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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 USUN NEW YORK 000299 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAQ:  SECRETARY POWELL MAKES THE CASE; THE 
COUNCIL DELIVERS PRELIMINARY RESPONSES 
 
¶1.  (U)  SECRETARY POWELL MADE AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN 
MINUTE-PRESENTATION FEBRUARY 5 TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
(SC) IN WHICH HE OUTLINED, IN DETAIL: IRAQI EFFORTS TO DEFEAT 
UNMOVIC AND IAEA INSPECTIONS; IRAQ'S FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR 
WMD AND OTHER MATERIALS IT WAS KNOWN TO HAVE POSSESSED; AND 
IRAQ'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE AL-QAEDA TERRORIST NETWORK, WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ACTIVITIES OF AL-QAEDA OPERATIVE 
ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI.  USING A COMBINATION OF TRANSLATED 
INTERCEPTS, SATELLITE IMAGERY, AND REPORTS FROM HUMAN 
SOURCES, THE SECRETARY, FLANKED BY AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE AND 
CIA DIRECTOR TENET, LAID OUT THE U.S. POSITION THAT UN 
INSPECTIONS WERE NOT WORKING, AND COULD NOT SUCCEED, IN THE 
ABSENCE OF ACTIVE IRAQI COOPERATION.  IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 
11 ENVIRONMENT, HE WARNED, THE USG COULD NOT EXPOSE ITS 
CITIZENS TO THE KIND OF DANGERS POSED BY A NEXUS BETWEEN 
IRAQI WMD AND TERRORIST GROUPS.  THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HE 
WARNED, HAD TO FACE UP TO THE CHALLENGES POSED BY IRAQI 
NON-COMPLIANCE OR FACE "IRRELEVANCE."  REACTIONS FROM COUNCIL 
MEMBERS WERE MUTED, IN PART BECAUSE THEY HAD HAD NO ADVANCE 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE SECRETARY'S BRIEFING.  SOME 
EXISTING FAULT LINES IN THE COUNCIL REMAINED CLEAR, WITH 
CHINA, GERMANY, SYRIA, AND PAKISTAN ARGUING THAT MORE TIME 
SHOULD BE ALLOTTED TO THE INSPECTIONS PROCESS.  SPAIN AND 
CHILE EXPRESSED EXASPERATION WITH IRAQI NON-COMPLIANCE BUT 
DID NOT GO AS FAR AS BULGARIA, WHICH DECLARED IRAQ IN 
MATERIAL BREACH OF UNSCR 1441.  ANGOLA, CAMEROON, AND GUINEA 
FIRMLY FENCE-STRADDLED WHILE FRANCE APPEARED TO EMBRACE ALL 
OPTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY.  FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DE VILLEPIN 
MADE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE 
INSPECTIONS REGIME WHILE DEMANDING AT THE SAME TIME 
"IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE" IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH UN 
INSPECTIONS.  IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AL-DOURI ROUNDLY 
REJECTED THE ENTIRE U.S. PRESENTATION AND ALLEGED THAT ISRAEL 
REPRESENTS THE "REAL WMD THREAT" IN THE MIDDLE EAST.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
SECRETARY POWELL MAKES THE CASE 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) THE SECRETARY BEGAN HIS DETAILED, ONE HOUR AND FIFTEEN 
MINUTE PRESENTATION BY FOCUSING ON IRAQ'S EFFECTS TO DECEIVE 
UN INSPECTORS.  HE PLAYED SEVERAL RADIO INTERCEPTS, DETAILING 
EFFORTS BY IRAQI MILITARY OFFICERS TO HIDE ITEMS FROM 
INSPECTORS.  HE OUTLINED THE SCALE OF GOI GOVERNMENTAL 
EFFORTS TO MISLEAD INSPECTORS AND SHOWED SATELLITE PHOTOS 
DETAILING IRAQI MILITARY ACTIVITY IN ADVANCE OF THE ARRIVAL 
OF INSPECTORS.  HE ALSO DESCRIBED THE THREATS MADE BY THE GOI 
TO IRAQI SCIENTISTS TO PRECLUDE THEIR COOPERATION. 
 
¶3. (U) THE SECRETARY THEN GAVE A SENSE OF IRAQI WMD 
STOCKPILES AND EXPLAINED WHY THEY WERE OF CONCERN: 
 
--  BIOLOGICAL:  IRAQ HAS NOT ACCOUNTED FOR LARGE AMOUNTS OF 
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS.  THE SECRETARY HELD UP A TEASPOON OF 
ANTHRAX SIMULANT, DESCRIBED HOW AN EQUIVALENT QUANTITY MAILED 
IN AN ENVELOPE HAD SHUT DOWN THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN 
2001, AND NOTED THAT THE UNDECLARED IRAQI AMOUNTS EQUATED TO 
TENS UPON TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TEASPOONFULS. THE SECRETARY 
ALSO EXPLAINED IRAQI PROGRAMS TO MAKE THEIR BIOLOGICAL 
PROGRAMS MOBILE, AND SHOWED CONCEPTUAL IMAGES OF IRAQI LABS 
LOCATED ON ORDINARY TRUCKS AND TRAINS. 
 
-- CHEMICAL:  THE SECRETARY PROVIDED A SENSE OF HOW MANY 
IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE MISSING, CITING THE NUMBER USED 
IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS AND RECENT USG 
STATEMENTS. HE EXPLAINED THAT IRAQ HAD SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED 
ITS DUAL-USE FACTORIES TO WITHSTAND INSPECTION, WHICH MEANT 
THAT IRAQI CW PRODUCTION DID NOT HAVE TO BE MOBILE.  THE 
SECRETARY DISPLAYED SATELLITE IMAGERY OF AN IRAQI CW 
TRANSSHIPMENT AREA THAT HAD BEEN BULLDOZED AND DENUDED OF 
TOPSOIL TO ENSURE THAT INSPECTORS DID NOT DETECT ANY CW 
TRACES IN THE SOIL.  HE PLAYED ANOTHER INTERCEPT OF IRAQI 
MILITARY OFFICERS DISCUSSING NERVE AGENT. 
 
-- NUCLEAR:  THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED IRAQI MOVES TO KEEP 
THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM ALIVE, SAYING THEY LACKED ONLY FISSILE 
MATERIAL, HAVING MAINTAINED CADRES OF NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS AND 
NUCLEAR BOMB DESIGNS.  HE DESCRIBED IRAQI NUCLEAR-RELATED 
PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR TUBES, 
BALANCING MACHINES, AND SPECIALIZED MAGNETS.  HE REMINDED THE 
WORLD THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD UNDERESTIMATED THE 
IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM BEFORE AND CHALLENGED IT NOT TO DO SO 
AGAIN. 
 
--  DELIVERY SYSTEMS: THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED GOI WORK ON 
BALLISTIC MISSILES AND UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS).  HE 
DESCRIBED IRAQI HOLDINGS OF AL-SAMOUD AND AL-FATAH MISSILES, 
EXPLAINING THAT BOTH HAVE RANGES EXCEEDING UN LIMITS AND THAT 
THEY ARE THEREFORE PROHIBITED.  HE NOTED IRAQI EFFORTS TO 
ILLEGALLY IMPORT MISSILE COMPONENTS SUCH AS SA-2 ROCKET 
ENGINES, AND TOLD THE COUNCIL THAT SOME HAD BEEN ACQUIRED 
AFTER THE PASSAGE OF UNSCR 1441.  HE DESCRIBED THE IRAQI UAV 
PROGRAMS, QUOTING EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF UAV DEVELOPMENT, 
DEPLOYMENT, AND ABILITY  TO DISTRIBUTE BIOLOGICAL AND 
CHEMICAL AGENTS.  HE DESCRIBED A RECENT IRAQI UAV FLIGHT THAT 
STRETCHED FOR 500 KILOMETERS, VIOLATING UN RANGE LIMITS, AND 
REMINDED THE COUNCIL THAT IRAQ HAD NOT PROVIDED UAV 
INFORMATION IN ITS DECEMBER 7 DECLARATION. 
 
¶4.  (U) TURNING TO TERRORISM, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED IRAQ'S 
LONG-STANDING TIES TO PALESTINIAN TERROR GROUPS.  HE NOTED 
TERRORIST ACTS COMMITTED IN EUROPE BY THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE 
SERVICE.  THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED IN DETAIL IRAQ'S LINKS WITH 
AL-QAEDA OPERATIVE ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI, OUTLINING HIS 
ACTIVITIES IN BAGHDAD, THE LACK OF IRAQI RESPONSE TO REQUESTS 
FOR HIS DETENTION AND EXTRADITION, AND HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
ASSASSINATION OF U.S. DIPLOMAT LAURENCE FOLEY IN JORDAN IN 
¶2002.  HE EXPLAINED CONNECTIONS BETWEEN AL-QAEDA AND 
AL-ZARQAWI WITH TERRORIST ACTIONS IN THE UK, SPAIN, ITALY, 
GERMANY, AND RUSSIA.   HE DESCRIBED IN DETAIL AL-QAEDA'S 
EFFORTS IN GAINING WMD ASSISTANCE FROM IRAQ, PARTICULARLY IN 
OBTAINING TRAINING IN THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. 
 
¶5. (U)  THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY DESCRIBING IRAQ'S 
DEPLORABLE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, INCLUDING ATROCITIES 
COMMITTED AGAINST THE KURDS, SHIA, AND MARSH ARABS.  HE 
REMINDED THE COUNCIL THAT SADDAM HAS ATTEMPTED TO INTIMIDATE 
THE MIDDLE EAST FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS AND OF HIS DETERMINED 
EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE MORE WMD.  HE ASKED THE COUNCIL WHETHER 
THE WORLD SHOULD TAKE THE RISK THAT IRAQ WOULD USE WMD IN A 
TIME AND PLACE OF ITS CHOOSING, AT A FUTURE POINT WHEN THE 
WORLD WAS IN A MUCH WEAKER POSITION TO RESPOND TO IRAQI 
ACTIONS.  HE DECLARED THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT AND CAN NOT RUN 
SUCH A RISK, SAID IRAQ HAD PLACED ITSELF IN DEEPER MATERIAL 
BREACH UNDER UNSCR 1441, AND CHALLENGED THE WORLD NOT TO 
SHRINK FROM WHATEVER IS AHEAD OF IT. 
 
 
STATEMENTS BY THE PERMANENT FIVE MEMBERS: 
 
