This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001325 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT AWAIT NSC 
MEETING BEFORE DECISION ON U.S. DEPLOYMENT 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1207 
     ¶B. ANKARA 1153 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch.  Reasons: 1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkish Parliament has rescheduled for March 
1 -- one day after the powerful National Security Council 
(NSC) meets -- its debate and possible vote on AK Party 
Government's draft decision to permit U.S. troop deployment 
through Turkey and deployment of Turkish troops in N. Iraq. 
A decisive NSC recommendation could change the dynamics of 
the deployment decision, but the NSC last month left formal 
responsibility in the Government's hands.  End summary. 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
"International Legitimacy":  Who Decides? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) As the NSC meets and Parliament prepares to debate 
Iraq policy on March 1, the Government is now facing an open 
challenge by President Sezer and Parliament Speaker Arinc, 
who are cooperating on the issue of the constitution's art. 
92 international legitimacy clause.  The odd-fellows alliance 
between the Kemalist Sezer and the Islam-oriented Arinc is 
fueling the already pronounced 11th-hour uncertainty and 
promoting further delay in the run-up to the floor debate. 
 
 
-- Sezer has repeatedly asserted that a second UNSC 
resolution authorizing force against Saddam is necessary to 
achieve the "international legitimacy" necessary for 
Parliament to act.  Arinc declared Feb. 24 that he opposes 
acting on a proposal absent the requisite "international 
legitimacy" as required by art. 92.  Arinc's stance resonates 
with the great majority of the AK parliamentary group. 
 
 
-- According to Advanced Strategy Center executive director 
and close observer of State affairs Faruk Demir, Sezer is 
trying to leave the strong impression in the public's mind 
that AK Party, both as the government and parliamentary 
majority, bears full responsibility for any consequences of 
an affirmative vote absent a new UNSC enforcement resolution. 
 Demir predicted that, if Sezer and the General Staff 
representatives on the NSC try to put additional pressure on 
the government to increase AK's internal splits and 
uncertainty, the vote might be delayed beyond March 1. 
-- Murat Yetkin, the influential and well-connected columnist 
for the daily Radikal wrote Feb. 28 that the military has 
reversed course and now signaling its unease about the 
"haste" with which the AK Government brought its petition to 
Parliament.  According to Yetkin, Sezer is trying to "create 
the impression that AK wants to pull the country into war 
over the objections of the military and the President." 
 
 
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What Next? 
---------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) The political ground continues to shift as the various 
players maneuver for tactical advantage: 
 
 
-- Akif Beki, a senior correspondent at Islam-oriented 
Kanal-7 news, asserted to us Feb. 28 as Faruk Demir did that 
Sezer's comments yesterday amounted to a step back, leaving 
the formal decision completely in Parliament's hands.  He 
predicted that the NSC is likely to strengthen GOT's hands 
somewhat by underscoring the need to protect Turkey's 
national interests -- and that Parliament will pass the 
petition. 
 
 
-- Former ambassador to Washington Nuzhet Kandemir, now a 
senior figure in right-of-center DYP, opined to us Feb. 28 
that the NSC will not go beyond its January decision and will 
avoid pushing the GOT or Parliament in a specific direction, 
thus leaving all the public responsibility for the decision 
in the GOT's and Parliament's (i.e., AK Party's) hands.  He 
predicted that Parliament will approve the resolution. 
 
 
-- Hasan Cemal Guzel, a close advisor to the late P.M. and 
President Turgut Ozal and now a leading columnist for daily 
"Tercuman", and Sevket Bulent Yahnici, a leading figure in 
nationalist MHP and a State Minister in the 1999-2002 Ecevit 
government, rejected Sezer's approach on international 
legitimacy in separate discussions with us Feb. 26-27 and 
predicted that the resolution will pass. 
-- Sami Selcuk, recently retired as the Chief Justice of the 
High Court of Appeals, offered to us Feb. 27 that Sezer is 
powerless to formally challenge a parliamentary "decision" -- 
as in this case on Iraq -- before the Constitutional Court. 
Nevertheless, a current senior Supreme Court Justice 
cautioned us Feb. 24 that, if the Parliament violates its 
by-laws or incorrectly applies them "in any way", then Sezer 
will have grounds to take the decision to the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
 
-- Opposition CHP shares Sezer's Kemalist outlook and is 
committed to voting en bloc against the Government's draft 
resolution.  Offering a representative view, Sukru Elekdag, a 
retired senior diplomat and now a CHP M.P., declared publicly 
that he and his colleagues would not support "America's dirty 
war" against Iraq.  He also expressed sympathy and support 
for the Arinc-led anti-war faction in AK.  His public 
comments are more pointed than but not different from those 
he and other senior CHPers, such as former ambassadors Onur 
Oymen and Inal Batu, have made privately to us steadily over 
the past month. 
 
 
-- M.P.s in both AK and CHP do not appear to be motivated by 
any concern over a possible financial collapse in the event 
of a no vote.  As reported ref B, Central Bank Governor 
Serdengecti intimated to us that AK in particular does not 
appreciate how serious the situation is, and seems to think 
it can manage its way through without either the U.S. 
assistance or the IMF program.  "Their lack of awareness 
makes me very scared," he said. 
 
 
-- On the other hand, Mustafa Gunay, General Secretary of the 
Fethullah Gulen-connected (Islamist) ISHAD businessmen's 
association and well connected with Gul, said that the 
Turkish State and Government is fully aware of the economic 
considerations at stake, but the GOT is concerned above all 
by what it perceives as weak USG assurances that an 
independent Kurdish state will not emerge in a post-Saddam 
Iraq.  According to Gunay, Gul and TGS Ozkok share a more 
conciliatory (pro-US) view, but are being stymied by: 1) 
hardliners in the military leadership, including TGS Deputy 
Chief Buyukanit; and 2) FM Yasar Yakis, who shares 
traditionalist Turkish State suspicions of the U.S. 
 
 
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Comment 
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¶4. (C) We will have to await the NSC decision, due the 
evening of Feb. 28, before being able to assess with more 
precision whether the March 1 debate will lead to a vote or a 
further postponement.  As our contacts suggest, what is 
driving the delay is, ultimately: 1) fear on the part of the 
Turkish State regarding USG intentions in northern Iraq; 2) 
the internal dynamics of the AK power struggle. 
PEARSON