This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 000626 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA DAS FISK, WHA/CEN, AND WHA/EPSC 
STATE FOR PM, INL, EB, AND CA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2013 
TAGS: PREL OVIP PGOV SNAR ETRD ECON MOPS KJUS HO
SUBJECT: TRANSFORMING CENTRAL AMERICA,S SECURITY PARADIGM: 
NEW MISSIONS, MORE APPROPRIATE WEAPONS, BUT LINGERING 
DOUBTS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Larry Palmer, Reasons 1.5(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  President Maduro reiterated his personal 
commitment to regional disarmament and expressed his 
willingness to move forward on this issue. He also asked for 
U.S. support, mentioning directly the possible need for a 
multilateral security guarantee and asked whether the U.S. 
could provide transition assistance for demobilized soldiers. 
Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) Deputy Assistant Secretary 
(DAS) Dan Fisk informed Maduro that the U.S. does not see 
threats to any Central American country coming from their 
regional neighbors.  Fisk commented that he had delivered 
similar messages in San Salvador and Managua over the last 
month and said that the U.S. wanted to understand how 
Honduras was restructuring to meet the new threats to 
national and international security.  He encouraged Maduro to 
take bold steps to rationalize the region's military forces. 
Fisk stressed that better regional security relationships 
would help Central American countries realize the full 
benefits of a Central American integration, including a 
Central American Free Trade agreement with the United States. 
 END SUMMARY 
 
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U.S. Interest In Regional Security 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) During WHA DAS Dan Fisk's February 5-8 visit he 
discussed Central American disarmament efforts, regional 
military arrangements, and ongoing border disputes with 
President Ricardo Maduro, Minister of Defense Frederico 
"Fred" Breve, and Foreign Minister Guillermo Perez-Cadalso 
Arias.  DAS Fisk conveyed the U.S. view that  Honduras had 
nothing to fear from its two neighbors, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua.  He added further that the U.S. does not see 
threats to any Central American country coming from their 
regional neighbors, commenting  that he had delivered similar 
messages in San Salvador and Managua over the last month.  He 
said the U.S. welcomed the Honduran perspective on regional 
security issues and was interested in understanding how 
Honduras is  restructuring its military to meet the new 
threats to national and international security.  He 
encouraged President Maduro to take bold steps to rationalize 
Honduras' military and to pursue similar initiatives 
regarding a new regional security framework.  He 
underscored to the Hondurans that better regional security 
relationships would help the region realize the full benefits 
of  Central American integration, including a U.S-Central 
America Free Trade agreement. 
 
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Maduro Still Willing To Pursue Disarmament 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) President Maduro reiterated his personal commitment to 
regional disarmament during his February 7 meeting with WHA 
DAS Fisk.  He told Fisk that he wants to reduce the amount of 
money spent on weapons in Honduras.  Maduro emphasized that 
he is willing to move forward on this issue and that his 
government has a proposal to do so. (COMMENT: We are not 
aware of, and doubt there is, any concrete proposal prepared 
by the Government of Honduras (GOH) at this time. END 
COMMENT.)   Noting that the militaries in El Salvador and 
Honduras were more subordinate to civilian authority than 
were those in Guatemala and Nicaragua, he commented that his 
fellow Central American presidents have favorably received 
his suggestions on this topic.  However, Maduro asked for 
U.S. support, mentioning directly the possible need for a 
multilateral security guarantee and whether the U.S. could 
provide economic assistance for demobilized soldiers to be 
integrated into local economies. 
 
¶4. (S) DAS Fisk said Washington recognized President Maduro's 
leadership and reiterated the U.S. assessment that most of 
the weapons in Central American military inventories 
represented a Cold War security frame of reference and are 
not the most effective means to  address current threats.  He 
urged President Maduro to take advantage of this historic 
moment and the good will of his fellow presidents to 
rearrange Central American security arrangements in a manner 
that addressed the current threats.  Fisk also urged Maduro 
to consider a dramatic gesture to seize the moral authority 
to lead this process.  He then suggested that Honduras' F-5 
aircraft did not enhance Honduras' ability to confront these 
new emerging security threats and that the costs of the 
logistical support for them crowded out other more pressing 
Honduran military needs.  Fisk continued by saying that the 
Bush Administration was willing to engage on this issue, 
including noting, for example, that the idea had been raised 
of U.S. engagement through such regional mechanisms as the 
Central American Armed Forces Conference (CFAC).  He also 
offered his view that whichever Central American country took 
the first concrete steps towards transforming its 
security/military framework would be in a strong position to 
define the process for the region and would bring positive 
attention to its actions from Washington. 
 
