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Viewing cable 03ZAGREB519, SANADER'S HDZ: RATINGS UP, BUT STILL NOT READY FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ZAGREB519 2003-03-10 17:16 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Zagreb
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ZAGREB 000519 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (BOGUE) AND EUR/SCE (NARDI) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2013 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00519  01 OF 05  101728Z 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM HR HRPGOV
SUBJECT: SANADER'S HDZ: RATINGS UP, BUT STILL NOT READY FOR 
PRIME TIME 
 
REF: 02 ZAGREB 2659 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POLOFF A.F. GODFREY FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D) 
 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
1.  (C) CROATIA'S OPPOSITION HDZ HAS BEEN WORKING HARD TO 
REHABILITATE ITSELF IN THE EYES OF VOTERS EVER SINCE IT WAS 
EJECTED FROM POWER IN JANUARY 2000.  PARTY LEADERS CLAIM -- 
LOUDLY AND OFTEN -- THAT THE HDZ IS COMPLETING ITS 
"DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION" FROM THE CORRUPT, NATIONALIST 
PARTY FOUNDED BY FORMER PRESIDENT TUDJMAN.  BUT BEYOND A 
STILL-INCOMPLETE POLITICAL PURGE AND THE APPLICATION OF A LOT 
OF POLISH TO ITS FACADE, THE HDZ REMAINS UNRECONSTRUCTED AND 
UNDEMOCRATIC, AND WHILE AN HDZ GOVERNMENT WOULD MOST LIKELY 
BE MORE EFFICIENT THAN THE CURRENT COALITION, IT WOULD STILL 
BE UNRELIABLE AND PROBABLY A HINDRANCE TO ACHIEVING OUR 
REGIONAL STABILITY GOALS IN SOUTH-CENTRAL EUROPE. 
 
2.  (C) POLLS SHOW THAT CROATIA'S VOTERS, APART FROM THE HDZ 
FAITHFUL, ARE STILL HESITANT TO ACCEPT HDZ PRESIDENT 
SANADER'S DECLARATION THAT THE HDZ IS "NEW AND IMPROVED," 
DESPITE THEIR FRUSTRATION WITH THE CURRENT LACKLUSTER 
COALITION.  SANADER DESPERATELY SEEKS THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY'S VALIDATION SO HE CAN PUT TO REST THE WELL-PLACED 
FEARS OF MANY CROATIANS THAT A RETURN OF THE HDZ TO POWER 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  00519  01 OF 05  101728Z 
WOULD HURT CROATIA'S CHANCES TO JOIN THE EU AND NATO.  U.S. 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE HDZ AS "NORMAL" IS CENTRAL TO SANADER'S 
STRATEGY.  FOR MORE THAN A YEAR, HE HAS SOUGHT TO CHANGE THE 
USG POLICY OF ONLY MEETING HIM AT THE WORKING LEVEL.  OUR 
POLICY OF KEEPING SANADER AT ARM'S LENGTH IS WELL-KNOWN IN 
CROATIAN POLITICAL CIRCLES. 
 
3.  (C) AS THE PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN CROATIA BEGINS TO 
WARM UP, OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE SANADER IS AT ITS PEAK.  ON 
FEBRUARY 21, THE AMBASSADOR MET PRIVATELY WITH SANADER FOR 
THE FIRST TIME.  A POLISHED SALESMAN CONVINCED OF THE QUALITY 
OF HIS "PRODUCT," SANADER TOUTED HIS "REFORM" RECORD AND DID 
HIS BEST TO ESTABLISH REGULAR TIES WITH THE EMBASSY.  BUT THE 
AMBASSADOR USED THE ONE-ON-ONE MEETING TO DELIVER A SHARP 
MESSAGE OF WHAT THE HDZ MUST DO BEFORE THAT TAKES PLACE. 
FROM COOPERATION WITH ICTY TO ACTIVELY SUPPORTING REFUGEE 
RETURN AND TO RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS IN THE REGION, THE 
AMBASSADOR LAID DOWN CLEAR EXPECTATIONS OF THE HDZ.  ON PARTY 
REFORMS, HE PRESSED SANADER TO MOVE BEYOND POLITICALLY 
EXPEDIENT PERSONNEL CHANGES AND DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT TO 
REFORM BY ADDRESSING COMPREHENSIVELY THE HDZ'S LEGACY OF 
CORRUPTION AND ETHNIC WAR AND BY ENSURING LOCAL HDZ LEADERS 
HEW TO A PUBLICLY-DECLARED, MORE PROGRESSIVE HDZ POLICY. 
SANADER CLAIMED HE WAS ON TRACK TO MAKE FURTHER CHANGES TO 
THE HDZ AND DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO PROGRESS IN THE 
REGION.  WE WILL HAVE TO SEE AND INSIST ON RESULTS BEFORE WE 
GIVE HIM THE VALIDATION HE SEEKS.  OUR FIRST REAL OPPORTUNITY 
TO SEE RESULTS WILL LIKELY NOT COME BEFORE THE NEXT ELECTION 
CAMPAIGN IS OVER.  END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 
 
HDZ: HOSTAGE TO HISTORY 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  00519  01 OF 05  101728Z 
----------------------- 
 
4.  (C) THE CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (HDZ) HAS FOR MOST OF 
THE PAST TWO YEARS BEEN CROATIA'S HIGHEST-POLLING POLITICAL 
PARTY (AROUND 20 PERCENT, PLUS OR MINUS THREE).  BUT EVEN AS 
THE COALITION PARTIES HAVE FALTERED, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE 
HDZ HAS NOT GROWN BEYOND 25 PERCENT.  THIS SUGGESTS THAT FEW 
VOTERS OUTSIDE THOSE ALWAYS FAITHFUL TO THE HDZ BRAND ARE 
READY TO TRUST THE PARTY, EVEN THREE YEARS AFTER IT WAS VOTED 
OUT.  ALTHOUGH TUDJMAN'S HDZ SECURED CROATIA'S FUTURE AS AN 
INDEPENDENT STATE, IT ALSO BROUGHT THE COUNTRY TO THE BRINK 
OF FINANCIAL RUIN AND INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION, LEAVING IT FAR 
BEHIND RIVALS IN THE RACE FOR THE PRIZES OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE 
EU AND NATO.  VOTERS SEEM TO REMEMBER ALL THAT. 
 
5.  (C) DURING THE TUDJMAN ERA, THE HDZ VIEWED ITSELF MORE AS 
A POLITICAL MOVEMENT THAN A POLITICAL PARTY.  ALL "GOOD 
CROATS," REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL ORIENTATION, WERE 
SUPPOSED TO UNITE IN THE HDZ TO BATTLE FOR CROATIA'S 
INDEPENDENCE AGAINST ALL ENEMIES, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, 
PERCEIVED OR INVENTED.  OPPOSITION TO THE HDZ WAS LABELLED AS 
"COMMUNIST" AND LEADERS CALLING FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION WERE 
ACCUSED OF TRYING TO RECONSTITUTE YUGOSLAVIA.  THIS 
SIMPLISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICS PERSISTS IN SOME 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ8989 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  00519  02 OF 05  101729Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    AID-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00 
      DOTE-00  PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    FAAE-00  FBIE-00 
      VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   MOFM-05 
      MOF-01   AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01 
      PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00 
      IRM-00   STR-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  EPAE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00 
      PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /012W 
                  ------------------41E985  101729Z /38 
P 101716Z MAR 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9643 
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 ZAGREB 000519 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (BOGUE) AND EUR/SCE (NARDI) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2013 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00519  02 OF 05  101729Z 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM HR HRPGOV
SUBJECT: SANADER'S HDZ: RATINGS UP, BUT STILL NOT READY FOR 
PRIME TIME 
 
OBSERVERS, AND CAN STILL BE SEEN IN HARDLINE COMMENTARY LIKE 
THAT OF "WASHINGTON TIMES" COLUMNIST JEFFREY KUHNER.  HDZ 
PRESIDENT IVO SANADER HAS, SINCE HE WAS FIRST ELECTED AS 
PARTY PRESIDENT AFTER THE HDZ'S CRUSHING ELECTORAL DEFEAT IN 
JANUARY 2000, SOUGHT TO RE-MAKE HIS PARTY AS A "NORMAL" 
CENTER-RIGHT POLITICAL OPTION.  BUT IN HIS FIRST TERM AS HDZ 
PRESIDENT, SANADER MADE CHANGES ONLY TO THE PARTY'S IMAGE, 
BLAMING STRONG INTERNAL OPPOSITION FROM RIVAL AND TOP TUDJMAN 
HENCHMAN IVIC PASALIC. 
 
CLEANING HOUSE AND SETTLING POLITICAL ACCOUNTS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6.  (C) WHEN SANADER DEFEATED PASALIC AND WAS RE-ELECTED TO 
THE PARTY PRESIDENCY IN APRIL 2002, HE BEGAN A SERIES OF 
POLITICAL PURGES IN THE HDZ TO ROOT OUT THOSE SENIOR MEMBERS 
AT THE CENTRAL AND LOCAL LEVELS STILL LOYAL TO PASALIC.  THIS 
CULMINATED IN THE EJECTION OF PASALIC LATER IN 2002 AND OF 
SEVERAL LOCAL PARTY COMMITTEES THAT WOULD NOT TOE THE LINE. 
BUT WHILE MOST OF THOSE WHO FOLLOWED PASALIC OUT THE DOOR (OR 
WERE PUSHED OUT) WERE FROM THE HDZ'S MOST EXTREME NATIONALIST 
WING, THE PURGES WERE CONDUCTED SOLELY FOR REASONS OF LOYALTY 
TO SANADER'S LEADERSHIP, NOT IDEOLOGY.  MANY OF THE HDZ'S 
NATIONALIST DINOSAURS REMAIN WITH SANADER. 
 
HDZ'S SIGHTS SET ON NEXT ELECTION 
--------------------------------- 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  00519  02 OF 05  101729Z 
 
7.  (C) WITH HIS INTERNAL BATTLES BEHIND HIM AND THE SUPPORT 
OF A FEW SLICK, MODERN POLITICAL OPERATORS (LIKE FORMER 
AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. MIOMIR ZUZUL AND HDZ VICE PRESIDENT 
JADRANKA KOSOR), SANADER NOW HAS HIS SIGHTS FIRMLY ON THE 
NEXT ELECTIONS.  WITH THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT FLOUNDERING FROM 
CRISIS TO CRISIS (MOST CREATED BY THEIR OWN INTERNAL 
BICKERING), THE HDZ OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO TAKE A COMMANDING 
LEAD IN THE POLLS. 
 
8.  (C) HOWEVER, THE HDZ CONTINUES TO POLL IN THE RANGE OF 23 
PERCENT, AHEAD OF PM RACAN'S SDP, BUT STUBBORNLY FAR BELOW 
THE LEVEL REQUIRED TO BE ABLE TO GOVERN BY ITSELF.  SANADER'S 
TASK IS SIMPLE TO UNDERSTAND, BUT HARD TO ACHIEVE: TO RETURN 
TO GOVERNMENT, THE HDZ NEEDS EITHER TO CONVINCE MORE VOTERS 
TO BACK HIS PARTY OR TO CONVINCE OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES THAT 
HIS HDZ WOULD BE A TRUSTWORTHY PARTNER IN COALITION.  AND HE 
HAS TO DO THIS WHILE KEEPING THE NATIONALIST RIGHT-WING CORE 
OF HIS HDZ FIRMLY IN HIS CAMP. 
 
HDZ NEEDS USG SEAL OF APPROVAL TO CONVINCE UNDECIDEDS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
9.  (C) ONE RECENT RELIABLE POLL SHOWS THAT NEARLY 40 PERCENT 
OF THOSE WHO INTEND TO VOTE IN THE NEXT ELECTION HAVE NOT 
MADE UP THEIR MINDS.  SANADER BELIEVES CROATIA'S UNDECIDED 
VOTERS ARE LOOKING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO JUDGE 
WHETHER THE HDZ HAS BECOME A PARTY CAPABLE OF GOVERNING THEIR 
COUNTRY OUTSIDE OF WARTIME.  WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE KONRAD 
ADENAUER FOUNDATION AND SOME CONSERVATIVE EU PARTIES 
AFFILIATED WITH THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY, OTHER IC LEADERS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  00519  02 OF 05  101729Z 
HAVE TAKEN THE SAME LINE AS WE HAVE, KEEPING THE HDZ AT ARM'S 
LENGTH UNTIL IT DEMONSTRATES -- ON THE ISSUES THAT MATTER, 
NOT JUST PERSONNEL -- THAT IT HAS CHANGED. 
 
10.  (C) WE HAD BEEN WEIGHING FOR SOME TIME A MEETING WITH 
SANADER TO EXPLAIN WHERE THE HDZ NEEDS TO CHANGE; AS THE 
PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN CROATIA BEGINS TO WARM UP, OUR 
ABILITY TO INFLUENCE SANADER IS AT ITS PEAK.  THERE IS ALSO 
LESS TO LOSE: AS THE COALITION PARTIES ARE INCREASINGLY 
SEIZED WITH ELECTIONS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALL BUT STOPPED 
TAKING UNPOPULAR STEPS ON SOME OF THE ISSUES WE CONSIDER MOST 
IMPORTANT, LIKE REFUGEE RETURN. 
 
11.  (C) SANADER'S RECENT CLEAR AND POSITIVE STATEMENTS ON 
IRAQ INFLUENCED THE TIMING OF OUR MEETING, WHICH WAS TAKEN 
(AS INTENDED) BY THE GOC AS A SHOT ACROSS ITS BOW.  OUR AIM 
WAS TO PROD PM RACAN INTO TAKING A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE LINE ON 
PROVIDING LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT CARRYING 
U.S. TROOPS TO THE MIDEAST.  ALTHOUGH THE DETAILS OF THE 
MEETING WITH SANADER REMAIN OUT OF THE PRESS -- AS AGREED -- 
WE LEAKED NEWS OF THE MEETING TO THE SDP, EXPLAINING THAT THE 
HDZ'S STANCE SUPPORTING USG CALLS FOR ACTION ON IRAQ WAS ONE 
OF THE REASONS.  PM RACAN ANNOUNCED HIS GOVERNMENT'S DECISION 
TO APPROVE USG LOGISTICS REQUESTS SOON AFTER.  RACAN REFERRED 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ8987 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  00519  03 OF 05  101729Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    AID-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00 
      PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   MOFM-05  MOF-01   AC-01 
      NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01  CAEX-01  PA-00 
      PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00 
      STR-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01 
      G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /013W 
                  ------------------41E992  101729Z /38 
P 101716Z MAR 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9644 
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 ZAGREB 000519 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (BOGUE) AND EUR/SCE (NARDI) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2013 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00519  03 OF 05  101729Z 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM HR HRPGOV
SUBJECT: SANADER'S HDZ: RATINGS UP, BUT STILL NOT READY FOR 
PRIME TIME 
 
INDIRECTLY TO THIS SANADER MEETING TO THE AMBASSADOR WHEN HE 
INFORMED THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE GOC WOULD APPROVE THE USE OF 
CROATIAN AIRSPACE AND AIRFIELDS (ZAGREB 409). 
 
12.  (C) ON FEBRUARY 21, THE AMBASSADOR MET PRIVATELY WITH 
SANADER AT THE RESIDENCE.  THE AMBASSADOR OPENED THE MEETING 
BY THANKING SANADER FOR HIS STRONG STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF 
THE USG POSITION ON IRAQ.  SANADER TOLD THE AMBASSADOR 
CONVINCINGLY THAT THIS WAS NOT JUST HIS, BUT HIS PARTY'S 
POSITION, TAKEN NOT TO GAIN FAVOR WITH THE U.S., BUT BECAUSE 
THE HDZ BELIEVES IT IS THE RIGHT THING TO DO.  HE KNOWS THE 
POSITION RUNS AGAINST PUBLIC OPINION.  THE AMBASSADOR 
EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR SANADER'S VIEW, BUT UNDERSCORED 
THAT IRAQ IS IN A CATEGORY OF ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE ABOVE 
POLITICS.  WE HAD INTERPRETED THE HDZ'S FEBRUARY 19 VOTE 
AGAINST THE GOC DECISION TO SUPPORT THE VILNIUS-10 DECISION 
IN A SABOR COMMITTEE AS PLAYING POLITICS WITH THE ISSUE. 
SANADER WAS DEFENSIVE, SAYING THAT THE COMMITTEE VOTE WAS NOT 
ON THE POLICY, PER SE, BUT TO APPROVE A GOVERNMENT REPORT 
ABOUT THE POLICY, A REPORT WITH WHICH HIS PARTY DID NOT FULLY 
AGREE SINCE IT FELT THE GOC WAS MISHANDLING THE IRAQ ISSUE. 
 
AMB: NO BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT FOR HDZ 
------------------------------------ 
 
13.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR THEN DESCRIBED FOR SANADER WHY HE HAS 
BEEN HESITANT TO ENGAGE WITH THE HDZ AND WHY THE USG WILL NOT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  00519  03 OF 05  101729Z 
TAKE HIS PARTY'S ASSERTIONS AT FACE VALUE.  WE HAVE A LONG 
MEMORY.  THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS INVOLVED 
IN SOUTH CENTRAL EUROPE WHEN THE POLICIES THE HDZ GOVERNMENT 
WAS IMPLEMENTING WERE WORKING IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO U.S. 
GOALS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.  THE 
HDZ GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN USEFUL TO US ON SOME FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
ISSUES, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT CAME TO SUPPORTING NATO AIR WAR 
AGAINST THE FRY, BUT ON ALMOST EVERY OTHER ISSUE -- FOR 
EXAMPLE THE TUDJMAN GOVERNMENT'S DISRUPTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH 
CROATS IN BOSNIA, ITS ACTIVE OBSTRUCTION OF THE RETURN OF 
ETHNIC SERBS TO THEIR HOMES IN CROATIA, ITS OBSTRUCTION OF 
COOPERATION WITH ICTY AND, OF COURSE, ITS PERVASIVE 
CORRUPTION AND CRONY CAPITALISM -- THE HDZ HAD BEEN ON THE 
WRONG SIDE.  THIS HISTORY WOULD CONTINUE TO COLOR THE 
EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATION TO WASHINGTON ON HOW TO ENGAGE WITH 
THE HDZ. 
 
FINISH YOUR "PURGE" -- GET RID OF GLAVAS AND ROJS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
14.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR TOLD SANADER THAT WE HAD BEEN 
FOLLOWING THE PERSONNEL CHANGES IN HDZ CLOSELY.  WHILE THE 
DEPARTURE OF PASALIC AND SOME OF HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES WAS A 
GOOD THING, THERE WAS MUCH MORE HOUSECLEANING TO DO.  RETIRED 
GENERAL LJUBO CESIC-ROJS IS A CARICATURE OF THE TUDJMAN HDZ, 
STILL TRYING TO DISGUISE HIS SMUGGLING AND ILLEGAL GAINS WITH 
PATRIOTIC STATEMENTS AND WITH ONE FOOT IN HERZEGOVINA.  WORSE 
STILL, OSIJEK STRONGMAN BRANIMIR GLAVAS, WAS STILL ONE OF 
SANADER'S MOST TRUSTED ADVISERS.  (INDEED, MANY ARGUE THAT 
GLAVAS' VOTE-RIGGING AT THE LAST HDZ CONVENTION KEPT SANADER 
IN CONTROL OF THE PARTY.)  THE AMBASSADOR RECALLED IN DETAIL 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  00519  03 OF 05  101729Z 
GLAVAS' ROLE IN CLOSE LEAGUE WITH FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER 
SUSAK THAT HELPED SPARK WAR IN 1991 IN THE MURDER OF OSIJEK 
POLICE CHIEF RIEHL-KIR AND THE BOROVO SELO ATTACK.  AS LONG 
AS GLAVAS WAS IN THE HDZ, THE AMBASSADOR TOLD SANADER, WE 
WOULD NOT TAKE IT (OR HIM) SERIOUSLY. 
 
NO ROOM FOR POLITICAL MANEUVER ON COOPERATION WITH ICTY 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
15.  (C) ON ICTY COOPERATION, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THERE IS NO 
ROOM FOR COMPROMISE.  IF THE HDZ WANTS THE RESPECT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, IT MUST SHOW RESPECT TO ITS 
INSTITUTIONS.  IF THE HDZ EXPECTS TO BE ACCEPTED AS A 
RESPONSIBLE PARTY, THEN ITS LEADER MAY NOT SAY THAT IF IN 
GOVERNMENT HE WOULD SEEK TO RE-OPEN CROATIA'S LAW ON 
COOPERATION WITH ICTY WHEN HE COMES TO POWER.  NO HDZ LEADER 
CAN EXPECT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE U.S. AS A REFORMER IF 
HE BASES HIS CAMPAIGN ON THE "WE WILL NEVER GIVE UP OUR 
GENERALS" THEME.  WHEN THE NEXT INDICTMENT COMES DOWN FROM 
THE TRIBUNAL, THE AMBASSADOR CONTINUED, CROATIA'S RESPONSIBLE 
POLITICAL LEADERS MUST CALL FOR WHOMEVER IS INDICTED TO GO TO 
THE HAGUE OR BE TRANSFERRED PROMPTLY. 
 
HDZ SHOULD PUT ITS MONEY WHERE ITS MOUTH IS ON RETURNS 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ8992 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  00519  04 OF 05  101730Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    AID-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00 
      PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   MOFM-05  MOF-01   AC-01 
      NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01  CAEX-01  PA-00 
      PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00 
      STR-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01 
      G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /013W 
                  ------------------41E9B2  101730Z /38 
P 101716Z MAR 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9645 
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 ZAGREB 000519 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (BOGUE) AND EUR/SCE (NARDI) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2013 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00519  04 OF 05  101730Z 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM HR HRPGOV
SUBJECT: SANADER'S HDZ: RATINGS UP, BUT STILL NOT READY FOR 
PRIME TIME 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
16.  (C) THE AMBASSADOR TOLD SANADER THAT REFUGEE RETURN AND 
REINTEGRATION IS AN ISSUE WHERE THE HDZ CAN SHOW WHETHER IT 
IS REFORMED WITHOUT WAITING FOR ELECTIONS.  HE CALLED ON 
SANADER TO BACK UP HIS POSITIVE PRIVATE STATEMENTS WELCOMING 
RETURN WITH PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENTS TO PARTY MEMBERS, 
INSISTING THAT THEY ENCOURAGE LAWFUL RETURN.  THE AMBASSADOR 
URGED SANADER TO CALL ON HDZ MAYORS AND COUNTY PREFECTS TO 
COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
TO FACILITATE REFUGEE RETURN.  THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT 
THAT SOME HDZ OFFICIALS, EVEN IN AREAS WHERE THE EFFECTS OF 
THE WAR ARE STILL STRONGLY FELT, ARE SUPPORTING RETURNS; THE 
USG IS PLEASED TO HAVE ENTERED INTO SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIP 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH SOME MUNICIPALITIES WHERE HDZ HOLDS A 
MAJORITY.  IN THE FIELD, READINESS TO MOVE FORWARD IS A MORE 
IMPORTANT CRITERIA FOR SELECTION IN THESE PROGRAMS THAN PARTY 
AFFILIATION, THE AMBASSADOR SAID.  BUT THE WORST 
OBSTRUCTIONIST MAYORS WERE DISPROPORTIONATELY HDZ.  SANADER 
NEEDED TO LEAD HIS PARTY TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE EVERYWHERE IT 
GOVERNED. 
 
SANADER: "HEY, WE'RE NOT ALL BAD" 
--------------------------------- 
 
17.  (C) SANADER THANKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS FRANK 
MESSAGES; HE SAID HE GENUINELY APPRECIATED THE USG'S 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  00519  04 OF 05  101730Z 
UNVARNISHED VIEW OF WHERE THE HDZ STOOD.  WHILE HE 
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE HDZ HAS ITS "WARTS," SANADER SAID HE IS 
NEVERTHELESS PROUD OF HIS PARTY.  PRESIDENT TUDJMAN WAS A 
STATESMAN WHOSE CONTRIBUTION WILL BE RECOGNIZED BY HISTORY. 
SANADER SAID HE KNOWS HIS PARTY'S TRANSFORMATION IS 
INCOMPLETE; THE HDZ STILL HAS A WAYS TO GO BEFORE IT BECOMES 
THE RESPONSIBLE, CENTER-RIGHT PARTY HE HOPES TO CREATE. 
 
18.  (C) HE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT WHEN HE WAS ELECTED 
PARTY PRESIDENT IN APRIL 2000, IT WAS STILL TUDJMAN'S HDZ 
THAT HE TOOK OVER, VERY MUCH A WARTIME PARTY.  DESPITE 
PASALIC'S DEPARTURE WITH A FEW OF HIS FAITHFUL, THE 
PARLIAMENTARY CAUCUS WAS AND IS STILL FULL OF "LITTLE 
TUDJMANS," MANY OF WHOM DO NOT SHARE THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
PARTY SANADER SEEKS TO DEVELOP.  UNTIL THESE PEOPLE LEAVE THE 
PARTY, THE HDZ WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE MANY OF THE 
CHARACTERISTICS OF A NATIONAL MOVEMENT RATHER THAN A 
MAINSTREAM POLITICAL PARTY. 
 
19.  (C) SANADER HOPES TO ADDRESS THE HDZ'S LACK OF TOLERANCE 
AND TRANSPARENCY BY CHANGING THE PEOPLE AT THE TOP OF THE 
PARTY WITH MORE PROGRESSIVE, YOUNGER PARTY MEMBERS.  WITH THE 
WIN OVER PASALIC IN 2002, SANADER CLAIMED HE NOW HAS COMPLETE 
CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL LEVEL ELECTORAL LISTS.  HE 
"GUARANTEED" THE AMBASSADOR THAT FULLY 80 PERCENT OF THE 
CURRENT PARLIAMENTARY CAUCUS WOULD BE OUT OF THE SABOR AFTER 
THE NEXT ELECTION.  HE CLAIMED THAT ROJS WAS ALREADY ON THE 
WAY OUT.  HE DID NOT TAKE ON THE AMBASSADOR'S DENUNCIATION OF 
GLAVAS BY NAME, BUT ARGUED THAT EASTERN SLAVONIA (LITERALLY, 
GLAVAS' STOMPING GROUND) IS A "DIFFICULT" AREA WHERE "THERE 
ARE STILL MANY WAR WOUNDS."  ON RETURNS, SANADER CLAIMED THAT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  00519  04 OF 05  101730Z 
HIS PARTY'S POLICY IS THAT ALL WHO WISH TO RETURN SHOULD BE 
ABLE TO DO SO.  HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISSUE IS NOT 
ADDRESSED IN A UNIFORM WAY BY HDZ LOCAL LEADERS.  SANADER 
EXPLAINED THAT ONE OF THE WAYS HE IS "DEMOCRATIZING" THE HDZ 
IS TO PUSH RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISSUES DOWN TO THE LOCAL LEVEL; 
IN DOING SO HE GIVES UP A MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER LOCAL 
OFFICIALS' BEHAVIOR. 
 
20.  (C) NEVERTHELESS, SANADER POINTED OUT THE HDZ HAS 
RECENTLY TAKEN SOME POLICY POSITIONS WHICH SHOW PROGRESS.  HE 
TOOK CREDIT FOR THE HDZ'S SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO 
CROATIA'S PROGRESSIVE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON NATIONAL 
MINORITIES, FOR ITS VOTE IN THE SABOR TO APPROVE THE 
DEPLOYMENT OF A CROATIAN MILITARY POLICE UNIT TO AFGHANISTAN 
AND HIS PARTY'S PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S LAUNCH OF 
CROATIA'S APPLICATION FOR EU MEMBERSHIP. 
 
21.  (C) SANADER SAID HE WAS PROUD OF THE HDZ RECORD IN 
SUPPORTING CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH CROATIA'S NEIGHBORS. 
THE HDZ HAS BROKEN TIES WITH THE HDZ-BIH, HE ASSERTED, AND 
SUPPORTED THE GOC POLICY OF PROPER STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS. 
HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK HARDER TO RESOLVE 
OUTSTANDING BORDER ISSUES WITH SERBIA-MONTENEGRO.  SANADER 
SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THE COMPLEXITY OF THE BORDER ISSUES (HE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ8999 
 
PAGE 01        ZAGREB  00519  05 OF 05  101730Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    AID-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00 
      PERC-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    EB-00    FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCE-00   MOFM-05  MOF-01   AC-01 
      NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   OMB-01   OPIC-01  CAEX-01  PA-00 
      PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00 
      STR-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-01 
      G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /013W 
                  ------------------41E9CC  101730Z /38 
P 101716Z MAR 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9646 
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 ZAGREB 000519 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (BOGUE) AND EUR/SCE (NARDI) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2013 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ZAGREB  00519  05 OF 05  101730Z 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM PREL PREF PHUM HR HRPGOV
SUBJECT: SANADER'S HDZ: RATINGS UP, BUT STILL NOT READY FOR 
PRIME TIME 
 
MENTIONED THAT HE HAD ALREADY MET WITH THE SERBIA-MONTENEGRO 
AMBASSADOR TO CROATIA), BUT ARGUED THAT WHILE IT MAY TAKE 
TIME TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES, IT ALSO TAKES LEADERSHIP, 
LARGELY ABSENT IN THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT.  (IN A LATER 
MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, S-M AMBASSADOR SIMURDIC 
CHARACTERIZED HIS MEETING WITH SANADER IN LESS POSITIVE 
TERMS.) 
 
22.  (C) SANADER WAS EAGER TO SET A DATE FOR A FUTURE MEETING 
WITH THE AMBASSADOR, AND SAID HE WOULD AGREE ON ANY TERMS 
PROPOSED.  HE ALSO SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH MORE REGULAR CONTACT 
WITH THE EMBASSY.  ON THE ISSUE OF REFUGEE RETURN, HE 
PROPOSED SETTING UP A WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS FROM THE HDZ 
AND THE EMBASSY TO DISCUSS WAYS TO MOVE THE ISSUE FORWARD. 
THE AMBASSADOR PARRIED THE IDEA OF WORKING GROUPS ON THIS 
ISSUE AND ON ICTY, PREFERRING TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE 
HDZ'S "REFORM" AND THEN SEEK TO ENGAGE WITH SANADER FOR 
FUTURE MEETINGS BASED ON THE PARTY'S FORWARD PROGRESS. 
 
23.  (C)  BY AND LARGE, SANADER STUCK TO THE "NO PRESS" 
GROUND RULES SET UP IN ADVANCE, ALTHOUGH OUR BACK-CHANNEL 
MESSAGE (SEE PARA 11 ABOVE) DID GENERATE SOME PRESS INTEREST 
ABOUT A "SECRET" MEETING BETWEEN SANADER AND AN EMBASSY 
"SENIOR OFFICIAL."  SANADER PUBLISHED A MAJOR INTERVIEW ON 
MARCH 1 IN WHICH HE ADDRESSED SOME OF THE AMBASSADOR'S 
CONCERNS, BUT MISSED IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES TO DEMONSTRATE 
HIS PARTY'S COMMITMENT TO THE GOALS OUTLINED BY THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ZAGREB  00519  05 OF 05  101730Z 
AMBASSADOR DURING THEIR MEETING.  AS HE HAS IN THE PAST, HE 
ACKNOWLEDGED THE HDZ'S FAILURE TO CURB RAMPANT CORRUPTION 
DURING THE TUDJMAN REGIME.  ON ICTY, HE SPOKE OUT OF BOTH 
SIDES OF HIS MOUTH IN THE SAME INTERVIEW.  WHILE HE SAID THAT 
"ALL UN MEMBER STATES MUST COOPERATE WITH THE TRIBUNAL" AND 
VOWED TO USE LEGAL CHALLENGES WHICH CROATIA HAS A RIGHT TO 
PURSUE, HE "REJECTED THE UNACCEPTABLE POLITICAL 
QUALIFICATIONS" IN THE GOTOVINA INDICTMENT AND DECLARED THAT 
THE HDZ WOULD STICK TO THIS POSITION.  (TO BE FAIR, THE GOC 
DOES LITTLE BETTER.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
24.  (C) SANADER, CLEARLY ONE OF CROATIA'S NATURAL SALESMEN, 
STRIKES US AS PERSONALLY GENUINE, BUT IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT 
HE IS NOT COMMITTED TO ANYTHING BUT RETURNING THE HDZ TO 
GOVERNMENT.  SANADER KNOWS THAT HIS ACHILLES' HEEL IS THE 
ABILITY OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS IN THE CURRENT COALITION TO 
CONVINCE CROATIANS THAT A VOTE FOR THE HDZ IS A VOTE AGAINST 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU.  THAT MEANS THIS PRE-ELECTION PERIOD IS 
OUR BEST OPPORTUNITY TO GET SANADER AT LEAST TO MAKE 
STATEMENTS (EVEN IF ACTIONS WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT) 
IN SUPPORT OF OUR REGIONAL STABILITY GOALS. 
 
25.  (C) OUR MEETING WITH SANDER DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE 
ANY CLOSER TO RECOGNIZING THE HDZ AS A VIABLE DEMOCRATIC 
OPTION FOR CROATIA.  WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THIS POINT 
PRIVATELY TO OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS IN CROATIA.  OUR 
RAMPED-UP ELECTION-YEAR DEMOCRACY-BUILDING ASSISTANCE 
CONTINUES TO BE AIMED AT SUPPORTING THE HDZ'S POTENTIAL 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ZAGREB  00519  05 OF 05  101730Z 
OPPONENTS BY HELPING THEM IDENTIFY RESONANT CAMPAIGN THEMES 
AND BY GETTING OUT THE VOTE -- EVERY VOTER WHO NEEDS TO BE 
GOTTEN OUT IS A COALITION VOTER; HDZ IS A SOLID BLOC. 
 
26.  (C) THE NEXT STEP IS UP TO SANADER'S HDZ.  WE SET CLEAR 
BENCHMARKS.  SANADER'S COMMITMENT TO REFORM BOTH ON POLICY 
ISSUES AND ON TRANSFORMING THE HDZ INTO A DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
SHOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY TO GAUGE, BOTH BY HIS PUBLIC 
STATEMENTS AND IN THE CANDIDATES THE HDZ PUTS UP FOR THE NEXT 
ELECTION.  FOR CROATIA TO BECOME A FULLY FUNCTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY, THE HDZ NEEDS TO BECOME A NORMAL POLITICAL PARTY 
WHICH VOTERS COULD CHOOSE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT 
LINEUP.  THIS MEETING WAS A FIRST SERIOUS EFFORT TO ENGAGE 
AND TEST SANADER'S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO EFFECT THAT 
CHANGE.  WE REMAIN FROM MISSOURI AS TO THE CHANGES HE WILL DO 
SO. 
ROSSIN 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
>