This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA AND PM;  SECDEF FOR DSCA AND ISA;  CINCPAC FOR 
J454 AND POLAD 
 
E.O.  12958:  DECL:  02/05/13 
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS PGOV PTER PINS CE
SUBJECT:  SRI LANKA:  NEED FOR EDA CUTTER 
 
¶1. (U) Classified by DCM W. Lewis Amselem, Reasons 1.5 (b, 
d) 
 
¶2.  (SBU) THE COUNTRY TEAM STRONGLY SUPPORTS PROVISION OF 
A 210' EDA CUTTER TO THE SL NAVY. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) AS EXTENSIVE EMBASSY REPORTING HAS DISCUSSED, 
THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT IN SRI LANKA HAS UNDERGONE DRAMATIC CHANGES 
SINCE THE 5 DECEMBER 2001 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WHICH 
BROUGHT A NEW GOVERNMENT TO POWER.  THE GSL AND TAMIL 
TIGERS (LTTE) HAVE SIGNED A CEASEFIRE MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING AS A PRELUDE TO TALKS (O/A MAY 27) AIMED 
AT ENDING NEARLY TWO DECADES OF BRUTAL CIVIL WAR. 
FEELINGS OF OPTIMISM AND HOPE HAVE SWEPT OVER THIS 
TROUBLED ISLAND. THE FIGHTING HAS STOPPED, AND THE MANY 
AND ONEROUS SECURITY PROCEDURES THAT AFFECTED EVERY DAY 
LIFE HAVE DISSIPATED: LONG CLOSED ROADS HAVE REOPENED; 
POLICE AND MILITARY CHECKPOINTS HAVE SHUT DOWN; AND 
DRACONIAN RESTRICTIONS ON FISHING AND OTHER MARITIME 
ACTIVITIES HAVE BEGUN TO DISAPPEAR. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) AS OUR REPORTING ALSO HAS STRESSED, HOWEVER, 
THE GSL WANTS TO ENTER THIS DELICATE PERIOD WITH 'A WARM 
HEART, BUT A COOL HEAD.'  THE GSL'S FOE IS ONE OF THE 
WORLD'S MOST RUTHLESS AND SOPHISTICATED TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS.  AS OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND OTHER 
INFORMATION HAVE MADE CLEAR, WE CONTINUE TO SEE LTTE 
EFFORTS AT RESUPPLY AND OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT SEEM TO 
INDICATE, AT A MINIMUM, A LACK OF TOTAL RELIANCE ON 
PEACE TALKS AS A MEANS TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE THAT HAS 
TORN APART SRI LANKA. 
 
¶5.  (C) THE SRI LANKAN NAVY NEEDS HELP.  IT HAS 
REPEATEDLY SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO CLOSE WITH THE LTTE'S 
OCEAN-GOING FORCE, THE SEA TIGERS.  THE NAVY'S WILL TO 
FIGHT, HOWEVER, HAS EXCEEDED THEIR ABILITY TO FIGHT 
EFFECTIVELY.  THE SEA TIGERS HAVE INFLICTED SERIOUS 
CASUALTIES ON THE NAVY, INCLUDING THROUGH THE USE OF 
DEVASTATING SUICIDE CRAFT.  OPEN PRESS IN SRI 
LANKA POINTS TO PAST ATTACKS BY LTTE SUICIDE 
BOATS AS THE INSPRIRATION FOR THE ATTACK ON THE 
USS COLE.  TIGER MARITIME SUPPLY ARGUABLY 
REMAINS ONE OF, IF NOT THE MOST, SERIOUS 
CHALLENGES FACED BY THE GSL IN BRINING TO A 
SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION THE RECENTLY LAUNCHED 
PEACE PROCESS.  AN ASSESSMENT BY A TEAM FORM 
THE US PACIFIC COMMAND HEADQUARTERS IN 
SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER OF 2002 INDICATED THAT 
MARITIME INTERDICTION OF THE LTTE'S RESUPPLY 
CAPABILITY WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT 
FACTORS NEEDING TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE 
GOVERNEMTN OF SRI LANKA.  THE 
NAVY SIMPLY CANNOT DO THE JOB WITH ITS CURRENT FLEET -- 
AND THE TIGERS KNOW IT AND SIMPLY DO NOT TAKE THE NAVY 
VERY SERIOUSLY.  BEEFING UP THE ABILITY TO INTERDICT AND 
DETER TIGER SUPPLIES WOULD MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE PEACE TALKS, SHOWING THE LTTE THAT TALKING IS BETTER 
THAN FIGHTING, AND, IF THE TALKS BREAK DOWN AND CONFLICT 
RESUMES, THE NAVY COULD PUT A SERIOUS DENT IN TERRORIST 
SUPPLY EFFORTS.  TO THOSE ENDS, THE COUNTRY TEAM 
STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE PROVISION OF A 210' EDA CUTTER TO 
THE SL NAVY. 
 
¶6.  (U) BELOW, WE SEEK TO ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS THAT NEED 
ANSWERING PRIOR TO THE PROCESSING OF A LETTER OF OFFER 
AND ACCEPTANCE (LOA). 
 
¶A. (C) COUNTRY REQUIREMENTS.  THE SRI LANKA NAVY IS 
SHIFTING FROM A STRATEGY OF CLOSE-IN (4 TO 12 NAUTICAL 
MILES) TO LITTORAL WATERS (25 - 27NM) DEFENSE AGAINST 
LTTE SMUGGLING EFFORTS BECAUSE OF THE RELAXATION OF 
MARITIME RESTRICTIONS MENTIONED ABOVE.  THIS CHANGE IN 
NATIONAL STRATEGY AND NAVAL DOCTRINE IS NOT WELL 
SUPPORTED BY THE CURRENT FLEET.  THE ADDITION OF SEVERAL 
VESSELS OF MEDIUM ENDURANCE FOR LONGER AND DEEPER 
PATROLLING, SUCH AS THE 210' FORMER-USCG CUTTERS, WOULD 
CONTRIBUTE IMMENSELY TO THE SRI LANKA NAVY'S ABILITY TO 
PERFORM THIS VITAL NATIONAL FUNCTION.  THIS NATION'S 
NAVY ONLY HAS FOUR, OLDER VESSELS OF MIXED NATIONAL 
ORIGIN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION.  FAILURE TO ASSIST 
SRI LANKA'S NAVY IN THE PROCUREMENT OF SUITABLE VESSELS 
IN SUFFICIENT QUALITIES COULD RESULT IN THE LTTE'S SEA 
TIGER WING GAINING THE UPPER HAND IN THE 'LOGISTICS 
WAR.' CONTINUED SUCCESS BY THE LTTE AT SEA 
WOULD ALSO SET AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHER GROUPS TO 
COPY-CAT IN THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE US. 
AFTER AN END TO LOCAL HOSTILITIES, THE SRI 
LANKA NAVY COULD USE THE VESSEL FOR MARITIME 
PATROLLING IN THE COUNTER-DRUGS ROLE, COMBAT 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING, COUNTER PIRACY AND CONDUCT 
SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS IN THE NOW 
LARGELY 
UNPATROLLED SOUTHERN INDIAN OCEAN. 
 
¶B. (C) ABILITY TO USE EFFECTIVELY.  THE COUNTRY TEAM 
BELIEVES THE SRI LANKA NAVY HAS THE ABILITY TO USE A 
MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTER IN THE WAR AGAINST THE LTTE, A 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE-DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION, AND THAT THIS IS IN THE USG INTEREST.  THE 
NATION'S MARITIME SERVICE HAS OVER 50 YEARS EXPERIENCE 
IN LITTORAL OPERATIONS COUNTERING SMUGGLERS AND 
TERRORISTS.  THE NAVY ALREADY OPERATES A SIMILARLY 
SIZED, OFFSHORE PATROL VESSEL (OPV) OF INDIAN-ORIGIN. 
SRI LANKAN NAVAL OFFICERS ATTEND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY 
EDUCATION COURSES IN THE UNITED STATES RANGING FROM THE 
VERY PRACTICAL CIC OFFICERS COURSE TO THE MORE 
THEORETICAL SENIOR COMMAND COURSE.  FINALLY, THE 
GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA PLANS TO BECOME MORE INVOLVED IN 
GLOBAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS WHERE MARITIME RESOURCES, 
SUCH AS US-PROVIDED MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTERS, COULD 
PROVIDE VALUABLE SYNERGIES WITH THE UNITED STATES NAVY 
AND COAST GUARD AS WELL AS OTHER ALLIED FLEETS. 
 
¶C. (C) ITEM LOCATION AND TRANSPORTATION.  THE SRI LANKA 
NAVY INITIALLY PLANS TO BASE ANY MAJOR US ACQUISITION AT 
THE PORT OF COLOMBO WITH DUTY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN BASIN 
AND THE PALK STRAITS. THIS IS FOR TWO MAJOR REASONS. 
FIRST, THE PORT OF COLOMBO HAS THE NATION'S MAJOR HARBOR 
WITH ASSOCIATED SUPPORT FACILITIES, SECOND, TO 
PROTECT THE VESSEL FROM POSSIBLE SEA TIGER 
ATTACK.  THE VESSEL WOULD THEN PATROL THE 
WATERS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN BASIN FROM AMBANTOTA 
IN THE SOUTH TO THE JAFFNA PENINSULA IN THE 
NORTH.  A VESSEL AS LARGE AS A 210' MEDIUM 
ENDURANCE CUTTER COULD BE SAILED FROM ITS 
REFURBISHMENT SITE IN THE US TO SRI LANKA AFTER 
A PERIOD OF CREW TRAINING.  THE SRI LANKA NAVY 
HAS EXPERIENCE IN MOVING SHIPS FROM THE UNITED 
KINGDOM TO THE ISLAND NATION. 
 
