This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001433 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM IZ JO MEPP
SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD: JORDANIAN ELECTIONS AFTER AN IRAQ 
WAR:  A CHANCE TO SHOWCASE DEMOCRACY? 
 
REF: AMMAN 1336 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) We believe it is essential that we start to think 
seriously about Jordan's position in a post-Iraq war 
environment: what the GOJ will expect us to do, and how 
Jordan can contribute to achieving our longer term regional 
goals.  Assuming that a military campaign is of limited 
duration and fully successful, the King will focus on a 
number of issues soon after military action ceases.  These 
will include pushing for (1) a renewed U.S. emphasis on the 
MEPP and (2) a positive and credible U.S. message to the 
region that will reinforce his own domestic reform efforts. 
 
¶2. (C) Looking to our own priorities, Jordan's parliamentary 
elections now scheduled for June 17 (reftel) will offer an 
important (and probably the first post-war) opportunity for 
the U.S. to highlight and encourage democracy in the Arab 
world.  Given the deep skepticism that permeates Arab 
perceptions of U.S. ambitions in the region, we will need to 
quickly find ways to demonstrate that our democratizing 
rhetoric prior to military action is translated into concrete 
and positive expression following it.  Jordanian 
Parliamentary elections that are free, fair, and credible 
could help provide a timely model for the President's vision 
of a reformed and progressive Middle East.  To that end, we 
should think at two levels: (1) helping create the broader 
political context in the region that will facilitate the kind 
of campaign and election results that support our interests 
in broadening democracy in the Arab world generally, and (2) 
providing (at a programmatic level and with a light touch) 
assistance that facilitates the electoral process without 
appearing to meddle.  If we do this right, it could have 
positive effects not only for Jordan, but for our influence, 
both long and short-term, in the Post-Saddam Middle East. 
End Summary. 
 
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A Reenergized MEPP: 
Step 1 in Rebuilding Credibility with The Street 
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¶3. (C) As the King, FM and PM have all made clear to senior 
Washington decision makers, there is no more important issue 
in the hearts and minds of Jordanians than Palestine.  The 
relentless conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, and 
the belief among most here that the U.S. has abdicated its 
historic role as "honest broker," has done more to hurt U.S. 
credibility with the average Jordanian than any other single 
factor -- and, in turn, has forced the GOJ to adopt a 
defensive tone when characterizing the U.S.-Jordan 
relationship to its citizens. 
 
¶4. (C) In order to begin to reverse this current reality, the 
King will press us to move forward quickly to reenergize the 
MEPP and demonstrate clearly the political will to restart 
serious negotiations, press Israel to take positive steps, 
and forge a solution that brings peace and security to both 
Israelis and Palestinians.  In and of itself, such an 
approach will not mend our frayed image and influence. 
Without it, however, the task is likely to be impossible. 
 
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A Message We (And He) Can Take to the People 
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¶5. (C) A broader USG message should also address the 
corrosive effects of months of virulent anti-American 
rhetoric throughout the region.  By demonstrating -- through 
our actions not only our words -- that we are on the side of 
average people, and that our actions are emphatically not "a 
war against Islam," the greater resonance our efforts will 
have with Jordanian audiences.  This will help not only to 
rebuild a pro-U.S. constituency in the Kingdom, but will also 
help support the King's own program to steer Jordan in a 
progressive, pro-Western direction. 
 
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June 17 Elections: Showcasing Democracy in the Arab World 
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¶6. (C) As we consider what the King and GOJ will ask of us 
and how we can help Jordan after a war, we should recognize 
that political developments here will inevitably contribute 
greatly to the pattern of our goals and strategy for the 
region in the eyes of Jordanians and all their neighbors.  An 
important marker in this regard will be the upcoming 
Parliamentary elections -- which the PM recently announced 
would be held on June 17.  If handled adroitly, these 
elections may offer a timely opportunity to highlight the 
possibilities and promise of democracy in the Arab world. 
 
¶7. (C) It is in our interests -- and the GOJ's -- that these 
elections be inclusive, spirited, and reflect a broad debate 
on Jordan's future.  The structure of the elections -- 
single-member constituencies -- will almost certainly result 
in a pro-Hashemite majority, but one with traditional tribal 
views.  That said, we would also want to see an end result 
that reflects a genuine commitment to democratic reforms. 
 
¶8. (C) In our view, the best way to accomplish this objective 
is to help create the broader political context that 
neutralizes those issues that detract attention from that 
agenda:  the most obvious example being Palestine.  The 
relative popularity of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the 
political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, is rooted more in 
its steadfast rhetorical support for the Palestinian cause 
and opposition to an Iraq war than in its policy 
prescriptions for Jordan.  If we can take those two hot 
button issues off the table, and the GOJ can show near-term 
tangible benefits for Jordanians following the cessation of 
hostilities, the likelihood of a strong showing by pro-reform 
candidates could increase significantly. 
 
¶9. (C) In addition to taking policy steps to help create a 
more favorable political climate for democratic progress, we 
should also look for ways that the U.S. can help facilitate 
the election process itself programatically.  Given the deep 
suspicions that the U.S. intends to "redraw the map" and 
impose its own political design on the Arabs, we must 
scrupulously avoid any appearance of trying to influence the 
election's outcome.  Whenever possible we should assist the 
elections through NGO's and follow a multinational approach, 
possibly in cooperation with the Europeans and Japanese.  We 
should also ensure that any assistance to candidates (e.g. 
speaker programs or training) be available to all potential 
candidates who do not pose any security concerns.  Clearly, 
this is a delicate matter for the GOJ.  That said, a careful 
offering of traditionally successful programs such as guest 
speakers on democracy and voter education programs could 
provide useful ways to spur popular interest and solidify 
credibility for the event and its outcome.  If done right, 
the Jordanian example could help communicate to a wider 
regional audience that the vision of reform in the middle 
east is neither a distant possibility, nor a scheme to 
benefit outsiders in the West. 
 
¶10. (C)  We should also recognize that the elections and the 
campaign period leading up to them is likely to come during a 
period in which the economy is buffeted by the loss of the 
"special" economic relationship with Iraq that Jordan has 
enjoyed for the past decade in terms of cut price oil 
supplies and a protected market for Jordanian exports.  The 
end of this relationship, plus the effects of lower tourism 
and export revenues expected to coincide with a war, is 
likely to mean job losses for low income Jordanians and 
higher prices for some oil products.  To some extent, these 
effects will be concentrated in areas of the country -- 
poorer parts of Amman and the south -- that have been the 
biggest beneficiaries of the Iraq relationship. 
 
¶11. (C) The short-term economic consequences of a war are 
likely to strain Jordan's political fabric, and to test the 
commitment to sound economic policies and fiscal discipline 
that has undergirded the impressive strength of recent 
economic performance.  The King and his advisers are counting 
on economic assistance from the United States and other 
countries (including Gulf oil suppliers) to blunt the 
economic and political impact of these short-term disruptions 
by smoothing out the adjustment process over time.  Still, 
maintaining the balance between smoothing the economic 
adjustment and avoiding loss of macroeconomic control in a 
pre-election environment will be a delicate issue on which we 
will have to work closely with the Jordanians. 
GNEHM