This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000566 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2013 
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID SZ NP
SUBJECT: NEPALI MAOISTS PURSUE SEPARATE DIALOGUE WITH 
EUROPEAN DONOR MISSIONS 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 0408 
 
Classified By: DCM ROBERT K. BOGGS.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C)  Anton Hagen, local head of the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC), confirmed to the DCM that 
Maoist insurgents have enlisted his help in sounding out 
other European and Canadian donor agencies regarding a 
possible meeting with Maoist interlocutors.  Hagen also 
confirmed that SDC had quietly sponsored a conflict mediation 
workshop, attended by both Maoist and mainstream political 
party representatives, in Switzerland in February.  The DCM 
cautioned that meeting the Maoists at senior levels might 
give the insurgents, who attempt to portray themselves as a 
legitimate political force, a respectability and 
international profile they do not deserve and urged him to 
keep the Government of Nepal (GON) apprised.  The Foreign 
Secretary told the Ambassador on March 28 that the GON 
 
SIPDIS 
strongly opposes the initiative and will do "as much as 
possible" to ensure the proposed meeting does not occur. 
Although, as far as we know, no such meetings have yet 
materialized, it is clear that the Maoists are adopting the 
same "divide-and-conquer" strategy toward donors perceived as 
sympathetic as they employ with domestic political leaders. 
End summary. 
 
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SWISS SURROGATES? 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Anton Hagen, the local head of the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC), confirmed to the DCM that 
Maoist representatives had asked him recently to sound out 
the heads of European and Canadian donor agencies and certain 
embassies about possibly meeting with the Maoists.  (Note: 
The Americans, Japanese, Australians, and the British 
Ambassador were pointedly excluded from the Maoist 
invitation, although British aid agency DFID was not.  End 
note.)  Hagen acknowledged "responding positively" to the 
request, reasoning that donors "will have to talk with the 
Maoists sooner or later" anyway.  He has since polled the 
Danes, Norwegians, Canadians, Finns, Dutch, EU, DFID, and 
German aid agency GTZ about their willingness to participate 
in such a meeting.  Hagen told the DCM the Maoists have not 
contacted him since the initial overture to learn the results 
of his survey, and he expressed regret that certain missions 
(e.g, the U.S.) were excluded from the invitation.  (Note: 
The Maoists approached the Danish Embassy with a similar 
request several weeks before.  The Danes agreed to pass the 
message but not to organize an actual meeting.  The Maoists 
never contacted them again.  End note.) 
 
¶3.  (C)  The DCM told Hagen that the USG fully supports 
negotiations that will lead to a final and peaceful 
resolution of the seven-year Maoist insurgency.  Such 
negotiations are certain to be complicated, lengthy, and 
delicate, he cautioned, and friends of Nepal should do 
nothing to increase their difficulty.  The Maoists are trying 
to (mis)represent themselves as a legitimate political force, 
claiming that they constitute the government in areas under 
their sway, and want to be recognized by the international 
community on the same level as the Government of Nepal (GON). 
 Senior-level foreign diplomats and aid directors agreeing to 
meet the Maoists could give the insurgents a status and 
respectability they do not deserve, the DCM warned. 
Moreover, if the insurgents believe they have international 
support, it could affect their negotiating strategy with the 
GON.  He urged Hagen to keep the GON informed of his efforts. 
 Hagen thanked the DCM for his comments, but did not commit 
to advising the GON. 
 
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SWISS PEACE SEMINAR 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Hagen also acknowledged to the DCM that the SDC had 
quietly sponsored a seminar on conflict resolution and peace 
building for about 20 Nepali participants in Switzerland from 
February 11-18.  (We had learned about the seminar from at 
least two of the participants.)  In addition to members of 
civil society, businessmen, and mainstream political parties, 
SDC had also invited two Maoist representatives.  SDC in 
Bern, along with Swiss NGO Inter Cooperation, were the main 
impetus for the seminar, Hagen said, determining the 
participants and the agenda. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Nischal Nath Pandey, Deputy Executive Director of 
the GON-sponsored Institute of Foreign Affairs and son of 
Information Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey, told the DCM in a 
separate conversation that the GON had declined SDC's 
invitation to send official representatives to the February 
conference, opting instead to send him and National Assembly 
member Padma Jyoti as unofficial observers.  Pandey said he 
found the seminar useful and instructive as background on how 
other domestic conflicts had been resolved.  For the first 
several days of the seminar, the Maoists were silent, he 
said, speaking instead through three pro-Maoist "human 
rights" activists.  On the fourth day--when the Swiss 
facilitators left the Nepali participants alone to hammer out 
a joint statement--the two insurgents spoke for two hours, 
explaining their position to the other participants at 
considerable length, Pandey recalled.  They reportedly 
stressed three points.  First, they denied having any secret 
agreement with the Palace.  Second, they appealed to the 
mainstream political parties to forge an alliance with them 
against the King to press for a constituent assembly.  (Note: 
 Jhala Nath Khanal, a Communist Party of Nepal - United 
Marxist Leninist (UML) member who also attended the seminar, 
recalls this point being communicated with a somewhat 
different emphasis than the pro-Palace Pandey.  According to 
Khanal, the Maoists argued that if they are now willing to 
accept multiparty democracy, then the political parties 
should be willing to consider a constituent assembly.  End 
note.)  Finally, the Maoists denied having engaged in 
indiscrimate violence but acknowledged killing "intelligence 
officers," among whom they explicitly included U.S. Embassy 
guards Ramesh Manandhar (killed in December 2001) and Deepak 
Pokhrel (killed in November 2002). 
 
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GON REACTION 
------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  On March 28 Foreign Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya 
told the Ambassador and DCM that he had personally called 
Hagen to express the GON's "explicit opposition" to the 
proposed meeting between European aid donors and the Maoists. 
 Acharya said he stressed that the GON was committed to doing 
"as much as possible" to ensure that such a meeting does not 
take place.  The Foreign Secretary added that the GON had 
also rejected two other proposals (one from the UNDP and the 
other in the context of ongoing GON/donor dialogue) to 
include Maoists in formal discussions with foreign missions. 
The GON believes the Maoists are doing all that they can to 
burnish their international image and credentials in order to 
strengthen their hand before negotiations begin, Acharya 
concluded. 
 
¶7.  (C)  The Ambassador told Acharya that the Embassy, which 
had not been included in the Maoist overture, has been 
counseling its diplomatic colleagues against agreeing to such 
a meeting.  (Note:  The Indian Ambassador told his US and 
British counterparts on March 27 that his government strongly 
opposes the idea as well.  End note.)  As guests of the GON, 
foreign diplomats have an obligation to keep the Government 
informed of any such initiative, he emphasized.  In any 
event, formal talks between diplomatic missions and the 
Maoists are premature as long as the insurgents have not 
renounced violence.  Most donors have already established a 
modus vivendi for getting humanitarian aid to recipients in 
Maoist-affected areas, and thus do not need to establish 
formal channels of communication to carry out their projects, 
he observed.  Many of the donors most intimately involved in 
this overture provide comparatively modest aid, he noted, 
adding that he resents Maoist attempts to split the donor 
community. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8.  (C)  While we don't doubt the good intentions of some of 
our diplomatic colleagues here, we do question the wisdom of 
even appearing to accord violent insurgents the same status 
due a legitimate government.  By limiting their invitation to 
those missions and donors they perceive as more sympathetic, 
the Maoists are clearly using the same "divide-and-conquer" 
strategy they have employed so effectively against domestic 
political parties.  The insurgents can be counted on to 
exploit any form of favorable recognition from the 
international community to legitimate their claims of 
constituting a viable alternative government to the GON.  We 
will continue to strongly counsel our colleagues against 
pursuing any contact with the Maoists that could jeopardize 
progress toward peace talks. 
 
 
 
MALINOWSKI