This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000194 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  02/03/13 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM PINR CE IN LTTE
SUBJECT:  Key GSL Minister sets low expectations for 
Berlin round and expresses deep concerns about the LTTE 
 
Refs:  Colombo 184, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
¶1.  (C/NF) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador met with Minister 
Milinda Moragoda on February 1.  Moragoda set low 
expectations for the February 7-8 GSL-LTTE talks in 
Berlin and expressed concerns about Tamil Tiger 
activities.  He also elaborated on his efforts to 
convince India to engage more re the peace process.  On 
the domestic front, he did not think parliamentary 
elections were in the immediate offing, but thought it 
possible that the president might try for elections in 
selected localities to test the GSL.  While he was not 
hitting the panic button, our sense was that Moragoda 
felt the government had its hands full.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
=========================== 
Low Expectations for Berlin 
=========================== 
 
¶2.  (C/NF) The Ambassador and DCM met February 1 with 
Milinda Moragoda, the GSL Minister of Economic Reform 
and a key player on peace process issues.  Moragoda set 
low expectations for the GSL talks with the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) slated to take place in 
Berlin, February 7-8.  (Note:  The Berlin talks will 
constitute the fifth round of talks held between the two 
sides since September 2002.)  He said he did not expect 
any breakthroughs in Berlin.  That was unfortunate 
because the peace process could use the additional 
momentum, he remarked.  (Note:  According to most 
reports, the Berlin talks are slated to focus mainly on 
human rights and humanitarian issues.) 
 
================================ 
Deepening Worries about the LTTE 
================================ 
 
¶3.  (C/NF) Moragoda expressed deep concern about LTTE 
activities, seeing the group as becoming increasingly 
aggressive.  In particular, the situation in the multi- 
ethnic east was a real problem, as the LTTE worked to 
expand its influence there.  The pattern of Tiger 
activities, in turn, was leading to more extremism among 
Muslims, forcing the government to watch the potentially 
combustible situation in the east very closely.  He 
added that LTTE eastern leader Karuna was proving not to 
be very cooperative with the GSL.  He wondered whether 
the LTTE high command in the north had any real control 
over its eastern command, given that the LTTE leadership 
had repeatedly said it wanted its cadre to work with the 
government. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) As an example of problems with the LTTE in 
the east, Moragoda reviewed an incident that received a 
lot of local press coverage last week.  During a late 
January visit to Batticaloa, Moragoda related that he 
had come across a large billboard (a "hoarding" as 
Moragoda called it) at the entrance to the city.  The 
sign carried a blatantly pro-LTTE message.  Noting that 
the sign was on government property, Moragoda told the 
police to tear it down, which they did, but the next day 
pro-LTTE Tamils put it back up.  Acting at Moragoda's 
instructions, the police then tore it down again and 
destroyed it.  Moragoda noted that the police had acted 
reluctantly in dealing with the matter. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF) Trying to explain the dynamics of the 
situation in the east, Moragoda commented that several 
factors seemed to be underlying the pattern of LTTE 
misbehavior.  First, the Tigers were a "wild bunch" in 
general and it would take a long time to "domesticate" 
them.  Second, the LTTE was clearly taking advantage of 
lax law enforcement by the police and military. 
Moragoda said he had spoken with security force 
officials in the east about this, advising them to 
enforce all laws (see Batticaloa sign incident above). 
The officials responded that they were worried about 
doing this due to the potential ramifications for the 
peace process should they come down hard on the LTTE. 
Moragoda said he told them just to do their jobs. 
Third, Moragoda said the Tigers were clearly "hedging 
their bets" out of a deep concern that anti-peace 
process elements could gain the upper hand in the south 
(see Paras 10-11).  All that said, Moragoda stressed 
that the government had to let the LTTE know there were 
"boundaries" that it could not cross. 
¶6.  (C/NF) In other comments re the Tigers, Moragoda 
related that the group did not seem to have any 
intention of moving to stop its use of child soldiers 
(see Reftels).  In fact, Moragoda remarked, the LTTE's 
positioning on the issue seemed to be getting worse.  In 
the past, the group denied that it was recruiting 
children, but now it was basically admitting that it 
did, but saying "so what."  Explaining this phenomenon, 
Moragoda said he thought that many of the Tigers had 
been brought into the group basically as children and 
saw no problem with that fact.  (Note: UNICEF Executive 
Director Carol Bellamy met with the LTTE last week and 
pressed the group on the forced child recruitment issue. 
As they have in the past, the Tigers essentially 
promised to do better, without making any firm 
guarantees.) 
 
¶7.  (C/NF) Returning to a theme he has touched on 
previously (see Reftels), Moragoda said he was deeply 
concerned for the future of the peace process if chief 
LTTE negotiator Anton Balasingham left the scene.  He 
said Balasingham was very ill, much more so than many 
people thought (see Reftels), and it was questionable 
whether he could remain involved in the talks.  (Note: 
The February talks were recently shifted to Berlin from 
Bangkok at the LTTE's request, so they could be held 
closer to Balasingham's London home.)  If anything 
happened to Balasingham, Moragoda said he was not sure 
whom in the LTTE had the ability to replace him as chief 
LTTE negotiator.  S.P. Thamilchelvam, the political 
assistant to LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran, did not, nor 
did Karuna, the LTTE leader in the east. 
 
======== 
Re India 
======== 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) Shifting focus, Moragoda related that he 
continued to try to get India more involved in Sri 
Lanka's peace process.  (Note:  Moragoda wanted his 
comments on this matter to be kept strictly 
confidential.)  Re the GoI situation, Moragoda said he 
 
SIPDIS 
was convinced that there was a split between the 
National Security Adviser's office and RAW on one hand, 
and the Ministry of External Affairs on the other, with 
the former wanting to assume a more activist posture on 
Sri Lanka than the latter. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Moragoda said he was urging RAW to get more 
involved and he had heard that the agency was thinking 
of trying to make contact with the LTTE.  In fact, RAW 
might try to contact Balasingham during the LTTE 
negotiator's planned visit to LTTE-controlled northern 
Sri Lanka later this month.  Moragoda noted that he 
planned to visit India later in February with Prime 
Minister Wickremesinghe.  On that trip, he (Moragoda) 
planned to meet with Sonia Gandhi, the Congress Party 
leader, at the request of National Security Adviser 
Mishra.  The idea was to brief her on the peace process 
and try to moderate her strongly anti-LTTE views. 
(Note:  Mrs. Gandhi's husband, former Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated by the LTTE in 1991.) 
 
================== 
Domestic Situation 
================== 
 
¶10.  (C/NF) In regard to the domestic political 
situation, Moragoda said he did not expect President 
Kumaratunga to dissolve Parliament and call new 
elections soon.  (Note:  Per Reftels, Kumaratunga and 
other politicians from her People's Alliance party have 
recently raised the idea of early elections in various 
public statements.)  Explaining why she might not do so, 
Moragoda advised that in his estimation the president 
and the PA did not want early elections because they 
would probably lose seats, with the United National 
Front (UNF) governing coalition at least holding its 
own.  If elections were held, he also predicted that the 
Tamil National Alliance and the radical Janantha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party would gain seats (the JVP 
gaining at the expense of the PA).  He added that he 
thought that early elections would decimate the Sri 
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), which was seriously 
hobbled by fierce party infighting. 
 
¶11.  (C/NF) Although early parliamentary elections were 
probably not in the cards, Moragoda said Kumaratunga 
might call provincial elections in order to "test" the 
GSL's popularity.  (Note:  The PA controls most of Sri 
Lanka's provincial councils, which are elected bodies.) 
In particular, she might try to call an election for the 
Southern Province, an area where the PA might be 
expected to do well.  (Note:  The PA has traditionally 
been quite strong in the mainly Sinhalese Buddhist south 
of the country.)  Moragoda noted that he had picked up 
some rumblings that Buddhist monks and others were not 
happy with the peace process, feeling that the 
government was giving too much to the LTTE.  If this was 
the case, the GSL could be becoming politically exposed 
in the south. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶12.  (C/NF) While he was not hitting the panic button, 
our overall sense from the discussion with Moragoda was 
that he was worried that the government was drifting a 
bit and must work harder to keep the initiative.  In 
particular, he felt that the Tigers were a big problem, 
and the GSL had to find a way to engage the group firmly 
and effectively, so that the peace process was not 
disrupted.  At the same time, the GSL was under pressure 
on the domestic front, with the president proving non- 
cooperative on the peace process and in regard to 
economic reform.  Although she might not call elections 
soon, Moragoda said she was looking for every 
opportunity to slam the government.  Given this tricky 
confluence of factors, Moragoda was clearly sweating it 
out a bit, but was seemingly hopeful that more Indian 
involvement could bring pressure on the LTTE and help 
the GSL's peace initiative.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶13.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS