Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03KINSHASA477, NEW BREED OF HARDLINERS INFLUENCES KABILA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03KINSHASA477.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03KINSHASA477 2003-02-27 14:57 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kinshasa
P 271457Z FEB 03
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5287
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000477 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2008 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG
SUBJECT: NEW BREED OF HARDLINERS INFLUENCES KABILA 
 
REF: A. 2/25 E-MAIL HOOKS-BELLAMY/EASTHAM/AMADEO 
     B. KINSHASA 172 
     C. KINSHASA 447 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POLOFF EDWARD BESTIC FOR REASONS 1.5 B AND D 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  IN RECENT WEEKS GDRC PRESIDENT JOSEPH KABILA 
HAS APPROVED SEVERAL ACTIONS WHICH ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF A 
SLOW-BUILDING EVOLUTION TOWARDS HARDLINE POLICIES.  "HAWKISH" 
ADVISERS SUCH AS AUGUSTIN KATUMBA, SAMBA KAPUTO AND EVARISTE 
BOSHAB HAVE GAINED THE ASCENDANCY OVER MORE "MODERATE" 
FIGURES SUCH AS VITAL KAMERHE, ANDRE KAPANGA AND THEOPHILE 
MBEMBA.  KABILA HIMSELF IS NOT AN INNOCENT VICTIM IN THIS 
STORY.  HE HAS NOW SURROUNDED HIMSELF WITH A NEW BREED OF 
HARDLINERS--NOT HIS FATHER'S CRONIES, BUT A YOUNGER, MORE 
SOPHISTICATED GROUP OF HAWKS.  IN THE PAST, KABILA APPEARED 
TO SHOW GREATER APPRECIATION FOR THE LONGER-TERM CONSEQUENCES 
OF HIS CHOICES, IN PARTICULAR THE REACTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  THESE DAYS, HE IS TAKING HIS 
ADVISERS' ADVICE SEEMINGLY WITH LESS REGARD FOR THEIR BROADER 
IMPACT, AND APPEARS TO BE MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO STAY IN 
POWER.  END SUMMARY. 
 
INCREASING HARDLINE TENDENCIES 
------------------------------ 
2. (C) OVER THE PAST YEAR, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT KABILA 
HAS INCREASINGLY BEEN FAVORING THE VIEWS SHARED BY THE 
"HAWKS" AROUND HIM.  IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS ALONE, THE GDRC 
HAS TAKEN SEVERAL ACTIONS IN LINE WITH THIS MODE OF THINKING. 
 EXAMPLES INCLUDE THE ATTEMPT TO EXPEL CONGOLESE LIBERATION 
MOVEMENT (MLC) REPRESENTATIVES FROM KINSHASA IN JANUARY (REF 
B), THE FIRING OF THE FINANCE MINISTER MATANGULU IN FEBRUARY 
(REF C), AND, SINCE LATE 2002, THE DEPLOYMENT OF REGULAR GDRC 
TROOPS TO THE BENI-BUTEMBO REGION--PUTTING THEM BEYOND THE 
LUSAKA CEASEFIRE LINES. 
 
3. (C) IN GENERAL, HARDLINERS TEND TO ESPOUSE THE BELIEF THAT 
TIME IS ON KINSHASA'S SIDE IN THE REUNIFICATION PROCESS, THAT 
THE OPPOSING BELLIGERENTS CAN BE OUTMANEUVERED, OUTLASTED, 
AND PERHAPS EVENTUALLY DEFEATED MILITARILY.  INTERNATIONAL 
PRESSURE CAN BE FENDED OFF BY SIGNING AGREEMENTS IN SUN CITY 
AND PRETORIA, BUT ENOUGH OUTSTANDING DISPUTES (SUCH AS OVER 
SECURITY) REMAIN THAT KINSHASA CAN MANIPULATE WITHOUT 
APPEARING TO BE THE HOLDOUT.  IN KEEPING WITH LONGTIME 
CONGOLESE POLITICAL NORMS AND PRACTICES, THESE ADVISERS ARE 
DOUBTLESS MOTIVATED IN NO SMALL PART BY A DESIRE TO KEEP 
THEIR JOBS AND THEIR ACCESS TO WEALTH AND POWER.  DESPITE 
NATIONALIST RHETORIC--MODERATES ARE DENOUNCED AS 
"TRAITORS"--SOME MAY IN FACT PREFER TO RULE UNCHALLENGED IN 
PART OF THE COUNTRY RATHER THAN SHARE POWER WITH OTHERS IN A 
NEW NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
WHO HAS KABILA'S EAR? 
--------------------- 
4. (C) OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, KABILA HAS REPLACED A GREAT 
MANY OF THE "OLD GUARD" OF ADVISORS AND MINISTERS APPOINTED 
BY HIS FATHER.  ONCE-POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS MWENZE 
KONGOLO, GAETAN KAKUDJI AND ABDOULAYE YERODIA HAVE LARGELY 
BEEN SIDELINED.  (YERODIA OCCASIONALLY RESURFACES TO SUPPORT 
THE GOVERNMENT IN HIS BAS-CONGO HOME REGION, AND HAS RECENTLY 
BEEN RUMORED--VERY SPECULATIVELY--AS A POSSIBLE GDRC VICE 
PRESIDENT.) 
 
5. (C) AMONG THE NEWER BREED, THE MOST INFLUENTIAL "HAWKS" 
APPEAR TO BE ON KABILA'S OWN PERSONAL STAFF: CABINET DIRECTOR 
EVARISTE BOSHAB, DEPUTY CABINET DIRECTOR SAMBA KAPUTO, AND 
PIERRE LUMBI, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES.  PRESIDENTIAL 
SPOKESMAN MULEGWA ZIHINDULA, IN A 23 FEB. PRIVATE MEETING 
WITH THE AMBASSADOR, LEVELED CHARGES OF CORRUPTION AT ALL 
THREE OF THESE INDIVIDUALS. 
 
--BOSHAB IS FROM KASAI, A LAW PROFESSOR BY TRAINING AND 
BACKGROUND, WHO HAD BEEN DEPUTY CABINET DIRECTOR UNTIL THE 
OCTOBER 2002 SHUFFLE. 
 
--KAPUTO, WHO IS PERHAPS MORE INFLUENTIAL THAN BOSHAB ON 
POLICY MATTERS, WAS BORN IN KATANGA BUT RAISED IN THE KIVUS, 
AND IS A POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR BY TRAINING.  GOVERNOR 
OF BANDUNDU AND ORIENTALE PROVINCES IN THE MOBUTU ERA, HE WAS 
VITAL KAMERHE'S DEPUTY AT THE GREAT LAKES PEACE COMMISSION 
UNTIL OCTOBER 2002, WHEN HE WAS TAKEN ON BOARD IN HIS CURRENT 
CAPACITY.  HE IS CONSIDERED THE PROTEGE OF AUGUSTIN KATUMBA. 
 
--LUMBI, FROM MANIEMA, WAS AN UNOFFICIAL ADVISER PRIOR TO 
OCTOBER 2002.  AN EARLY CIVIL SOCIETY LEADER (HE FOUNDED A 
SELF-HELP NGO IN 1978 WHEN SUCH ORGANIZATIONS WERE STILL 
TECHNICALLY ILLEGAL), HE BECAME ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI'S FOREIGN 
MINISTER IN 1992-3 AND THEN POST & COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER IN 
THE KENGO WA DONDO GOVERNMENT. 
 
6. (C) PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THESE FORMAL ADVISERS IS 
AUGUSTIN KATUMBA, WHO WAS MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY UNTIL HE 
WAS SUSPENDED IN OCTOBER 2002 (FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF THE 
UN PANEL REPORT ON PLUNDERING THE DRC'S RESOURCES).  KATUMBA, 
LONG CONSIDERED KABILA'S RIGHT-HAND MAN, HAS BEEN ACTIVELY 
INVOLVED IN ALL INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE 
SUN CITY.  THIS HAS ENABLED HIM TO TRANSLATE THE HARDLINE 
VIEW INTO THE GDRC'S NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AT THE VARIOUS 
ROUNDS OF TALKS.  CURRENT RUMOR HAS IT THAT HE MAY REPLACE 
JEAN MBUYU AS KABILA'S SPECIAL SECURITY ADVISOR AND CHIEF OF 
THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY. 
 
7. (C) REGARDING MILITARY MATTERS, HERETOFORE KABILA HAS 
LISTENED TO ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF, LIEUTENANT GENERAL 
LIWANGA MATA, AN EX-FAZ OFFICER.  HOWEVER, HE ALSO LISTENS TO 
ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL FRANCOIS OLENGA AND AIR FORCE 
COMMANDER GENERAL JOHN NUMBI.  OLENGA AND NUMBI ARE SIMILAR 
IN THAT THEY ARE BOTH POLITICAL APPOINTEES WITH NO 
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY BACKGROUND, HAVE VIOLENT STREAKS, AND 
ARE REPUTED TO BE CORRUPT.  THE TWO ARE RIVALS, EACH VYING 
FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRAVEL ABROAD ON ARMS-BUYING TRIPS, 
WHICH ENABLES THEM TO SKIM OFF A PERCENTAGE OF ANY SALES 
TRANSACTION.  THEY STAND TO LOSE SUCH OPPORTUNITIES AND 
PERHAPS EVEN THEIR JOBS IF THE VARIOUS BELLIGERENTS' ARMIES 
ARE MERGED. 
 
8. (C) IN TERMS OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY, AS NOTED 
EARLIER THE FIRING OF FINANCE MINISTER MATANGULU SENT 
SHUDDERS THROUGH THE DONOR COMMUNITY.  UNTIL RECENTLY, 
MATANGULU HAD SUFFICIENT INFLUENCE OVER KABILA THAT ENABLED 
THE FORMER TO "HOLD THE LINE" ON PUBLIC EXPENDITURES.  HIS 
OUSTER--OVER THE ISSUE OF MAINTAINING FISCAL DISCIPLINE--HAS 
RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GDRC'S INTENT TO ADHERE TO 
IFI-APPROVED ECONOMIC POLICIES.  IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THERE 
IS ANYONE LEFT AMONG KABILA'S CLOSE ADVISERS WHO IS PREPARED 
TO CARRY ON MATANGULU'S ROLE AND PROVIDE SOUND, IF UNPOPULAR, 
ADVICE ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS.  JEAN-CLAUDE 
MASANGU AS CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR IS STILL MAINTAINING A 
STABLE MONETARY POLICY, HOWEVER THERE HAVE BEEN FREQUENT 
RUMORS THAT HE HIMSELF IS LESS THAN SQUEAKY CLEAN. 
 
 
MODERATES, TAKING A BACK SEAT 
----------------------------- 
9. (C) THOSE WHO PUBLICLY EXPRESS A MORE "MODERATE" VIEW 
APPEAR TO HAVE WANING INFLUENCE.  SUCH FIGURES INCLUDE: 
 
--THEOPHILE MBEMBA, CABINET DIRECTOR UNTIL OCTOBER 2002, 
SINCE THEN INTERIOR MINISTER, LED THE GDRC DELEGATION AT THE 
PRETORIA NEGOTIATIONS IN DECEMBER, BUT HAS NOT PLAYED A 
VISIBLE ROLE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE. 
 
--ANDRE KAPANGA, FORMERLY LAURENT KABILA'S PERMREP AT THE UN 
IN NEW YORK, CURRENTLY KABILA'S POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC 
ADVISER, HAS NOT TAKEN CHARGE OF HIS NEW BRIEF AND ALREADY 
HAS BEEN MARGINALIZED;  HE WAS ILL-INFORMED ABOUT KEY 
DECISIONS SUCH AS THE ABORTIVE MLC EXPULSION ORDER. 
 
--VITAL KAMERHE, LONGTIME CHIEF NEGOTIATORS IN THE INTERNAL 
AND EXTERNAL PEACE PROCESSES, NOW PLAYS SECOND FIDDLE TO 
SAMBA KAPUTO IN THESE TALKS. 
 
--MULEGWA ZIHINDULA, PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN SINCE OCTOBER 
2002, CLAIMS TO BE EAGER TO SEE REFORM BUT HAS NOT 
DEMONSTRATED SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON KABILA'S DECISIONS. 
 
--LEONARD SHE OKITUNDU, FOREIGN MINISTER SINCE LAURENT 
KABILA'S TIME, CURRENTLY HAS VIRTUALLY NO SAY IN IMPORTANT 
MATTERS.  HIS STAFF HAS COMPLAINED TO EMBOFFS SEVERAL TIMES 
IN RECENT MONTHS ABOUT BEING MARGINALIZED. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
10. (C)  OVER THE PAST YEAR, THERE HAS BEEN A SLOW BUT 
SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTION TOWARDS HARDLINE POLICIES ON THE PART 
OF THE GDRC.  KABILA HIMSELF IS NOT AN INNOCENT VICTIM IN 
THIS STORY, HAVING APPOINTED THE VERY ADVISORS TO WHOM HE IS 
CURRENTLY LISTENING.  HE HAS NOW SURROUNDED HIMSELF WITH A 
NEW BREED OF HARDLINERS--NOT HIS FATHER'S CRONIES, BUT A 
YOUNGER, MORE SOPHISTICATED GROUP OF HAWKS.  IN THE PAST, 
KABILA APPEARED TO SHOW GREATER APPRECIATION FOR THE 
LONGER-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF HIS CHOICES, IN PARTICULAR THE 
REACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  THESE DAYS, HE IS 
TAKING HIS ADVISERS' ADVICE SEEMINGLY WITH LESS REGARD FOR 
THEIR BROADER IMPACT, AND APPEARS TO BE MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE 
TO STAY IN POWER. END COMMENT. 
 
 
HOOKS