This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. 
MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL: 03/05/13 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM PINR CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT:  In meeting with Ambassador, senior Tamil MP 
gives thumbs down on current state of peace process 
 
Refs:  Colombo 358, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.  Reasons 
1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a March 5 meeting with the 
Ambassador, Gajen Ponnambalam, a senior Tamil MP, gave 
the peace process negative reviews, asserting that the 
GSL had to do more to diminish its military presence in 
Jaffna and in lifting fishing restrictions.  Ponnambalam 
said the LTTE supported the ceasefire, but felt it had 
already given away a great deal at the peace talks and 
was under pressure from its hard-line eastern wing not 
to compromise.  He reacted negatively to the argument 
that it was critical for the LTTE to do more. 
Ponnambalam's comments shed light on the peace process' 
current difficulties.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
Meeting with Senior Tamil MP 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador Wills met March 5 with Gajendrakumar 
"Gajen" Ponnambalam, a senior MP for the Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) representing Jaffna.  Ponnambalam, 28, a 
lawyer by profession, was elected to Parliament for the 
first time in December 2001 and is the scion of an 
important Tamil political family.  He inherited 
leadership of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), a 
constituent element of the TNA, from his father, Kumar, 
who was killed under mysterious circumstances in 
January 2000.  Ponnambalam told the Ambassador that he 
was certain that former deputy defense minister 
Anuruddha Ratwatte had a hand in arranging the slaying. 
(Note:  The investigation into the murder of Kumar 
Ponnambalam is continuing.  Ratwatte, a relative of the 
president's, is currently being tried in a separate case 
involving multiple homicide.)  Ponnambalam's 
grandfather, G.G, was also well-known.  In the mid- 
1940's, G.G. founded the ACTC, which was the first Tamil 
political party in Sri Lanka. 
 
¶3.  (C) While young for a Sri Lankan politician, 
Ponnambalam is articulate, intelligent, and has an 
impressive presence.  Because of his abilities and 
background, he is considered an up-and-comer in the 
Tamil political leadership.  Per the comments that 
follow, while he is not overtly pro-LTTE, he tends to 
parrot some of the group's views.  As is the case with 
many other Tamil politicians, it is not clear whether 
this is out of true belief, or from fear of retribution. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Peace Process Gets Negative Reviews 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) When asked, Ponnambalam gave a thumbs down on 
the current state of the peace process.  In doing so, he 
laid blame squarely on the government's lap, asserting 
that it had to make much more progress on the following 
two issues, among many others: 
 
-- Security forces in Jaffna:  Ponnambalam said the 
government was not moving quickly enough to diminish the 
presence of its security forces in Jaffna.  He 
understood that the government had to maintain a 
security presence, but the GSL had to do more for 
civilians in the Jaffna area.  The security zones were 
too large and civilians needed their property rights 
restored.  It was positive that the GSL had given 
indications that it was willing to move forward with 
resettlement outside of the zones, but much, much more 
had to be done. 
 
-- Fishing:  The government had to do more to lift 
fishing restrictions.  Although the February 2001 
ceasefire accord had required the government to lift 
most restrictions by "D-Day plus 90 days) (i.e., late 
May 2001), the GSL had not done all it had to do.  Many 
fishing boats, for example, were being prevented from 
returning to port at night.  Because the boats were 
often small, this created serious dangers for Tamil 
fishermen, who had to stay out in the sea all night. 
(Note:  Although we have not asked the GSL about this 
specific issue, the military, for good reason, is 
fearful of giving too much leeway to Tamil fishing 
boats.  The LTTE sometimes uses the boats to bring in 
arms, for example.  At the same time, with many Tamils 
in the north and east reliant on the fishing industry, 
the government has to approach the issue cautiously.) 
----------- 
Tiger Views 
----------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador asked about the views of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) toward the peace 
process, noting news reports that TNA politicians had 
met with Tiger leaders in late February.  Ponnambalam 
confirmed that he had attended the meeting, which took 
place in the LTTE-controlled Wanni region in north- 
central Sri Lanka.  S.P. Thamilchelvam, the chief of the 
LTTE's political wing, and Ilamparuthi, the group's 
Jaffna political coordinator, represented the LTTE. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ponnambalam said the LTTE officials had used the 
meeting to underscore that the group remained fully 
committed to the ceasefire and had no desire or 
intention of returning to war.  That said, they were 
very negative about the current state of the peace 
process.  They related that the LTTE had taken a series 
of difficult steps in past months that had helped move 
the peace process forward.  Despite its long-standing 
stance, for example, the group had decided not to press 
for an interim administration in the north and east.  In 
agreeing to this, the LTTE had listened to the 
government, which had argued that going for an interim 
setup at this time would be politically difficult to 
sell in the south.  In addition, the LTTE had decided to 
come out in support of federalism, despite its 
discomfort with that term given its long-time support 
for the "Eelam" (separate Tamil state) concept.  In 
spite of all this, the group felt that the GSL had not 
fully reciprocated and that was the crux of the peace 
process' current problems.  (Note:  Although Ponnambalam 
did not specifically mention it, the Tigers have also 
been vociferously complaining that the government is not 
doing enough to funnel economic assistance into the 
north and east, and especially to LTTE-controlled 
regions.) 
 