¶D. (C) ABILITY TO PAY.  IN THE PAST WE HAVE 
REPORTED THAT SRI LANKA, AND ITS NAVY, HAS 
BEEN CASH STRAPPED BECAUSE OF BUDGETARY 
CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE GSL AS IT STRUGGLES 
TO MEET INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND TARGETS. 
THE SRI LANKA DEFENSE BUDGET, NEVERTHELESS, IS 
OVER UNITED STATES DOLLARS (USD) 500 MILLION 
WITH ALMOST USD 100 MILLION OF THAT FOR 
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, AND THE PRIME MINISTER 
HAS RECENTLY DIRECTED THE SERVICE CHIEFS TO 
LOOK SPECIFICALLY AT US EQUIPMENT.  WHILE THE 
SRI LANKA NAVY'S INITIAL PROCUREMENT BUDGET 
FOR FY2002 WAS APPROXIMATELY USD 30 MILLION, A 
SUPPLEMENTAL COULD BE GIVEN AT THE DIRECTION 
OF THE GOVERNMENT.  THE PURCHASE OF A MEDIUM 
ENDURANCE CUTTER COULD BE SPREAD OVER TWO 
FISCAL YEARS. 
 
¶E. (C) ABILITY TO ABSORB INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE.  THE 
SRI LANKA NAVY IS PLANNING TO CHANGE ITS FORCE STRUCTURE 
OVER THE NEXT DECADE FROM A PURELY CLOSE-IN FORCE 
RELIANT UPON FAST ATTACK CRAFT AND PATROL CRAFT TO A 
LITTORAL FORCE BASED ON OPVS AND POSSIBLY CORVETTES/CUTTERS. 
THE FLEET'S FOCUS WILL SHIFT AS WELL FROM CONCENTRATING 
EXCLUSIVELY ON SMALLER SMUGGLERS' CRAFT TO 'MOTHER SHIPS.' 
WHILE THERE WILL CERTAINLY BE SOME 'TEETHING PAINS' WITH THE 
ACQUISITION OF MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTERS BY THE SRI LANKA 
NAVY, THE SYSTEM(S) SHOULD EVENTUALLY ENTER SERVICE.  THE 
PURCHASE OF AN INDIAN OPV WENT EXTREMELY SMOOTHLY FROM AN 
OPERATIONAL POINT OF VIEW.  FINALLY, THE MAINTENANCE COST 
ESTIMATES PROVIDED BY THE USCG ARE BASED MAINLY ON THREE 
ITEMS, LABOR (MUCH CHEAPER IS SRI LANKA THAN IN THE US), 
FUEL (CURRENTLY AT A SIMILAR PRICE AS PAID BY THE USCG) AND 
SPARES (THE ONLY FIXED PRICE THAT CANNOT BE ADJUSTED BY THE 
GSL).  WITH THESE COSTS IN MIND, COUNTRY TEAM BELIEVES THAT 
SRI LANKA CAN AFFORD TO MAINTAIN THE VESSEL. 
 
¶F. (C) MPP SUPPORT.  PROVIDING THE SRI LANKA NAVY WITH 
VESSELS OF THE MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTER CLASS SIZE 
SUPPORTS AMEMBASSY COLOMBO'S MPP.  REGIONAL SECURITY AND 
COUNTER-TERRORISM ARE TWO FUNDAMENTAL AREAS OF THE 
MISSION'S PLAN FOR SRI LANKA.  BY IMPROVING THE NAVY'S 
ABILITY TO INTERDICT LTTE SUPPLIES, THE USG WILL HELP TO 
BRING THIS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION TO HEEL. 
 
¶G. (SBU) HUMAN RIGHTS.  THE SRI LANKA MILITARY HAS HAD 
AN IMPROVING HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD WHILE THE LTTE HAS A 
CONSISTENTLY POOR RECORD.  ASSISTING THE GSL TO BRING 
AND KEEP THE LTTE AT THE NEGOTIATION TABLE AND IN THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS CAN ONLY HELP IMPROVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
RECORD OF BOTH SIDES.  THE SRI LANKA NAVY'S SEA-GOING 
UNITS HAVE A SOLID HR RECORD WITH FEW VERIFIABLE 
INCIDENTS IN THE LAST THREE YEARS. 
¶7.  (C) FINAL COMMENTS:  PROVISION OF THE CUTTER FULLY 
SUPPORTS OUR 2003 MPP AND THE OVERALL US OBJECTIVES OF 
COMBATTING TERRORISM AND ILLICT TRAFFIC IN DRUGS AND 
HUMANS.  IT FURTHER INCREASES US INFLUENCE WITH THE SL 
MILITARY AND REWARDS A FRANKLY PRO-US GOVERNMENT THAT 
SEEKS INCREASINGLY CLOSE US-SL MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONS. 
 
¶8.  (U) POINT OF CONTACT IS LT COL RICH GIRVEN, DEFENSE 
AND ARMY ATTACHE, CHIEF OF THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE 
COOPERATION.  TELEPHONE AT:  94 (COUNTRY CODE) - 1 (CITY 
CODE) - 448007, EXT.: 2442/2; OR, EMAIL AT: 
DIGIRRS@NOTES.DAWN.DIA.SMIL.MIL (CLASSIFIED) OR 
DATT@ITMIN.COM (UNCLASSIFIED). 
 
WILLS