This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LAGOS 000322 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2008 
TAGS: PREL KISL PINR PTER NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF POLITICIZED ISLAM IN THE 
SOUTH 
 
Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL ROBYN HINSON-JONES FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AN 
 
 
D (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  Islam as a factor in politics in 
southwestern Nigeria and the 
threat of the imposition of Shari'a (Koranic law) in the 
south are not current 
or near-term possibilities.  However, all observers agree 
that overwhelming 
poverty, and uncertainty and possible instability in 
government in Nigeria are 
factors that could lead to some future politicization of 
Islam in the region. 
End summary. 
 
 
Background 
 
 
¶2. (U)  Northern Nigeria has had a significant Muslim 
population (Hausa and 
Fulani ethnic groups) since the eleventh century, and is 
today over 90 percent 
Muslim.  Only as recently as the nineteenth century has Islam 
spread 
significantly in the south.  Southern Muslims (mainly in the 
Yoruba southwest) 
have lived peacefully with their Christian and animist 
countrymen for decades. 
However, according to researchers on the issue of the rise of 
political or 
fundamentalist Islam, conditions in all of Nigeria over the 
past decade have 
become ideal for the development of politicized Islam.  They 
point to the facts 
that Nigeria is the most populous country on the continent, 
Muslims probably 
make up over half its population, there is wide-spread 
poverty, political 
instability, a weak and ineffective police force and 
prodigious official 
corruption all of which have, in other majority Muslim 
countries, led to the 
rise of dissident Islamists.  Some Muslims have addressed 
social grievances 
through religious expression in fundamentalist appeals to 
piety or challenges 
to the political status quo.  It should be noted here that 
Usama bin Laden's 
original protest was against what he believed to be the 
corrupt, greedy, and 
ineffective ruling al Saud family who claimed to be the 
protectors of the 
holiest places in Islam, but who allowed US troops 
(non-Muslims) to defile 
Saudi soil by their very presence. 
 
 
¶3. (U) In 1999 Nigeria transitioned from military to civilian 
rule and 
installed retired General Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian 
Yoruba from the south, 
as President.  According to southern observers, this was 
accomplished only because 
Obasanjo and his Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) agreed to 
support the official 
adoption of Shari'a law in several northern states. 
(Comment. Several of our 
southern interlocutors, Christian and Muslim and from several 
political parties, 
say that adoption of Shari'a led to an increase in 
ethnic/religious conflict and 
confrontations between Muslims and Christians in the north 
over the past four 
years.  The Muslim majority in the north scored a political 
point with Shari'a, 
and they press that point home at every opportunity.  End 
comment.) The events 
of September 11, 2001, further heightened Nigeria's 
visibility, along with other 
west African countries, as a majority Muslim country and a 
possible breeding 
ground for Islamist fundamentalist terrorism. 
 
 
¶4. (U)  Questions of regional stability prompted 
investigation of whether Islam 
is on the rise and becoming more political in the country. 
When a Muslim woman 
(Amina Lawal) from the North was sentenced to death by 
stoning, several 
contestants in the Miss World Pageant that was to be held in 
Nigeria in 
November, 2002, protested by refusing to come to Nigeria. 
Shortly after the 
remaining contestants arrived, an article in a national 
newspaper that 
allegedly "insulted" the prophet Mohammed set off Muslim 
riots that left 200 
dead.  These events and the continuing ethnic/political 
conflicts in the North 
also raise unease about the possible upsurge in political 
Islam in the South. 
 
 
State of Islam in the South 
 
 
¶5. (C) PolOff met with the Secretary General of the 
Lagos-based Nigerian 
Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, Dr. Lateef Adegbite. 
Adegbite said that 
there is no conflict between Muslims in the south and other 
religions here. 
Although he could not give even a rough estimate of the 
current number of 
Muslims in the south, he said that Islam is growing steadily 
in the region and 
the concern of the Muslim community is to fund and build 
enough schools 
(madrassas) for increasing numbers of Muslim children. 
According to Adegbite, 
there is no pressure to adopt Shari'a in the south, and the 
uproar over the 
Lawal case will be resolved peacefully by the courts. 
Adegbite's views on 
other possible areas of religious friction are conservative 
and track the views 
of other Muslim sources.  He told us that many Muslims, in 
Nigeria and 
worldwide, were convinced the War on Terrorism is a war 
against Muslims, and he 
added the familiar charge that the US has a "double standard" 
when dealing with 
the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.  Nigeria's 
Supreme Council 
has no authority to appoint or remove Muslim clergy, nor to 
review or 
standardize the Friday mosque sermons, unlike many other 
majority Muslim 
countries.  As a consequence, Adegbite said he has no way to 
determine if an 
individual mosque, or southern mosques in general, are 
becoming politicized, 
but he doubts this could be the case. 
 
