This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000502 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, S/CT, NEA/NGA, 
DS/DSS/ITA, DAERCC, INR/NESA, AND IO 
 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 03-25-13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KPAO PHUM ASEC CE MV IZ
SUBJECT:  TFIZ01:  Mission presses points re CHR, UN; 
Sri Lanka/Maldives reaction continues to be low-key 
 
Refs:  (A) State 76597 
 
-      (B) Colombo 483 (Notal) 
-      (C) Colombo 486, and previous 
-      (D) State 75513 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons: 1.5 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Mission is continuing to press points 
re keeping the Iraq issue out of the CHR and the 
UNSC/UNGA.  Overall reaction in Sri Lanka and the 
Maldives to the Iraq situation continues to be low-key. 
Media coverage is heavy, with almost all commentary 
anti-U.S.  Our best educated guess is that the local 
situation will remain calm barring unforeseen events. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) PRESSING POINTS RE CHR/UN:  Mission continues to 
press Department's points re keeping the Iraq issue out 
of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and the 
UNSC/UNGA.  In a conversation earlier today (March 25) 
with Foreign Secretary Rodrigo, Ambassador reiterated 
Ref D points re the CHR (already passed to the GSL per 
Ref C).  Rodrigo assured the Ambassador that the GSL 
would not support any effort to put Iraq on the CHR's 
agenda.  (Note:  We understand that the Sri Lankan 
Ambassador in the U.S. has made similar assurances to 
Department.) 
 
¶3.  (C) In response to Ref A points re Arab efforts to 
place the issue on the agenda at the UN, Rodrigo was a 
bit more equivocal.  He indicated that the government 
would oppose any effort to raise the Iraq issue at the 
UN if the GSL had a sense that doing so would lead to 
name-calling or tendentious discussions in that forum. 
If plans for a possible discussion seemed to be going in 
a constructive direction by focusing on humanitarian or 
other matters, however, the GSL might re-consider and 
support such a meeting, Rodrigo said.  In a second phone 
call with Rodrigo this afternoon, Ambassador focused 
again on the Arab League's call for a special session of 
the UNSC or a UNGA session.  Rodrigo confessed to being 
out of touch with the latest developments, but said Sri 
Lanka would work to be as constructive as possible. 
(Note:  Mission has also passed Ref A points to the 
Maldivian government, which had no response.) 
 
¶4.  (C) SRI LANKA REACTION:  Overall reaction in Sri 
Lanka and the Maldives to the Iraq situation continues 
to be low-key.  The "Sri Lankan street" continues to be 
quiet.  As previously reported to SA/INS, there was an 
anti-U.S. rally after Muslim prayers on Friday, 
March 21, in Colombo.  Muslim parties and organizations, 
and the radical left Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 
party sponsored the rally.  Upwards of a thousand or so 
demonstrators turned up.  There was no violence 
(although a U.S. flag or two were reportedly burned) and 
the crowd dispersed quickly.  There have also been some 
rallies in other parts of the country, but, again, no 
reports of violence. 
 
¶5.  (C) Mission has not picked up any vibrations that 
anti-U.S. groups are planning bigger rallies to come. 
In any case, the government, in line with its stated 
willingness to protect fully diplomatic personnel and 
interests, continues to underscore that it is ready to 
quell any problems provoked by demonstrators. 
(Note:  See the GSL's relatively constructive March 20 
statement re the situation, which is contained in 
Ref D.)  (Note:  Also see Septel re Mission's latest 
Emergency Action Committee meeting.) 
 
¶6.  (C) Regarding local political reaction, it is 
interesting that the main Opposition grouping, the 
People's Alliance (PA), has not yet issued a coherent 
policy statement re the Iraq situation, as of this 
point.  Various PA officials have made public 
statements, some moderate-themed, some extreme, but the 
party itself has not issued a statement.  (Note:  On the 
extreme side, one third-tier PA official reportedly 
called President Bush a "war criminal."  When Polchief 
called the official and challenged him about the quote, 
the PA official clamed up and would not confirm that he 
had said it.)  The PA's lack of a focused reaction could 
be due to the fact that President Kumaratunga, the 
leader of the party, has been vacationing in the UK of 
late and, after postponing her planned return, is not 
due back in-country until the coming weekend. 
(Note:  FYI.  Re Tamil Tigers' reaction, the group has 
reportedly made a public statement to the effect that it 
wished the U.S. had gone through the UN and not attacked 
Iraq.) 
 
¶7.  (C) MALVIVES REACTION:  Based on everything we are 
picking up, the Maldives is also quiet.  We have heard 
no reports of demonstrations or disturbances of any 
sort.  The government website "Haveeru" contains mainly 
AFP wire service reports re the situation. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) MEDIA COVERAGE:  As has been the case for the 
past several days, Sri Lanka's newspapers were full of 
stories re the Gulf situation on March 25. (Note:  See 
Septel media reaction cable for more re the March 25 
press.  Also see Ref C.)  The news coverage continues to 
be basically straightforward, as are most headlines. 
(Note:  In a particularly egregious exception, the 
Opposition English-language ISLAND carried a blaring 
headline on its front-page stating, bizarrely, "Apache 
Down, Another U.S. Symbol Dented.")  In the meantime, 
editorial and op-ed comment continues to be vociferously 
anti-U.S. 
 
¶9.  (C) In a March 24 meeting, PAO asked ISLAND editor 
Gamani Weerakoon about the anti-U.S. coverage. 
Weerakoon replied that the U.S. should not make too much 
of it.  The majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil 
communities do not care a wit about the Iraq situation. 
Some Muslims might care, but they are a small minority, 
he said.  (Note:  Muslims are about 8 percent of the 
population.) 
 
¶10.  (C) COMMENT:  Our best educated guess is that the 
local situation will remain calm barring unforeseen 
events.  If a siege of Baghdad turns particularly 
bloody, for example, perhaps local concerns will 
skyrocket.  At the same time, if the conflict takes many 
weeks, perhaps it will begin to hurt pocketbooks in Sri 
Lanka via higher fuel costs or a decline in remittances 
from workers in the Middle East.  Outside of that, as we 
have stressed before, Sri Lanka remains largely focused 
on its own very real problems, most particularly its 
complex, fragile peace process.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS