This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: WHY THE VOTE WENT SOUTH 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1345 
     ¶B. ANKARA 418 
     ¶C. ANKARA 808 
     ¶D. ANKARA 1325 
     ¶E. ANKARA 1266 
     ¶F. ANKARA 1346 
     ¶G. ANKARA 1341 
     ¶H. ANKARA 618 
     ¶I. ANKARA 1303 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson.  Reason: 
1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Ref A reported the March 1 defeat in 
Parliament of the AK Government's petition to permit 
deployment of U.S. troops to Turkey.  A number of factors 
contributed to the outcome, primarily: 1) the secular Turkish 
State's fears about USG intention in Iraq; 2) a strong desire 
to bring the Islam-oriented AK to its knees (ref B); and 3) 
the internal political dynamics, rivalries, and ineptitude 
within AK itself.  The AK Government is now badly shaken, AK 
leader Erdogan and P.M. Gul humiliated, and US-Turkish 
relations under severe strain.  Erdogan signaled publicly 
March 2 that the defeated proposal will not be revived, but 
that the Government is considering other unspecified 
alternatives.  Most likely, these will have to wait until at 
least March 11; Erdogan is running for Parliament in the 
March 9 special election in Siirt province, a prelude to his 
eventual assumption of the prime ministership.  End summary. 
 
 
----------- 
"The Enemy" 
----------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) AK and Public Opinion: strong anti-war sentiments 
dominated the Turkish public, media, and held sway in the 
legislature on both sides of the aisle (including AK), 
proving to be too much for an inexperienced AK 
Government/Party to manage.  AK leader Erdogan showed little 
of the decisive leadership on which he prides himself; he did 
too little, too late to sway the voters and his parliamentary 
group.  P.M. Gul's high-profile regional diplomatic efforts 
to find a "peaceful solution" to the crisis won AK kudos from 
the voters but also hardened the resolve of anti-war voices 
in the public, the Turkish State, and AK itself.  A number of 
intellectuals across the spectrum had argued that Turkey 
could spike the US war effort with a no vote.  In the 
aftermath, they trumpeted the outcome as a victory for 
democracy. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Erdogan, Gul and the "AK Parliament": ref C reported 
on the rise of Parliament as an semi-independent foreign 
policy decision making node under the leadership of Speaker 
Bulent Arinc, an AK heavyweight and rival to Erdogan and Gul. 
 Arinc's outspoken cooperation with both President Sezer and 
the opposition CHP -- which voted en masse to reject -- 
undermined AK party discipline and emboldened fence sitters 
to side against their party leadership.  Minutes after the 
vote, a senior AK member and a well-connected former NSC 
staffer separately observed to us privately that a 
rejectionist appeal by former Islamist P.M. Erbakan to his 
many one-time followers and sympathizers in the AK cadre also 
helped spook some AK members. 
 
 
-- On behalf of the Party of Ataturk, senior CHP official 
Onder Sav -- who Arinc pointedly granted procedurally dubious 
leeway to speak on substantive issues -- charged that the USG 
in engaging in a "disgusting and shameful war" and declared 
that U.S. ships off Iskenderun belong to "the enemy." 
 
 
-- A well-connected former M.P. who had visited the floor 
shortly before the vote related to us afterwards that Erdogan 
and Gul, acutely aware of public and AK intramural 
sensitivities and hoping to outflank parliamentary and 
Turkish State rivals, had tried to engineer a close but 
successful vote by allowing a number of their colleagues to 
side with the opposition.  "They miscalculated," he said. 
 
 
-- Contacts in AK and elsewhere note that the AK group is now 
wracked with tension and divided, at least for now, between 
Erdogan-Gul and Arinc.  While observers say that this may not 
ultimately lead to the break-up of AK, it poses a serious 
management problem for Erdogan in particular. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
Killing Two Birds with One Stone 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
¶4. (C) Turkish NSC issued a noncommittal statement after its 
Feb. 28 meeting designed, our contacts say, to keep the heat 
on the AK Government and Parliament by depriving them the 
cover of an ecumenical "State" commitment to support the USG 
(ref D).  Moreover, as reported ref E, Turkey's powerful 
generals in recent days allowed the impression to build of 
their "concern" that the AK Government was "rushing" 
Parliament to a vote; although they issued a denial, this 
came hard on the heels of months of military criticism of AK 
for foot-dragging on a "political" decision the General Staff 
(TGS) claimed it needed to act.  In fact, the military had 
simultaneously encouraged the Government to make maximal 
demands on the U.S. while intentionally aggravating the 
implementation of the site preparations process, adding 
further tension and pressure to the mix (ref E).  President 
Sezer, who chairs the NSC, reiterated at the 11th hour his 
public challenge to the constitutionality of the AK 
Government's petition, teaming up with the ambitious Arinc 
and CHP to press the case in the legislature. 
 
 
-- In post-vote conversations, contacts echoed what we had 
been picking up before the debate: that Sezer and the 
generals were trying to create the impression that they were 
preventing AK from dragging Turkey into an unpopular war -- 
thereby inducing further hesitation on the part of some AK 
elements.  (Our General Officer contacts at the TGS have been 
telling us for months now that the military clearly sees the 
imperative of total support for the U.S., but that the 
government must step up to its responsibility.  TGS appears 
to have miscalculated.  Our contacts expected a yes vote on 
March 1 and must have been suprised at the outcome.) 
 
 
-- A senior journalist, the former NSC staffer, and an AK 
M.P. close to Erdogan noted that, in the run-up to the vote, 
the military was focused primarily on undermining Erdogan and 
AK.  The journalist asserted that the military's intent was 
"to kill two birds with one stone" -- AK and USG policy in 
Iraq. 
 
 
¶5. (C) The Kurdish issue was of abiding importance in the 
calculations and the surreptitious political effort led by 
senior elements of the military, the MFA, and its 
bureaucratic allies (refs F-G).  This suspicion about U.S. 
policy toward the Kurds -- regardless of our cooperation and 
statements -- colors the military and bureaucracy views of 
our efforts; they allowed a public campaign (ref H and 
previous) to suggest the USG is working against Turkey with 
the PKK.  The  resurgence of tensions between Turkish 
security forces and ethnic Kurds in southeastern Turkey is, 
according to numerous Kurdish and other contacts -- including 
iconoclastic CHP deputies -- a direct result of the Turkish 
military's fears of separatism in the region (ref I and 
previous).  There is an element of the self-fulfilling 
prophecy here; several Turkish Kurdish figures with ties to 
both Islamic (AK) and Kurdish nationalist circles had 
privately criticized USG policy for siding with "Kemalist 
Turkey."  They expressed happiness that the petition failed, 
thereby paving the way for greater USG cooperation with Iraqi 
Kurds -- instead of the Turks. 
 
 
------------ 
What's Next? 
------------ 
 
 
¶6. (C) Erdogan signaled publicly March 2 that the Government 
will not revive the defeated proposal, but is considering 
other unspecified alternatives.  Most likely, any 
reconsideration of U.S. deployments to Turkey will have to 
wait until at least March 11.  On March 9, Erdogan is running 
for Parliament in the special election in Siirt province, a 
prelude to his eventual assumption of the prime ministership. 
 
 
------------------- 
Our Turkish Friends 
------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) The defeat in Parliament is widely understood in 
Ankara as tantamount to de facto vote of no confidence 
against a  Government that has been left badly shaken. 
Though victim of their own leadership shortcomings and 
tactical ineptitude, Erdogan and Gul ultimately stepped up to 
the plate and at considerable risk pushed to support the USG 
-- only to succumb to the pressure of traditional State and 
political rivals and to be publicly humiliated in the 
process.  Many of those rivals are found in the military 
leadership and other official circles that have long 
professed to be the USG's best friends in Turkey.  The 
anti-war nexus has scored a tactical political victory while 
risking harm to the bilateral relationship.  Whether that 
damage and drift can be limited or forestalled depends upon 
whether all elements of the corporate Turkish entity -- 
elected Government and unelected State alike -- pull together 
rather than seeking partisan advantage at a watershed moment 
in Turkish history. 
PEARSON