This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000534 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO POL FOR MAXSTADT 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2013 
TAGS: PREL PROP ZI NI UK AS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: THE FOUNDATIONS OF OBASANJO'S FANTASIES 
 
 
Ref:  (A) Harare 422 
-     (B) Abuja 343 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B) AND 
(D). 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Although not a formal member of the Front Line States, 
Nigeria was in the vanguard of those fighting for the 
liberation of southern Africa.  The current Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force has told us stories of the role he played in 
ferreting weapons to ZANU to shore up ZANU's fight against the 
Rhodesians. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Nigeria's support for Mugabe today is rooted in the 
era of liberation.  Nigerians generally, not just Obasanjo, 
are loathe to "abandon" someone they see as both prot ?and 
ally, the more so when there is a widespread perception that 
"the West" (especially the UK) is carrying water for white 
farmers whose forebears expropriated land belonging to the 
rightful black owners.  In other words, the Nigerians believe 
that land issues are at the root of the political crisis in 
Zimbabwe, and they deeply resent pressure from the UK, feeling 
HMG did not do nearly enough to realize a fair and equitable 
redistribution of land in years past.  They also ignore the 
overwhelming evidence that the GOZ is redistributing land not 
to right historical wrongs but to provide favors to supporters 
while punishing opponents.  For them, this redistribution is 
"justice".  The lack of reference to historical antecedents 
and established principles of land redistribution in Africa 
does not invalidate the "principle," in their minds. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Obasanjo also believes he owes a debt to Mugabe, a 
friend for more than 25 years with whom he has a deep personal 
bond.  Obasanjo was Head of State during the Lancaster House 
negotiations and has repeatedly stated that he pressured 
Mugabe to accept a constitution that would hold land reform in 
abeyance even though Mugabe wanted to forge ahead immediately 
on the issue.  In the late eighties and early nineties, 
Obasanjo also counseled Mugabe to bridle his drive for land 
reform so events in Zimbabwe would not scare apartheid 
supporters and thus throttle reform in South Africa.  After 
having twice asked Mugabe to cool his heels, Obasanjo feels 
obliged to support Mugabe on land reform now, the flaws that 
riddle its implementation notwithstanding.  Obasanjo adheres 
firmly to an erroneous belief that Zimbabwe's political and 
economic crisis today is unrelated to the chaos arising from 
political events that have taken place over the past year. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) The Nigerians, again not just Obasanjo, find it just 
excruciatingly difficult to criticize Mugabe when they see him 
in conflict with his old adversaries (white Zimbabweans); this 
makes them want to see inequalities in land distribution as 
root rather than secondary causes of political and economic 
crisis.  Zimbabweans and Nigerian diplomats in Zimbabwe see an 
autocratic and increasingly brutal old man who refuses to cede 
power gracefully.  Nigerians in Nigeria, including Obasanjo 
himself, still see the Mugabe they supported in the 70s. 
These factors, together with the points made in para four, may 
underlie Obasanjo's willingness to believe GOZ assertions 
despite all evidence to the contrary.  Of course, we cannot 
confirm that Nigerian diplomats in Harare report faithfully to 
Abuja the views they hold forth to U.S. diplomats.  Ambassador 
Olufemi George, the MFA Under Secretary for Africa, professes 
a firm belief that land is the fundamental cause of Zimbabwe's 
instability.  Other key advisors, including Foreign Minister 
Sule Lamido and International Affairs Advisor Ad'Obe Obe, take 
equally hard lines.  The position that Obasanjo takes on the 
Zimbabwe question is fed and reinforced by these hardliners. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Obasanjo was clearly annoyed with Australia for having 
implemented sanctions that went beyond those imposed by the 
Commonwealth.  He made that clear in his letter to Howard, and 
it was one of the first points he raised in a meeting (ref B) 
with Ambassador Jeter and AF DAS Bridgewater.  His personal 
distaste for Howard magnified Obasanjo's outrage at Howard's 
unilateral action.  Animus toward Howard is pervasive within 
the GON. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Obasanjo has also been unhappy with MDC leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai, whom he views as unreasonable and inflexible.  The 
 
SIPDIS 
fact that Tsvangirai went to the media with details about an 
earlier meeting with Obasanjo reportedly annoyed the Nigerian 
President.  Moreover, Obasanjo tends to regard the views of 
those shorter in the tooth than he (whether in chronological 
years or in years of experience as a national leader) as less 
worthy of serious consideration than those of contemporaries. 
This tendency has at times heightened domestic tensions, and 
it may be a factor in his dealings, respectively, with Mugabe 
and Tsvangirai. 
 
 
¶7. (C) That said, the British High Commissioner here 
believes that there is flexibility in Nigeria's position. 
Obasanjo desperately wants to hold the next Commonwealth 
Summit in Abuja and will not jeopardize that opportunity even 
for Mugabe.  The HC told Ambassador Jeter that if a 
recommendation for Mugabe's continued suspension comes from 
the Commonwealth Secretary General and Secretariat Obasanjo 
will not oppose it and will go forward with the Commonwealth 
Summit even if Mugabe is excluded.  However, if the 
recommendation comes from Howard, it will be much harder for 
Obasanjo to swallow. 
JETER