This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000701 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAN, WHA/PDA 
WHITE HOUSE PASS NSC/WEUROPE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KPAO KMDR OIIP OPRC CA
SUBJECT:  MEDIA REACTION: SERBIA; IRAQ; NORTH KOREA 
 
SERBIA 
¶1.   "A murder in Serbia" 
The leading Globe and Mail stressed (3/13): "...We hope 
the world sees this [assassination of reformist Prime 
Minister Zoran Djindjicas] more than just another in a 
line of troubles that have historically made the 
Balkans a powder keg. We hope its concern is for the 
country as it is today, for the reforms and 
constitutional rule taking shape, and the well-being of 
its people." 
 
¶2.   "Serbia's reformer, R.I.P." 
The conservative National Post opined (3/13): "...Mr. 
Djindjic was a controversial politician who often had 
bitter disagreements with his own democratic-minded 
colleagues. But he will no doubt be remembered as a 
democratic hero. The best way for Serbians to avenge 
his death is to continue with Mr. Djindjic's political 
reforms and anti-crime crusade. As Mr. Djindjic himself 
noted in a tragically prescient interview following a 
botched assassination attempt against him last month, 
the death of the reformer need not necessarily spell 
the death of his reforms." 
 
¶3.   "Serbia's loss" 
The nationalist Ottawa Citizen declared (3/13): 
"...Bringing lasting peace to the Balkans was already 
difficult. Mr. Djindjic's death makes it even harder." 
 
IRAQ 
¶4.   "We should sit out this war" 
Under the sub-heading, "U.S. credibility on Iraq has 
eroded to an extent that it is becoming hard to believe 
anything from the Bush administration," 
editorial page editor Haroon Siddiqui commented in the 
liberal Toronto Star (3/13): "...The Bush 
administration's staggering dishonesty can best be seen 
in the number of times the U.N. inspectors have had to 
shoot down its unsubstantiated assertions. Both Hans 
Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei are seasoned international 
civil servants who understand the value of non- 
partisanship. But they felt compelled to set the record 
straight. 
First, Blix: 
No, his inspectors were not spied on. No, the Iraqis 
could not have had advance knowledge of the sites to be 
inspected. 
No, he did not think Iraqi agents were posing as 
scientists, or that real scientists were being whisked 
out of the country to avoid interrogations. 
No, he found no evidence of Iraqis hiding or moving 
banned materials in or out of the country. 
No, he did not believe that Iraq had cleaned up some 
sites before inspections, as Colin Powell alleged, 
using before and after satellite pictures that Blix 
exposed as having been taken `several weeks apart.' 
No, the trucks that Powell identified as mobile labs 
producing biological weapons were not in the germ 
warfare business; they were carrying food-tasting and 
seed-processing equipment. 
No, Iraq had not hidden the long-range missiles that 
the inspectors ordered destroyed: `These weapons were 
declared; they were not clandestine.' 
No, he found no evidence that Iraq was producing and 
storing chemical or biological weapons in underground 
bunkers. 
No, he saw no persuasive evidence of Iraqi links to Al 
Qaeda. 'There are other states where there appear to be 
stronger links.' 
Now, ElBaradei: 
No, there was no uranium bought from Niger. Documents 
purporting to show that were forged. 
No, the International Atomic Energy Agency found no 
evidence that high-strength aluminium tubes were 
imported for uranium enrichment. Even if they were, it 
was unlikely that Iraq had the capacity to redesign 
them for such usage. 
No, there is no evidence of Iraq using imported high- 
strength magnets in its nuclear program. 
No, there is no evidence of a resumption of 'prohibited 
nuclear or nuclear-related activities.' 
Despite being contradicted on so many fronts, Powell is 
now saying with a straight face that he has 'new 
information' that Iraq is building new missiles as the 
inspectors are destroying the old ones. That's quite 
possible. But does anyone believe him, or America, any 
more? The evaporation of American credibility is a 
tragedy whose effects may outlast the war." 
 
¶5.   "Bush's so-called rush into battle is anything 
but" 
Columnist Marcus Gee observed in the leading Globe and 
Mail (3/13): "- Rush to war? It has been 18 months 
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 14 months since U.S. 
President George W. Bush gave his speech naming Saddam 
Hussein's Iraq part of an 'axis of evil,' six months 
since he took his case to the United Nations and four 
months since he secured a UN resolution giving Iraq 
a final chance to give up its weapons of mass 
destruction. If this is a rush, it's hard to imagine 
what a crawl would look like.... Whether or not all the 
diplomacy succeeds, no one can say that the United 
States didn't go the last mile to get international 
support. Far from plunging into war, Mr. Bush has 
proceeded by careful, deliberate steps.... And if Mr. 
Bush doesn't get the UN majority and goes to war 
anyway? Well, at least no one can call it a 'rush to 
war.'" 
 
NORTH KOREA 
¶6.   "North Korea shows how to make the U.S. temper its 
actions" 
Columnist Jonathan Manthorpe wrote in the left-of- 
center Vancouver Sun (3/12): "...Because Kim is a real 
military threat and has neighbours - China, Japan and 
South Korea - of importance to the U.S., Washington has 
chosen to negotiate rather than attack. Saddam, on the 
other hand, has no nuclear weapons and might or might 
not be able to account for biological and 
chemical weapons stocks he might or might not have 
had.... Once you have nuclear weapons Washington will 
treat you with caution. So better get the bomb 
quick.... So the way the U.S. administration has 
handled the Iraq-North Korea dichotomy can be seen as 
promoting weapons proliferation rather than containing 
it.... It's not necessary to be on Washington's hit 
list to feel that in an increasingly uncertain world 
having a nice fat bomb stored in the basement might be 
a good idea.... An arms race in Asia is, of course, 
most likely to happen if Washington's allies feel the 
U.S. cannot be depended upon to support its friends as 
it has for the last half century. That development 
seems unlikely now, but who can tell what mood America 
will be in after its Iraqi adventure? Even without a 
spate of proliferation in Asia, the situation between 
the U.S. and North Korea is dangerous enough.... What 
Washington does not seem to have grasped with 
sufficient clarity is that Kim's North Korean regime is 
not house-trained. More than half a century of self- 
imposed isolation has bred institutional suspicion, 
paranoia and sheer ignorance about how the world works. 
Kim's paranoia roared forth when Bush declared a 
strategy of 'pre-emptive attack' on any country deemed 
a future risk to America. Washington discovered Kim's 
secret nuclear research last year, confirming its view 
 
SIPDIS 
that he could not be trusted." 
 
CELLUCCI