This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
KUWAIT PLEASE PASS TO CODEL WARNER 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL OVIP TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL WARNER 
 
 
THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: We look forward to your upcoming visit.  It 
comes at a key decision time for Turkey.  US-Turkey relations 
have been dominated recently by Iraq.  Should the Turks 
continue delaying a decision to support US military requests 
related to Iraq, our close regional, economic, and strategic 
cooperation could be in question.  Over the last two years 
the US has supported Turkish economic reforms and recovery 
from its worst economic crisis in decades.  Despite the 
concentration on Iraq, the strategic partnership has grown as 
a result of Turkey's significant support in the global war on 
terrorism, including taking leadership of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  Over the 
last six months, the governing coalition of Bulent Ecevit 
crumbled and was replaced in November elections by the first 
majority government in over ten years.  The new 
Islam-influenced AK Party, which holds almost two-thirds of 
the seats in Parliament, is now facing numerous external 
challenges including Turkey's EU candidacy, Cyprus, and Iraq. 
 END SUMMARY 
 
 
------------------------- 
Political-Military Issues 
------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Iraq: The US and Turkey have been engaged in intense 
and detailed discussions about Iraq for the last 11 months, 
including the possibility of military operations.  The 
Turkish public overwhelmingly opposes military action against 
Iraq and opening Turkish bases to the US.  The GOT is not 
enthusiastic about working against that trend.  Turks fear 
that an Iraq war would have a serious negative economic 
impact on them and could lead to increased instability next 
door and in Turkey's restive southeast.  On Feb. 6 the 
Turkish Parliament authorized deployment of US forces to 
prepare sites for a full US deployment here.  We understood 
that the Turkish Parliament would consider support for US 
troops Feb. 18.  That vote has been delayed.  Whether there 
will be a US-Turkish agreement resulting in Parliamentary 
authorization remains an open question. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Operation Northern Watch: Turkey continues to 
support Operation Northern Watch (the northern no-fly zone) 
based out of Incirlik, which was again renewed for six months 
on Christmas Day.  The Turks also have good relations with 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and had a visit from 
Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani the first 
week of January which helped put what had become a tense and 
unhappy relationship back on a more cooperative footing.  The 
Turks are strong supporters of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, and 
have recently begun meeting for the first time with Iraqi 
opposition groups other than the KDP, PUK, and the ITF.  The 
Turks met jointly with the KDP, PUK, ITF and the US 
Presidential Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad in Ankara at the 
beginning of February to discuss visions of a post-Saddam 
Iraq.  All participants agreed to coordinate future efforts 
in this regard. 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Global War on Terrorism: Immediately after 9/11, 
Turkey opened its infrastructure to the US military for the 
GWOT and supported the invocation of Article V at NATO. 
Turkey has granted clearance to over 8000 US sorties in 
support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in and through 
Turkey. The GOT has also offered special operations forces 
and aerial refuelers for Operation Enduring Freedom.  But 
chief among the GOT's contribution was its agreement to take 
over leadership of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in June 2002, which it 
relinquished on February 10 . 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) NATO: Ankara was supportive of the US agenda at the 
NATO Prague Summit in November, including our push for NATO 
expansion and improved capabilities.  Turkey's primary 
concern is keeping the three NATO commands currently located 
in Turkey after the command structure review is conducted in 
Brussels which seeks to streamline (and thus cut) the number 
of commands.  Turkey has relied heavily on US support at NATO 
to gain approval for planning for the defense of Turkey in 
the event of an attack from Iraq.  Approval for such planning 
by NATO military authorities was given Feb. 16 after four 
weeks of debate in Brussels. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Arms Sales:  A $1.1 billion contract for four Boeing 
AEW&C aircraft was signed last June.  Since then, contract 
effectively has been delayed twice because of GOT 
dissatisfaction with USG restrictions on certain technology 
transfer as well as other commercial issues.  These problems 
are working their way to resolution, and we hope for 
effectivity by early March.  Meanwhile, a $2.0 billion 
contract negotiation with Bell-Textron for 50 attack 
helicopters has been stalled by price issues. 
 
 
--------------- 
Political Scene 
--------------- 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) The AK Party won a major victory on Nov. 3 and 
controls 362 (of 550) seats in the legislature.  After 
assuming power Nov 18, AK moved quickly to promote Turkey's 
EU candidacy by passing a package of long overdue human 
rights reforms, and with strong USG support garnered an EU 
conditional date of end-2004 for the beginning of formal EU 
accession talks.  In other areas, AK's inexperience and lack 
of expertise is hampering decisions on complex issues and is 
preventing application of the clean government and economic 
and democratic reform program it promised.  AK, with its 
roots in Islamic politics, is further handicapped by poor 
relations with traditional State institutions that are loath 
to tolerate most expressions of religiosity, and which see AK 
as a challenge to the status quo.   In this regard, the 
judiciary launched a case to close AK some 10 days before the 
last elections.  On Jan. 8, Turkish General Staff issued a 
strong warning to AK -- whose poll numbers have been on the 
upswing since the elections -- to abandon policies allegedly 
at odds with the secularist principles of the Kemalist 
Republic.  The political ban against AK leader R. Tayyip 
Erdogan will run its course by late February.  He has already 
announced his candidacy for Parliament in the special March 9 
election in Siirt province, but his candidacy may still be 
challenged by the election board or judiciary.  If Erdogan is 
allowed to stand, and wins, the way will be cleared for his 
assumption of the prime ministership. 
 
 
------ 
Cyprus 
------ 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) AK Government has been far ahead of its predecessors 
in pushing for a solution on Cyprus -- and has pressed "TRNC 
President" Denktas to negotiate on the draft UN Cyprus 
settlement plan.  Negotiations to reach a solution in the 
decades-old Cyprus dispute continue, against the backdrop of 
unprecedented, massive demonstrations in Turkish Cyprus aimed 
at both Denktas and the Turkish Establishment that has long 
nurtured him.  AK leader Erdogan and other AK officials have 
openly criticized Denktas and by implication Turkey's 
traditional policy.  However, while working toward an 
agreement, Turkey has yet to obtain a package it deems 
acceptable. 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Current UN efforts call for the parties to complete 
a deal by February 28, which would allow sufficient time for 
a settlement to be incorporated into Cyprus' EU accession 
treaty.  (The EU at its December summit in Copenhagen agreed 
to admit Cyprus; the treaty will be signed in April). 
Turkish sensitivities include: 1) the need to maintain 
security for Turkish Cypriots (and mainland Turkish 
"strategic" interests on the island); 2) the question of 
territorial adjustments and the right of displaced Greek 
Cypriots to return to (or seek restitution for) their former 
properties; and 3) the equal status of Turkish Cyprus within 
the new partner state. 
 
 
--------------- 
Economic Issues 
--------------- 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Economic Crisis: Although nearly two years of 
IMF-backed economic reform have laid the foundation for 
greater financial stability and growth, Turkey's enormous 
public debt burden and structural weaknesses keep the economy 
fragile.  The key during 2003 is to maintain market 
confidence, so investors will continue to lend the government 
the massive amounts it needs to avoid a debt default. 
Markets initially greeted the AK election  victory, and AK's 
commitment to further economic reform, with a rally.  So far, 
however, the government's performance has been disappointing. 
 Rather than pursue reform, the government has adopted 
populist spending policies and moved to dismantle some key 
reforms.  Strong international and market pressure over the 
past month have forced the government to respond, including 
with announcements of new fiscal and privatization measures, 
but it is still not clear whether the government will 
implement the full reform program.  Expectations of a large 
U.S. bilateral assistance package in the context of an Iraq 
operation have propped up markets despite disappointment with 
the government's policies. 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) Trade Relationship: In January 2002, President Bush 
and then-Prime Minister Ecevit committed to enhance the 
bilateral economic relationship.  One pillar of that 
initiative is superb cooperation on building an East-West 
energy corridor to bring Caspian oil and gas through Turkey 
to the West.  The U.S. administration has also submitted 
Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) legislation to the Congress. 
 Turkish expectations about US economic support remain high, 
particularly in the context of a possible Iraq operation. 
They are looking to the U.S. to provide substantial financial 
support to offset expected losses and keep the overall 
economy afloat, and to offer new trade initiatives to boost 
exports and offset possible job losses.  In the Turkish view, 
both types of assistance are essential for the government 
justify cooperation in the face of widespread public 
opposition to an operation. 
PEARSON