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MOD Outlines New Regional Military Missions 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In DAS Fisk's first meeting in Honduras on February 6, 
Defense Minister Fred Breve said that his country's and the 
region's military are preparing themselves for the new 
transnational threats to their sovereignty and that his 
President, Ricardo Maduro, is ready to pursue regional 
disarmament in order to better align the types of weapons and 
size of the region's militaries to these new threats.  As an 
example, Breve pointed to the Central American Armed Forces 
Conference (CFAC) declaration in December that calls on the 
Central American militaries to prepare a common plan to 
combat terrorism.  In addition to this recognition of new 
threats, Breve said that CFAC is also working to downgrade 
their concern about the old threats (i.e. invasion by one 
country in the region against the other).  He said CFAC knows 
it must now unify in order to act against the new common 
enemy.  As an important first step, the CFAC agreed to new 
intelligence sharing on organized crime, with specific 
cooperation in the areas of d 
rug trafficking, narcoterrorism, and Arab alien smuggling. 
Breve also added that the countries agreed to work toward 
establishing a "true" regional inter-agency military 
taskforce. (COMMENT: He did not elaborate on what its mission 
would be. END COMMENT.)  He admitted it will take the 
countries time to identify first the units for the force and 
then the resources to support it. 
 
¶6. (C) Breve specifically stated that, given his reduced 
military budget, regionalization of Central American military 
efforts presented an opportunity for more effective use of 
the limited resources available.  He assured Fisk that the 
Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF) were aware that it was a 
different world.  Breve wants the HOAF to participate in the 
CFAC counterterrorism unit.  He added that the HOAF mindset 
was changing, noting  that he was reorienting Honduran forces 
to the new missions by reducing the number of bases and 
battalions and deploying forces in the prime drug trafficking 
areas of the North Coast.  The Maduro administration also has 
involved the HOAF in the effort to combat the growing crime 
problem in Honduras and the military itself was more involved 
with the community via civic action, responding to natural 
disasters, and helping to address health programs.  He 
assured Fisk that Honduras was adapting to the new threat 
environment. 
 
¶7. (C) Fisk responded that the U.S. wanted Honduras to think 
about new missions in exactly this way.  He told Breve that 
CFAC was the right mechanism to pursue this kind of 
regionalization of militaries and informed the Minister that 
the idea of U.S. engagement, through the U.S. Southern 
Command, with CFAC had recently been raised.   Fisk made 
specific reference to the expanded HOAF engagement in the 
counternarcotics effort and expressed Washington's 
appreciation. 
 
¶8. (C) Breve said he saw military regionalization as directly 
linked to greater regional economic integration.  However, he 
said Honduras felt there were still some considerable 
challenges to overcome.  He cited the glacial progress toward 
actual land border demarcation with El Salvador and the 
continuing Nicaraguan tariff as impediments.  He cautioned 
that Presidential-level commitments to integration were not 
being translated into action.  He also voiced concern about 
Salvadoran small arms and military transport acquisitions and 
renewed U.S. interest in military-to-military relations with 
Nicaragua, which he imagined would eventually include new 
U.S. military equipment.  Noting the smaller size of the 
Honduras armed forces, he opined that the Honduran Air Force 
provided equilibrium for the Hondurans, even while he 
acknowledged at the same time that the Air Force's F-5s were 
more of a symbolic, rather than an effective, deterrent 
force. 
 
¶9. (C) Fisk, noting that he had met two days before with the 
Salvadoran MOD, said it is the U.S. conclusion that El 
Salvador's military sees its missions being in such areas  as 
humanitarian/disaster response, and also that it wants to 
cooperate with its neighbors.  Its defense modernization is 
designed to help it move troops to respond to these new 
missions.  He said he was impressed with the Salvadoran 
military's professionalization and added that he did not see 
any evidence of  expansionist tendencies. After reassuring 
Breve about U.S. views and efforts on the Nicaraguan tariff, 
Fisk agreed that the U.S. has sought a new relationship with 
the Nicaraguan military.  He told Breve that the U.S. effort 
was very respectful of Nicaraguan civilian authority over the 
military and our support would be primarily in logistical 
areas and designed to help transform the Nicaraguan armed 
forces to meet their new missions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
MOD Views Disarmament Favorably But Asks For U.S. Help 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶10. (S) Fisk called Breve's attention to Nicaraguan Foreign 
Minister Norman Caldera's statement on weapons  at the OAS 
counterterrorism meeting in El Salvador two weeks earlier. 
He characterized it as very forward learning and stated that 
the U.S. supported Caldera and the GON efforts to control its 
weapon inventories, including surface-to-air missiles.  Breve 
felt that Caldera's statement had been made in response to 
OAS pressure regarding Nicaraguan arms smuggling to 
terrorists in Colombia.  Fisk then stated that there was 
interest and enthusiasm in the U.S. for disarmament 
initiatives emanating from the region.  He commented that any 
such effort would have to take into account defense needs to 
protect against  new threats  and the resources needed to 
address them.  He told Breve that the U.S. was looking to the 
region's leaders to grasp this opportunity and that 
leadership would be needed on these issues.  Fisk underscored 
that the U.S. was open to Central American ideas on this 
issue and needed the regio 
n to let us know where it wanted to go on this issue so that 
the U.S. could engage.  He noted that all sides had weapons 
that did not meet their needs against the current threats 
that they confront. 
 
¶11. (C) Breve outlined talks between President Maduro and 
Salvadoran President Francisco Flores on disarmament.  He 
said the two had agreed and presented the issue to their 
fellow Central American presidents.  The two presidents were 
working on how to present such ideas to their militaries. 
Breve said that initial discussions also had identified broad 
regional concern about the need to address the implications 
of the demobilization of forces.  The leaders felt that such 
decommissioned forces would represent a target of opportunity 
for organized crime.  Without some sort of jobs program, 
organized crime could use its resources to recruit 
well-trained military to support their ends. Breve affirmed 
Honduran willingness to start a disarmament process but he 
believed it would be a long process.  As much as he would 
like to see early agreement, Breve's honest assessment is 
that it will take some time.  He noted that all sides may 
have the intent but may not be willing to act. 
 
¶12. (C) Fisk said that he understood the historical 
challenges confronting the region and that demobilization was 
a real concern.  He said the U.S. did not seek to minimize 
the challenges but hoped for a start in the short term.  He 
urged that all sides consider bold steps.  He stressed that 
whomever "gambled" first would have the moral high ground and 
could use it to move the others.  He suggested that another 
way to approach the issue was to view it as a rationalization 
of arms inventories rather than disarmament of militaries. 
He highlighted that the U.S. goal was a better framework for 
overall regional security.  Breve thanked Fisk for this 
encouragement and closed by mentioning the need to consider a 
multilateral security guarantee or body with oversight 
authority. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Foreign Minister Concerned About El Salvador and Nicaragua 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
¶13. (C) In DAS Fisk's meeting with Foreign Minister 
Perez-Cadalso later in the day, the FM reiterated Honduran 
concerns and suspicions about its neighbors' intentions. 
(COMMENT: Interestingly, MOD Breve made a similar comment, 
saying that suspicions would continue to exist in the 
short-term. END COMMENT.)  Two issues stood out:  Honduran 
concern about Nicaragua's 35 per cent tariff and deep 
frustration over the slow, practically non-existent pace of 
land border demarcation with El Salvador.  Perez-Cadalso 
stated that both problems were frustrating to the GOH because 
Presidential-level agreements were not being followed through 
on at the working level by its neighbors.  However, in both 
cases, Perez-Cadalso affirmed that these were issues that 
needed to be put behind the countries because the leaders 
shared the same vision of the future. 
 
¶14. (C) FM Perez-Cadalso stressed that the GOH was prepared 
to accept an ICJ ruling on its maritime border with 
Nicaragua, but that the tariff threatened to start a trade 
war between the two countries.  He noted that the Maduro 
government had been patiently waiting for some action for 
more than a year.  He warned that the Honduran Congress was 
considering taking action because many in Tegucigalpa were 
skeptical that the Nicaraguan Congress really planned to act. 
 
¶15. (C) Perez-Cadalso was equally frustrated about the land 
border demarcation with El Salvador.  He said that it was now 
more than 10 years since the ICJ ruling and there had been 
very little progress in actually marking the border as called 
for in the ruling.  He commented that many Hondurans believe 
that El Salvador is simply stalling.  He told DAS Fisk that 
Honduras was prepared to accept a technical expert (an 
independent third party, preferably an American engineer) who 
could settle disputes on the spot.  Perez-Cadalso said that 
the GOH was prepared to accept such an arrangement in order 
to make progress. 
 
Palmer