This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

200727Z Mar 03

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000468 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, S/CT, NEA/NGA, 
DS/DSS/ITA, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 03-20-13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KPAO ASEC CE MV IZ
SUBJECT:  TFIZ01:  Low-key reaction in Sri 
Lanka/Maldives to start of military operations 
 
Refs:  (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 200727Z Mar 03 
 
-      (B) State 72921 
-      (C) State 72913 
-      (D) Colombo 463 
-      (E) Colombo 460, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons: 1.5 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY:  General reaction in Sri Lanka and the 
Maldives to the start of military operations against 
Iraq has been low-key, so far.  The PM has asked to see 
the Ambassador late today.  Sri Lanka's envoy to the 
U.S. called the Ambassador earlier, and said the GSL 
plans to issue a "helpful" statement re the situation. 
Latest demarche re Iraqi intel officials has been 
conveyed to the GSL.  Media coverage continues to be 
heavy.  A test of local reaction will come after Muslim 
prayers on March 21.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) INTERACTIONS WITH GSL:  Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe has invited Ambassador Wills to see him 
late today.  The PM almost certainly wants to discuss 
the developing situation.  We will brief Department 
after the meeting. 
 
¶3.  (C) In the meantime, Sri Lankan Ambassador to the 
U.S. Devinda Subasinghe called Ambassador Wills early 
March 20 (before the actual commencement of military 
operations) and said the GSL was planning on issuing a 
"helpful" statement re the Iraq situation.  (Note:  The 
PM had also told the Ambassador this on March 19 -- See 
Ref E.)  Subasinghe said domestic political (e.g., 
Muslim) sensitivities and other complexities 
(specifically President Kumraratunga's likely 
objections) would prevent the GSL from actually coming 
out and publicly joining the U.S.-led coalition of the 
willing. 
 
¶4.  (S) Per Ref B, Mission has conveyed the latest 
demarche pressing for the expulsion of Iraqi officials 
and the closure of the regime's embassy to the GSL.  We 
will continue to press government interlocutors re this 
high-priority matter. 
 
¶5.  (C) SRI LANKA REACTION:  The news that military 
operations had commenced broke in Sri Lanka just before 
9:00 am, March 20.  Most Sri Lankans were already at 
work at this point and traffic continued to proceed 
normally in Colombo.  There have been no reports of 
disturbances.  Mission has been in touch with contacts 
in mainly Muslim areas of the east and Puttalam District 
north of Colombo, and they report that the situation is 
quiet.  There was a demonstration by Muslims north of 
Batticaloa town early March 20, but it reportedly ended 
peacefully.  Per Ref D, an anti-U.S. rally is slated to 
take place in Colombo after Muslim prayers on Friday, 
March 21, and we have heard of some other rallies at 
other sites in country.  (Note:  Mission held an EAC on 
March 20 -- see Septel.  The police have contacted RSO 
and promised unequivocal cooperation.  DCM is also 
scheduled to attend a briefing for the diplomatic corps 
given by the Interior Minister late March 20.  The 
briefing will focus on the local security situation.) 
(Note:  Mission has just received a report attributed to 
AFP that someone in the Opposition People's Alliance 
called President Bush a "war criminal."  We are looking 
into the report, which is contained in Ref A.) 
 
¶6.  (C) MALDIVES REACTION:  In a conversation focused on 
other subjects, Polchief asked Dr. Shaheed, the 
Permanent Secretary of the Maldivian MFA, about the 
situation in Male.  Shaheed said all was quiet, noting 
that he did not expect any rallies or demonstrations to 
take place.  Poloff also spoke to Minh Pham (Amcit--pls 
protect), the UN coordinator for the Maldives, who 
confirmed that the situation was quiet.  Pham added that 
many Maldivians were watching news of the developing 
situation on CNN and BBC.  His overall impression was 
that Maldivians did not support the war, but were 
"resigned" to it.  The government website "Haveeru" 
contained AFP wire service reports re the situation, but 
no commentary. 
¶7. (U) MEDIA COVERAGE:  The front-pages of Sri Lanka's 
newspapers were full of stories re the Gulf situation on 
March 20, although the latest news re the ongoing Sri 
Lankan peace talks was also given significant coverage. 
The start of the military campaign took place after 
papers were published, so most Iraq-related articles in 
March 20 editions focused on the runup to war.  After 
the war started, TV stations were full of news re the 
situation.  Conforming to the general anti-U.S. slant of 
many press pieces here, an editorial in the Opposition 
English-language ISLAND entitled "From Satyr to Martyr?" 
stated: 
 
"This war is not only bound to bring about radical 
changes in the politics of Iraq and that of the Middle 
East...It will also turn the new political order that 
was taking shape after the Cold War topsy turvy (as the) 
the democratic idealism that gradually came to the 
forefront in US foreign policy (is)...replaced with 
sheer militarism and disregard for international law and 
the UN.  The world can only hope that what is happening 
is an aberration."  (Note:  See Ref D for additional 
text from this editorial.) 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT:  At this point, our sense is that Sri 
Lankans are just absorbing the news that war has begun 
and are collecting their thoughts.  Our best educated 
guess is that the situation will remain relatively calm 
here primarily for the good reason that Sri Lanka has 
plenty of other fish to tandoori.  A test will come 
after Muslim prayers on Friday, March 21, when religious 
extremists and leftists will try to bring out crowds and 
test the government's commitment to keep the situation 
under control.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS