O 172245Z MAR 03
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4425
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 
CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 000727 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2013 
TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ: NO VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION; SUBDUED COUNCIL 
 
REF: A. USUN 716 
     ¶B. USUN 637 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT; REASONS: 
 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  A SUBDUED SECURITY COUNCIL MET IN INFORMALS 
ON MARCH 17 TO RECEIVE WORD THAT THE U.S., UK, AND SPAIN HAD 
CHOSEN NOT TO BRING THEIR RESOLUTION TO A VOTE, BUT WOULD 
INSTEAD "RESERVE THEIR RIGHT TO TAKE THEIR OWN STEPS TO 
SECURE THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ." SYG ANNAN AND MOST COUNCIL 
MEMBERS EXPRESSED SADNESS AND FRUSTRATION THAT A COMPROMISE 
COULD NOT BE REACHED.  UNMOVIC EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN BLIX 
ANNOUNCED THE UNMOVIC WORK PROGRAM WITH ITS KEY REMAINING 
DISARMAMENT TASKS (KRDTS) WOULD BE READY THE AFTERNOON OF 
MARCH 17.  ANNAN ANNOUNCED THE SUSPENSION OF ALL UN 
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL UN PERSONNEL. 
RUSSIA, DRAWING FROM THE MARCH 15 RUSSIAN - FRENCH - GERMAN 
DECLARATION (REF A), PUSHED FOR A COUNCIL MEETING ON 
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, TO DISCUSS APPROVAL OF THE WORK PROGRAM 
AND KRDTS.  MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS (EVEN THE THREE AFRICAN 
STATES WHOSE FMS WILL BE IN NEW YORK ON TUESDAY, MARCH 18 FOR 
AN UNRELATED MEETING) HEDGED ON MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE.  THE 
RUSSIANS MAY CONTINUE TO PROBE FOR POTENTIALLY PROBLEMATIC 
AREAS, BUT HAVE NOT AS YET SURFACED A RESOLUTION PUSHING FOR 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT THE WORK PROGRAM.  IN ADDITION, 
RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV SEEMED RESIGNED TO THE REALITY OF THE 
SITUATION, AND SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE DIFFERENCES, UNLIKE HIS 
FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES. 
 
¶2. (C) GERMAN AND FRENCH PERMREPS BOTH PUSHED BACK ON THE 
U.S. - UK - SPANISH EXPLANATION REGARDING THE DRAFT 
RESOLUTION, ASSERTING THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD NOT HAVE HAD 
BACKING FROM THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL, AND MEXICAN PERMREP 
AGUILAR-ZINSER OUTLINED (AGAIN) MEXICO'S POSITION THAT USE OF 
FORCE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION WAS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW.  CHILE WAS ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS UNHELPFUL, ASSERTING THAT 
INSPECTIONS WERE WORKING AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED; THE AFRICAN 
STATES COLLECTIVELY WERE LESS CONTENTIOUS, FOCUSING INSTEAD 
ON THE FAILURE OF THE COUNCIL TO ACHIEVE UNITY.  FINALLY, 
PAKISTANI PERMREP AKRAM CAREFULLY AVOIDED SAYING MUCH THAT 
COULD BE INTERPRETED IN EITHER DIRECTION. COUNCIL MEMBERS ALL 
STOOD BEHIND SYG ANNAN'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW UN PERSONNEL, 
NOTING THAT THE DECISION WAS MADE IN THE INTEREST OF THEIR 
SAFETY.  LAVROV LAID A MARKER THAT THE COUNCIL DID NOT 
"SUPPORT" THE SYG'S DECISION BUT RATHER "NOTED" IT, AS THE 
PHRASEOLOGY TO BE USED IN ANY STATEMENT TO THE PRESS TO BE 
MADE BY THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT (GUINEA). END SUMMARY. 
 
