This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 ANKARA 000964 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR PRM - RGREENE, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA 
NSC FOR QUANRUD AND BRYZA 
DEPT PASS USAID FOR BHR/OFDA - WGARVELINK/RLIBBY AND FFP 
EUCOM FOR J3, J4, J5 AND POLAD 
CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2013 
TAGS: EAID IZ MOPS OTRA PREF PREL TU
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN PLANNING TEAM DISCUSSIONS ON 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH GOT AND HUMANITARIAN 
ORGANIZATIONS (SBU) 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 763 
     ¶B. ANKARA 946 
 
 
(U) Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Deutsch for 
reasons 1.5(B) and (D). 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
 
¶1. (C) During its January 27 to 29 visit to Ankara, the U.S. 
Humanitarian 
Planning Team (HPT) discussed contingency planning for a 
possible humanitarian 
crisis arising from the situation in Iraq with the GOT, 
representatives of the 
KDP and PUK administrations in northern Iraq, a 
representative of the Iraqi 
Turkmen Front, and international organizations.  While the 
GOT was receptive to 
our offer to consult and to assist, it is hesitant to 
establish crisis 
coordination centers to begin to implement its planning. 
MFA is also wary of 
providing NGOs access to Iraq through Turkey, though it is 
establishing a mechanism to register and define the 
activities of relief NGOs. 
MFA insisted that NGOs  will have to coordinate their 
activities with the Turkish Red Crescent and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  KDP and PUK 
representatives described their contingency planning, 
claiming that their 
administrations have the capacity to run the Oil for Food 
(OFF) ration distribution system and other humanitarian 
assistance programs when the UN evacuates, if adequate 
funding and other resources are provided.  The Turkish Red 
Crescent 
told us that it had the mandate to coordinate all relief 
efforts in the 
northern Iraq buffer zone, a position disputed by the local 
representative of 
the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies.  UN 
agencies described contingency planning and limited 
pre-positioning of relief 
supplies by UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, and said they were 
negotiating a legal 
framework with the GOT to allow UN agencies to provide relief 
to Iraq via 
Turkey.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) The Humanitarian Planning Team (HPT) delegation 
included:  Richard 
Greene, PDAS, State/PRM; William Garvelink, Deputy Assistant 
Administrator, 
USAID; Andrew Wyllie, PRM/ANE; Roger Corneretto, JCS; David 
Tarantino, DOD/OSD; 
Major Ray Eiriz, CENTCOM; Ron Libby, USAID/OFDA; Greg 
Austreng, USAID/OFDA; and 
Todd Horne, USAID/OFDA.  Representatives of EUCOM, the Office 
of Defense 
Cooperation (ODC) and Emboffs also attended the meetings. 
HPT held separate 
meetings with a GOT interagency group led by MFA; and 
representatives of:  the 
Turkish Red Crescent; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); 
the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP); the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC); the American Red Cross; Iraqi 
Turkmen Front (ITF); 
the Turkmeneli Foundation; and a joint meeting with most 
elements of the UN,s 
country team in Turkey. 
 
 
HPT,s Message 
------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) Greene and other members of the HPT provided 
interlocutors with an 
overview of U.S. contingency planning and key humanitarian 
objectives.  While 
emphasizing that the Administration has not made a decision 
to use force in 
Iraq, HPT emphasized the importance of: 
 
 
-- Incorporating humanitarian assistance (HA) concerns into 
military planning, 
particularly with respect to limiting damage to HA 
infrastructure and creating 
safe areas in which relief organizations can work.  Rapid 
restoration of the 
Oil for Food (OFF) ration distribution system and pipeline 
following any military operations is particularly 
important.  These measures are intended to help persuade 
vulnerable populations not to 
leave their homes, minimizing the scope of the relief effort; 
 
 
-- Building an HA coalition between and within the USG, UN 
agencies, other 
international HA organizations, NGOs, other donor 
governments, and governments 
in the region.  Coordination mechanisms such as the 
Humanitarian Operations Center currently being established in 
Kuwait and the UN,s Joint Logistics Center (JLC) are key; 
 
 
-- Pre-positioning assets and personnel to respond to a 
crisis, including AID 
Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs); 
 
 
-- Identifying relief funding requirements and sources; 
 
 
-- Obtaining safe and timely access for HA organizations to 
crisis locations; 
 
 
-- Limiting adverse impact for Iraq,s neighbors; 
 
 
-- Learning the lessons of the 1991 humanitarian crisis. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Variables affecting the ability to respond to a crisis 
include:  the 
intensity and duration of possible military operations; 
damage to HA 
infrastructure; international support for relief; access to 
vulnerable 
populations; and the unpredictable response of the Iraqi 
regime, including the 
possibility that chemical and biological weapons, or the 
threat thereof, might be used to create fear and panic. 
 
 
Discussion of Contingency Planning with the GOT 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) On January 28, the HPT met with an interagency 
group, including 
representatives of MFA, the Turkish General Staff (TGS), the 
Prime Ministry,s 
Emergency Management General Directorate, and the Turkish Red 
Crescent (TRC). 
Tunc Ugdul, MFA Deputy Director General for International 
Political 
Organizations, led the Turkish delegation. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Ugdul began by reading from a prepared statement 
outlining Turkey,s HA 
preparations and concerns.  He noted the GOT,s concerns 
about the economic 
impact of a war in Iraq on the Turkish economy, and contended 
that Turkey faced 
the 1991 refugee/internally displaced person (IDP) crisis on 
its own.  Turkey 
has done contingency planning both on an internal, 
interagency basis and with 
international organizations.  The GOT plans to establish 18 
&humanitarian aid 
collection zones8 in northern Iraq and Turkey which could 
handle up to 276,000 
refugees/IDPs.  Turkey plans to repatriate displaced persons 
as soon as the 
security situation would permit this. 
 
 
¶7. (C) TRC has pre-positioned some resources, but there are 
gaps in TRC,s 
ability to respond in the event the full 276,000 persons need 
relief, in part 
because TRC is not supposed to dedicate more than 60 percent 
of its capacity to 
any single crisis.  Ugdul noted that TRC has 30,000 tents 
which can shelter 
only about 160,000 people.  MFA is meeting regularly with 
UNHCR, which has 
begun to shift relief supplies (tents, blankets, bedding, 
kitchen equipment) 
into Turkey.  The GOT has designated airports to bring in 
relief supplies. 
Ugdul also noted that 60 percent of the Iraqi population is 
entirely dependant on the 
OFF ration to meet their monthly household needs and 
emphasized GOT,s concern about disruption to that 
distribution system.  Greene responded that major 
international organizations desperately need additional 
funding in order to respond to a potential crisis in the 
region, and that the USG planned to not only contribute, but 
also to mobilize other 
donors. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Humanitarian Access:  HPT emphasized the importance of 
allowing humanitarian access 
across Turkey,s frontier to deliver relief, and emphasized 
the important role that NGOs could play in the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, particularly since the UN agencies 
rely heavily on NGOs in the implementation of their own 
assistance programs.  Providing safe and early access for 
humanitarian agencies is a key element in our ability to 
persuade Iraqis not to leave their homes. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Ugdul responded that GOT was still considering how to 
deal with NGO 
requests for access, but that it planned to establish a 
registration process 
for NGOs and to craft memoranda of understanding defining the 
activities of 
those which could enter Iraq from Turkey.  Ugdul and Head of 
Department Feza 
Ozturk underlined the need for NGOs to coordinate their 
activities with TRC and 
UN agencies, while acknowledging that the International 
Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) would have the mandate for HA in areas of 
military conflict.  MOUs 
would be signed only if there is a need for NGO assistance in 
the Turkish-run 
camps.  Ugdul and Ozturk insisted that multiple NGOs would 
not be permitted 
entry if their efforts duplicated existing relief.  Ozturk 
said that, according 
to the Geneva conventions, the commander of a military 
occupation force has the 
right and responsibility to determine which NGOs are 
permitted in the area.  He 
added that the UN,s World Food Program (WFP) would face no 
access barriers from 
the Turkish authorities, but pointed out that UN agencies in 
Turkey have no 
mandate to operate outside Turkish borders and that this 
problem would have to 
be resolved.  NGO applications for work in Iraq beyond 
Turkish-run camps would 
be considered on an ad hoc basis.  Four (unnamed) NGOs, 
including two from 
Turkey, had applied for access, but none have yet been 
granted it.  HPT 
requested a speedy review of NGO applications and 
consideration for those 
intending to supply areas beyond Turkish-run camps. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Deconflicting Military/Civilian Operations:  In 
response to the GOT,s 
remarks on military and civilian designations for transport 
hubs and routes, 
HPT pointed out that military locations could be shared with 
civilian 
authorities to move HA provided the military retained overall 
control of those 
locations.  For example, an airport designated for military 
use could accept humanitarian supplies, provided the military 
retained overall control of the facility and its operations. 
HPT proposed that these details be discussed in 
technical-level meetings. 
 
 
¶11. (C) HPT raised the importance of coordination between 
civilian and military 
planners in both our governments, as well as between them and 
international 
organizations and NGOs, pointing to the positive example of 
the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) being established in 
Kuwait.  HPT proposed establishing a similar mechanism in 
Turkey to deconflict civilian and military operations and 
share information bilaterally and with other humanitarian 
relief providers.  Ideally, any mechanism in Turkey would be 
plugged into the HOC in Kuwait. 
 
 
¶12. (C) MFA responded that the GOT had plans to establish 
crisis/coordination 
centers in the Prime Ministry, MFA, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep and 
Van in the event 
of a conflict in Iraq.  MFA has also identified 42 diplomats 
to staff these 
centers.  However, the GOT is reluctant to establish them 
now, claiming that 
this could alarm the public by implying that war is 
inevitable.  Ozturk 
suggested that the primary communications link on HA issues 
be established 
between the U.S. Embassy and MFA, and offered himself as the 
point of contact. 
HPT agreed, and Embassy,s Mission Disaster Relief Officer 
(MDRO)  was 
designated as the U.S. POC.  HPT noted that MDRO would be 
assisted by AID,s 
DART team, by EUCOM and possibly other USG elements in the 
near future. 
 
 
¶13. (C) HDRs:  HPT members stated that local procurement 
would be an important 
element in the U.S. delivery of relief supplies, but that 
there were items ) 
including one million humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) ) 
that we would like to 
import for pre-positioning in Turkey.  A request to 
pre-position HDRs had not 
been approved pending a request from the Turkish General 
Staff for further 
information on the request (reftel). 
 
 
¶14. (C) CBW:  Fatih Evren, TRC,s General Director, asked how 
the USG planned to 
respond if Saddam Hussein were to use CBW to create a 
humanitarian crisis.  HPT,s military members responded that 
the U.S. military has planned extensively for this 
possibility by taking steps in any conflict to limit the 
GOI,s ability to use weapons of mass destruction and by 
containing the extent of damage if these weapons are in fact 
used.  HPT recognizes that civilian organizations do not 
have the equipment and expertise to protect themselves from 
CBW attack and that widespread use of CBW would have serious 
implications for the humanitarian relief plan.  The U.S. 
military, within the limits of its resources and 
capabilities, aims to take appropriate action to enable 
civilian organizations to safely assume 
relief efforts as quickly as possible. 
 
 
¶15. (C) The Turks asked if the USG had any plans for 
&internment of the 
civilian population8 and said one assumption of Turkish 
planning is a mass 
movement of IDPs toward the Turkish frontier.  Greene 
responded that the USG 
would not forcibly stop civilian movement.  Rather, our 
strategy is to 
enable Iraqis to avoid having to flee their homes due to a 
lack of assistance by ensuring speedy access for relief 
providers. 
 
 
Joint Meeting with PUK and KDP Representatives 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
¶15. (C) The HPT delegation discussed the humanitarian 
situation with Bahros 
Galali and Shusti Mehedin, of the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), and 
Safeen Dizayee, Hoshyar Siweyti, Karim Sinjari, Cemal Hamit, 
Chusty Asad, of 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) on January 28.  KDP and 
PUK 
representatives outlined major differences between the 
current situation and 
that of 1991:  almost all of the 5,000 villages destroyed by 
the regime in 
1987-89 have been rebuilt  and reconstruction in the north 
has gone well beyond 
those villages; the local administration is not answerable to 
Baghdad and the 
population trusts it; there are UN and NGO structures, along 
with the OFF; the 
local population does not want to repeat the experience of 
¶1991. 
 
 
¶16. (C) KDP representatives told HPT that they had 
established a structure to 
deal with a possible humanitarian crisis, including an 
emergency committee 
reporting to the KDP &Interior Minister8 Karim Sinjari and 
committees in major 
cities, subdistricts and villages to coordinate activities 
with NGOs.  KDP and 
PUK have also begun to identify 17 camp sites for IDPs (10 in 
the KDP region, 7 
in the PUK region).  KDP representatives said they do not 
expect many Kurdish 
IDPs, but others in central and southern Iraq could move to 
the north.  They 
registered strong concern that the UN agencies and the ICRC 
in Iraq were not 
prepared to respond to a crisis. 
 
 
¶17. (C) Echoing many of the KDP,s points, PUK 
representatives told us that its & 
Prime Minister8 chaired an emergency committee on 
humanitarian assistance.  PUK 
predicts that 500,000 Iraqis from the center and south will 
come to the north 
and is planning on seven camps, each capable of handling 
100,000 DPs, to deal 
with that contingency.  They also cited the need for funds to 
stock emergency 
supplies.  Noting the UN,s plans to evacuate expatriate 
staff in the event of 
war, PUK expressed the belief that this would bring the 986 
program to a halt 
given that national staff of the UN agencies do not have the 
authority to run 
the program.  International NGOs in northern Iraq, on the 
other hand, intend to 
remain.  PUK told us that, while they expected most IDPs to 
be cared for within 
Iraqi, they hoped neighboring states would not close their 
borders to displaced 
Iraqis. 
 
 
¶18. (C) KDP representatives expressed concern with deficits 
in rations 
authorized by Baghdad, stating that they had not received 
their January flour 
ration, the fuel ration had been cut by more than half, and 
that they had 
received only 30 percent of their medicine allocation.  They 
also cited serious 
shortfalls of medical supplies and equipment (especially 
ambulances, vaccines), 
fuel, food and shelter to cope with an influx from outside 
the KDP area.  KDP 
asserted that the authorities have limited amounts of food in 
warehouses for the local population, but no surplus for IDPs 
from elsewhere in Iraq and that food rations for as 
many as one million persons might be needed.  They stated 
that there was 
milling capacity in Erbil and Sulimaniye, but that this was 
contingent on 
adequate fuel supplies to power electricity generators. 
About 17,000 to 18,000 
tons of wheat are need to feed one million people.  They said 
that UN agencies 
had not responded to their requests to provide supplies and 
asked the USG to 
fill these gaps.  Both KDP and PUK stated that they were 
concerned about their 
inability to cope with the humanitarian and medical needs 
that could be 
generated by use of CBW and asked for U.S. assistance in this 
area.  They said 
that they had no gas masks or capability to detect/diagnose 
CBW effects.  Both 
groups stated that if their funding and supply shortfalls 
were met, local 
administrations had the ability to manage relief operations 
in consultation 
with the UN and NGOs. 
 
 
¶19. (C) HPT requested that KDP and PUK representatives 
provide humanitarian 
mapping information, and outlined U.S. plans to contribute to 
the UN,s funding 
appeal.  KDP and PUK representatives will provide 
humanitarian mapping information. 
 
 
¶20. (C) PUK and KDP representatives said they did not expect 
many IDPs to cross 
the Turkish or Iranian borders.  They told HPT that the GOT 
had not consulted 
them on plans for Turkish camps.  They expressed concern that 
if the USG 
prepositions supplies outside Iraq, these materials might not 
get to the 
population that needs them as neighboring governments play 
politics.  They 
requested that the USG pre-position supplies in northern Iraq. 
 
 
Turkish Red Crescent 
-------------------- 
 
 
¶21. (C) Meeting with the HPT, TRC President Ertan Gonen said 
that, using 60 
percent of its capacity, TRC could shelter and feed 80,000 to 
100,000 IDPs in a 
10-kilometer buffer zone in northern Iraq.  Note:  In other 
channels, the Turks 
have posited a zone that goes significantly beyond 10 km. 
End Note.  If 
ordered to do so by the GOT, TRC could, by dedicating all of 
its resources to 
the border area, take care of 250,000 to 300,000 
refugees/IDPs.  Gonen said 
that he wanted to share the costs of pre-positioning stocks 
with the UN 
agencies.  In response to a question from HPT about unmet 
needs in the 
contingency plan, Gonen replied that TRC had a shortage of 
tents. 
 
 
¶22. (C) Gonen maintained that TRC will coordinate all relief 
efforts along 
Turkey,s border with Iraq, including the buffer zone, and 
that ICRC had the 
responsibility for coordinating NGO access in any zone of 
conflict.  He claimed 
that ICRC, IFRC and the GOT had agreed on these arrangements. 
 Gonen 
insisted that all supplies going through Turkey be given to 
the TRC and that 
TRC would run the IDP camps in northern Iraq.  Greene 
responded that it was not 
our understanding that ICRC had taken on the NGO coordination 
mandate, and that ICRC,s role would likely be very limited 
in duration given the likelihood of a short period 
of military operations.  Garvelink stated that USG 
pre-positioning was underway 
at warehouses in Italy and that the DART team would follow up 
on our ability to 
fill gaps in supplies. 
 
 
IFRC and American Red Cross 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶23. (C) HPT discussed the HA situation on January 29 with 
Carl Naucler, Head of 
Delegation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies 
and Ian O'Donnell, Head of Delegation, American Red Cross. 
Naucler opined that 
few Iraqis would try to cross into Turkey.  While he said 
IFRC was prepared to 
work with TRC on Turkish territory, he emphasized that the 
organization would 
not support TRC operations in northern Iraq and recommended 
that HPT discuss 
the issue of TRC,s intentions with the ICRC. 
 
 
Iraqi Turkmen Front 
------------------- 
 
 
¶24. (C) Dr. Mustafa Ziya, Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) 
Representative, and Hasan 
Osman, Turkmeneli Foundation, told HPT that the ITF had 
planned for a camp 
which could accommodate 5,000 persons in Koi Sanjak near the 
old cease-fire 
line between the PUK and KDP regions.  The Turkmen have 
received funding from 
the TRC, GOT and some Turkish and foreign NGOs.  Ziya 
expressed concern about 
the possibility that the GOI would destroy the Kirkuk/Mosul 
oil fields, 
creating a humanitarian disaster that could generate as many 
as one million 
IDPs in northern Iraq.  He also said that the ITF and PUK 
were cooperating in 
the distribution of aid to IDPs in the PUK area. 
 
 
UN Agencies 
----------- 
 
 
¶25. (C) HPT discussed UN contingency planning and UN 
relations with Turkish 
authorities with Alfredo Witschi-Cestari, UN Resident 
Coordinator in Turkey, 
Gesche Karrenbrock, UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
Representative, John 
Murray, World Food Program, and Edmond McLoughney, United 
Nations Children,s 
Fund Representative. 
 
 
¶26. (C) Witschi-Cestari stated that the UN agencies planned 
to preposition 
supplies and set up an office in Silopi, and to establish a 
crisis coordination 
center in Diyarbakir.  In the event of military action, UN 
expatriate staff 
will evacuate and coordination of activities will take place 
from Cyprus, but 
the UN,s intention is to return to Iraq as quickly as the 
security situation 
allows. 
 
 
¶27. (C) Mandate for Iraq:  Witschi-Cestari highlighted the 
absence of a mandate 
for either GOT or UN Turkey activities in Iraq, saying that a 
clear legal framework was necessary to provide relief to Iraq 
via Turkey.  The UN will need Security Council approval for 
it to operate in Iraq, particularly in an area controlled by 
us while the current regime is still in place.  The UN and 
the GOT are working on an MOU which would allow the UN to run 
a supply pipeline through Turkey into northern Iraq and 
possibly run cross-border operations.  This MOU would indeed 
include considerations for NGOs.  Witschi-Cestari 
characterized the GOT as cooperative on humanitarian 
planning, but he said the GOT has not gone on a crisis 
footing yet and is resisting establishment of a crisis 
center.  He 
added that the UN agencies had not discussed the issue with 
the Turkish 
military and asked for U.S. help in establishing contact with 
them. 
 
 
¶28. (C) UNICEF:  McLoughney stated that UNICEF played a large 
role in OFF 
procurement, especially in northern Iraq, and that UNICEF had 
pre-positioned 
some supplies there, including winter clothes for children. 
 
 
¶29. (C) WFP:  Murray reported that WFP was working with MFA 
to reestablish an 
official presence in Turkey, but faced some hurdles in the 
Turkish 
bureaucracy.  WFP has a logistics office in Ankara, a field 
office in Silopi 
(and is also seeking warehouse space there) and is operating 
warehouses in 
Iskenderun and Gaziantep to store high energy biscuits and 
vegetable oil.  WFP 
has also arranged to draw on strategic wheat stocks from the 
Syrian 
Government.  WFP asked the GOT to consider a similar 
arrangement, but has not 
yet received a response.  WFP is concerned about transport 
restrictions on the 
road from Gaziantep to the Syrian border.  WFP,s planning is 
based on the need 
to feed 80,000 refugees in Turkey as well as an additional 
50,000 in northern 
Iraq.  Karrenbrock said that UNHCR is working closely with 
TRC to prepare to 
handle a crisis on this scale, with a target of basic 
preparedness by February 
¶15.  For the whole of Iraq, WFP is undertaking 
pre-positioning of rations to 
support 900,000 persons for 10 weeks. 
 
 
¶30. (C) NGOs:  Karrenbrock stated that UNHCR was establishing 
contacts between 
NGOs, TRC and MFA.  She opined that NGOs would be able to 
work in both Turkey 
and Iraq once the mandates for all parties were made clear. 
Witschi-Cestari 
pointed out that, while the GOT was still wary of NGOs, the 
Turks had become 
much more receptive to foreign help following their help in 
responding to the 
1999 earthquakes. 
 
 
¶31. (C) Humanitarian Mapping:  Witschi-Cestari said that he 
was aware of the 
U.S. initiative to collect information on humanitarian sites 
and personnel in 
Iraq and that UN provision of information on this was 
centralized at UNSECOORD.  He added, however, that the 
individual agencies would verify the completeness of 
information with UNSECOORD. 
 
 
Embassy Follow-up 
----------------- 
 
 
¶32. (C) Post,s MDRO is working closely with other Mission 
and ODC elements to 
follow-up on the humanitarian issues raised in the HPT visit, 
and particularly 
to help AID,s Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) 
establish a presence in 
Ankara and possibly Diyarbakir.  Embassy will continue to 
meet with MFA and other GOT elements to  follow up on a range 
of issues, including:  stepped-up HA consultations 
bilaterally and with international humanitarian organizations 
and NGOs and the Turkish military; urging the GOT to 
establish a crisis coordination center; pressing for 
Turkey,s support for unimpeded access into Iraq for UN 
agencies and NGOs delivering relief; and pre-positioning of 
1million humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) in Turkey, among 
other issues.  We have already held a followup meeting with 
MFA (ref B). 
PEARSON