This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO FOR POL -- MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SOUTH TENSE AS POLITICAL VIOLENCE RISES 
 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 00448 
     ¶B. ABUJA 00449 
     ¶C. LAGOS 504 
     ¶D. LAGOS 505 
 
 
Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL ROBYN HINSON-JONES.  REASON:  1.5 (B & D) 
 
 
. 
 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Southern civic and media groups have 
diverse views of the coming elections, ranging from 
optimistic anticipation of leadership change to fear of 
ruthless power tactics.  Some analysts predict "bloody" 
elections in Kwara and the South-South states, but relative 
calm in Lagos and elsewhere.  Across the South, the 
increasing frequency and prominence of apparent political 
assassinations has heightened the public's nervousness.  None 
of the scenarios for violence include attacks against foreign 
nationals.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
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SOUTHERN TENSIONS RISING; IMPUNITY REIGNS SUPREME 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Beyond the on-going societal violence and 
extrajudicial killings, which result in corpses on the 
streets and in the lagoons or rivers of Lagos State, numerous 
prominent Nigerian citizens have been murdered in recent 
months.  Southern Nigerians express universal horror at the 
murders, several of which have taken place in the victims' 
homes.  While the 2001 case of felled Attorney General Bola 
Ige remains under prosecution, to date no suspects have been 
convicted for politically motivated murders in the post-1999 
administration.  Over a dozen such murders and additional 
reported attempted murders remain unsolved from the past two 
years.  Whatever the reasons for the stinted administration 
of justice, many Nigerians view the GON as complacent toward 
or impotent against political violence in the South. 
Southern human rights groups have warned poloffs since 
September 2002 that the number of deaths would surely rise as 
elections drew nearer.  This sad prediction is being 
fulfilled, though the reasons behind the violence remain 
hazy. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Tensions in the South have increased steadily since 
last fall.  Multiple sources accuse political leaders and 
their supporters of plotting various murders that have taken 
place under suspicious circumstances.  Some candidates appear 
to be wearing bullet-proof vests.  Sources attribute 
assassinations generally to one of two possible motives: a 
major "business deal gone bad" or a political vendetta. 
Ledum Mitee, president of the Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People (MOSOP), says the motive itself is less 
important in explaining the phenomenon of these killings than 
the atmosphere of impunity they generate.  The "real reason 
why it happens," he argues, is the "lack of accountability" 
combined with an "irrational instinct to dominate that comes 
with power."  Political killings may occur if someone 
obsessed with power, or allies, views a person as an 
opponent's supporter.  The target may not be the opponent 
directly.  Some politicians are allegedly detaining opponents 
and critics with impunity.  For example, Eni Akinsola of CDHR 
reports that authorities are repeatedly detaining polytechnic 
professor John Okam without charges, allegedly under orders 
by a member of the Cross River State House of Assembly. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
FORECAST: MORE VIOLENCE AHEAD 
----------------------------- 
 
 
¶4.  (C) POLITICAL KILLINGS, THUGGERY, AND VIGILANTISM. In 
southern Nigeria, persons who initiate violence will usually 
appeal more to ethnic than to religious ties, most sources 
agree.  More dangerous than sporadic societal uprisings, some 
sources claim, are threats by hired thugs.  Southern human 
rights NGOs expect political violence will continue to rise 
throughout the election season.  Many see it as indisputable 
fact that some politicians recruit thugs to influence the 
outcome of elections or other political gatherings.  Other 
politicians, failing to discourage criminal actions by their 
supporters who are seeking to maintain or gain power, 
passively permit such violence.  Members of the Committee for 
the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR), including Eni Akinsola, 
Shina Loremikan, Belo Aideloje, and Ropo Ewenla, described 
first-hand experience they had in university when dominant 
military rulers paid friends to disrupt political and social 
meetings that could undermine the strongman's agenda.  The 
same methods are used to affect political agendas in 
democracy today, they claim. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) ARMED STUDENTS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS.  Contacts from 
CDHR, MOSOP, the Catholic Secretariat, and the Civil 
Liberties Organization continue to raise allegations with 
poloffs that some candidates actively recruit student 
"cultists" to join street armies and intimidate voters at the 
polls.  Groups such as the Vikings in Rivers and Black Ax in 
Enugu are receiving funds in exchange for their "support." 
Arms are being stockpiled on university campuses, they claim. 
 "Students will tell you, 'I'm for so-and-so,'" said CDHR's 
Eni Akinsola.  "When you ask them, 'Why?' they'll tell you 
simply, 'He's my candidate.'  You know what they mean.  They 
have been paid." 
 
 
¶6.  (C) DEADLY PLACES TO WATCH?  Akinsola and Chukwuma 
Ezeala, national coordinator of the Justice Development and 
Peace Commission (JDPC), predict that roughly half of 
Nigeria's states will be violent and half will be peaceful 
come elections.  Kwara's capital of Illorin will be "one big 
pool of blood," they say.  "Kwara is anybody's game: Lawal, 
Saraki, or Lai Mohammed."  Rivers and Delta will also be 
"very bloody."  Bayelsa and Cross River will have "problems." 
 In Akwa Ibom, though the urban centers may be peaceful, the 
villages may endure the "worst potential violence."  They 
expect violence in Ondo and Oyo "because the people there do 
not support the candidates they are bringing, and the PDP 
will win these states at all costs."  Potential hotspots in 
the North include Kano, Kebbi, and especially Katsina, they 
believe.  Kaduna and Plateau will be "dicey."  Borno will be 
interesting because of the balanced strength of competing 
parties, they argue.  Nassarawa may have skirmishes as well. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
TENTATIVE TRUCES AND "TRANSPARENT RIGGING" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Lagos will be relatively peaceful, think Akinsola and 
Ezeala, because "the two factions of the OPC have agreed not 
to fight each other here." Representatives of these two 
organizations believe that the OPC may be involved in 
violence elsewhere, namely Kwara, but the police have "agreed 
to allow the OPC to participate in Lagos politics as long as 
no violence is involved."  In Ogun, where the vote is being 
"more transparently rigged--no, 'allocated,'" voting will be 
relatively peaceful.  Kogi "will be very peaceful, for the 
most part."  In Niger, "the big-wigs won't allow their 
domains to deteriorate into violence."  Ekiti "would have 
been a bloody tag team, but the four parties are not fighting 
each other now."  Other states that will not experience 
"much" violence include Osun, Sokoto, Abia, Bauchi, Benue, 
Zamfara, Adamawa, and Gombe.  Anambra will be violent, but to 
a lesser degree than the norm. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) RIGGING LEGITIMATELY: WHEN THEY'LL THROW IN THE 
TOWEL.  "You need to have genuine support in order to rig an 
election," asserted Akinsola.  "If you cross the 30 percent 
threshold of support, then you can rig it to get the 
mandate."  Most rigging, according to Ledum Mitee of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), does 
not involve the literal "stuffing of the ballot box."  The 
process is less definable than the outcome in some cases. How 
electoral officers are chosen and what they do with the 
resources they are given are important.  Do they make voting 
materials available?  Do they distribute fraudulent ballots? 
To combat rigging and increase the perceived legitimacy of 
election outcomes, several NGOs say, results should be 
announced on site by the local government offices, rather 
than passing the results all the way to Abuja for final 
announcement. 
 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT.  Political fears in the South are largely 
by-products of societal clashes between indigenous groups 
(e.g. Warri, Delta State), alleged assassinations, and 
political legitimacy questions (as some candidates across the 
South are reportedly "imposed" on voters without popular 
consent). Despite Obasanjo's popularity with many 
Southerners, his recent efforts to shore up political support 
have failed to convince people who feel that the GON has done 
little to engender economic development and social welfare, 
issues repeatedly highlighted as paramount to Southern 
constituents.  The climate remains volatile in pockets across 
the South; moreover, tensions continue to riddle 
relationships between the international oil companies 
operating in the region and the local residents. The 
coincidence of tensions in the Middle East and domestic 
violence in Nigeria is thus making many an expat 
uncomfortable.  Whatever election violence there may be in 
the South is not expected to involve foreign nationals, 
however. Prudence and common sense should help keep foreign 
nationals away from the election fray.  END COMMENT. 
HINSON-JONES