This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000628 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PINR ASEC ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC ELEMENTS STILL CONTEMPLATING VIOLENCE 
 
REF: HARARE 516 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Audu Besmer for reasons 1.5 b/d 
 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) On March 26, MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube 
assured the Ambassador that the party remains committed to 
peaceful change, while acknowledging that some party elements 
had been planning bombing attacks prior to the March 18-19 
stayaway.  Solomon Chikowero, the MDC Head of Intelligence 
said, however, that some in the party rank and file were 
still prepared to launch violent action against the 
Government, and were awaiting the green light from MDC 
leadership to proceed.  End Summary. 
 
Ambassador with MDC Secretary-General 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Polchief, met on March 
26 with MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube to counsel 
strongly against the MDC's initiation of violence.  The 
Ambassador emphasized that in addition to losing the high 
moral ground in such a scenario, the MDC would be playing on 
ZANU-PF's proven turf and could not win a violent battle with 
the ruling party.  Ncube stressed that the MDC leadership 
remains committed to peaceful change, saying that conducting 
a war against ZANU-PF with petrol bombs would be suicidal. 
He acknowledged that elements of his party had been planning 
certain "insane things" prior to the stayaway, such as 
bombing bridges and electrical installations.  When this was 
brought to his attention, he immediately spoke with deputy 
Secretary-General Gift Chimanikire, who supervises the 
 
SIPDIS 
party's intelligence and security directorates, and told him 
to rescind any orders that might have been given for violent 
action. 
 
¶3.  (C) Ncube said the party would not be ready to launch the 
next phase of mass action when a March 31 ultimatum deadline 
expires.  (Note: After the successful March 18-19 stayaway, 
the MDC issued a list of demands the Government must meet by 
March 31 or face further civil unrest.  End Note.)  The party 
is now coordinating with civic organizations such as the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the National 
Constitutional Assembly, and would likely need until the 
second or third week in April to do the necessary 
mobilization.  Asked what form the next phase of mass action 
would take, Ncube said the party wanted to organize protests 
that were sustainable and ongoing, not one- or two-day 
affairs.  Prolonged stayaways and street demonstrations in 
the high-density suburbs were the most likely actions.  In 
the beginning, however, the MDC would not organize 
large-scale demonstrations in the city center, in order to 
minimize the possibility of security service attacks on 
members of the public and to avoid gathering large numbers of 
party activists in the same place. 
 
Violence - A Contingency Plan? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) In a separate conversation with Poloff on March 26, 
Solomon Chikowero, the MDC Head of Intelligence, said plans 
for violent activities are in place and that they are simply 
waiting for the green light from the MDC leadership, which is 
to meet on March 28 to decide what to do when the MDC 
ultimatum expires on March 31.  Chikowero said there was a 
feeling within the MDC that whether they engaged in 
stayaways, demonstrations, or more violent activities--the 
response from the GOZ was the same: detentions, arrests, 
beatings, tortures and rapes.  He expressed the sense of some 
within the MDC that they had exhausted their options and were 
left with only violent means to pressure the GOZ into a 
dialogue on political change. 
 
¶5. (C) Chikowero suggested that parastatal Zimbabwe Unified 
Passenger Company (ZUPCO) buses would be prime targets for 
attack, and that avoiding injuries would be important. 
Chikowero did not mention other specific targets, but his 
subordinates had elaborated on this topic in previous 
conversations with us (reftel). 
 
¶6. (C) Poloff reiterated that if the MDC engaged in violence 
that the U.S. and others in the international community would 
have no choice but to distance themselves.  Organized 
violence was not the hallmark of a legitimate democratic 
political party.  Poloff suggested there were many other 
peaceful ways to motivate political change.  Poloff suggested 
that the recent stayaway had already bolstered Zimbabweans' 
confidence in their ability to influence political change. 
Violent activities would only invite a more violent crackdown 
on the part of government, as we saw in the aftermath of the 
March 18-19 stayaway. 
¶7. (C) Chikowero agreed in principle that non-violent 
activities were a good idea, and that violent activities 
could backfire politically, but he said that the final 
decision would be made above his head.  He also said 
non-violent stayaways and protests, though more desirable, 
were more complicated to organize in a reasonable amount of 
time, and according to him, less likely to succeed. 
Chikowero said discouraging stone throwing was a lost cause 
with MDC supporters on the street who have been beaten 
repeatedly by security forces. 
 
Soldiers? 
--------- 
 
¶8. (C) Chikowero said the "soldiers" currently carrying out 
the retribution campaign against MDC supporters are National 
Youth Service members, "green bombers" led by war vets who 
re-entered the military in 2001.  He claimed that none of 
them are regular soldiers.  Chikowero said that his office 
could compile a list of the war-vets cum soldiers, and other 
information on which military units have supplied the 
camouflage uniforms, military vehicles and weapons. 
Chikowero was speculating, but he suggested that it was 
likely the Joint Operations Command (JOC), which comprises 
elements of the police, military, and Central Intelligence 
Organization, was coordinating, or was at least complicit in 
the operation. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶9. (C) We believe that Welshman Ncube is committed to 
achieving political change peacefully and hope that other 
senior MDC leaders share this view.  His obvious discomfort 
in discussing this topic, however, raises some question about 
the commitment of other MDC leaders to the path of 
non-violence.  It is noteworthy, that the MDC has issued no 
public statement condemning the sporadic violence that 
occurred during the March 18-19 stayaway.  Such a statement 
would send a clear message to the increasingly frustrated 
rank and file that the party was opposed to violence of any 
sort.  Instead it appears that attacks on ZANU-PF interests 
are being kept in reserve as a contingency plan, and 
cultivated by lower-level officials and supporters who 
themselves see few other viable options.  So far, those 
elements have heeded the leadership's stand down orders, but 
it is impossible to predict how long their commitment to the 
party leadership will outweigh their frustration with the 
regime.  We will continue to stress in our interactions with 
MDC leaders our conviction that violence is not the way 
forward. 
 
Who is Chikowero? 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Chikowero is an impressive figure, a former Air Force 
paratrooper and intelligence officer who served in Somalia, 
Mozambique and various posts within Zimbabwe.  A military 
court imprisoned him in 1991 for refusing to follow orders 
during operations in Mozambique, which he described as using 
junior soldiers as cannon fodder.  He was released in 1996 
and declined an offer to re-join the Air Force to instead 
team up with the fledging MDC a couple of years later.  Since 
joining the MDC he has been arrested about eleven times, and 
tortured twice within the past year.  He said the tortures 
have only hardened his resolve against the current regime. 
He is widely regarded in ZANU-PF circles as being at the 
center of plans for MDC-sponsored violence, and is watched 
closely by the security services.  End Comment. 
SULLIVAN