This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000190 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP 
CDR USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2013 
TAGS: PREL BM UN
SUBJECT: JAPANESE VIEWS OF RAZALI'S MISSION 
 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez.  Reason: 1.5 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: According to Japanese Embassy sources in 
Rangoon, at the upcoming UN meetings in Tokyo, Japan will 
argue that the current sanctions-based western approach to 
Burma has failed and should be revised to allow for a more 
gradual process of transition, more direct aid support and 
more dialogue with regional states regarding the implications 
of change in Burma.  The Japanese Ambassador to Burma, Yuji 
Miyamoto, has taken the lead on formulating this approach and 
will likely be the prime GOJ spokesman at the meetings.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The GOJ believes that the Razali process will have to 
be reformulated before it can make any further progress in 
Burma.  According to the Japanese Embassy's Political 
Counselor, Rokuichiro Michii, the GOJ, led by Ambassador 
Miyamoto, has reached a number of conclusions in recent 
weeks.  First, the GOJ believes that Than Shwe has emerged as 
the single important decision-maker in the GOB; "everything," 
according to Michii, "centered on him."  Secondly, there was 
now little pressure for change in Burma.  While Burma's 
economic situation was problematic, the problems were not 
serious enough to force change.  Similarly, Western ties with 
Burma were now minimal and Western sanctions ineffectual, 
given the absolute absence of front line state support for 
sanctions.  India, China, Thailand and all other regional 
states were now all engaged with the GOB, Michii noted; none 
were prepared to put their relations with Burma at risk for 
the sake of political change.  On the contrary, all now 
effectively provided a cushion of support for the GOB in the 
face of western sanctions. 
 
¶3. (C) The GOJ also believed that no confidence had been 
re-established between the GOB and the NLD, despite two years 
of talks. While the SPDC had made "tactical concessions," 
there were "no incentives" for it to change, Michii said. 
Meanwhile, there were many "risks" to embarking on a course 
of political change while active insurgencies continued in 
the countryside.  As for the NLD, it too feared to 
compromise, acording to Michii.  Aung San Suu Kyi's release 
in May had created high expectations, which could backfire on 
the party if the NLD settled for anything less than a full 
participatory democracy.  On the other hand, the NLD also 
knew the risks of trying to force the pace of change.  In 
1990 and 1998, it had been the victim of government 
crackdowns and did not want to go that route again.  Hence, 
it had settled for an ineffectual middle course -- demanding 
change, but doing nothing directly to press the government 
towards change. 
 
The Problems 
 
¶4. (C) As for UN Special Envoy Razali, Micchi said, Japan 
supported him and his efforts.  It also believed that 
Razali's "facilitation" had produced some results; e.g., the 
release of political prisoners and some additional political 
space for the NLD.  However, there were problems with the 
current process.  First of all, Razali did not enjoy full 
international support.  By and large, regional states, 
including front line states like India, China and Thailand, 
viewed Razali's mission as a western initiative meant to 
serve western interests in human rights even at the expense 
of issues of high interest to regional states like narcotics 
control, refugees, and regional development.  Those states 
might give lip service to Razali's efforts, but none were 
prepared to sacrifice their relations with Burma for the sake 
of his program.  Secondly, Razali had set his sights too 
high, according to Michii.  Given adequate incentives, the 
GOB might sign on for some process leading to a "guided 
democracy;" however, it would not accept the full 
participatory democracy that the West, following the NLD, was 
now demanding.  Finally, the GOJ felt that the international 
community had used only "sticks and no carrots" in dealing 
with the SPDC.  It had not toned down its rhetoric and had 
not delivered on promises of support even for humanitarian 
issues. 
Japanese Proposals 
 
¶5. (C) To deal with these problems, the GOJ plans to 
recommend in Tokyo that the international community take 
steps to make Razali's mission relevant to, or at least 
compatible with, regional interests.  In its view, if we 
continue as we are today, with western states headed in one 
direction and regional states in another, then the chances 
for any succesful internationally led effort at change will 
be small.  Secondly, the Japanese will argue that the West 
should be realistic regarding its expectations for change. 
The NLD might be constrained regarding the types of change it 
could advocate, but the West need not remain locked in that 
same box.  If a slower, but ultimately more promising process 
could be worked out, then that is the direction in which we 
should move with or without an explicit endorsement from the 
NLD.  Finally, if the West truly wanted the Razali process to 
work, it had to be more generous, Michii said.  Right now, 
the west was advocating radical change without providing any 
restructuring support.  Not unreasonably, the GOB and most 
regional governments questioned the wisdom of that approach 
in a country with such deeply-rooted problems. 
 
Comment 
 
¶6. (C) The analysis above is not new, but it is accurate. 
There is little pressure for change or inclination towards 
compromise in Burma now.  The economy is faltering, but not 
so badly as to completely undermine the government's hold on 
power.  Western sanctions hurt, but not enough to threaten 
the government.  Meanwhile, those same sanctions alienate 
regional states, who feel that the West has placed its 
interest in human rights before their interest in regional 
stability and regional development.  As a result, the West 
has ended up trying to run a blockade without front-line 
state support.  Not surprisingly, that approach has failed. 
 
¶7. (C) Whether anything else is possible is the real 
question.  The prescription the Japanese plan to offer fits 
the diagnosis, but they will need the bedside manner of 
saints to make that prescription go down with Western 
governments.  More dialogue with regional states regarding 
the regional implications of change in Burma, more realistic 
goals for the process of transition and more direct aid 
support for change could all help the transition process. 
When all is said and done, however, the GOJ will essentially 
be asking the West to distinguish its political goals from 
those of the Burmese domestic political opposition led by 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.  The Japanese may be right in 
arguing that the NLD is trapped by the current configuration 
of political forces into taking a maximalist position. 
Unfortunately, they may find that the West as a whole is in 
exactly the same position. 
 
¶8. (C) In any case,  USG representatives should be prepared 
to react to the Japanese analysis and presentation in Tokyo. 
From what we understand, this position has been well vetted 
within the GOJ and could determine Japanese policy in Burma 
for some time to come, regardless of any decisions taken at 
the coming meeting.  End Comment. 
Martinez