 
UK: ACTION ON UNSCR IS OFF; IRAQ CAN STILL ACT 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (C) AFTER ANNOUNCING TO THE PRESS THE CO-SPONSORS' 
DECISION NOT TO CALL FOR A VOTE ON THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION 
(REF B), UK PERMREP GREENSTOCK CONVEYED THE SAME MESSAGE IN 
SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS.  HE SPECIFIED THAT THE 
CO-SPONSORS HAD NOT ACTUALLY WITHDRAWN IT AS HAD BEEN 
MISREPORTED IN THE PRESS.  HE REITERATED THAT THE RESOLUTION 
REMAINS ON THE TABLE. GREENSTOCK SAID THE UK HAD HELD 
INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT COUNCIL 
CONSENSUS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IN LINE WITH RESOLUTION 1441. 
HE EXPLAINED THAT "ONE COUNTRY IN PARTICULAR HAS UNDERLINED 
ITS INTENTION TO VETO ANY ULTIMATUM 'NO MATTER WHAT THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES.'"  GREENSTOCK CONTINUED THAT THAT COUNTRY 
(NOTE: FRANCE. END NOTE.) "REJECTED OUR COMPROMISE PROPOSAL 
BEFORE EVEN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ITSELF AND HAS PUT FORWARD 
SUGGESTIONS THAT WOULD ROW BACK ON THE UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT OF 
THE COUNCIL IN 1441 - THOSE SUGGESTIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO NO 
ULTIMATUM, NO PRESSURE, AND NO DISARMAMENT."  HE SAID THAT 
"THE CO-SPONSORS RESERVE THEIR RIGHT TO TAKE THEIR OWN STEPS 
TO SECURE THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ." 
 
¶4. (C) GREENSTOCK SAID, IN THE VIEW OF HMG, IT WAS STILL 
POSSIBLE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN TO DEMONSTRATE HE HAD MADE THE 
STRATEGIC DECISION TO DISARM AND CALLED FOR IRAQ TO TAKE THE 
APPROPRIATE STEPS.  HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN UNMOVIC 
PRESENTING ITS WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTS TO THE COUNCIL, SAYING 
THAT THE UK WAS OPEN TO DISCUSSIONS ON ITS PROVISIONS. 
GREENSTOCK WARNED THAT ANY PROGRESS ON THE WORK PROGRAM OR 
THE KRDTS WAS PREDICATED ON OVERALL IRAQI COOPERATION.  HE 
SAID THAT THE UK ATTORNEY GENERAL HAD JUST RELEASED A RULING 
ON THE LEGALITY OF ACTION AGAINST IRAQ AND THAT THE UK 
MISSION WOULD DISTRIBUTE THAT RULING TO COUNCIL MEMBERS. 
GREENSTOCK RESERVED THE UK'S POSITION ON ATTENDING THE 
PROPOSED MINISTERIAL BUT, IN THE EVENT FS STRAW DID COME, HE 
WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ARRIVE UNTIL WEDNESDAY. 
 

U.S.: RESOLUTION IS OFF; UNMOVIC AND IAEA OUT 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE SUPPORTED GREENSTOCK'S 
EXPLANATION OF ACTION ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.  HE REGRETTED 
THAT, IN THE FACE OF A CERTAIN VETO THREAT, THAT THERE WAS NO 
PURPOSE IN PURSUING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ANY FURTHER. 
 
¶6. (C) AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE THEN EXPLAINED CALLS HE AND 
OTHER USG OFFICIALS HAD MADE TO UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA ON MARCH 
16, SAYING THAT THE U.S. HAD PROMISED THE UN THAT IT WOULD 
PROVIDE ADVANCE WARNING WHEN IT WAS TIME TO WITHDRAW 
INSPECTORS FROM IRAQ.  HE SAID THE U.S. HAD ASKED THE WEAPONS 
INSPECTORS TO TAKE "EXPEDITIOUS ACTION" TO SUSPEND THEIR 
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND TO REMOVE ALL PERSONNEL FROM THE 
COUNTRY.  AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE SAID THAT THE WARNING DID NOT 
NECESSARILY MEAN THAT WAR WAS IMMINENT, BUT THAT THE U.S. 
WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE FURTHER WARNINGS. 
 
 
BLIX: WORK PROGRAM READY; DETAILS ON WORK 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) UNMOVIC EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN BLIX EXPLAINED THAT COPIES 
OF THE DRAFT WORK PROGRAM WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN THE AFTERNOON 
OF MARCH 17.  BLIX REVIEWED THE REQUIREMENTS BEHIND THE WORK 
PROGRAM AND KRDTS, AND SAID THE "CLUSTER" DOCUMENT DELIVERED 
ON MARCH 7 HAD OUTLINED THE RANGE OF DISARMAMENT ISSUES.  THE 
WORK PROGRAM WOULD CONTAIN 12 KEY REMAINING DISARMAMENT 
TASKS, ALONG WITH DETAILS OF HOW UNMOVIC INTENDED TO GO ABOUT 
ITS WORK. 
 
¶8. (C) BLIX CONTRASTED THE KRDTS WITH VARIOUS COUNCIL 
"BENCHMARK" PROPOSALS, SAYING THAT UNMOVIC DID NOT USE THE 
TERM BENCHMARKS.  BLIX THOUGHT THE VALUE OF BENCHMARKS, SUCH 
AS THOSE PROPOSED LAST WEEK BY THE UK, RESIDED IN THEIR 
ABILITY TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AMONG THOSE CONCERNED ABOUT 
IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMS.   BLIX SAID UNMOVIC'S ROLE IN A 
BENCHMARK-BASED EXERCISE WOULD BE TO REPORT BACK 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME.  HE ALSO CLARIFIED 
THAT DISCUSSION OF A 120-DAY TIME PERIOD FOR UNMOVIC REFERRED 
TO UNSCR 1284-BASED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, AND WAS NOT 
NECESSARILY LINKED TO THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO DISARM IRAQ, 
WHICH HE REPEATED WOULD TAKE "NOT DAYS, NOT YEARS, BUT 
MONTHS." 
 
¶9. (C) BLIX TOUCHED ON CHALLENGES IN ASSESSING PROGRESS IN 
VARIOUS AREAS.  MISSILES COULD BE VERIFIED AS THEY WERE 
DESTROYED - HE NOTED THAT 70 OF THE AL-SAMOUD MISSILES HAD 
BEEN DESTROYED SO FAR - AND THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTATION ON 
UAVS SHOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY TO DELIVER.  HOWEVER, IN THOSE 
CASES WHERE THERE WAS A QUESTION OF WHETHER THE IRAQIS 
ACTUALLY HAD A SYSTEM - E.G., ANTHRAX OR MOBILE CW OR BW LABS 
- THE SITUATION WOULD BE MORE COMPLICATED.  IF THE IRAQIS 
ACTUALLY HAD THE SYSTEM, THEN IT SHOULD BE A RELATIVELY 
STRAIGHTFORWARD TASK TO TURN THE ITEMS OVER. HOWEVER, IF THEY 
DID NOT HAVE THE SYSTEMS, THEY WOULD FACE A FAR MORE 
CHALLENGING TASK IN ASSEMBLING THE DOCUMENTATION PROVING THAT 
THEY DID NOT HAVE, OR NEVER HAD, A PARTICULAR SYSTEM.   BLIX 
SAID THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN "PRO-ACTIVE" IN PROVIDING DOCUMENTS 
RECENTLY ON VX AND ANTHRAX, BUT THAT HE AWAITED UNMOVIC'S 
ANALYSIS BEFORE PRONOUNCING ON THE PAPERS THEMSELVES. 
 
¶10. (C) BLIX NOTED THE CALLS FROM AMERICAN OFFICIALS URGING 
UNMOVIC WITHDRAWAL, AND SAID HE WOULD WAIT FOR THE SYG'S 
JUDGMENT. 
 
 
SYG: UN OPERATIONS SUSPENDED; PERSONNEL OUT 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) SYG ANNAN ANNOUNCED THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS: 
 
-- ALL UN HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM 
IRAQ.  (NOTE: WHILE THE SYG DID NOT PROVIDE A TIMELINE, A 
PARTICIPANT IN THE MEETING WHERE THE SYG MADE THE DECISION 
SAID THE UN WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF 24 TO 48 HOURS.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
-- WITHDRAWAL OF UN PERSONNEL FROM IRAQ WOULD INCLUDE 
CONTRACTORS FROM COTECNA AND SAYBOLT (NOTE:  AUTHENTICATORS 
OF OFF DELIVERIES AND OVERSEERS OF OIL LOADINGS, 
RESPECTIVELY. END NOTE.). IN ALL, THE NUMBER OF HUMANITARIAN 
WORKERS WITHDRAWING WOULD TOTAL 195. 
 
-- ANNAN SAID THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN STAFF WOULD LEAD TO THE 
SUSPENSION OF OIL-FOR-FOOD, WHICH COULD NO LONGER OPERATE 
WITHOUT PERSONNEL TO VERIFY OIL LIFTINGS OR OFF DELIVERIES 
AND DISTRIBUTION. 
 
-- THE SYG STRESSED THAT UN ACTION ON OFF WAS A SUSPENSION, 
NOT A CANCELLATION, AS THE LATTER WOULD REQUIRE A UNSC 
DECISION. 
 
-- WEAPONS INSPECTIONS WOULD ALSO BE SUSPENDED, WITH 130 
UNMOVIC AND 5 IAEA INSPECTORS BEING WITHDRAWN. 
 
-- UNIKOM MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WOULD ALSO BE 
INSTRUCTED TO WITHDRAW (MORE DETAILS SEPTEL). 
 
-- THE SYG SAID A LETTER WOULD BE FORTHCOMING TO THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL PRESIDENT, LISTING THESE STEPS AND EXPRESSING THE 
NEED TO CONTINUE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. 
 
 
RUSSIA:  MOVE FORWARD PROGRAM OF WORK, 
BUT NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE OFFERED 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV EXPLAINED THE PROPOSAL 
CONTAINED IN THE MARCH 15 JOINT RUSSIAN - GERMAN - FRENCH 
DECLARATION.  HE STRESSED THAT THE DOCUMENT COULD "SPEAK FOR 
ITSELF" SINCE INSPECTIONS WERE UNDERWAY AND YIELDING RESULTS. 
IN CONTRAST TO THE AZORES STATEMENTS, RUSSIA "TAKES A 
DIFFERENT APPROACH BASED ON CONCRETE FACTS, THAT INSPECTIONS 
ARE WORKING;"  IRAQ HAD TAKEN POSITIVE STEPS ON THE SUBSTANCE 
OF THE REMAINING DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS.  IN THAT CONTEXT, 
LAVROV LOOKED FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE DRAFT WORK PROGRAM 
LATER TODAY PER BLIX'S EARLIER PROMISE TO HAVE IT COMPLETED. 
FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND GERMANY ALL BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO 
HOLD A MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE WORK 
PROGRAM, AND HE REQUESTED THAT THE COUNCIL SET A DATE SOON SO 
THAT THE MINISTERIAL COULD TAKE PLACE, PREFERABLY EITHER 
TUESDAY AFTERNOON ON WEDNESDAY MORNING, SINCE IT WAS "CLEAR 
WE CAN'T DELAY." 
 
 
FRANCE: MORE OF THE SAME, BUT YOU CAN'T BLAME FRANCE 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶13. (C) PERMREP DE LA SABLIERE SAID THAT HE HAD A "STRANGE 
FEELING THIS MORNING, WHICH PERHAPS OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS 
SHARED."  HE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD BE DISCUSSING 
THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT, "TO WHICH ALL ARE 
DEDICATED," BUT "MUCH TO MY SURPRISE," HE HAD LEARNED 
PUBLICLY THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION HAD BEEN "WITHDRAWN."  OF 
COURSE, THE CO-SPONSORS COULD DO AS THEY SEE FIT, BUT THE 
COUNCIL SHOULD NOT HAVE LEARNED THAT THE RESOLUTION HAD BEEN 
"WITHDRAWN" OUTSIDE A COUNCIL SETTING.  UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEREBY THE INSPECTIONS WERE MAKING PROGRESS 
TOWARDS ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT IN A "LIMITED 
TIMEFRAME," FRANCE COULD NOT SUPPORT A PROPOSAL THAT 
AUTHORIZED USE OF FORCE.  WHILE THE CO-SPONSORS HAD "PUT 
FORTH" THAT A PARTICULAR DELEGATION -- "I BELIEVE MINE" -- 
HAD MADE CLEAR IT WOULD OPPOSE A DRAFT AUTHORIZING THE USE OF 
FORCE, THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD NOT HAVE ACHIEVED A 
MAJORITY VOTE;  WITHOUT A MAJORITY, A "NO" VOTE DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE A "VETO" UNDER THE CHARTER, HE STATED.  THE 
DISCUSSIONS HELD DURING THE LAST WEEK HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE 
MAJORITY OF COUNCIL MEMBERS COULD NOT SUPPORT A RESOLUTION 
AUTHORIZING THE USE OF FORCE, FOR THEY REMAINED COMMITTED TO 
PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT. 
 
¶14. (C) LA SABLIERE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL WAS COLLECTIVELY 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS "BINDING" RESOLUTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO 
THE PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ.  THE INSPECTORS WERE 
TELLING THE COUNCIL THAT DISARMAMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED 
PEACEFULLY, HE STRESSED.  HE WAS THUS INTERESTED IN THE DRAFT 
WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTS, WHICH HE BELIEVED SHOULD BE APPROVED 
ON MARCH 19 AT A MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AS 
A FINAL COUNCIL DISCUSSION.  THERE WAS CONVICTION IN THE 
COUNCIL THAT BENCHMARKS, KRDTS, AND AN INSPECTOR-PROPOSED 
TIMEFRAME OF ONE OR TWO MONTHS COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR 
EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION, WITHOUT THE AUTOMATICITY 
"CONTEMPLATED BY SOME, BUT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT FOR THE 
MAJORITY OF DELEGATIONS."  THE USE OF FORCE WITHOUT COUNCIL 
APPROVAL WAS NOT JUSTIFIED, GIVEN PROGRESS MADE IN 
INSPECTIONS, HE REPEATED.  THE COUNCIL COULD CONTINUE TO WORK 
ON THE BASIS "DESIRED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE UN AND THE 
PEOPLES OF THE WORLD."  IN A SEPARATE INTERVENTION, LA 
SABLIERE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NOT FOR THE COUNCIL TO 
DECIDE THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN STAFF.  HE PLACED FULL TRUST IN 
THE SYG TO MAKE THE DECISION ON "TEMPORARY" WITHDRAWAL, BUT 
NOTED THAT FRANCE WAS IN FAVOR CONTINUING INSPECTIONS. 
 
 
CHINA: STILL NEED MAXIMUM EFFORT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) CHINESE PERMREP WANG STATED CHINA BELIEVED THAT AS 
LONG AS THERE WAS ONE PERCENT HOPE, THE COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE 
THE EFFORT TO CONTINUE INSPECTIONS.  WANG SUPPORTED THE 
FRENCH, RUSSIAN, AND GERMAN MARCH 15 JOINT STATEMENT AND 
EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE MARCH 19 MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MEETING 
TO DISCUSS THE INSPECTORS' WORK PROGRAM.  HE NOTED THE 
"WITHDRAWAL" OF THE CO-SPONSORS DRAFT RESOLUTION, AND 
EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS GOOD IF THE DECISION INDICATED THAT 
THERE WAS HOPE FOR CONSENSUS ON A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.  IF 
THIS DECISION SIGNIFIED A PATH TO WAR, THEN IT WAS "VERY 
REGRETTABLE" BECAUSE CHINA BELIEVED THAT THE REALIZATION OF 
PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT WAS STILL POSSIBLE.  IT WAS IN THE 
INTEREST OF ALL SIDES TO CONTINUE INSPECTIONS AND AVOID WAR. 
ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN PERSONNEL FROM IRAQ, CHINA WAS ALSO 
CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF PERSONNEL, AND RESPECTED THE 
SYG'S DECISION IN THAT REGARD. 
 
 
GERMANY: ON TO 1284, CONSENSUS NOT EQUAL TO UNANIMITY 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶16. (C) GERMAN PERMREP PLEUGER AGREED WITH RUSSIAN PERMREP 
LAVROV'S STATEMENTS REGARDING THE MARCH 15 JOINT DECLARATION. 
HE STRESSED THAT GERMANY STILL BELIEVED THAT THE COUNCIL 
COULD ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT, AND THAT THE 
"VAST MAJORITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WANTED ANOTHER TRY 
AT ACHIEVING PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT."  CONSENSUS DOES NOT MEAN 
UNANIMITY, HE STATED.  PLEUGER EMPHASIZED THAT HE "COULD NOT 
ACCEPT THAT THE COUNCIL CONSENSUS WAS NOT IN LINE WITH UNSCR 
1441" AS POSITED BY THE CO-SPONSORS.  ALL THOSE THAT WERE 
OPPOSED TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION "WERE NOT OUTSIDE 1441."  ON 
THE CONTRARY, THESE MEMBERS WANTED PEACE BASED ON UNSCRS 1441 
AND 1284.  AT THIS POINT, IT WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE TO SUSPEND 
INSPECTIONS, HE STRESSED.   BLIX HAD PREPARED THE DRAFT WORK 
PROGRAM AND THE KRDTS.  MINISTERS COULD ACHIEVE CONSENSUS BY 
MEETING TO APPROVE THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE "NOT THAT 
DIFFERENT" FROM THE UK BENCHMARKS.  THE SYG WAS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE SECURITY OF UN STAFF; THEREFORE, GERMANY WOULD 
SUPPORT ANY DECISION HE MADE ON UN WITHDRAWAL. 
 
 
SPAIN:  1441 IN ENTIRETY, CAN'T BE SELECTIVE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) SPANISH PERMREP ARIAS CONCURRED WITH AMBASSADOR 
GREENSTOCK THAT THE CO-SPONSORS WOULD NOT PROCEED WITH THE 
VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION.  BASED ON UNSCR 1441, READ AS A 
WHOLE, SPAIN HAD NOTED THAT IRAQ WAS IN MATERIAL BREACH. 
SOME MEMBERS HAD NOT READ UNSCR 1441 AS A WHOLE, BUT HAD A 
TENDENCY TO OMIT CERTAIN POINTS, FOR EXAMPLE, "ANY OMISSION 
OR FALSEHOOD" OR "NOT FULL COOPERATION" WOULD RESULT IN A 
MATERIAL BREACH.  COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE PURSUING A DIFFICULT 
PHILOSOPHY BECAUSE WITHOUT MILITARY PRESSURE, THE INSPECTORS 
WOULD NOT BE IN IRAQ.  MERE LANGUAGE WOULD NOT FUNCTION 
WITHOUT AN ULTIMATUM.  LA SABLIERE SUGGESTED THAT THE 
CO-SPONSORS DID NOT HAVE THE MAJORITY OF VOTES.  BUT WHETHER 
OR NOT THIS WAS THE CASE, THE FRENCH DELEGATION SAID IT WOULD 
VETO, AND THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE. 
 
 
BULGARIA: SAD DAY FOR THE COUNCIL 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) BULGARIAN PERMREP TAFROV STATED THAT IT WAS A "SAD 
DAY FOR THE UN AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL, SAD THAT IT WAS 
CLEARER THAN EVER THAT SECURITY COUNCIL DIVISIONS OVER THE 
IRAQ CRISIS WERE INSURMOUNTABLE." BULGARIA HAD ADVOCATED 
COUNCIL UNITY AND WAS CONCERNED OVER THE TREND IN THE COUNCIL 
TOWARD TWO RIGID POSITIONS ON IRAQ.  THIS SPLIT SHOULD NOT 
HAVE DIVIDED THE COUNCIL ON ITS COMMON GOAL OF DISARMAMENT. 
BULGARIA SUPPORTED THE UK PROPOSAL, BELIEVING THAT IT 
PROVIDED THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE FOR COUNCIL 
UNITY.  CERTAIN DELEGATIONS REJECTED THE PROPOSAL.  THE 
DIVISIONS IN THE COUNCIL LIKELY WOULD REMAIN FOR DAYS AND 
EVEN WEEKS, BUT COUNCIL MEMBERS SHOULD NOT RESORT TO "MUTUAL 
RECRIMINATION."  DIFFERENCES IN THE COUNCIL WERE NOT 
"INSURMOUNTABLE," AS LONG AS COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD THE 
POLITICAL DETERMINATION TO TAKE "ONE LAST STEP."  IN THE 
FINAL ANALYSIS, BULGARIA WAS OPEN TO ANY PROPOSAL THAT COULD 
RESTORE COUNCIL UNITY. 
 
¶18. (C) FOR THE MOMENT, THE COUNCIL SHOULD FOCUS ON THE MAIN 
ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF THE UN AS AN "ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION 
FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE VERY INCARNATION OF THE 
PRINCIPLE OF MULTILATERALISM IN WORLD AFFAIRS."  IT WAS 
CRITICAL FOR THE COUNCIL TO RESTORE ITS CENTRAL ROLE ON THE 
ISSUE OF IRAQ, AND CONTINUE DIALOGUE.  THE COUNCIL, HOWEVER, 
NEEDED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND 
WITH REGARD TO THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL.  BULGARIA WOULD 
HEED ADVICE ON UN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SYG AND THE CHIEF 
INSPECTOR. 
 
 
PAKISTAN: THE ART OF SAYING LITTLE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C)  IN WHAT HAS BECOME TYPICAL OF HIS INTERVENTIONS IN 
THE COUNCIL ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAQ, PAKISTANI PERMREP AKRAM 
CAUTIOUSLY AVOIDED MAKING CHOOSING SIDES IN THE DEBATE, 
SAYING IT WAS CLEAR THE COUNCIL WAS AT AN IMPASSE.  PAKISTAN 
HAD SOUGHT "FULL AND FAITHFUL" IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCRS AS 
THE SOLUTION TO IRAQ'S WMD, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. 
DISARMAMENT BY PEACEFUL MEANS HAD ALWAYS BEEN A STRONG 
PREFERENCE.  PAKISTAN HAVE ALSO BELIEVED IN THE UNITY OF THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL IN ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES, BUT 
UNFORTUNATELY THE COUNCIL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND 
CONVERGENCE IN ANY OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH HAD BEEN TABLED BY 
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.  THAT SAID, PAKISTAN BELIEVED THAT 
TIME AND SPACE FOR DIPLOMACY DID NOT END, AND DIPLOMATIC 
OPTIONS MUST CONTINUE TO BE EXPLORED IN ORDER TO FIND A 
UNITED STAND.  THE COUNCIL SHOULD RECEIVE THE PROGRAM OF WORK 
WHILE CONTINUING TO URGE A RESPONSE FROM THE IRAQI 
AUTHORITIES EVEN AT THIS LATE DATE. 
 
 
CHILE, MEXICO: (TYPICALLY OF LATE) UNHELPFUL 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) CHILEAN PERMREP VALDES AGREED THAT IT WAS A SAD DAY 
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, "GIVEN THAT THE INSPECTIONS ARE 
STRENGTHENED AND MORE EFFECTIVE DAILY... THEY COULD HAVE 
ACHIEVED THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ, AND CHANGED THE DYNAMIC 
THERE," WHICH HE ASSERTED WOULD HAVE LED TO GREATER DEMOCRACY 
IN IRAQ.  CHILE REGRETTED THAT ITS PROPOSAL TO BRIDGE 
DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE P-5 HAD BEEN REJECTED BEFORE IT WAS 
FULLY CIRCULATED FOR CONSIDERATION.  HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE 
NEED TO "MAINTAIN A CONSTRUCTIVE CLIMATE" IN THE COUNCIL, HE 
WARNED MEMBERS AGAINST RECRIMINATIONS.  CHILE SUPPORTED THE 
PRESENTATION OF THE PROGRAM OF WORK, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS "NO 
REASON" TO IGNORE THE SERIOUS SITUATION ON THE SECURITY OF 
IRAQ AND THE SYG'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW UN PERSONNEL. 
 
¶21. (C) MEXICAN PERMREP AGUILAR-ZINSER MADE A 
CHARACTERISTICALLY LONG INTERVENTION, ECHOING PREVIOUS POINTS 
MADE IN THE COUNCIL, OUTLINING MEXICO'S INTERPRETATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN CHARTER.  HE REGRETTED THAT 
THERE HAD BEEN NO UNANIMOUS DECISION WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED 
THE COUNCIL TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ, AND, 
RECALLING 1441, REGRETTED THAT THE CONCLUSION HAD NOT BEEN TO 
SEEK A UNANIMOUS DECISION ON PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT.  MEXICO 
HAD CAREFULLY EXAMINED THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH BY THE U.S., 
UK AND SPAIN AS CO-SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. 
FURTHER, MEXICO SHARED BILATERAL COMMITMENTS THAT RELATED TO 
COMMON SECURITY "WITH ONE CO-SPONSOR WITH WHOM WE SHARE 
GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND POLICY GOALS;"  MEXICO WOULD 
DEFEND THE IMMEDIATE SPHERE OF SECURITY TOGETHER WITH THAT 
PARTNER. 
 
¶22. (C) WITH RESPECT TO THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ, HOWEVER, 
MEXICO BASED ITS POSITION ON THE CONVICTION THAT ACTION 
SHOULD BE TAKEN WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK WITH FULL 
AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE.   WHILE MEXICO HAD NEITHER 
"ARSENALS NOR STRATEGIC PROJECTS NOR FINANCIAL INTERESTS 
GLOBALLY," ITS EXTERNAL POLICIES WERE FOUNDED ON THEIR 
CONSTITUTION WHICH REGULATED ITS BEHAVIOR.  PRESIDENT FOX HAD 
SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED HIS FOREIGN MINISTER AND PERMREP TO 
ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MEXICAN 
CONSTITUTION:  ONE REQUIRED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH FORCE 
ONLY BROUGHT AT THE FINAL MOMENT, AND ANOTHER REQUIRED THAT 
THE THREAT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AS SUCH BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
"AS THE SOLE BODY AUTHORIZED TO DECLARE THE USE OF SUCH 
FORCE."  HOPE WAS NOT YET EXHAUSTED, AND THUS "THERE WAS NO 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN DISARMING IRAQ."  THE 
PRECEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN CHARTER SET FORTH 
THE CONDITIONS FOR USE OF FORCE; MEXICO DID NOT SEE THAT 
THOSE CONDITIONS HAD BEEN MET. THE SECURITY COUNCIL CANNOT 
RELINQUISH AUTHORITY HERE, FOR MAJORITIES -- WHETHER OR NOT 
UNANIMOUS -- ALSO HAVE THE AUTHORITY OF COLLECTIVE WILL. 
SADDAM HUSSEIN MUST DISARM, MUST ABIDE BY THE RELEVANT 
UNSCRS, AND CANNOT THREATEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. 
 IN THAT CONTEXT, MEXICO SUPPORTED THE DRAFT PROGRAM OF WORK, 
WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A STANDARD TO DISARMAMENT EFFORTS, HE 
CONCLUDED. 
 
 
ANGOLA, CAMEROON, GUINEA: REGRETFUL, 
BUT STILL TINGED WITH HOPE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶23. (C) ANGOLAN PERMREP GASPAR-MARTINS SAID THAT THE BLIX AND 
EL-BARADEI REPORTS TO THE COUNCIL HAD MADE CLEAR THAT 
INSPECTIONS WERE PRODUCING SOME RESULTS IN THE ATTEMPT TO 
DISARM IRAQ, BUT THOSE RESULTS WERE NOT SATISFACTORY TO EVERY 
MEMBER.  ALTHOUGH ALL PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS HAD TO BE EXHAUSTED 
BEFORE MOVING TO WAR, THAT SEEMED TO BE THE SITUATION FACING 
THE COUNCIL.  IN THAT CONTEXT, HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE MOST 
RECENT UK EFFORT, BUT "EVEN THAT" DID NOT WORK.  WAR CAUSED 
UNTOLD SUFFERING, AND IF THE COUNCIL COULD AVOID A DECISION 
HAVING TO UPHOLD WAR, IT SHOULD DO SO.  ON A PRACTICAL NOTE, 
GASPAR-MARTINS SUGGESTED THAT SOME TIME SHOULD ELAPSE BEFORE 
HOLDING ANOTHER MINISTERIAL MEETING, "TO LET THINGS CALM 
DOWN."  IF GOVERNMENTS MIGHT BE CONVINCED OF MOVING FORWARD 
ON THE DRAFT PROGRAM OF WORK WITH THE FULL COMMITMENT OF THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL, HOWEVER, THEN THE ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO 
DO SO. 
 
¶24. (C) CAMEROONIAN PERMREP BELINGA-EBOUTOU AGREED THAT THE 
COUNCIL WAS FORCED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE LIMITS OF DIPLOMACY IN 
MANAGING THE IRAQI CRISIS.  DESPITE THE DRAMATIC EVENTS OF 
THE PREVIOUS 48 HOURS IN THE CAR, THE COUNCIL HAD NOT 
REGISTERED THAT CRISIS; THIS SIMPLE FACT SUPPORTED HIS 
ASSERTION.  HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE COUNCIL'S DISUNITY WAS A 
"DISSERVICE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MULTILATERALISM," AND 
APPEALED FOR THE P-5 TO CAUCUS AND SORT OUT THEIR 
DIFFERENCES.  THE SIX HAD PROPOSED ELEMENTS FOR A 
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT THAT HAD BEEN REJECTED, BUT WHICH 
REMAINED ON THE TABLE.  HE CONCLUDED THAT "A MIRACLE" COULD 
NOT YET BE RULED OUT. 
 
¶25. (C) GUINEAN PERMREP TRAORE, COUNCIL PRESIDENT FOR MARCH, 
SAID THAT GUINEA HAD SPARED NO EFFORT TO FIND A COMPROMISE 
THAT WOULD BE HEAL THE DEADLOCK IN THE COUNCIL.  HOWEVER, THE 
FRENCH - GERMAN - RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF MARCH 15 AND THE 
AZORES SUMMIT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE COUNCIL WAS "MORE DIVIDED 
THAN EVER."  ALL WILL LOSE WITHOUT SOME COMPROMISE, HE 
WARNED; HE HOPED SOME COMPROMISE SOLUTION COULD STILL BE 
FOUND. 
 
 
SYRIA: DEADLOCK 
--------------- 
 
¶26. (C) SYRIAN PERMREP WEHBE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL HAD "TRULY 
REACHED A STATE OF COMPLETE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN 
IRAQ," WITH THE U.S. INFORMING UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA TO 
EVACUATE, THE INSPECTORS' WITHDRAWAL, AND THE STATEMENTS MADE 
IN THE AZORES.  THE COUNCIL HAD REACHED DEADLOCK, BUT THERE 
WAS STILL ANOTHER COURSE: THE PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ. 
THE COUNCIL AGREED UNDER UNSCR 1441 THAT THE AIMS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL 
DISARMAMENT.  UNSCRS 1284 AND 1441 ESTABLISHED UNMOVIC AND 
REINFORCED THE INSPECTIONS SYSTEM.  IRAQ WAS COOPERATING ON 
PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE; IT MADE POSITIVE EFFORTS TO DESTROY 
WEAPONS, AND HAD PRODUCED REPORTS ON ANTHRAX AND VX.  NOW THE 
COUNCIL HAD "GREATER DETERMINATION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR WORK 
UNDER 1441" AND CONTINUED COUNCIL UNITY BECAUSE THE 
INSPECTORS WERE READY TO PRESENT A WORK PROGRAM AND KRDTS. 
WEHBE SUPPORTED LAVROV'S PROPOSAL TO HEAR THE WORK PROGRAM ON 
MARCH 19 TO "LEAD TOWARDS ADDITIONAL PEACEFUL ACTION." 
 
 
NEGROPONTE