This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000462 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER CU VM
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM: CASTRO VISITS HANOI - ACCORDING TO A 
--          (HASTY) SCRIPT 
 
REFS:  Hanoi 264 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  Cuban President Fidel Castro and an 
entourage of over 100 government and business officials made 
a "successful" and carefully scripted visit to Hanoi from 
February 21-23, on his way to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
summit in Kuala Lumpur.  This was Castor's third visit to 
Vietnam (previous visits were in 1973 and 1995).  The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced the visit only 
24 hours in advance.  The visit generated significant press 
coverage but there did not appear to be much interest among 
the general public.  Castro's visit "cemented bonds" between 
two traditional friends.  "Multi-faceted" bilateral 
cooperation, especially on the political and economic 
fronts, appeared to be the main focus; Castro also found 
time to denounce US policy on Iraq.  Communist Party of 
Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary Nong Duc Manh called for an 
"immediate end" to the Cuban embargo.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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VISIT A SURPRISE 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The MFA announced on the afternoon of February 20 
that Castro would be visiting Hanoi February 21-23.  Even by 
GVN standards, this was exceptionally short notice for a 
major state visit.  Several third country embassy contacts 
as well as senior UN officials said that they were also 
surprised by the MFA's announcement.  An MFA Americas Desk 
official who was not directly involved in the visit claimed 
that the short notice was "not significant."  According to 
the Americas Desk, the visit had been planned for a long 
time, but the exact timing was in doubt until very recently. 
Colonel Tran Nhung, International Department Director of the 
"People's Army" newspaper said that even the GVN's top 
leadership only knew about the visit three days in advance. 
Colonel Nhung opined that the main reasons for the short 
notice were (1) Cuban "obsession" with security and (2) the 
Cuban government's "typical indecisiveness as reflected by 
Castro's working style."  A contact at the Mexican Embassy 
suggested that the current Cuban ambassador, who is "very 
close to Fidel," might have influenced him to stop in Hanoi 
on his way to the NAM summit. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Despite the apparently short notice, the GVN put 
together a very busy program for Castro, who looked "quite 
frail" according to press reports.  The program included a 
series of meetings with top officials, including CPV General 
Secretary Nong Duc Manh; Prime Minister Phan Van Khai; State 
 
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President Tran Duc Luong; and National Assembly Chairman 
Nguyen Van An.  Castro also met with former CPV General 
Secretaries Do Muoi and Le Kha Phieu; former President Le 
 
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Duc Anh, and General Vo Nguyen Giap, according to press 
reports.  Other events included a cultural performance at 
the Hanoi Opera House; ceremonies at the Ho Chi Minh 
mausoleum and Jose Marti statue; a visit to an electronics 
plant on the outskirts of Hanoi; and a speech to students at 
the Hanoi Polytecnic University. 
 
----------------- 
DISCUSSION TOPICS 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  MFA Latin American Desk officials involved in the 
Castro visit told Pol FSN they are all "too busy" to discuss 
the substance, if any, to the visit.  However, it appears 
that Castro's meetings focused mainly exchanging ideas on a 
number of bilateral issues.  One unconfirmed rumor picked up 
by the embassy is that Castro made a plea to the GVN senior 
leadership for additional economic assistance due to the 
dire state of Cuba's economy.  (Note:  During PM Khai's 
visit to Cuba in October 2002 (reftel), Vietnam agreed to 
sell additional rice to Cuba.  In 2002, Vietnam exported 
125,000 tons of rice to Cuba; the total volume for 2003 is 
expected to rise to 150,000 tons, apparently on "easy 
payment" terms.  (End Note)  According to Colonel Nhung, 
Castro's meetings with the GVN and CPV leadership included: 
(1) exchanging views on the NAM summit; (2) discussing 
Vietnam's views on current issues such as Iraq and North 
Korea; and (3) obtaining the GVN's thoughts on how Vietnam's 
economic renovation policies might be applied to Cuba. 
While other areas, such as economic cooperation, received 
some attention, Colonel Nhung said that he "doubted" that 
those discussions were "more than general;" as far as he 
knew, there were no concrete bilateral agreements.  The 
bilateral relationship is "strong and established and there 
are really no outstanding bilateral issues between us, 
Colonel Nhung claimed. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  According to press reports, both sides would like 
to improve two-way trade, which amounted to only about USD 
48 million in 2002.  However, Colonel Nhung said that 
"substantial improvement" in this sector is "unlikely in the 
near future" due to the ailing Cuban economy.  He opined 
that the US embargo has "really hurt" Cuba's economy. 
Indeed, during the visit, CPV General Secretary Manh 
denounced the US embargo and said that it should "be ended 
immediately," according to a press report.  Le Linh Lan, 
head of the MFA's Institute of International Relations 
Institute for International Relations Center for Euro - 
American Studies said separately that the visit was "mainly 
symbolic."  Lan opined that, while there were "probably a 
few minor interministerial agreements as well as "some" 
business contracts, the poor state of Cuba's economy is an 
overriding factor that limits the possibility of a stronger 
economic relationship. 
 
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IRAQ DISCUSSION - AS EXPECTED 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  According to Colonel Nhung and press reports, 
Castro and Vietnam's leadership discussed Iraq.  One press 
report noted that both sides called for a diplomatic 
solution based on "respect for Iraq's independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity, in keeping with the 
UN Charter and international laws."  (Comment:  This is very 
much in line with prior GVN statements on the Iraq issue. 
End Comment)  Colonel Nhung claimed that both sides 
"completely agree" on Iraq; he predicted that the NAM summit 
will also reflect their "solidarity" concerning Iraq. 
 
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VISIT GENERATED LITTLE PUBLIC INTEREST 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U)  While State-controlled broadcast and print media 
gave the Castro visit widespread coverage, there appeared 
little discernable public interest.  At the Hanoi Opera 
House cultural performance on February 22, poloff observed a 
"crowd" of perhaps 250 people waiting on sidewalks adjacent 
to the Opera House for Castro's arrival.  About 10-15 
percent appeared to be tourists from nearby hotels.  Two 
university students said that they "were excited" about the 
visit because "Fidel is a great friend of Vietnam."  The 
event, attended by many senior diplomats was scheduled to 
begin at 9:00 PM; however, the guest of honor, preceded by 
the GVN and CPV leadership and accompanied by what looked 
like a platoon of very large Cuban security personnel, did 
not arrive until nearly 10:30.  The ambassador of Japan 
apparently ran out of patience and was seen leaving the 
venue at about 9:40.  Reportedly, a number of senior 
diplomats chose not to attend the performance due to the 
last minute invitations.  At the February 23 ceremony at the 
Ho Chi Minh mausoleum, poloff observed perhaps 50 onlookers, 
(kept at least 250 meters from the mausoleum); at least 20 
were PRC tourists on a group tour.  Castro's speech at the 
Hanoi Polytechnic University on February 23 drew a crowd of 
students and government officials estimated at 3,000, but, 
according to a press report, many of the attendees were 
"encouraged" to attend the event.  Colonel Nhung attributed 
the lack of demonstrative public interest to (1) a decline 
in Cuba's relevancy to Vietnam over the past 15 years and 
(2) people generally have become more used to "all types of 
foreign visits." 
 
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WHAT'S NEXT? 
------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Reftel reported that Party Secretary Manh may 
visit Cuba in 2003.  According to press reports, Castro 
reiterated the invitation and Manh "happily accepted." 
Colonel Nhung predicted that Manh's visit is "more likely" 
to take place in 2004 because National Assembly Chairman 
Nguyen Van An "will probably" visit Cuba in late March or 
early April in conjunction with his attending the April 6-12 
Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference in Santiago, Chile. 
Following the NAM summit, Castro will visit China.  Although 
not announced in the local press, Castro will also visit 
Japan on March 1 and 2, according to Japanese emboffs. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9.  (SBU)  The last minute nature of this visit invites 
speculation that Castro needed some convincing to visit 
arguably his oldest friend, despite having visited here only 
twice since he came to power in 1959.  In contrast, another 
"old friend," Palestine Authority President Yasser Arafat, 
has visited Vietnam about 20 times.  While it seems likely 
that the close bilateral relationship (as well as the 
solidarity rhetoric) between two of the five remaining 
communist countries will continue, we predict that Vietnam 
will maintain its path of trying to become a more 
significant player in the mainstream diplomatic community, 
focusing on oft-stated goals such as WTO accession and a 
seat on the UN Security Council. 
BURGHARDT