¶7.  (C) When asked by the Ambassador, Ponnambalam 
defended the LTTE's stance toward the reopening of the 
Jaffna library.  (Note:  Last month, reacting to 
pressure from the LTTE, local Tamil politicians decided 
to postpone the reopening of the library -- see 
Reftels.)  Ponnambalam commented that the LTTE felt that 
the government had not finished construction of the 
library, which, given its symbolic importance to Tamil 
people, they felt should only be opened when fully 
complete.  Ponnambalam denied that the group had used 
any coercion to get its way on the issue.  (Note:  There 
have been many reports that the LTTE threatened senior 
TNA MP and leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front 
¶V. Anandasangaree over the issue, for example. 
Anandasangaree has denied these reports, but seems to be 
spending a lot of time outside of Sri Lanka of late.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
A North/East Divide in the LTTE? 
-------------------------------- 
¶8.  (C) In an interesting aside, Ponnambalam remarked 
that in his estimation the LTTE high command's 
positioning on the peace process was being strongly 
influenced by the views of its eastern cadre at this 
time.  Ponnambalam said the eastern cadre were more 
hard-line toward the peace process than cadre in the 
north and did not support compromise.  He explained that 
this north/east division in the LTTE was understandable 
given the ongoing communal tensions in the east, which 
were more pervasive and potentially more destabilizing 
than those in the north.  While a strong leader, LTTE 
chief V. Prabhakaran, a northerner, was probably 
reluctant to press cadre in the east too much regarding 
the peace process.  In taking this position, Prabhakaran 
was trying not to accentuate the north/east divide, 
especially given the long-standing resentment of eastern 
Tamils, who felt that northerners treated them in a 
second-class manner. 
 
--------------- 
A Negative Riff 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) In response to Ponnambalam's litany of 
complaints, the Ambassador noted that the GSL was not 
perfect, but it was critical to the future of Sri Lanka 
that the LTTE work with it.  In doing this, it was vital 
that the LTTE make some sort of gesture showing that it 
was still on board with the peace process.  A sour mood 
was developing in many quarters and it was important 
that the LTTE do something soon.  It was up to the LTTE 
to decide what it should do, but it had to make clear to 
those in the south that it had forsworn violence and the 
use of terrorism.  No one was asking the group to disarm 
totally, but the fact that it had not gotten rid of its 
"Black Tiger" (suicide squad units), for example, was 
abominable. 
 
¶10.  (C) In response, Ponnambalam went on a long and 
largely negative riff, the gist of which was that Tamils 
and the LTTE were in no mood to compromise at this time. 
It was up to the south to do something to show its 
sincerity.  Tamils could not trust southerners; they had 
shown countless times in the past that they were willing 
to undermine past peace initiatives.  Even within the 
current government, only the Prime Minister and several 
other ministers routinely spoke out in favor of the 
peace process -- the rest were quiet.  Until the south 
reached some consensus, it would be difficult for 
progress to be made.  The Ambassador remarked that 
complete consensus in the south would be difficult to 
achieve.  In dealing with its political opponents in the 
south, it would help the GSL, which supported peace, if 
the LTTE showed some more give.  Ponnambalam took the 
Ambassador's points on board, commenting that he would 
try to reflect such views when he met with LTTE leaders 
on March 7.  (Note:  Visiting chief LTTE negotiator 
Anton Balasingham has scheduled a meeting in the Wanni 
with Tamil politicians on that date.) 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Ponnambalam's comments shed light on the peace 
process' current difficulties.  Clearly, based on his 
comments and those of other observers, the LTTE is not 
in the mood at this time to compromise with a south it 
does not fully trust.  At the same time, some in the 
south are making increasingly strident comments that the 
LTTE cannot be trusted and the peace process is a waste 
of time.  Given these conflicting views, which mutually 
reinforce hard-liners in each camp, the peace process is 
in a bit of a trough after a surge of optimism last 
year.  Perhaps Balasingham's current visit and the 
upcoming visit of a high-level Norwegian facilitation 
team can breathe some new life into the situation.  The 
Ambassador also plans to visit Jaffna next week to size 
up the situation there.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶12. (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS