CONSTRUCTIONIST 
POSITION ABOUT UNSCRS GENERALLY. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT: RACAN'S FOCUS ON THE RISK OF DOMESTIC 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00669  02 OF 03  251246Z 
DESTABILIZATION AND THEREFORE OF DAMAGING USG REGIONAL 
INTERESTS SHOULD HE TAKE A BOLD DECISION IS FAMILIAR -- 
ANYTIME A TOUGH CHOICE LOOMS, RACAN USES THE SAME ARGUMENT TO 
SOLICIT USG "UNDERSTANDING" OF CROATIA'S "UNIQUE 
CIRCUMSTANCES."  WE NEVER HAVE BOUGHT IT AND DO NOT NOW, BUT 
HIS FOCUS IS ALWAYS ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, NO 
MATTER THE IMPLICATIONS OF A DECISION FOR CROATIA'S LARGER 
INTERESTS. 
 
USG DISAPPOINTMENT 
------------------ 
 
6.   (C) AFTER RACAN SPOKE THUSLY FOR AN HOUR, THE AMBASSADOR 
REMARKED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER HAD HE HEARD THE PM'S 
EXPLANATION OF CROATIA'S POLICY TEN DAYS AGO IN PRIVATE, 
RATHER THAN READING ABOUT IT FOR OVER A WEEK IN THE PAPERS. 
THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED HIS OWN DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE 
DEBATE HAD BECOME SO PUBLIC.  WE REMAINED "DISAPPOINTED" AT 
THE LACK OF GOC POLITICAL SUPPORT ON THIS HUGE, HISTORIC 
ISSUE.  OTHER CONSIDERATIONS TENDED TO FADE IN SIGNIFICANCE 
FOR THE USG AT THIS TIME.  BUT AT LEAST A TIMELY PRESENTATION 
BY THE PM WOULD HAVE ALLOWED US TO INFORM WASHINGTON OF THE 
GOC'S MOTIVES BEFORE UNATTRACTIVE PRESS COMMENTARY BY HIM, 
DPM GRANIC AND PRESIDENT MESIC HAD DONE SO.  THAT SAID, WE 
AGREED THAT IT WAS BEST TO CIRCUMSCRIBE OUR AREA OF DISCORD, 
FOCUS ON POSITIVES SUCH AS WHAT THE GOC HAD APPROVED FOR 
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, GWOT COOPERATION AND CROATIA'S STATED 
DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ, AND 
COOL THE MEDIA FEVER. 
 
RACAN: GOC STANCE POLITICAL, NOT LEGAL 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  00669  02 OF 03  251246Z 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) THE AMBASSADOR REJECTED GOC ASSERTIONS THAT COALITION 
MILITARY ACTION WAS "ILLEGITIMATE" OR IN CONTRAVENTION OF UN 
RESOLUTIONS.  IT WAS ONE THING FOR THE GOC TO TAKE A 
DIVERGENT POSITION ON POLITICAL GROUNDS, BUT ANOTHER TO 
ASSERT THAT ITS STANCE HAD LEGAL FOUNDATION WHEN IT HAD 
PRODUCED NO LEGAL ANALYSIS WHATSOEVER CONTRADICTING THE 
ANALYSIS WE HAD PRESENTED TO THE GOC.  "SHOW US YOUR ANALYSIS 
OR MODERATE YOUR RHETORIC."  RACAN REPLIED BY DISTANCING 
HIMSELF FROM MESIC'S TERMINOLOGY AND TONE.  CONTRARY TO 
MESIC, RACAN AND THE GOVERNMENT HE LEADS HAD NOT 
CHARACTERIZED THE U.S. POSITION AS ILLEGITIMATE OR CONTRARY 
TO UNSC RESOLUTIONS.  HE SAID THE GOC SAW NO PURPOSE IN THAT 
SORT OF DEBATE AND WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN IT.  (COMMENT: MESIC 
IS A FREE AGENT.  HE CLEARS NOTHING WITH RACAN OR THE MFA, SO 
RACAN'S ASSERTION IS PLAUSIBLE.  HOWEVER, RACAN PAINTED THE 
MOST CONCILIATORY POSSIBLE PICTURE OF THE MFA'S, HIS OWN AND 
OTHER MINISTERS'  STATEMENTS.  THEY HAVE NOT PUSHED THE LEGAL 
ARGUMENT AS AGGRESSIVELY AS DID MESIC, BUT NEITHER HAVE THEY 
STEERED AS WIDE AS RACAN CLAIMED.) 
 
PURPORTED ADDITIONAL USG SUPPORT REQUESTS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ASKED RACAN TO EXPLAIN AN ASSERTION IN 
HIS MARCH 22 INTERVIEW THAT CROATIA, WERE IT TO HAVE JOINED 
THE COALITION OF THE WILLING, KNEW FROM "INFORMAL 
CONSULTATIONS" WITH US THAT WE WOULD HAVE ASKED IT TO PROVIDE 
MUCH MORE MILITARY HELP, IMPLICITLY INCLUDING DEPLOYMENT TO 
IRAQ.  HE REMINDED RACAN THAT HE AND ALL U.S. OFFICIALS HAD 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  00669  02 OF 03  251246Z 
BEEN VERY PRECISE IN DESCRIBING OUR LIMITED SUPPORT REQUESTS. 
 WE HAD TOLD CABINET MINISTERS REPEATEDLY THAT WE FORESAW 
NO/NO CROATIAN MILITARY ROLE IN THE IRAQ CAMPAIGN BECAUSE ITS 
ONLY DEPLOYABLE CAPABILITY WAS ALREADY IN ISAF.  RACAN WAS 
INSISTENT THAT, FROM THE TIME OF OUR REQUEST FOR CIVIL AIR 
CHARTER LANDING AUTHORIZATION, WE HAD BEEN "TESTING CROATIA" 
BY IMPLYING FURTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE.  THE AMBASSADOR 
STRESSED THAT THAT WAS NOT SO; THAT WE HAD BEEN PRECISE; AND 
THAT HE AND THE GOC OUGHT TO BE MORE CAREFUL IN TALKING TO 
THE PRESS ABQ OUR DISCUSSIONS.  THIS WAS IN OUR MUTUAL 
INTEREST, TO AVOID FANTASTIC MEDIA REPORTS OF IMMINENT U.S. 
MILITARY BASING IN CROATIA.  (COMMENT: RACAN BETRAYED CLASSIC 
BALKANS CONSPIRACY THEORY PROCLIVITIES.) 
 
GOC WOULD WEIGH FURTHER REQUESTS -- DON'T HOLD YOUR BREATH 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
9. (C) THE AMBASSADOR NOTED POSITIVELY RACAN'S STATEMENT IN 
THE SAME INTERVIEW THAT, IF THE USG ASKED FOR FURTHER 
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, THE GOC WOULD CONSIDER IT SERIOUSLY. 
THIS WAS ESPECIALLY WELCOME SINCE DPM GRANIC HAD SAID "NO 
FURTHER APPROVALS" LAST WEEK.  WAS IT TRUE?  WHILE NO FURTHER 
REQUESTS WERE NOW PENDING AND THERE MIGHT NOT BE ANY MORE, 
THERE MIGHT BE AND WE WOULD WANT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. 
 
10. (C) RACAN CONFIRMED THAT THE GOC WOULD CONSIDER ANY 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ8327 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  00669  03 OF 03  251246Z 
ACTION SS-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   AMAD-00  ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00 
      DODE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EUR-00   FBIE-00  VC-00 
      H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   L-00     VCE-00 
      MFLO-03  AC-01    NEA-00   DCP-01   NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OMB-01 
      DHS-00   OPIC-01  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00 
      SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  R-00 
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00 
      SWCI-00    /010W 
                  ------------------4A4A88  251247Z /38 
O 251246Z MAR 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9804 
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ZAGREB 000669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2008 
TAGS: PREL KAWC PGOV MARR HR KAWC PGOV MARR HR KAWC PGOV MARR HR IZ IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: CROATIA'S PM DISCUSSES GOC IRAQ POLICY 
WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
FURTHER SUPPORT REQUESTS, INCLUDING PRESENTING THEM TO THE 
SABOR IF THEIR CHARACTER WAS SUCH AS TO REQUIRE PARLIAMENTARY 
APPROVAL PURSUANT TO CROATIA'S LAW.  (COMMENT: RACAN'S 
WILLINGNESS TO ENTERTAIN REQUESTS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH 
ANY COMMITMENT TO APPROVE THEM.  WE CANNOT ANTICIPATE MUCH 
MORE SUPPORT FROM THE GOC.  ALMOST ANYTHING ADDITIONAL WOULD 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00669  03 OF 03  251246Z 
NEED SABOR APPROVAL; ITS REACTION WOULD LIKELY BE NEGATIVE 
AND COME ONLY AFTER PROTRACTED CONTROVERSY.) 
 
CALMING THE MEDIA FURORE 
------------------------ 
 
11.   (C) THE AMBASSADOR CONCLUDED BY AGREEING WITH RACAN 
THAT IT WAS IN NEITHER THE GOC'S NOR OUR INTEREST TO PROLONG 
MEDIA DEBATE AND SPECULATION THAT THE IRAQ DISAGREEMENT WILL 
DRIVE OUR TWO COUNTRIES APART.  WE WERE DISAPPOINTED, AND 
CROATIA'S ABSENCE FROM THE LIST OF COALITION PARTNERS WAS 
NOTICED IN WASHINGTON, BUT IT WOULD SERVE BOTH SIDES TO TURN 
THE FOCUS ONTO AREAS OF AGREEMENT -- THE GWOT AND POST-WAR 
RECONSTRUCTION IN PARTICULAR.  THE AMBASSADOR AND RACAN 
AGREED ON A LOW-KEY MEDIA LINE ON THE MEETING WITH THAT 
THEME.  BOTH RACAN AND THE EMBASSY'S PD SECTION USED THOSE 
THEMES IN ANSWERING PRESS QUERIES ABOUT THE MEETING, AND 
PRESS COVERAGE OF THE MEETING MARCH 25 REFLECTED THEM. 
 
ROSSIN 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
>