This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PGOV PGOV PGOV IT ITPREL ITPREL ITPREL ITALIAN POLITICS IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALY: BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT RIDING TOUGH DOMESTIC 
WAVE ON IRAQ 
 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  00699  01 OF 04  202219Z 
REF: A. ROME 0443 
     ¶B. ROME 6167 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: A/POLITICAL-MINISTER COUNSELOR GARY ROBBINS 
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) ITALY HAS MADE ITS STRATEGIC CHOICE ON IRAQ.  THE GOI 
WILL BACK FORCIBLE DISARMAMENT OF SADDAM, WITH OR WITHOUT A 
UN RESOLUTION, IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY.  HOW IT GETS TO THAT 
DECISION POINT WILL BE MESSY, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE PM 
BERLUSCONI IS CONFRONTING A MOSTLY UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL 
SITUATION ON THE HOME FRONT.  THE ITALIAN PUBLIC 
OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSES MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ; THE 
VATICAN CONTINUES TO PRESS THE "PEACE" TRACK; AND THE 
CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION REFUSES TO CLIMB ON BOARD A BIPARTISAN 
BANDWAGON.  STRIP AWAY ITALY'S SECULAR FACE, AND A COUNTRY 
THAT IS STILL HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY "CULTURAL CATHOLICISM" 
SURFACES.  IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, THIS TRANSLATES INTO 
DEEP SKEPTICISM TOWARD MILITARY ACTION, IF NOT OUTRIGHT 
PACIFISM.  IT MAKES THE GOI'S PUBLIC "BURDEN OF PROOF" FOR 
WHY ITALY MAY NEED TO SUPPORT ARMED INTERVENTION IN IRAQ VERY 
HIGH. 
 
¶2.  (C) THE GOI HAS SETTLED ON A WORKABLE PARLIAMENTARY 
STRATEGY THAT RESULTED IN OVERWHELMING COALITION SUPPORT FOR 
ITS FEBRUARY 19 MOTION ON IRAQ (SEPTEL): EMPHASIZE PEACE, 
PREPARE FOR CONFLICT, AND CONSULT REGULARLY WITH PARLIAMENT. 
THE CENTER-LEFT, EAGER TO RIDE THE TIGER OF PUBLIC OPINION, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  00699  01 OF 04  202219Z 
HAS SPURNED THE GOI'S EFFORTS TO TURN IRAQ POLICY INTO A 
BIPARTISAN ISSUE.  FOR THIS REASON, DENYING THE OPPOSITION 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO PAINT THE GOI AS ISOLATED IN EUROPE WAS, 
FOR BERLUSCONI, A KEY OUTCOME OF THE FEBRUARY 17 EU SUMMIT 
AND MAY HELP SOME IN MANAGING PUBLIC OPINION.  IN PUBLIC, THE 
PM WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT ITALY IS WORKING FOR PEACE, 
PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING A MAJOR ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATION IN 
ROME.  AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, IT IS MAKING THE CASE MORE 
OPENLY THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR SADDAM TO COOPERATE WITH 
THE UN INSPECTIONS.  IF PRESIDENT BUSH DECIDES TO ATTACK 
IRAQ, THE GOI WILL LINE UP A DIVIDED COUNTRY BEHIND A 
U.S.-LED MILITARY COALITION.  WE BELIEVE THE BERLUSCONI 
GOVERNMENT IS SOLID ENOUGH INTERNALLY, AND STILL ENJOYS 
SUFFICIENTLY BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT TO STAY THE COURSE.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
A FAITHFUL ALLY 
--------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) THE GOI HAS ARRIVED AT THE IRAQ ENDGAME FULLY 
COMMITTED TO SOLIDIFYING ITALY'S POLITICAL AND SECURITY 
PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S.  IT HAS MADE A STRATEGIC CHOICE IN 
BACKING OUR FUNDAMENTAL GOAL OF DISARMING SADDAM.  PM 
BERLUSCONI'S SIGNATURE ON THE WALL STREET JOURNAL "LETTER OF 
THE EIGHT" PROVED A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE SIDES IN PUBLIC, AT 
SOME POLITICAL RISK.  THE GOI'S RECENT GRANTING OF ROAD, 
RAIL, AND PORT ACCESS FOR MOVEMENT OF U.S. TROOPS AND 
EQUIPMENT THROUGH ITALIAN NATIONAL TERRITORY MOVES ITALY 
FURTHER INTO THE CAMP OF THOSE COUNTRIES OFFERING NOT ONLY 
POLITICAL, BUT ALSO CONCRETE SUPPORT.  ITALY IS AND WILL 
REMAIN A FAITHFUL ALLY -- WILLING TO MAKE THE TOUGH CALLS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  00699  01 OF 04  202219Z 
WHEN NECESSARY.  NEVERTHELESS, BERLUSCONI IS MANAGING A 
DELICATE DOMESTIC SITUATION THAT IMPACTS HOW THE GOVERNMENT 
HAS FRAMED THE IRAQ ISSUE AND THE TACTICS THE GOI HAS ADOPTED 
TO SUPPORT ITS POLICY. 
 
TOUGH DOMESTIC SLEDDING 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) ITALY'S IRAQ POLICY IS BEING GENERATED UNDER MOSTLY 
UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES:  STRONG ANTI-WAR 
SENTIMENT, THE PERSISTENT INFLUENCE NOT SIMPLY OF THE VATICAN 
BUT CATHOLIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY MORE BROADLY, AND AN 
OPPOSITION DETERMINED TO SEEK POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AND THUS 
UNWILLING TO BROOK ANY COMPROMISE OVER AN ISSUE IT HAS CAST 
AS PEACE VERSUS WAR.  NEW POLLS RELEASED LAST WEEK REVEAL A 
YAWNING GAP BETWEEN THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF ITALIANS WHO 
BELIEVE BOTH THAT IRAQ HAS TIES TO AL-QAIDA AND RETAINS WMD 
CAPABILITY, BUT YET REJECT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE OUT OF 
HAND, AND THE MINORITY WILLING TO COUNTENANCE WAR AS A MEANS 
TO ADDRESS THE THREAT.  SEVENTY PERCENT OF THE PUBLIC IS NOW 
OPPOSED TO ATTACKING IRAQ. 
 
¶5.  (C) THE VATICAN'S INFLUENCE IS INDIRECT AND DIFFUSE; THE 
POPE IS NOT PULLING ANY STRINGS AT THE PM'S OFFICE OR THE 
 
SVC REF B NOT 2003 MSG 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ2279 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  00699  02 OF 04  202220Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DOEE-00  WHA-00 
      SRPP-00  EAP-00   VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00 
      VCE-00   AC-01    NEA-00   NRRC-00  NSAE-00  OES-00   OIC-02 
      OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00 
      IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    SVC-00   TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00 
      SA-00    SSD-00   PMB-00   DRL-01   G-00     SSR-00   SAS-00 
        /005W 
                  ------------------3901DD  202221Z /15 
P 201733Z FEB 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8354 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 ROME 000699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PGOV PGOV PGOV IT ITPREL ITPREL ITPREL ITALIAN POLITICS IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALY: BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT RIDING TOUGH DOMESTIC 
WAVE ON IRAQ 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  00699  02 OF 04  202220Z 
MFA.  HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THE HOLY SEE CONTINUES TO CLAIM 
"THERE ARE STILL AVENUES OF PEACE TO EXPLORE," IT IS 
DIFFICULT FOR THE GOI TO ARGUE OTHERWISE.  MOREOVER, ITALY, 
DESPITE A DECADES-LONG TREND OF SECULARIZATION, REMAINS A 
COUNTRY THAT IS "CULTURALLY CATHOLIC" AND ITS POLITICAL 
CLASS--ESPECIALLY ON THE CENTER-RIGHT--REFLECTS THIS SOCIAL 
REALITY.  THE UPSHOT IS A PERVASIVE AND VISCERAL ANXIETY 
ABOUT MILITARY CONFLICT THAT, WITHIN THE GOVERNING COALITION, 
EXTENDS BEYOND THE TINY CENTRIST UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS 
(UDC). 
 
¶6.  (C) INDEED, A STRONG CATHOLIC STREAK RUNS THROUGHOUT THE 
GOVERNING COALITION; OLD LINE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS PLAY AN 
IMPORTANT ROLE IN FORZA ITALIA AND ARE ACTIVE IN THE 
RIGHT-WING NATIONAL ALLIANCE.  WHILE THESE PROFESSIONAL 
POLITICIANS ARE NOT DETERMINANT IN SHAPING THE FOREIGN POLICY 
DEBATE, THEY WIELD CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE. MOREOVER, A 
GOVERNING COALITION THAT REACHED OUT TO CATHOLIC VOTERS AS A 
KEY CONSTITUENCY CANNOT AFFORD TO USE BELLICOSE RHETORIC TO 
EXPLAIN POLICY CHOICES.  THEREFORE, THE RHETORICAL TONE IS 
MUTED, STRATEGY IS CAST IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING THE FOCUS ON 
PEACE, AND PUBLIC ENCOURAGEMENT IS GIVEN TO DIPLOMATIC 
INITIATIVES REGARDLESS OF THEIR CHANCES OF SUCCESS (REF A). 
WHILE PREPARING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT, THE GOI IS 
TRYING TO INSULATE ITSELF FROM ACCUSATIONS THAT IT IS 
PRO-WAR. 
 
¶7.  (C) THE CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION'S DISJOINTED APPROACH TO 
IRAQ IS A MIXED BLESSING FOR THE GOI.  THE OPPOSITION'S 
TACTICAL DECISION TO TARGET GOI POLICY AS PART OF ITS 
LONG-RUNNING GUERRILLA WARFARE CAMPAIGN AGAINST BERLUSCONI 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  00699  02 OF 04  202220Z 
WILL PREVENT ANY SIGNIFICANT BI-PARTISAN COOPERATION, WHICH 
THROUGHOUT THE POST-COLD WAR ERA HAS BEEN THE NORM ON MAJOR 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES.  THE GOI HAS MADE AN EFFORT TO 
"NATIONALIZE" ITS IRAQ POLICY, CALLING ON THE CENTER-LEFT TO 
UNITE BEHIND A POLICY OF DIPLOMACY BACKED BY THE THREAT OF 
FORCE.  HOWEVER, WITH PUBLIC SENTIMENT RUNNING SO STRONGLY 
AGAINST CONFLICT, AND THE OPPOSITION DESPERATELY SEARCHING 
FOR ISSUES AROUND WHICH IT CAN RALLY VOTERS, THE CENTER-LEFT 
WILL WORK TO KEEP THE DEBATE DIVISIVELY PARTISAN.  WHILE THIS 
COMPLICATES THE GOI'S MANAGEMENT OF THE ISSUE IN PARLIAMENT, 
THERE IS AN UPSIDE. 
 
¶8.  SPLIT AMONG THREE CAMPS--A PACIFIST LEFT, A CENTER-LEFT 
OPPOSED TO PREVENTIVE WAR BUT SENSITIVE TO THE UN, AND AN 
ELITE CONCERNED ABOUT RELATIONS WITH THE U.S AND ITALIAN 
PRESTIGE--THE OPPOSITION IS NOT WELL POSITIONED TO INFLICT 
SERIOUS POLITICAL DAMAGE ON THE GOI.  INDEED, THE CENTER-LEFT 
WOULD SPLINTER BADLY IF A FOLLOW-ON RESOLUTION TO UNSC 1441 
AUTHORIZING MILITARY FORCE WERE PASSED BY THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL.  MANY IN THE OPPOSITION'S RANK AND FILE ARE PINNING 
THEIR HOPES ON FRANCE TO FORESTALL THIS. 
 
¶9.  (C) THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
REPUBLIC IS NOT STRONG IN ITALY; THE OFFICE HOLDER'S 
INFLUENCE STEMS FROM HIS MORAL STANDING AND PERSUASIVE 
ABILITIES.  PRESIDENT CIAMPI, WHO ENJOYS BROAD RESPECT, ACTS 
AS A BUFFER BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION AND IS 
FOCUSED INTER ALIA ON ENSURING THAT INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES 
DO NOT BREAK DOWN.  BUT HE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO SHAPING 
POLITICAL OPINION -- INCLUDING ON THE IRAQ DEBATE -- IF NOT 
SO MUCH POLICY OUTCOMES (SEPTEL). 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  00699  02 OF 04  202220Z 
 
¶10.  (C) CIAMPI IS A COMMITTED INTERNATIONALIST WHO BELIEVES 
AS STRONGLY IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC 
RELATIONSHIP AS HE DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION.  HE WOULD MAKE 
HIS VIEWS KNOWN (AND HAS DONE SO) WERE THE BERLUSCONI 
GOVERNMENT IGNORING ONE OR THE OTHER IN POLICY FORMULATION. 
NOW, THEIR MUTUALLY COINCIDING GOALS--DEMONSTRATING ITALY'S 
FAITHFULNESS TO AN ALLY AND KEEPING THE EU'S INTERNAL CRISIS 
WITHIN MANAGEABLE BOUNDS--WORKS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE GOI. 
INDEED, A LETTER FROM CIAMPI DELIVERED TO BERLUSCONI ON 
FEBRUARY 14 IN WHICH HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO ITALY OF 
THE EU, THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK, AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE UN, ALSO COMPLIMENTED THE 
GOVERNMENT FOR ITS HANDLING OF THE IRAQ ISSUE.  IF THE GOI 
CANNOT FIND COVER UNDER BI-PARTISANSHIP, IT HAS FOUND SOME 
COMFORT IN THE INSTITUTIONAL ARMS OF THE PRESIDENT. 
 
MANAGING THE DEBATE 
------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) BERLUSCONI AND HIS CLOSEST POLITICAL 
ALLIES--ESPECIALLY DEPUTY PM FINI, HOUSE OF DEPUTIES 
PRESIDENT CASINI, FM FRATTINI, AND DEFMIN MARTINO--HAVE SO 
FAR MANAGED TO KEEP THE WHITE HOT IRAQ ISSUE ON THE RAILS. 
 
SVC PARA 8 HAS NO PARA MARKING 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ2489 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  00699  03 OF 04  202358Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DOEE-00  WHA-00 
      SRPP-00  EAP-00   VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00 
      VCE-00   AC-01    NEA-00   NRRC-00  NSAE-00  OES-00   OIC-02 
      OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00 
      IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  SA-00 
      SSD-00   PMB-00   DRL-01   G-00     SSR-00   SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------390B91  202358Z /15 
P 201733Z FEB 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8355 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 ROME 000699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PGOV PGOV PGOV IT ITPREL ITPREL ITPREL ITALIAN POLITICS IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALY: BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT RIDING TOUGH DOMESTIC 
WAVE ON IRAQ 
 
WITHIN THE COALITION, DISSENTERS FROM THE PM'S 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  00699  03 OF 04  202358Z 
LINE--INCLUDING A GROUP OF LIBERAL LEGISLATORS PERPLEXED 
ABOUT PREEMPTIVE WAR--HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO SPEAK OUT WITHOUT 
BEING SHOUTED DOWN.  BERLUSCONI HAS ALSO MET PERSONALLY WITH 
LEGISLATORS NOT COMPLETELY COMFORTABLE WITH THE GOI'S 
POSITION.  SHUTTING OFF INTERNAL DEBATE WOULD HAVE BEEN 
IMPOSSIBLE; BY FRAMING ITALY'S IRAQ POLICY AROUND A VIRTUOUS 
GOAL--COMING TO THE AIDE OF AN ALLY IN NEED--BERLUSCONI HAS 
EFFECTIVELY DEFUSED THE RISK OF A FIFTH COLUMN DEVELOPING. 
 
¶12.  (C) FINI, FOR HIS PART, HAS PLAYED A BEHIND-THE-SCENES 
ROLE, HELPING TO CONTAIN ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT IN THE NATIONAL 
ALLIANCE.  CASINI HAS BEEN MORE OUTSPOKEN.  WHILE HIS PARTY, 
THE UDC, IS THE SMALLEST COALITION PARTNER, ON IRAQ ITS 
SKEPTICISM TOWARD WAR IS BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
CENTER-RIGHT'S CATHOLIC ELECTORATE.  CASINI IS ACUTELY 
SENSITIVE TO THESE FORMER CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC VOTERS--AND 
THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT--AND HAS ADROITLY MIXED A 
PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO PEACE WITH POLITICAL REALISM IN 
FRAMING THE ISSUE PUBLICLY.  FRATTINI'S STRAIGHTFORWARD 
NON-POLEMICAL APPROACH IN DEFENSE OF THE UN'S CRITICAL BUT 
NOT EXCLUSIVE ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT HAS HELPED KEEP THE 
GOVERNMENT LINE CONSISTENT AND RELATIVELY CLEAR. 
 
¶13.  (C) MARTINO'S JOB IS TO HELP MANAGE THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS IN THE LEGISLATURE.  BY AND LARGE, HE HAS WIDESPREAD 
CREDIBILITY BECAUSE HE IS CONSIDERED HONEST, SERIOUS, AND 
GENERALLY REFUSES TO BE DRAGGED IN TO THE DAILY "TEATRINO" OF 
POLITICAL SHADOW DANCING.  THE GOI'S DECISION TO CONSULT WITH 
PARLIAMENT ON DETAILED FLOW OF FORCES ISSUES CERTAINLY WAS 
TAKEN WITH AN EYE TO CONTAINING OPPOSITION RANCOR, BUT IT HAS 
ALSO PROBABLY HELPED KEEP THE COALITION IN LINE.   INDEED, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  00699  03 OF 04  202358Z 
MARTINO, WHO WE ARE TEMPTED TO CALL A RELUCTANT HAWK, MUST, 
IN DEALING WITH PARLIAMENT, MANAGE A FLOCK OF DOVES WHO ARE 
CULTURALLY ALLERGIC TO SEEING ITALY ENGAGED DIRECTLY IN 
MILITARY CONFLICT. 
 
¶14.  (C) THE DEFMIN, WHO SOWED HIS POLITICAL OATS IN THE NOW 
DEFUNCT ITALIAN LIBERAL PARTY, OWES HIS ALLEGIANCE TO 
BERLUSCONI, NOT TO ANY PARTICULAR POLITICAL GROUPING.  HE 
SERVES AS A LIGHTENING ROD FOR THE PM, AND MARTINO'S CAUTION 
REFLECTS, WE THINK, MOSTLY A RECOGNITION THAT THE GOI IS FAR 
OUT IN FRONT OF PUBLIC OPINION.  MARTINO HAS AT TIMES SAID 
MORE IN PUBLIC THAN WE THOUGHT NECESSARY.  HOWEVER, AS 
HIGHLIGHTED IN REF B, IN GETTING OUT IN FRONT ON 
CONTROVERSIAL SECURITY ISSUES SUCH AS IRAQ, HE MORE OFTEN 
THAN NOT SETS THE TERMS OF DEBATE, AND USUALLY IS ABLE TO 
STEER IT IN A DIRECTION FAVORABLE TO OUR INTERESTS. 
 
¶15.  (C) DENYING THE CENTER-LEFT AN OPPORTUNITY TO USE EUROPE 
AS A WEDGE ISSUE ALSO HAS BEEN FUNDAMENTAL TO THE GOI'S 
OVERALL STRATEGY.  WITH 56 PERCENT OF ITALIANS SAYING THEY 
JUDGE POSITIVELY THE ROLE OF FRANCE AND GERMANY ON IRAQ 
VERSUS 41 PERCENT SAYING THE SAME ABOUT THEIR OWN COUNTRY'S 
ROLE, EFFORTS TO BRIDGE THE INTRA-EU GAP HAVE A DUAL FOREIGN 
POLICY (PAVING THE WAY FOR A SUCCESSFUL ITALIAN EU 
PRESIDENCY) AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL OBJECTIVE.  EVEN A PAPER 
EXERCISE SUCH AS THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED EU SUMMIT SHOULD HELP 
BERLUSCONI AMELIORATE HIS "EUROPE" PROBLEM AND REDOUND 
POSITIVELY WITH PUBLIC OPINION. AT THE SAME TIME, BERLUSCONI 
MUST BE ATTUNED TO LATENT AND NOT-SO-LATENT ANTI-AMERICANISM 
CREEPING AROUND THE EDGES OF ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT IN ITALY. THE 
MORE EU COVER HE CAN SECURE FOR HIS VERY PRO-US POLICY 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  00699  03 OF 04  202358Z 
POSITIONS, THE BETTER THE GOI WILL BE ABLE TO COUNTER THIS 
PHENOMENON.  COMPLETING A "TRIFECTA" BY HELPING TO MEND THE 
RIFT BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE U.S., WITHIN THE EU, AND BETWEEN 
THE GOI AND THE ITALIAN PUBLIC, IS ONE OF BERLUSCONI'S KEY 
POLICY OBJECTIVES. 
 
