This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000419 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR FRAZER 
CAIRO POL FOR MAXSTADT 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PINS EFIN KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: BUHARI SAYS NIGERIA NEEDS DISCIPLINE, WANTS 
TO VISIT U.S. BEFORE ELECTIONS 
 
 
Ref:  ABUJA 418 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B) AND 
(D). 
 
 
¶1.  (U) This message contains a recommendation.  See para 5. 
 
 
------------ 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
 
¶2.  (U) DCM January 31 met with ANPP Presidential candidate 
Mohammadu Buhari and two associates (Bello Abubakar, an aide 
when Buhari was Head of State previously) and Mouftah Baba- 
Ahmed (a businessman and brother to both Nafiu Baba-Ahmed 
(Secretary-General of the Supreme Council for Sharia in 
Nigeria) and Hakeem Baba-Ahmed (Secretary of the Independent 
National Electoral Commission-INEC)).  DCM February 2 met 
separately with Buhari campaign coordinator Sule Hamma. 
Buhari expressed interest in visiting the U.S., while Hamma 
described how Buhari planned to win. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
OBASANJO LACKS CREDIBILITY, HAS BETRAYED HIS 1999 SUPPORTERS 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Buhari, Baba-Ahmed and Abubakar argued Obasanjo had 
betrayed an electorate that had trusted him to combat 
corruption and instill discipline.  The key to economic 
efficiency and prosperity was to be found in disciplined 
leadership by example (from the top), not in expanded 
privatization.  Nigeria's "privatization" program had thus far 
succeeded merely in handing state-owned enterprises over to 
Obasanjo's political allies, they said.  A Buhari government 
would focus on rebuilding Nigeria's social and physical 
infrastructure, they added.  Asked whether he would support 
the bodies charged with combating corruption, such as the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Code 
of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal, Buhari hedged.  He would 
support all bodies that were "constitutional" but felt that 
Nigeria had plenty of laws on the books to fight corruption; 
again, the problem was lack of disciplined leadership at the 
top and impartial enforcement of existing laws.  COMMENT: The 
constitutionality of the ICPC has survived all challenges to 
date, but at least one case is still pending.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Buhari said he was interested in visiting the U.S. and 
key European countries during a to-be-determined 10-day period 
before the elections.  DCM repeated the message he had given 
to Baba-Ahmed earlier; a visit would be welcome but reception 
at the highest levels was not possible.  Buhari understood and 
said it was essential for Nigeria's most important partners to 
get to know and "understand" him.  DCM concurred, noting that 
Buhari had a "formidable" reputation from his earlier stint as 
Head of State.  "Yes, but you know me very well," Buhari 
replied, alluding to an association dating back to 1994. 
 
 
-------------- 
RECOMMENDATION 
-------------- 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Recommendation: That Buhari be received by A/S 
Kansteiner should the proposed trip take place.  While other 
candidates may have been received at the DAS level, Buhari is 
a former Head of State and Obasanjo's only real opposition. 
 
 
------------- 
THE GAME PLAN 
------------- 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Sule Yahaya Hamma was once Sani Abacha's political 
counselor.  Now, he is the coordinator of the Buhari campaign 
organization.  The campaign itself is yet to take off.  Its 
principal had gone on the Hajj and just returned to Nigeria 
with a cold and without a voice.  Notwithstanding this lack of 
domestic campaign activity by the candidate, Hamma professes 
to believe that Buhari will win. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) According to Hamma, Buhari will win by large margins 
all 19 Northern states except Adamawa (VP Atiku Abubakar's 
turf) and will get at least 25% of the vote in Adamawa, Ekiti, 
Ondo, Lagos, Anamabra (VP candidate Chuba Okadigbo's home), 
one other Southeast state, and four of the six South-South 
states.  Hamma counts on a heavy Northern voter turnout to 
produce the overall margin for victory.  Hamma does not 
perceive a divide between Northern Muslims and Northern 
Christians, arguing that adherents of both religions have 
suffered at the hands of the Obasanjo Administration for their 
regional identities.  He claimed that neither Obasanjo nor 
Atiku understood the depth of antipathy toward the incumbent 
government.  Hamma expressed concern, however, that opening 
ballot boxes and tallying votes in "counting and collation 
centers" would give the ruling PDP the means to rig (by 
switching ballot boxes). 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶7.  (C) We have not been able to confirm Hamma's allegation 
that INEC plans to establish "counting and collation centers" 
but would agree that offsite tallying increases the risk of 
fraud.  Nonetheless, it is an axiom of Nigerian politics that 
"you only rig where you are strong."  Practically, this means 
that one can inflate vote totals to enhance the margin of the 
candidate favored in a particular area.  One risks unrest, 
however, by announcing a candidate as the winner of an area 
whose voters know they overwhelmingly voted for the other 
contestant.  Rigging to strength can have a net percentage 
effect of near zero nationally if practiced by all.  This 
phenomenon explains why most international observers felt the 
1999 presidential election, though marred by fraud on both 
sides, broadly reflected the will of the Nigerian electorate. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Although we cannot rule out a Buhari presidency, it 
does not seem highly likely.  Incumbents have certain inherent 
advantages that challengers need energy and determination to 
overcome.  In Nigeria, they also need a lot of money.  Thus 
far, Buhari has manifested determination but relatively little 
energy, and the funds available to him are unknown but judged 
by most observers as significantly less than the resources 
Obasanjo and Atiku can marshal.  Of course, if Buhari used the 
margins of the Hajj to raise money, his position might now be 
somewhat improved, but Obasanjo and Atiku almost certainly can 
outspend him regardless.  Meanwhile, his campaign remains in 
the starting blocks fully two weeks after the February 13 
Obasanjo/Atiku launch. 
 
 
¶9.  (C) The rationale for a Washington meeting for Buhari has 
more to do with engaging his support base than with engaging 
him.  Many Buhari supporters are deeply suspicious of the USG. 
Buhari has been a Mission contact for many years.  It is in 
our interest now to engage with him at a senior Washington 
level, and to be seen by his supporters as in dialogue with 
him.  History and the nature of Buhari's base suggest that a 
Buhari presidency probably would not be as favorably inclined 
toward us as the Obasanjo Administration has been (or would 
be), but Buhari himself could exercise a moderating influence 
on his supporters.  Even if he loses, his influence will 
remain substantial.  Finally, scheduling conflicts  prevented 
Buhari from meeting Andrew Natsios in Nigeria and hearing the 
USAID Administrator's message on the importance of non-violent 
elections.  However, the points on the imperative of avoiding 
violence in the upcoming elections were made by the Ambassador 
during a separate meeting with Buhari (Septel). 
JETER