This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001332 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EUR/SE, EUR/PD, NEA/PD, DRL 
JCS PASS J-5/CDR S. WRIGHT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR TU
SUBJECT: ANKARA MEDIA REACTION REPORT 
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2003 
 
THIS REPORT WILL PRESENT A TURKISH PRESS SUMMARY UNDER THREE 
THEMES: 
 
 
HEADLINES 
BRIEFING 
EDITORIAL OPINION 
                         ------- 
 
 
HEADLINES 
 
 
MASS APPEAL 
Government shies away from responsibility on Iraq - Milliyet 
AKP group unconvinced, decree delayed - Turkiye 
Erdogan's tough time to convince his deputies - Vatan 
UNSC says `No' to war - Hurriyet 
Saddam agrees to destroy Al-Samud missiles - Sabah 
Bush: Our struggle for the future of Muslims - Sabah 
Arafat next after Saddam - Aksam 
Annan effort to by-pass Denktas - Hurriyet 
 
 
OPINION MAKERS 
Decree struggle between government and presidency - Radikal 
Government takes refuge in NSC - Cumhuriyet 
AKP MPs: U.S. disloyal - Yeni Safak 
Bush: Democratic Iraq will pave way for Palestine state - 
Radikal 
Kurdish leaders acting provocatively - Cumhuriyet 
Annan gives Turks, Greeks ten days - Zaman 
 
 
FINANCIAL JOURNALS 
Government's economic performance victimized by war - Dunya 
U.S. oil reserves diminishing, prices up to $38.66 - 
Finansal Forum 
 
 
 
 
BRIEFING 
 
 
Iraq: The government has decided to wait for Friday's 
National Security Council (NSC) meeting before taking the 
decree for foreign troop deployment in Turkey to the 
parliament on Saturday.   President Sezer's warning about 
the lack of international legitimacy for an Iraq operation 
has forced the government to seek the counsel of the NSC. 
"Cumhuriyet" and "Milliyet" blame the government for `hiding 
behind the NSC' after having failed to obtain solid 
guarantees from the U.S.  Papers say that the U.S. has given 
Turkey no guarantees of blocking the establishment of a 
Kurdish state, and reports suggest continued ambiguity 
regarding the economic aid package.  "Vatan" claims that the 
voting was delayed due to strong opposition among AKP 
deputies.  Dailies expect 38,000 of the total 45,000 U.S. 
troops deployed in Turkey to pass into northern Iraq, with 
the remaining 7,000 to be stationed on Turkish soil.  60,000 
Turkish troops will set up a 30 km security zone inside 
northern Iraq.  Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups, upset by the 
fact that Turkey and the U.S. are close to a compromise, 
staged protest demonstrations against Turkey in Erbil.  KDP 
leader Barzani reportedly said at the Iraqi opposition 
conference in Sulaimania that Turkey should not interfere in 
the Kurds' internal affairs.  Meanwhile, the MFA has issued 
a warning for Turkish citizens to leave Iraq in order to 
avert `likely risks.'  Some NGOs and labor unions will stage 
a large rally against the war in Ankara on Saturday. 
Cyprus: UN Secretary General Annan, in Cyprus for talks, has 
suggested that Papadopoulos and Denktas take the third plan 
to a referendum on March 30, and he invited the two leaders 
to The Hague on March 10 to sign an agreement.  Denktas 
rejected Annan's offer, saying that the new plan has many 
`traps.'  "Hurriyet" believes that Annan, seeing Denktas as 
the largest obstacle to a compromise, intended to by-pass 
the Turkish Cypriot leader.  Papers report that about 70,000 
Turkish Cypriots attended a rally against Denktas, with some 
demonstrators carrying placards saying `Rescue us, Annan,' 
`We are all Cypriots, let's unite,' and `Give peace a 
chance.' 
 
 
 
 
EDITORIAL OPINION: US-Turkey on Iraq 
 
 
"There is a chance to delay the war" 
Fehmi Koru suggested in Islamic-intellectual Yeni Safak 
(2/28): "Even the founding principles of the Turkish 
republic have been forgotten.  Oddly enough, Turkey debated 
the possibility of preventing a war during the Gulf crisis. 
. There is not much difference regarding the essential 
principles and sensitivities about the situation today and 
the 1990s.  Yet I am still looking for an authorized 
representative who will stand up and ask the very basic 
question: What has Turkey got to do with somebody else's 
war? .  The parliamentarians better listen to the warning of 
President Sezer very carefully and wait until international 
legitimacy has been ensured.   The authorization debate at 
the parliament must be postponed until the next UN 
resolution." 
 
 
"The US weighs the importance of Turkey and the Kurds" 
Sedat Ergin analyzed the reasons for the anti-Turkish 
sentiment among some Iraqi Kurdish groups in mass appeal 
Hurriyet (2/28): "There are certain factors and reasons for 
the hostility, which can be listed as follows: 
1)   the Barzani factor: The threatening, anti-Turkish 
remarks mostly come from KDP leader Barzani, not from PUK 
leader Talabani. This is explained by the fact Turkey's 
border are is under the control of Barzani. 
2)   the psychological factor: Kurdish groups will be 
uncomfortable if the Turkish army enters northern Iraq. They 
will consider the presence of a colossal foreign military 
force -- around 40,000 -- in their territory as a threat to 
their aspirations for sovereignty. 
3)   Domestic policy considerations: The Kurdish leaders 
might be trying to address the public at home by making 
threatening remarks against Turkey. 
4)   the Turkey-US deal: The timing of the Kurdish threats 
is also very important. 
They came after details about the political and military 
agreements discussed by Turkey and the US were leaked to the 
press. It is clear that Kurdish leaders were disappointed by 
the guarantees given by the US to Turkey. 
5)   the federation problem: Kurdish leaders might be 
disappointed by the references to a federation in the 
political agreement between Turkey and the US. Barzani was 
planning to form a federation on an ethnic basis in the post- 
war era.  He may very well be disappointed to see the 
obstacles placed in front of his goal. 
6)   the future of the peshmerges:  Once the unified Iraqi 
army is formed, both Barzani and Talabani will have to 
dissolve their local forces. The Kurdish leaders must have 
been bothered by the fact that after the war the US is 
planning to take back the weapons distributed to the Kurds, 
and by the fact that this operation will be carried out the 
observation of the Turks. The Iraqi Kurds are uneasy with 
the control mechanisms set up by Turkey. 
7)   the deterrent effect of Turkish troops: The Turkish 
army says it will go into Northern Iraq for humanitarian 
activities. The Iraqi Kurds, however, see the situation 
differently. They know that the Turkish army will be present 
in northern Iraq to avoid  `undesirable developments.' The 
presence of the Turkish army will restrict the movements of 
the Kurds and will block their aspirations for independence 
or for acquiring control of oil-rich regions. 
8)   Turkey-US plan not compatible with Kurdish plans: The 
plans for a post-war Iraq designed by the US and Turkey are 
not compatible with the plans of the Iraqi Kurds. The Kurds 
will have to give up certain privileges they acquired during 
as a result of the power vacuum, including de-facto 
sovereignty status, since 1991.  Ironically, they might even 
prefer that Saddam Hussein stays in power. 
9)   Bargaining tool: It is possible that the Iraqi Kurds 
are deliberately aggravating the tension with Turkey in 
order to win more support from the US. They hope to change 
the balances in their favor after the war. 
10)  Suspicions about US intentions: Just like Turkish 
decision-makers, the Kurds might be suspicious about US 
intentions in a post-war Iraq. They are afraid that the US 
will abandon the Kurds by giving major concessions to 
Turkey. 
11)  The US needs the northern front and wants to increase 
its strategic cooperation with Turkey to topple Saddam 
Hussein. Thus, the strategic importance of Turkey weighs 
more than the importance of the Kurdish groups in the eyes 
of the US.  Nevertheless, Turkey should not forget the 
possibility that the situation might change after the war." 
 
 
PEARSON