This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001267 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD TU IQ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: CODEL HEFLEY PRESSES FOR TURKISH SUPPORT 
 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR W.R. PEARSON FOR REASONS 1.5(B) 
AND (D). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: In February 20-21 meetings, Codel Hefley 
politely but aggressively pressed Turkey's leadership to 
permit U.S. forces to use Turkey as a potential base for 
operations.  While recognizing the political difficulties 
Turkey's elected politicians face, the Codel called upon them 
to help enforce UNSCR 1441.  From the interlocutors that 
matter, particularly AK Party Chairman Erdogan and PM Gul, 
the Codel heard assurances that Turkey would stand by its 
long relationship with the United States when making the 
decision whether to allow U.S. troops to deploy on Turkish 
soil.  The members elicited less support from President Sezer 
and FM Yakis.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) COMMENT:  Codel Hefley came to Ankara at a crucial 
juncture in our efforts to convince the Turks of the need for 
U.S. troops in SE Turkey.  The members' consistent, firm, and 
bipartisan message rounded out a broad series of political 
and military contacts we have had with the GOT over the last 
weeks.  In the context of our asking the AK Party's 
relatively new government to make an unpopular choice, 
face-to-face contact between elected officials helped 
reinforce to the GOT that the USG understands the dilemma 
Parliament faces.  The Codel, which coordinated its 
statements well with our ongoing engagement of the GOT on 
Iraq, left its interlocutors in no doubt of America's 
determination to disarm Saddam.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
¶3.  (U) Codel Hefley, which had visited Brussels and Paris as 
the U.S. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NPA), 
came to Ankara at the invitation of the Turkish NPA 
delegation.  The U.S. delegation was headed by Congressman 
Joel Hefley, who was accompanied by Congressmen John Tanner, 
Paul Gillmor, Nick Lampson, Scott McInnis, and Dennis Moore. 
The Codel met with President Sezer, PM Gul, AK Party Chairman 
Erdogan, FM Yakis, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) 
Chairman Arinc, and Foreign Ministry U/S Ziyal. 
 
 
---------------------- 
Codel Hefley's Message 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Codel Hefley presented a bipartisan and consistent 
appeal to Turkey for its assistance against Iraq.  The 
members emphasized the USG's preference for Saddam's peaceful 
disarmament.  Nonetheless, the experience of the last twelve 
years argued against his choosing to disarm voluntarily.  As 
Congressmen Hefley and Tanner pointed out to their 
interlocutors, Saddam had already proven that he would use 
weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors, as well as 
against his own people.  Turkey, as a "frontline" state, is 
among those Saddam threatens the most. 
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
Erdogan & Gul: Political Difficulties 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In separate meetings, PM Gul and AK Party Chairman 
Erdogan (who is likely to become PM in March) cited the 
Turkish public's "90 percent opposition to war."  Erdogan 
said that the public remains unconvinced of the case against 
Saddam.  Foremost in Turkish public opinion is the memory of 
losses incurred during the course of the Gulf War, as well as 
during the ongoing embargo, which hit Turkey's poor southeast 
the hardest.  Erdogan said the US economic package is 
critical in winning public and parliamentary support for a 
U.S. deployment.  Gul, ideally, said he would like a second 
UNSCR.  At the Codel's prompting, however, he admitted that 
Saddam, having long defied many resolutions, would be 
unlikely to comply with yet another.  To Gul, the value of 
another resolution would be in "establishing the broadest 
coalition possible" against Saddam's regime.  Both Gul and 
Erdogan averred that Turkey's strategic partnership with the 
United States is Turkey's most vital relationship.  Gul said 
it is the "best thing Turkey has"; Erdogan said that Turkey 
will not allow Iraq to overshadow the bilateral alliance. 
 
 
---------------- 
MOU Negotiations 
---------------- 
 
 
¶6.  (C) FM Yakis made it clear that Turkey does not wish to 
"make" the United States abandon what he called the "northern 
option."  He recognized that if there is a war in Iraq, it is 
in Turkey's interest to have U.S. forces working from Turkish 
soil.  Foreign Ministry U/S Ziyal said that Turkey would 
"make the right decision" and that the AK Party government 
would do everything in its power to meet the USG's request. 
Echoing statements from the PM and Erdogan, he said that 
Turkey's vital interests require that the GOT stand up 
against public opinion in regard to Iraq.  If negotiations 
seem difficult, he added, it is because the GOT takes its 
commitments seriously and fully intends to carry them out. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Both Yakis and Ziyal made appeals for U.S. 
flexibility on the political, military and, particularly, on 
the economic documents.  Yakis cautioned that the current 
Parliament is untested.  The better the package the United 
States presents, the more likely it is that Parliament will 
allow U.S. troops into the country.  The earlier legislation 
that approved the site surveys and site preparation was not 
as sensitive as the proposed troop deployment, which will 
open Turkish territory for the United States to launch a war 
against a neighbor.  The current Parliament is more open to 
debate than its predecessors; it is in the United State's 
interest to give the GOT everything it can to make it 
comfortable with making a hard decision to go against public 
opinion.  Ziyal underlined the fragility of Turkey's economy 
even without the threat of war, while Yakis warned that a 
bankrupt Turkey would be unable to effectively support the 
United States.  He argued for U.S. economic support 
regardless of Parliament's approval for a U.S. troop 
deployment. 
 
 
--------------- 
Saddam and Iraq 
--------------- 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Ziyal dwelled on the future of Iraq.  He doubted that 
Saddam is in full "grasp of his faculties" and seems to get 
"crazier and crazier" over time.  Tariq Aziz showed the 
strain on the regime during his recent visit to Istanbul, 
when he was at "great unease."  Turkey's preference is for 
peaceful evolution in Iraq rather than revolution.  Ziyal 
said he hoped for a change of attitude in Baghdad and said 
that the Turkey has worked hard to impress the need for 
change on the Iraqis.  Iraq's future is of immediate interest 
to Turkey due both to proximity and to "relatives across the 
border".  Ziyal predicted that though the United States could 
quickly invade Iraq, the military aspect of changing Iraq is 
just the "tip of the iceberg."  We should be ready for a 
long-term commitment -- rebuilding Iraq will not be like 
rebuilding Japan.  Iraq is an "armed society" with a "culture 
of violence."  The first order of business will be to contain 
violence -- Turkey understands that a northern front will 
contribute to containing instability.  Turkey is even more 
willing to cooperate because issues in Iraq may look 
different to Turkey than from the USG's cross-Altantic 
perspective.  This is especially the case in regard to the 
vital issue of Iraq's territorial integrity. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Sezer Repeats His Call for a Second UNSC Resolution 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
¶9.  (C) President Sezer sounded a different note than any 
other interlocutor.  He emphasized his interpretation that 
Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution requires 
"international legitimacy" for foreign troops to be based in 
Turkey.  The president claimed that the UNSC is the only body 
that can confer it and that UNSCR 1441 is insufficient. In 
his view, only a second UNSCR would allow the GOT to clear 
what he referred to as a "constitutional hurdle."  Staking 
out a tougher position than the Codel heard elsewhere, he 
said Turkey is already helping the United States more than 
Turkey had helped during the Gulf War, relative to the lack 
of a second resolution authorizing force. Absent a second 
resolution, he predicted that the opposition party (the 
Republican People's Party) would contest the approval of a 
U.S. deployment in the Constitutional Court. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
The Bilateral Relationship 
-------------------------- 
 
 
¶10.  (C)  All parties praised the Turkish-U.S. strategic 
partnership.  Other than Iraq, four issues came up in two 
venues: 
 
 
-- President Sezer expressed appreciation for an October 16, 
2002, Congressional resolution that thanked Turkey for its 
support in the war against terror.  He cited it as an 
important, symbolic step in improving relations.  Sezer also 
applauded the creation of a Turkey caucus in the 107th 
Congress.  He hoped that it would be an active grouping in 
the 108th. 
-- Urging action, Sezer complained that the GOT has been 
waiting for more than one year for the United States to 
finalize arrangements for the establishment of Qualified 
Industrial Zones in Turkey. 
 
 
-- U/S Ziyal asked the Codel for a "better record from 
Congress."  Just as the USG is now asking Turkey to 
subordinate some of its interests to America's appeal for 
help against Iraq, he asked that Congress work to keep the 
United State's national interest above "ethnic or local 
considerations."  Ziyal asked for a deeper understanding of 
Turkey's sensitivity toward Armenian genocide resolutions and 
repeated Turkey's position that the issue is one best left to 
historians. 
 
 
-- Ziyal asked that the USG and, specifically, Congress try 
to take a "balanced" approach on Cyprus.  He worried that the 
USG tends to hear only one side of the issue because Turkey 
lacks a U.S.-based ethnic lobby to match the strength of the 
Greek-American community. 
 
 
¶11.  (U) Codel Hefley did not clear this cable. 
PEARSON