 
¶6. (C) PolSpecs from Abuja and Lagos spent several days in 
January interviewing 
key members of the Muslim communities in Lagos, Ibadan and 
other towns in the 
southwest about their views on the status of Islam in the 
region.  (Comment. 
All observers agree that Muslims do not make up a significant 
percentage of the 
population in the southeast or south-central regions.  Thus, 
the PolSpecs 
concentrated their efforts in the southwest.  End comment.) 
After a number of 
interviews, they reached the general conclusion that religion 
is not a major 
factor in the political calculations of residents and 
politicians in the 
southwest.  However, they reported that many of their 
interlocutors were also 
quick to point out that Islam is growing in the region, 
Muslims are being more 
assertive and, thus, religion could at some point in the 
future become a 
political issue.  Some Muslims reported seeing signs now, 
such as growing 
religious intolerance and exclusion based on religion, that 
may be the 
precursors of future religious strife and disruptions of 
government. 
 
 
A scholar's view 
 
 
¶7. (C)  In Ibadan, PolSpecs met with Ahmeed Agberemi, a 
highly respected 
Islamic scholar.  Agberemi told them that Muslims object to 
the use of the word 
"fundamentalist" when discussing Islam, and disagree with 
most Westerners' 
definition of the term.  "What we should be concerned about," 
he declared, "is 
rising 'essentialism' in all the major religions."  He 
explained that 
essentialism, often mistaken for fundamentalism, has an 
overarching presence 
within and across national boundaries, and has the potential 
to influence 
socio-political outcomes, not only in Nigeria, but globally 
as well.  Agberemi 
said he does not believe that fundamentalism is, as yet, a 
problem in the 
southwest, nor does he think that the region's politics are 
currently 
influenced in any way by religion.  "Unlike in the north," he 
said, "where 
there are extreme forms of Islam, the 50-50 Christian to 
Muslim demographic 
split in most southwestern States precludes the possibility 
of the ascendance 
to power by Islamists of whatever persuasion."  On the 
subject of Shari'a, 
Agberemi said the likelihood of southwestern States' enacting 
Shari'a law was 
extremely remote.  He was more concerned, however, with what 
he said is a 
growing use of inciting rhetoric in speeches by Muslim 
leaders and in the 
mosques sermons.  He concluded, saying that the recent 
debates and discussions 
in Nigeria about identity, ethnicity and the role of religion 
in government, 
are "notions that merely inhibit pluralities of ideas while 
justifying 
exclusion, hatred and violence." 
 
 
A Muslim woman's view 
 
 
¶8. (C) PolSpecs also met with Abiola Akiyode-Afolabi, 
Executive Director of the 
Lagos-based Center for Women Advocates, Research and 
Documentation. 
Akiyode-Afolabi is also a noted supporter of and campaigner 
for Muslim women's 
rights.  Although she generally agreed with the thoughts of 
Agberimi, she 
warned that a failing economy and massive poverty could drive 
Nigerians "to the 
point where they seek social justice through politicized 
religion."  She said 
some Muslim politicians in the past had tried to get 
co-religionists' votes by 
passing out food and oney.  She predicted that this might 
again be the 
situation in the upcoming elections because of the alarming 
rate of poverty. 
As to real politicized Islam, that is, Muslims voting for 
Muslims only because 
of their religion, or Muslims voting for Muslims in the hope 
of influencing 
government with Islamic tenets, Akiyode-Afolabi said she had 
not seen this in 
the southwest--yet. 
 
 
A politician's view 
 
 
¶9. (C)  In a private conversation with Ambassador and CG 
(septel), Lagos State 
Governor Bola Tinubu, himself a Muslim, concurred that Islam 
is not politicized 
in the south.  Tinubu opined that in the southeast and 
southwest, religion is 
less important to voters than a candidate's political record 
or personality. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Comment.  Based on our interviews and the opinions of 
political 
observers in the southwest, we conclude that Islam and the 
possibility of 
Shari'a law are not political concerns for the near-term in 
southwestern 
Nigeria.  Islam in the southwest is relatively new, compared 
to that in the 
north, and may be too young to flex its muscles here.  Even 
growing Muslim 
activities in the region, especially the sudden emergence and 
fast growth of 
"Nasfat" groups (Muslim youth organizations)  in Lagos and 
other parts of the 
southwest, do not appear to be an indication of the 
politicization of Islam; 
instead these activities are an effort by Muslim elite to 
turn Muslim youth 
from the seduction of a robust Pentecostal movement by making 
Muslim ritual 
more "Christian-like."  For the long-term, however, all of 
our sources agree 
that if socio-economic conditions do not improve, there is a 
reasonable 
possibility of a future politicization of Islam in both 
northern and southern 
Nigeria. 
HINSON-JONES 
HINSON-JONES