HOLDING IT TOGETHER 
------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) THE ONE MILLION (UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATES) PEACE 
DEMONSTRATORS WHO MARCHED IN ROME ON FEBRUARY 15 WILL NOT 
CHANGE THE GOI'S DECISION-MAKING PARADIGM.  BERLUSCONI HAS 
SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE BELIEVES THEY UNDERMINED THE CAUSE OF 
PEACE BY GIVING SADDAM FALSE HOPE THAT FULL COOPERATION WITH 
THE UN INSPECTORS MAY NOT BE NECESSARY.  HE KNOWS THAT, WHILE 
CERTAINLY SOME CENTER-RIGHT VOTERS PARTICIPATED, GENERALLY 
ITALY'S CONSERVATIVE CLASSES DO NOT TAKE TO THE STREETS. 
WHILE LOCAL ELECTIONS ARE SCHEDULED IN MAY, VOTERS DO NOT 
HAVE A HISTORY OF USING THEM AS REFERENDA TO REGISTER 
DISSATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE ON NATIONAL 
ISSUES.  THE GOI IS HOPING THAT BY THE TIME ELECTIONS TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ROLL AROUND NEXT YEAR, IT CAN TOUT THAT 
ITALY ON IRAQ WAS ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ2490 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  00699  04 OF 04  202359Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DOEE-00  WHA-00 
      SRPP-00  EAP-00   VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00 
      VCE-00   AC-01    NEA-00   NRRC-00  NSAE-00  OES-00   OIC-02 
      OMB-01   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00 
      IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  SA-00 
      SSD-00   PMB-00   DRL-01   G-00     SSR-00   SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------390BA4  202359Z /15 
P 201733Z FEB 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8356 
INFO NTO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL FLORECE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY 
SEDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 ROME 000699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PGOV PGOV PGOV IT ITPREL ITPREL ITPREL ITALIAN POLITICS IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: ITALY: BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT RIDING TOUGH DOMESTIC 
WAVE ON IRAQ 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  00699  04 OF 04  202359Z 
 
¶17.  (C)  NEVERTHELESS, THE DEMONSTRATIONS DID HIGHLIGHT THE 
VERY SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC RELATIONS DILEMMA THE GOI MUST STILL 
TRY TO RESOLVE.  ON THE ONE HAND, BERLUSCONI, IN HIS PRESS 
STATEMENTS, WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS 
PURSUING ALL OPTIONS TOWARD A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE 
CRISIS.  FOR EXAMPLE, FOLLOWING HIS FEBRUARY 18 MEETING WITH 
KOFI ANNAN, HE SAID, "NO ONE IS THINKING ABOUT GIVING UP 
EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION."  YET, IN MORE 
FORMAL SETTINGS, SUCH AS HIS FEBRUARY 19 STATEMENT BEFORE 
PARLIAMENT, THE PM IS ADOPTING A MORE COLDLY RATIONAL 
APPROACH.  ITALY, HE SAID, IS WORKING FOR PEACE BUT IRAQ MUST 
BE DISARMED; SADDAM ALONE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS FATE; AND 
NON-COOPERATION WILL LEAD TO SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.  WE MUST 
SPEAK THE LANGUAGE OF PEACE, BUT NOT OF SURRENDER, BERLUSCONI 
AFFIRMED. 
 
¶18.  (C) WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT 
WILL BE ABLE TO SHIFT PUBLIC OPINION DRAMATICALLY ON IRAQ. 
IN LEADING FROM THE FRONT, THE GOI HAS PLACED THE U.S.-ITALY 
RELATIONSHIP AND ITS PERCEPTION OF ITALY'S NATIONAL INTEREST 
AT THE FORE -- WITH THE ADVANTAGE OF A SECURE PARLIAMENTARY 
AND ELECTORAL BASE, WHICH, IT PROBABLY CALCULATES (WE THINK 
CORRECTLY) WILL CAST FUTURE VOTES ON THE BASIS OF MORE 
PAROCHIAL ISSUES.  UNTIL THE UN INSPECTORS REPORT AGAIN ON 
MARCH 1, ITALY WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT A RHETORICAL 
BALANCING ACT, BUT RECOGNIZES THAT THE WAITING GAME MAY BE 
NEARLY OVER.  OUR ACE IN THE HOLE IS THAT BERLUSCONI WILL 
FOLLOW OUR LEAD ON HOW LONG IS LONG ENOUGH.  IN THE EVENT OF 
MILITARY ACTION, BERLUSCONI WILL ALIGN A DIVIDED COUNTRY WITH 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  00699  04 OF 04  202359Z 
THE U.S.-LED INTERNATIONAL COALITION.  UN AUTHORIZATION 
WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON PUBLIC -- AND 
POLITICAL -- OPINION.  IT WOULD ALSO HELP BUFFER THE GOI AND 
ENHANCE ITS ABILITY TO MANAGE WHAT COULD BE EXTREME DOMESTIC 
TURBULENCE IF A CONFLICT WERE TO BE PROLONGED AND RESULT IN 
UNEXPECTEDLY LARGE NUMBERS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. 
SEMBLER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
> 
 2003ROME00699 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL