This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000626 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA, NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2013 
TAGS: PREL MARR IZ KU
SUBJECT: (C) GOK SAYS ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL WAS TOUGH ON 
SADDAM 
 
 
Classified By: (U) AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASON: 1.5 (B,D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  MFA MinState Dr. Mohammed al-Sabah told 
Ambassador February 19 that the February 15-16 Arab League 
Ministerial in Cairo was very tough on Iraq and will not have 
given any comfort to Saddam.  The Saudi FM in particular 
stated forcefully that the Europeans and Americans really had 
the same goal, regime change in Iraq, and the quicker 
American approach was arguably kinder.  Dr. Mohammed asserted 
that the Ministers did not agree to any statement, nor to an 
extraordinary summit as called for by Egypt:  as of March 1, 
Bahrain will take over as chairman of the Arab League; an 
extraordinary summit before then would be chaired by Lebanon, 
which performed unacceptably in Cairo, under Syrian pressure. 
 The alleged communiqu published by Lebanon after the 
meeting had not even been discussed, because of widespread 
opposition to issuing any statement at all.  The Ambassador 
stressed Washington's strong commitment to action on Iraq. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) The Ambassador met February 19 with Shaykh Dr. 
Mohammed Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs.  DCM sat in along with PolChief (Notetaker); 
Dr. Mohammed was accompanied by his Office Director Shaykh 
Dr. Ahmed Nasser Mohammed al-Sabah, Amb. Khaled al-Babtain, 
Director of the Americas Department, and Babtain's Deputy 
Ayham al-Omar. 
 
¶3.  (C) Iraq virtually monopolized the discussion (other 
topics septels).  The Ambassador reported that the message he 
came away with from the NEA Chiefs of Mission Conference 
earlier this month was that the USG is fully committed to 
action on Iraq, preferably with a second UNSCR, but without 
one if necessary. 
 
¶4.  (C) Dr. Mohammed asked about the USG's view of the 
position of various countries in the region.  The Ambassador 
stressed our appreciation for the support of Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, the GCC as a whole with its 
Peninsula Shield Force, and King Abdullah of Jordan.  (He 
said we appreciate that Turkey is moving forward, but are 
frustrated at its slow pace.)  At the other end of the 
spectrum was Syria, where we continued to receive credible 
troubling reports of operational support for Iraq -- though 
this has not affected our cooperation against al-Qaeda 
terrorism.  In response to another question, he added that we 
appear to have reached an understanding with Egypt, which 
continues to provide access to the Suez canal, a very real 
contribution to our preparations for Iraq contingencies. 
 
¶5.  (C) Dr. Mohammed raised France and Germany, noting that 
he had received the French ambassador during the Eid holidays 
and told him the absence of a timeline renders unacceptable 
France's proposal for strengthening inspections:  "Saddam has 
been in material breach for twelve years."  Responding to Dr. 
Mohammed's concern about a possible French veto of a second 
UNSCR, the Ambassador recalled the Kosovo precedent, in which 
NATO took military action despite a threatened Russian veto, 
but still obtained a UNSCR for managing matters after the 
fighting ended.  The Ambassador shared his impression that 
Washington wanted to make a strategic decision on how to 
proceed before the end of February -- without necessarily 
acting on it right away. 
 
(U) ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL 
--------------------------- 
¶6.  (C) Turning to the February 15-16 Arab League Ministerial 
in Cairo chaired by Lebanon, Dr. Mohammed (who represented 
Kuwait at the event), said there was a long closed meeting 
(i.e. Ministers only) at which speaker after speaker told 
Iraq there is no way to avoid war short of total cooperation. 
 Saudi FM Prince Saud al-Faisal, briefing on his recent 
meetings with Presidents Bush and Chirac, stated that both 
the European and American approaches lead to the same result: 
 regime change in Iraq.  The US approach would chop off the 
head, while the European approach would strangle the body 
until it collapsed.  Perhaps the quicker option would be more 
merciful.  Prince Saud had no doubt the US was determined to 
go to war.  Recognizing this, he had advised the U.S. not to 
target administrative and security (i.e. police) 
installations, which would be needed to hold the country 
together and prevent a bloodbath of revenge killings.  The 
slim chance of averting war is 100% compliance on four 
issues:  missiles, VX, anthrax, and scientists. 
 
¶7.  (C) Iraqi FM Naji Sabri responded not with a defense of 
Saddam and his regime but with numerous references to the 
Baath party's closeness to the people -- an obvious pitch to 
Syria, per Dr. Mohammed.  Sabri reiterated Baghdad's standard 
claim that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its WMD and 
documentary proof of the destruction.  He drew derisive 
laughter when he said "we threw it (the VX) into the river." 
 For the next four and a half hours, one Minister after 
another told Sabri there is no way out except 100% 
compliance, and Iraq needs to prove its peaceful intentions 
to its neighbors, Kuwait but also others including Iran.  He 
was told that Saddam's December 7 speech, allegedly an 
apology to Kuwait, had harmed his own cause. 
 
¶8.  (C) Syrian FM Sharaa was "odd man out", claiming Iraq was 
already cooperating fully; he opposed Egypt's call for an 
extraordinary Arab League summit on grounds that if it was to 
put pressure on Iraq, it was "US inspired" and thus 
unacceptable.  Lebanon chaired the meeting but did not speak. 
 
(C) STATEMENT DEBACLE 
--------------------- 
¶9.  (C) Dr. Mohammed said Kuwait considers the statement 
issued by Lebanon after the meeting to be a "forgery." 
Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, and the Palestinians supported 
issuing a statement, and a draft was circulated half an hour 
before the meeting broke up, but it was never discussed 
because of widespread opposition to issuing any statement. 
Egypt moved for a vote on the concept of whether to issue any 
statement at all, Saudi Arabia seconded, and Algeria did 
likewise on behalf of the Maghreb.  Rather than calling for a 
vote, the chair ended the meeting, then went out and gave the 
statement to the press, saying the Ministers had agreed to it. 
 
(C) EMERGENCY SUMMIT? 
--------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Regarding Egypt's call for an extraordinary Arab 
League summit, Dr. Mohammed said Kuwait is not keen on the 
idea even though "we trust Mubarak."  However, in light of 
Lebanon's performance in Cairo, he said there is widespread 
opposition to letting it chair a summit, especially given 
that Bahrain will assume the chairmanship as of March 1. 
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the 
GCC states and the Maghreb countries all oppose the idea of 
an extraordinary summit, he said, though for varying reasons. 
 He thought only three countries had responded favorably to 
Egypt's call:  Oman, Djibouti and Somalia. 
 
¶11.  (C) COMMENT:  Dr. Mohammed seemed confident that, 
despite the negative press play, the substance of the 
discussion in Cairo Ministerial was positive for Kuwait, and 
"cannot have reassured Saddam." 
JONES