This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000606 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: TFIZ01:  YEMEN - ROYG WALKING A TIGHTROPE 
 
REF: A. SANAA 593 
     ¶B. SANAA 585 
     ¶C. SANAA 338 
     ¶D. SANAA 255 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alan G. Misenheimer for Reasons 
1.5 (b,d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  ROYG is determined to stay ahead of 
regional and Yemeni opinion and maintain its bilateral 
relations with the U.S.  Yemeni leadership continues to 
oscillate between condemnation of the U.S. for the war in 
Iraq and its stated commitment to protect foreigners, 
particularly Americans, and continue CT cooperation in Yemen. 
 End summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
PRE-WAR: A TIME OF RHETORIC 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, ROYG, like 
many of its Arab neighbors, expressed its opposition to the 
use of force in Iraq and the importance of Iraqi compliance 
with the inspection regime.  President Saleh, FM Qirbi, and 
other senior officials availed themselves of the media and 
numerous regional and international conferences, including 
the Arab League, OIC, and the NAM summits, to clarify and 
expand upon the ROYG position.  Specifically, FM Qirbi noted 
that the U.S. and its allies should not be hasty in the use 
of military force (ref C), and, on February 8, predicted that 
war in Iraq would "destabilize the delicate situation" in the 
region (ref D). 
 
¶3.  (C)  ROYG organized a series of internal demonstrations 
to signal their support for the people of Iraq, the 
inspection program, and opposition to the use of force. 
Orderly and non-violent, these demonstrations resembled 
political rallies, with pictures of President Saleh rather 
than Saddam. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  Privately, the same senior officials 
characterized U.S.-Yemen relations as "good" and "very 
important."  Behind closed doors, ROYG officials never 
objected to, and even welcomed, regime change, but were 
concerned about the commencement of hostilities so close to 
Yemen's April 27 parliamentary elections and U.S. plans for a 
"new" Iraq.  President Saleh positioned himself and his party 
in an effort designed to limit the influence of extremist 
factions, both political and Islamic. 
 
-------------------- 
HOSTILITIES COMMENCE 
-------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  At the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq, ROYG 
statements were low-key and non-confrontational (ref A). 
ROYG called for the cessation of hostilities in Iraq and 
declared ROYG commitment to a peaceful resolution through 
legitimate channels -- namely the UN, the Arab League, and 
the Non-Aligned Movement. 
 
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UNDER PRESSURE FROM GOI, ROYG CHANGES TACK 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C)  ROYG is under diplomatic and media pressure by the 
Iraqi government.  Iraqi VP Taha Ramadan followed his 3/23 
statement (ref B) in which he described Yemen and its 
government as hopeless, with a 3/25 statement (text in para 
10) addressing the Arab regimes who are "aiding the 
aggressors", namely Yemen.  Ramadan asked why these regimes 
do not "demand the closure of the U.S. and British embassies 
instead of killing their own people when they head for these 
embassies to demonstrate"  -- another direct reference to the 
violent demonstration on 3/21 near U.S. Embassy Sana'a. 
 
¶7.  (C)  In a March 25 response President Saleh strengthened 
his previously low-key comments saying "there is no 
justification for the American and British aggression against 
Iraq, it is against every resolution in international law..." 
 Saleh also accused the U.S. of allowing Israel to take 
"advantage of the aggression against Iraq to carry out its 
own terrorism campaign against the Palestinian people." 
 
¶8.  (C)  During a 3/25 meeting between ROYG Speaker of 
Parliament Abdallah Bin-Husayn Al-Ahmar and the Iraqi Charge 
d'Affaires to Yemen, Husayn Sadiq Khalifa, Al-Ahmar expressed 
what he declared as the attitude of Yemeni leadership, 
government, and people: that the "Anglo-American aggression" 
against Iraq is considered aggression against the whole Arab 
and Islamic community.  This is an election year and 
Al-Ahmar's comments are similar to statements made by other 
Yemeni officials who are trying to hold on to their 
constituencies in the tide of emotions sweeping the region 
since the beginning of the war.  This tone is also an attempt 
to bolster Yemen's Arab and Islamic credentials during this 
time of regional uncertainty. 
 
--------------- 
ULEMA STATEMENT 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  In the midst of increasing ROYG rhetoric, the Yemeni 
Ulema (council of religious scholars) released a relatively 
balanced statement after its March 24th session.  The 
meeting's stated purpose was "to review the unjust aggressive 
war that is being waged against the Iraqi Arab and Muslim 
people by the leadership of the United States and its ally 
Britain, and those behind them."  The Ulema condemned the 
unjust aggression and called for a boycott of goods from the 
aggressor states, a breaking of the Iraqi blockade, and the 
provision of material and moral support to Iraq and 
Palestine.  However, the last paragraph of their statement 
entreated Yemenis to continue expressing opinions by peaceful 
means and to refrain from damaging public or private 
property, even if it belongs to the citizens of aggressor 
states. 
 
¶10.  (C)  The Ulema were tapped as leaders of a peaceful, 
government-organized anti-war march on March 27.  This 
reflects Saleh's ongoing effort to ensure that the Islamist 
opposition party, Islah, cannot use the war as an electoral 
issue against the ruling party.  The 3/27 march was a 
transparent attempt to pre-empt possible unauthorized 
demonstrations following Friday prayers on March 28.  That 
attempt was successful and there were no demonstrations on 
3/28. 
 
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EXCERPTS OF THE IRAQI VP'S PRESS CONFERENCE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U)  Excerpts from Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin 
Ramadan's March 25 news conference: 
 
--  Why do the Arabs supply the aggressors oil to operate 
their war machine?  Why don't they stop supplying oil to the 
states of aggression?  Why don't they close their airspace 
and land and sea routes to prevent the activities of the 
states of aggression? 
 
--  Why don't they demand the closure of the U.S. and British 
embassies instead of killing their own people when they head 
for these embassies to demonstrate?  They defend the safety 
and security of the personnel at the embassies of the 
aggressors but do not give a damn or offer anything to 
protect the safety and security of the Iraqi people.  They 
may not sever diplomatic relations because they are incapable 
of doing so.  But they should tell them:  Withdraw the 
personnel at your embassies because we cannot be responsible 
for their security. 
 
End text. 
 
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