FRANCE: WE DO NOT RULE OUT ANY OPTION 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U)  FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DE VILLEPIN SAID THE 
SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION CONTAINED ELEMENTS OF INTEREST THAT 
THE INSPECTORS SHOULD ASSESS.  IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S 
INDICTMENT OF IRAQI NON-COOPERATION WITH UN INSPECTIONS, 
VILLEPIN STRESSED THAT, BY ADOPTING UNSCR 1441, THE COUNCIL 
HAD REAFFIRMED RELIANCE ON AN INSPECTIONS PROCESS, AND 
ASSERTED THAT THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION PROVIDED FURTHER 
JUSTIFICATION "TO THE COURSE OF THE UN" AND INTERNATIONAL 
INSPECTIONS.  HE ARGUED THAT, THROUGH THE INSPECTIONS REGIME, 
RESULTS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED:  UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA WERE BOTH IN 
IRAQ AT WORK, THERE HAS BEEN A MULTIPLICATION OF SITES 
INSPECTED, AND THERE WERE MORE THAN 100 INSPECTORS ON THE 
GROUND.  "GOOD PROGRESS" HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN DEEPENING THE 
IAEA'S KNOWLEDGE OF IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPACITY, ACCORDING TO 
EL-BARADEI, AND ACCORDING TO BLIX, THERE HAD BEEN NO TRACE OF 
CBW MATERIALS IN THE TRACE SAMPLES TAKEN TO DATE.  BUT, 
VILLEPIN SAID, "IRAQI COOPERATION CONTAINED GREY AREAS."  THE 
JANUARY 27 BLIX REPORT CONTAINED EVIDENCE OF REAL PROBLEMS IN 
THIS AREA. TO HELP ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF COOPERATION, FRANCE 
WILL CONTINUE TO PASS INFORMATION TO FACILITATE THE 
INSPECTIONS, HE ADDED.  THE ABSENCE OF LONG-RANGE DELIVERY 
SYSTEMS HAS, TO DATE, LARGELY CONTAINED THE THREAT OF CBW, 
BUT THERE WERE "DISTURBING INDICATIONS ABOUT ATTEMPTS TO 
ACQUIRE SUCH SYSTEMS." HE ALSO STRESSED A NEED TO "KEEP AN 
EYE ON" THE ALUMINUM TUBES ISSUE AND WHAT THEY MIGHT SIGNIFY. 
 
¶7. (U) THE COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST 
DELIVER A DIFFICULT MESSAGE TO IRAQ, VILLEPIN STATED. THE USE 
OF FORCE WAS THE FINAL RECOURSE, AND WHY GO TO WAR, HE ASKED, 
IF THERE IS "UNUSED SPACE" IN UNSCR 1441?   VILLEPIN ARGUED 
THAT THE COUNCIL MUST DETERMINE TO WHAT EXTENT THE "NATURE 
AND SCOPE" OF IRAQI VIOLATIONS JUSTIFIED THE USE OF FORCE, 
DECLARING "WE WILL NOT RULE OUT ANY OPTION, AS WE HAVE SAID 
ALL ALONG." VILLEPIN MADE THE FOLLOWING KEY POINTS: 
 
--THE UN MUST BE AT THE CENTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
TO IRAQ, AS A MEANS TO GUARANTEE THE UNITY OF IRAQ, ASSURE 
REGIONAL STABILITY, PRESERVE INTERNATIONAL UNITY, AND PROTECT 
CIVILIAN POPULATIONS; 
 
--THERE SHOULD BE "DECISIVE REINFORCEMENT OF THE MEANS OF 
INSPECTIONS."  THIS WOULD INCLUDE INCREASING BY TWO TO THREE 
TIMES THE NUMBER OF INSPECTORS, ESTABLISHING SURVEILLANCE OF 
SITES INSPECTED BY INTERNATIONAL FORCES, DEPLOYING AERIAL 
SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT, AND CREATING A COORDINATING AND 
PROCESSING CENTER FOR RELEVANT INTELLIGENCE; 
 
--WE SHOULD LIST AND "RANK" UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS; 
 
--THERE MUST BE REGULAR PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.  IT WOULD BE 
USEFUL TO ESTABLISH A POSITION FOR A NEW DISARMAMENT 
COORDINATOR IN BAGHDAD TO COORDINATE WITH BLIX AND 
EL-BARADEI; 
 
--IRAQ MUST "IMMEDIATELY AND COMPLETELY" COMPLY BY AGREEING 
TO U-2 FLIGHTS, ADOPTING A LEGAL PROHIBITION ON WMD, AND 
HANDING OVER ALL PROBABLE INFORMATION ON CBW PROGRAMS; AND 
 
--BAGHDAD MUST ALSO NOW PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS 
RAISED BY SECRETARY POWELL'S BRIEFING.  BY THE NEXT REPORT OF 
THE INSPECTORS ON FEBRUARY 14, IRAQ MUST HAVE DEMONSTRATED 
THAT IT IS PROVIDING CONCRETE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION. 
FRANCE HAS A "MORAL AND POLITICAL DUTY TO DIRECT MORAL AND 
POLITICAL ENERGY" TO ENSURE THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ. 
 
 
RUSSIA: NO CONCRETE TIME LIMITS TO 1441, 
BUT IT'S TIME FOR BAGHDAD TO GET THE MESSAGE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) FM IVANOV NOTED RUSSIA'S DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL 
SETTLEMENT TO THE IRAQ CRISIS AND CALLED ON IRAQ TO FULLY AND 
UNCONDITIONALLY COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF UNSCR 1441. 
HE STATED THAT GIVEN THE UNANIMOUS DESIRE OF THE COUNCIL TO 
DEAL WITH WMD CONCERNS WORLD-WIDE, IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF 
ALL MEMBERS TO WORK TOGETHER THROUGH THE COUNCIL AND THE UN 
TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM.  THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SECRETARY 
POWELL WAS SERIOUS AND REQUIRED THOROUGH STUDY BY MOSCOW. HE 
ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION ALSO BE HANDED OVER TO THE 
INSPECTORS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW IRAQ AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND 
TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED. IVANOV URGED THE COUNCIL TO DO 
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT THE WORK OF THE 
INSPECTORS--RUSSIA, HE NOTED, FOR ITS PART WAS READY TO 
PROVIDE AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLANES AND ADDITIONAL 
INSPECTORS AS NEEDED. 
 
¶9. (U)  IVANOV STATED THAT IT WAS TIME FOR BAGHDAD TO 
UNDERSTAND THE CRITICAL NATURE OF THE SITUATION. HE POINTED 
OUT "IRAQ SHOULD BE THE FIRST CONCERNED" WITH PROVIDING FINAL 
CLARITY TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THAT THE END OF 
SANCTIONS RESTED IN IRAQ'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE.  HE ALSO 
STATED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAS OFTEN HEARD THAT "TIME IS 
RUNNING OUT" FOR IRAQ, THERE ARE NO CONCRETE TIME LIMITS 
ATTACHED TO UNSCR 1441, AND THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT RULE OUT 
THE POSSIBILITY OF ONE--OR MORE--RESOLUTIONS. IN CLOSING, 
IVANOV OPINED THAT THE MORE SERIOUS CHALLENGE FACING THE 
WORLD--INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM--WAS BEING DEALT WITH 
EFFECTIVELY AS A RESULT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND 
UNITY. HE URGED THE MEMBERS TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE IN THE 
SAME MANNER. 
 
UK: IRAQ HAS FAILED THE TEST, 
COUNCIL ON THE EDGE OF A SLIPPERY SLOPE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) UK FM STRAW WELCOMED THE POWERFUL AND AUTHORITATIVE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE U.S. AND STATED THAT THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OWED THANKS TO SECRETARY POWELL FOR 
ILLUSTRATING THE GRAVE DANGERS POSED BY IRAQ.  STRAW NOTED 
THAT THE COUNCIL HAD GIVEN IRAQ ONE LAST CHANCE TO COMPLY 
FULLY WITH ITS DISARMAMENT OBLIGATIONS IN UNSCR 1441--A 
RESOLUTION TO WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD RESPONDED WITH THE 
SAME CONTEMPT AS THE MANY RESOLUTIONS BEFORE IT. STRAW STATED 
THAT IRAQ HAD VIOLATED BOTH "TESTS" SET FORTH IN OP 4 OF 
1441--NAMELY THE OMISSION OF INFORMATION IN ITS DECLARATION, 
AND ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE AND DISARM WILLINGLY, 
INCLUDING ITS REFUSAL TO PERMIT U-2 FLIGHTS. STRAW DECLARED 
THAT IRAQ'S ACTION TO DATE COULD ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS 
FURTHER MATERIAL BREACH AND,  WHILE THE UK DOES NOT WANT WAR, 
HMG DOES WANT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UN SYSTEM TO BE UPHELD. 
STRAW NOTED THAT, WHILE SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE GOI HAD 
SERIOUS CHOICES TO MAKE, THE COUNCIL HAD A SERIOUS CHOICE AS 
WELL. CITING THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FAILURES OF THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, HE OBSERVED THAT THE COUNCIL WAS AT RISK 
OF SLIPPING DOWN THE SAME SLOPE IF IT CHOSE INACTION.  WE OWE 
IT TO HISTORY, HE SAID, NOT TO MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES AGAIN. 
 
CHINA: AVOID WAR IF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS AT ALL POSSIBLE 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶11. (U) CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER TANG UNDERSCORED THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN COUNCIL UNITY 
AND COOPERATION ON THE ISSUE OF IRAQ.  TANG NOTED THAT THE 
U.S. INITIATIVE TO PROVIDE THE COUNCIL AND THE INSPECTORS 
WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF 
UNSCR 1441, AND HE URGED ALL OTHER STATES TO FOLLOW THE U.S. 
EXAMPLE.  HE FURTHER NOTED THAT THE COUNCIL'S UNITED GOAL TO 
DISARM IRAQ WAS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF 
UNSCR 1441, AND HE CALLED ON IRAQ TO ADHERE TO ITS 
RESPONSIBILITIES TO FULLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY IMPLEMENT THE 
MEASURES CALLED FOR IN THAT RESOLUTION.  TANG ALSO STATED 
THAT THE UNIVERSAL DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD 
BE ADDRESSED THROUGH THE UN FRAMEWORK AND HE URGED THE 
COUNCIL TO AVOID WAR IF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WAS EVEN 
REMOTELY POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE. 
 
 
THE ELECTED TEN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL: 
 
GERMANY: VITAL TO EXPAND AND ENHANCE INSPECTIONS REGIME 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶12.  (U) GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER FISCHER AFFIRMED THAT THE 
UNSC SHOULD BE PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN DECISION MAKING ON 
IRAQ.  THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION WARRANTED CAREFUL 
EXAMINATION AND A QUICK AND CLEAR RESPONSE BY IRAQ.   FOR 
INSPECTIONS TO BE BETTER TARGETED, DETAILED INFORMATION WAS 
NECESSARY.  FISCHER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IRAQ HAS REPEATEDLY 
FLOUTED UNSCRS OVER THE TWELVE-YEAR SPAN IN WHICH IT HAS 
FIGURED ON THE COUNCIL AGENDA; HE SAID IRAQ WAS A BRUTAL 
REGIME THAT HAD ATTACKED IRAN, KUWAIT, ISRAEL, AS WELL AS THE 
KURDS, AND IT WAS THAT AGGRESSION THAT JUSTIFIED THE 
IMPOSITION OF NO-FLY ZONES.  WHILE THE PRESENCE OF INSPECTORS 
IN IRAQ HELPED CONTAIN THE DANGER, LASTING DISARMAMENT 
REMAINED THE TRUE OBJECTIVE.  THE INSPECTIONS REQUIRED 
GREATER REINFORCEMENT AND, ABOVE ALL, MORE TIME.  THE 
UPCOMING TRIP OF BLIX AND EL-BARADEI TO BAGHDAD WAS A CRUCIAL 
CHANCE FOR IRAQ TO DISPEL SUSPICIONS ABOUT THEIR PROGRAMS AND 
CAPACITIES.  WARNING AGAINST THE "CLEAR DANGERS" OF MILITARY 
ACTION, FISCHER CALLED FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE 
CRISIS WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK. IT WAS VITAL TO EXPAND AND 
ENHANCE THE INSPECTIONS REGIME OF UNSCR 1441 WHICH, FISCHER 
SUGGESTED, COULD PROVE A PARADIGM FOR APPROACHING CRISES 
ELSEWHERE.  HE EMPHASIZED THAT IRAQ MUST COMPLY WITHOUT DELAY 
WITH UNSCR 1441. 
 

MEXICO: POWELL'S PRESENTATION VALUABLE 
TO PROCESS OF DISARMING IRAQ 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (U) MEXICAN MINISTER OF STATE (FOREIGN MINISTER) DERBEZ 
SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION HAD CONTAINED VALUABLE 
MATERIAL TO DETERMINE AND SHAPE THE PROCESS OF DISARMING 
IRAQ, AND HE REINFORCED THE NEED TO DEVELOP VERIFIABLE IRAQI 
COOPERATION.  HE UNDERSCORED THAT MEXICO'S OBJECTIVE WAS THE 
UNEQUIVOCAL DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ BY PEACEFUL MEANS, WITHOUT 
UNDERMINING THE BATTLE ON TERRORISM.  MEXICO HAD DIRECTLY 
APPROACHED IRAQ TO "ENCOURAGE" COOPERATION WITHOUT DELAY, AND 
HE REITERATED THE CALL "TO THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE AT THIS 
TABLE" TO ACTIVELY AND GENUINELY COOPERATE ACCORDING TO THE 
PROVISIONS OF UNSCR 1441.  HE LATER "REITERATED THE DEMAND TO 
THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WORK URGENTLY TO MAKE ALL 
FACILITIES" ACCESSIBLE TO THE INSPECTORS.  CONCLUDING, HE 
STRESSED MEXICO'S DESIRE FOR A MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO 
RESOLVING THE IRAQ CRISIS. 
 
SYRIA:  COUNCIL SHOULD PERMIT MORE TIME FOR INSPECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶14.  (U)  SYRIAN PERMREP WEHBE, READING A STATEMENT ON BEHALF 
OF FOREIGN MINISTER AL-SHARA', SIDESTEPPED DIRECT COMMENT ON 
SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION BY RECOMMENDING THAT THE INFORMATION 
IT CONTAINED  SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY UNMOVIC AND IAEA.  HE 
APPEALED TO OTHER MEMBER STATES ALSO TO SUBMIT RELEVANT 
INFORMATION.  HE NOTED SYRIA HAD JOINED CONSENSUS ON UNSCR 
1441 AFTER RECEIVING GUARANTEES FROM UNNAMED PERMANENT 
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE USED 
AS A PRETEXT FOR WAR.  WEHBE SAID THAT SYRIA INTERPRETED 
ONGOING DISCUSSIONS OF A SECOND RESOLUTION AS CONFIRMATION OF 
THOSE ASSURANCES.  URGING THE SC TO FIND A PEACEFUL 
RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS, WEHBE DECRIED CONSIDERATION OF WAR 
AS AN INDICATION OF THE  FAILURE OF UNSCR 1441 AND, MORE 
GENERALLY, OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF.  AVERTING CONFLICT 
WAS IMPERATIVE IN ORDER TO SPARE THE LIVES OF IRAQI 
CIVILIANS, AS WELL AS THE "LIVES OF THE SOLDIERS WHO HAD 
TRAVELED TO THE REGION." IRAQ -- "UNLIKE ISRAEL" -- NEITHER 
OCCUPIED TERRITORY ILLEGALLY NOR POSED A DANGER TO 
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES; INSPECTIONS WOULD ALWAYS INVOLVE 
HITCHES, YET THESE HITCHES DID NOT JUSTIFY WAR.  THE COUNCIL 
SHOULD PERMIT MORE TIME FOR INSPECTIONS AND ALL MEMBER STATES 
SHOULD ACTIVELY COOPERATE WITH UNSCR 1441  BY PROVIDING 
INFORMATION TO INSPECTORS.  IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PREVIOUS 
RESOLUTIONS, THE COUNCIL SHOULD LIFT SANCTIONS ON IRAQ AND 
IMPLEMENT THE CALL FOR A WMD-FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 
WEHBE LAUDED REGIONAL EFFORTS TOWARDS  A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION, 
AND STRESSED THAT ANY MILITARY OPTION SHOULD ONLY BE 
EXERCISED WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK. 
 
PAKISTAN: INSPECTORS' REPORTS 
SHOULD CONSTITUTE BASIS FOR SC DECISION 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (U)  PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER KASURI DESCRIBED THE DAY 
AS A CRITICAL AND HISTORIC MOMENT IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND 
SECURITY, AND HE WELCOMED THE U.S. "DETERMINATION IN WORKING 
THROUGH THE UN VIA UNSCR 1441."  SECRETARY POWELL HAD 
PROVIDED CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO 
THE PROVISIONS OF 1441, WHICH SHOULD ENHANCE THE INSPECTORS' 
EFFECTIVENESS.  SUCH ENHANCEMENT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT STEP 
FORWARD IN ELIMINATING IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMS.  HE HOPED THE 
"CONCERNS" RAISED WOULD RECEIVE "CREDIBLE ANSWERS."  THE 
PROVISIONS OF UNSCRS 687, 1284, AND 1441 WERE ALL CLEAR, HE 
STRESSED.  THE COUNCIL BROADLY SHARED THE VIEW THAT MORE 
ACTIVE COOPERATION WAS REQUIRED, AND IN THAT CONTEXT, BLIX 
AND EL-BARADEI HAD SET OUT THREE CONDITIONS: USE OF UNMANNED 
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES (UAVS); PRIVATE INTERVIEWS; 
AND IRAQI LEGISLATION.  IRAQ SHOULD MOVE SWIFTLY TO MEET 
THESE REQUIREMENTS AND TO RESPOND TO ANY SUBSEQUENT 
REQUIREMENTS.  KASURI ASSERTED THAT THE JANUARY 27 BRIEFINGS 
TO THE COUNCIL WERE NOT MEANT TO BE CONCLUSIVE.  THE 
INSPECTORS' REPORTS SHOULD CONSTITUTE THE CENTRAL BASIS ON 
WHICH A UNSC DECISION WOULD BE PREDICATED, CONSISTENT WITH 
THE OBJECTIVES OF EARLY COMPLIANCE BY IRAQ, AMELIORATION OF 
THE SUFFERING OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE, THE PRESERVATION OF IRAQ'S 
SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND THE PRESERVATION 
OF PEACE IN THE REGION, "INCLUDING THE DISPUTE OVER JAMMU AND 
KASHMIR." 
 
SPAIN: IRAQ VIOLATED 1441, 
OPTION FOR PEACE RESTS WITH SADDAM 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U)  SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER PALACIOS RECOGNIZED THAT, 
ONCE AGAIN, THE U.S. HAD COME TO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS BY BRINGING IMPORTANT INFORMATION TO THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL.  SECRETARY POWELL HAD SET COMPELLING DATA BEFORE THE 
COUNCIL:  THE EXISTENCE OF WMD PROGRAMS AND CONFIRMATION OF 
IRAQI DECEPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  PALACIOS 
SAID THAT IRAQ HAD VIOLATED ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER UNSCR 1441. 
 THE COUNCIL COULD NOT ALLOW A COUNTRY TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION, AS SUCH ACQUISITION WOULD ENDANGER 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.  IT JEOPARDIZED THE VERY 
EXISTENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  ONLY ONE 
EXPLANATION OF THE IRAQI RESPONSE TO UNSCR 1441 WAS POSSIBLE: 
 SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS NOT RENOUNCED HIS PLANS TO USE SUCH 
WEAPONS AS HE HAS USED THEM IN THE PAST.  SPAIN WAS GREATLY 
CONCERNED THAT THESE WEAPONS MIGHT ALSO FALL INTO THE HANDS 
OF A TERRORIST. 
 
¶17.  (U) INSPECTIONS COULD ONLY BEAR FRUIT IF IRAQ COOPERATED 
ACTIVELY, SHE STRESSED.  IT WAS TIME FOR IRAQ TO VOLUNTARILY 
DISARM, AND THE INSPECTORS WERE THERE TO WITNESS DISARMAMENT 
ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  BUT SADDAM HUSSEIN 
LACKS THE WILL TO RESPECT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S 
DEMAND FOR DISARMAMENT WITHOUT DELAY AND WITHOUT CONCEALMENT. 
ALTHOUGH INSPECTIONS WERE A VALUABLE INSTRUMENT, IN TWELVE 
YEARS, IRAQ HAS STILL NOT DISARMED.  IT WAS TIME FOR A CLEAR 
MESSAGE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PROGRAMS WERE A THREAT TO 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AND THAT DISARMAMENT MUST 
BE IMMEDIATE, COMPLETE, AND FINAL.  DESPITE IRAQ'S CONTINUED 
NON-COMPLIANCE, THERE WAS STILL A CHANCE FOR PEACE IF IRAQ 
RADICALLY MODIFIED ITS BEHAVIOR.  THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
PEACE IN IRAQ RESTS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN.  THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY IS OFFERING ONE LAST CHANCE UNDER 1441 FOR PEACEFUL 
DISARMAMENT, SHE WARNED. 
 
CHILE: PARTIAL COMPLIANCE VIOLATES UNSCR 1441, 
COUNCIL MUST USE ALL MEANS AVAILABLE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶18.  (U)  CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER VALENZUELA SAID THE 
SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION POINTED TO A PATTERN OF DEFIANCE AND 
RESISTANCE TO UNCONDITIONAL, IMMEDIATE, AND COMPLETE 
DISARMAMENT, AS FIRST CALLED FOR UNDER UNSCR 687.  UNSCR 1441 
GAVE ONE LAST OPPORTUNITY FOR DISARMAMENT, YET A REGIME THAT 
HAD DRAGGED THE IRAQI PEOPLE INTO TWO WARS AND A SANCTIONS 
REGIME WAS TAKING MAJOR RISKS AGAIN.  PARTIAL COMPLIANCE IN A 
"PIECEMEAL" WAY AND THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER EVERY PIECE OF 
INFORMATION PROVIDED, INSTEAD OF PRESENTING IT VOLUNTARILY, 
WERE ALL IN VIOLATION OF 1441.  SUCH A MENTALITY DERIVED FROM 
A TOTALITARIAN REGIME, SHE EMPHASIZED, QUOTING BLIX'S 
STATEMENT THAT IRAQ HAD NOT ARRIVED AT A GENUINE ACCEPTANCE 
OF ITS OBLIGATION TO DISARM. 
 
¶19.  (U) VALENZUELA NOTED THAT CHILE STILL SUPPORTED 
INSPECTIONS.  INSPECTIONS ALONE COULD "IMPOSE THE LOGIC OF 
PEACE" IF PRESSURE WAS KEPT UP ON IRAQ.  IT WAS UP TO UNMOVIC 
UNDER OP11 OF 1441 TO INFORM THE COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY OF ANY 
INTERFERENCE OR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE 
INSPECTIONS, AND SECRETARY POWELL'S ACCUSATIONS REQUIRED A 
FULL AND URGENT EXPLANATION BY IRAQ.  CHILE SUPPORTED 
"RETAINING MULTILATERAL CONTROL IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS;" 
THE PASSAGE OF 1441 WAS A DEMONSTRATION OF UNITY, AND THE 
COUNCIL SHOULD CONTINUE TO BUILD UNITY IN THE CRUCIAL 
SITUATION AHEAD.  THE IRAQI PEOPLE HAD SUFFERED OVER THE LONG 
TERM UNDER SANCTIONS.  IF THERE WAS NO "RADICAL CHANGE" IN 
IRAQ'S ATTITUDE, THE COUNCIL MUST USE "ALL MEANS AVAILABLE." 
 
BULGARIA: IRAQ IN MATERIAL BREACH, 
ALL MEANS SHOULD BE USED TO DISARM IRAQ 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (U) BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PASSY SAID THAT "THE FACT 
THE U.S. HAD COME WITH STRONG, COMPELLING EVIDENCE SHEDS 
ADDITIONAL LIGHT ON IRAQI FAILURE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 
1441." HE HOPED THE INFORMATION COULD BE USED TO ASSIST 
UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA.  THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION WOULD 
HAVE THE SAME "MOBILIZING EFFECT" ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY AS UNSCR 1441, REAFFIRMING TO THE IRAQIS THAT THIS 
WAS THEIR LAST CHANCE FOR DISARMAMENT BY PEACEFUL MEANS.  THE 
JANUARY 27 UNMOVIC AND IAEA REPORTS TO THE COUNCIL NOTED THAT 
ACTIVE COOPERATION WAS A PREREQUISITE TO 1441, AND THE IRAQI 
LEVEL OF COOPERATION WAS NOT SATISFACTORY.  BULGARIA INSISTED 
THAT IRAQ SUPPLY ALL INFORMATION ABOUT WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND 
PROVIDE EVIDENCE IT HAD UNCONDITIONALLY AND FULLY CHANGED ITS 
ATTITUDE TO INSPECTIONS.  IRAQ WAS IN MATERIAL BREACH OF 
PREVIOUS COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING UNSCR 1441, AND 
SECRETARY POWELL HAD PROVIDED NEW EVIDENCE OF THAT BREACH TO 
THE COUNCIL IN HIS PRESENTATION.  ALL MEANS SHOULD BE USED TO 
DISARM IRAQ, AND PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT WAS STILL POSSIBLE.  IF 
THE INSPECTORS DO NOT REPORT IN THE NEAR FUTURE THAT IRAQ HAS 
CHANGED ITS ATTITUDE, HOWEVER, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST TAKE 
UP ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, HE CONCLUDED. 
 
CAMEROON: WAR IS NOT INEVITABLE, 
ANNAN SHOULD GO TO BAGHDAD 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (U)  CAMEROONIAN MINISTER NGOUBEYOU STATED THAT THE 
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SECRETARY WAS "TROUBLING," AND HE 
URGED THE U.S. TO PROVIDE THE INSPECTORS THIS INFORMATION AS 
SOON AS POSSIBLE.  HE ALSO URGED THE COUNCIL TO GIVE THE 
INSPECTORS ADEQUATE TIME TO STUDY AND USE THIS INFORMATION. 
NGOUBEYOU NOTED THAT, WHILE THE COUNCIL IS NOT OBLIGED TO 
DEAL WITH PUBLIC OPINION, IT WAS UNDENIABLE THAT THE ISSUE OF 
IRAQ HAD BECOME A HIGH PROFILE ISSUE GLOBALLY. AT STAKE, HE 
SAID, WAS THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 
AND THE RESPECT OF THE UN AS A WHOLE.  FOR THIS REASON, HE 
WAS CONVINCED, HE SAID, THAT THE U.S. AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY WOULD PROCEED IN THE SPIRIT OF THE UN CHARTER AND 
WOULD SOLVE THIS ISSUE THROUGH THE COUNCIL.  NGOUBEYOU ALSO 
RECOMMENDED THAT, GIVEN THE GRAVITY OF THIS ISSUE, THE SYG BE 
ASKED TO GO TO IRAQ TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE IRAQIS, IN ORDER TO 
ALLOW A SPEEDY RESOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM.  DESPITE THE 
SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION, HE CLAIMED, WAR WAS NOT 
INEVITABLE. 
 
ANGOLA: COMPELLING INTELLIGENCE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (U) ANGOLAN DFM CHIKOTY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF 
PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE TO SEND SECRETARY POWELL TO THE 
COUNCIL, "TO SHARE WITH US THE COMPELLING INTELLIGENCE JUST 
SEEN."  FOR TWENTY YEARS, IRAQ HAD BEEN AT THE CENTER OF THE 
WORLD'S SECURITY CONCERNS.  THE JANUARY 27 REPORT TO THE 
COUNCIL, WITH THE SUPPLEMENTAL PRESENTATION BY THE U.S., 
ENABLED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE IMPORTANT DECISIONS. 
THE INFORMATION PRESENTED TODAY BROUGHT NEW ELEMENTS, WHICH 
MUST BE ADDRESSED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL.  THE IMPORTANCE OF INSPECTORS SHOULD NOT BE 
MINIMIZED, AS ONLY THROUGH COOPERATION WITH THEM COULD IRAQ 
PROVE ITSELF READY TO EMBARK ON A DISARMAMENT PROGRAM. 
COUNTRIES SHOULD URGENTLY PURSUE PROVIDING INFORMATION TO 
UNMOVIC, HE ADDED.  PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT WAS STILL POSSIBLE, 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD NOT EXHAUSTED ALL THE 
OPTIONS BEFORE RESORTING TO WAR, HE CONCLUDED. 
 
GUINEA: LIFT SANCTIONS TO INDUCE IRAQI COOPERATION 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶23.  (U)  GUINEAN PERMREP TRAORE, SPEAKING IN THE ABSENCE OF 
HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, PRAISED THE SECRETARY'S INITIATIVE IN 
MAKING HIS PRESENTATION.  HE SAID THAT THE JANUARY 27 BLIX 
/EL-BARADEI PRESENTATION REVEALED SOME IMPROVEMENT IN IRAQI 
COOPERATION, YET CLEARLY THERE WERE SUBSTANTIVE DEFICITS. 
IRAQ MUST OFFER COGENT EVIDENCE ON THE DESTRUCTION OF ITS 
WMD, ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INTERVIEWS WITH SCIENTISTS, PROVIDE A 
CREDIBLE UPDATED LIST OF SCIENTISTS, AND AUTHORIZE U-2 
OVERFLIGHTS.  ITS PAST FAILURE TO COOPERATE  DEMONSTRATED 
THAT THE COUNCIL COULD NOT  ACCEPT MERE WORDS.  LIFTING 
SANCTIONS, HE SUGGESTED, WOULD ENCOURAGE IRAQI COOPERATION. 
 
 
IRAQ SPEAKS LAST 
---------------- 
 
¶24.  (U) IRAQI PERMREP AL-DOURI COMPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT 
HAVE EQUAL TIME TO REBUT THE U.S. PRESENTATION, WHICH HE 
DECRIED AS "UTTERLY UNRELATED TO THE TRUTH."  THE SECRETARY 
HAD PRESENTED NO NEW INFORMATION, MERELY SOUND RECORDINGS 
WHOSE AUTHENTICITY COULD NOT BE ASCERTAINED, HE ASSERTED.  HE 
AVERRED THAT THE SOLE AIM OF THE U.S. WAS TO JUSTIFY WAR; BUT 
IRAQ IS WMD-FREE, AS NUMEROUS IRAQI OFFICIALS HAVE REPEATED 
FOR MORE THAN A DECADE.  MOREOVER, THE SECRETARY SHOULD HAVE 
SPARED HIMSELF THE EFFORT OF APPEARING BEFORE THE COUNCIL BY 
TAKING THE PRESENTATION DIRECTLY TO UNMOVIC AND IAEA, IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH OP10 OF UNSCR 1441, THUS ALLOWING THE 
INSPECTORS TO "PROCEED WITH THEIR WORK IN PEACE AND QUIET." 
THE FEBRUARY 8-9 VISIT TO IRAQ BY BLIX AND EL-BARADEI OFFERED 
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THEM TO ASCERTAIN THE VALIDITY OF THE U.S. 
ALLEGATIONS, HE ADDED, CLAIMING THAT THE INSPECTORS HAD 
PREVIOUSLY DEMONSTRATED THE "FALSITY" OF U.S. AND UK 
ALLEGATIONS.  AS PROOF OF IRAQI COOPERATION, HE REFERRED TO 
IRAQ'S 12,000 PAGE DECEMBER 7 DECLARATION, THE PRESENCE OF 
MORE THAN 250 INSPECTORS IN IRAQ, AND THE 575 INSPECTIONS 
COMPLETED AT MORE THAN 300 SITES AS OF FEBRUARY 4.  UNMOVIC 
AND IAEA ANALYSES HAD CONFIRMED THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROSCRIBED 
WMD AGENTS, HE STATED.  MOREOVER, BLIX HAD NOT FOUND ANY 
EVIDENCE OF MOBILE LABS AND BLIX HAD DISCOUNTED THE ASSERTION 
THAT IRAQI AGENTS WERE POSING AS SCIENTISTS IN A NEW YORK 
TIMES PIECE PUBLISHED ON JANUARY 30, HE ADDED.  IRAQ HAD NO 
OBJECTION TO U-2 OVERFLIGHTS IN PRINCIPLE;  HOWEVER, THESE 
COULD NOT GO FORWARD UNTIL THE U.S. AND UK SUSPENDED THEIR 
"ILLEGAL" NO-FLY ZONES. 
 
¶25.  (U)  AL-DOURI REJECTED U.S. EVIDENCE OF IRAQI 
CONCEALMENT AND TRUCK TRANSPORTATION OF INCRIMINATING 
MATERIALS PRIOR TO INSPECTIONS, DECLARING THAT INSPECTIONS 
WERE TAKING PLACE WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING.  MOREOVER, 
UNMOVIC, THANKS TO ITS HELICOPTERS AND OTHER RESOURCES, WAS 
TOO WELL-INFORMED FOR SUCH ALLEGED CONCEALMENT TO ELUDE 
NOTICE, HE SAID.  WMD PROGRAMS "WERE NOT ASPIRIN PILLS THAT 
COULD BE EASILY HIDDEN."  ON THE CONTRARY, THE U.S. EVIDENCE 
"COULD EASILY BE FABRICATED."  AL-DOURI REPUDIATED ANY 
LINKAGE BETWEEN IRAQ AND AL-QAEDA, CITING NEW YORK TIMES 
REPORTING ON COMPLAINTS BY CIA ANALYSTS THAT THE U.S. 
EXAGGERATED EVIDENCE ON AL-QAEDA TO BOLSTER ITS CASE FOR WAR. 
 SIMILARLY, HE ACCUSED FM STRAW OF WILLFULLY IGNORING UK 
ANALYSIS CASTING DOUBTS ON A LINKAGE TO AL-QAEDA.   AGAIN 
QUOTING THE NEW YORK TIMES,  HE ASSERTED THAT THE USG HAD 
KNOWN, SINCE 1988, THAT IRAQ HAD NOT, IN FACT, DEPLOYED 
CHEMICAL AGENTS. THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION WAS DESIGNED TO 
SELL U.S. AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION ON THE CASE FOR WAR IN THE 
ABSENCE OF CONVINCING LEGAL, MORAL, OR POLITICAL 
JUSTIFICATIONS, HE ALLEGED.  IRAQ, HOWEVER, OFFERED A PATH OF 
PEACE, HE CONCLUDED, APPENDING A LAST COMMENT THAT IT WAS 
ISRAEL THAT POSED THE REAL WMD THREAT IN THE REGION. 
 
 
NEGROPONTE