This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000418 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR JFRAZER 
CAIRO POL FOR JMAXSTADT 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PINS EFIN KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA:  BUHARI ON INTER-COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, THE 
ECONOMY AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: During a lengthy January 30 meeting with 
the Ambassador, ANPP Presidential candidate Maj. Gen. 
(Ret.) Muhammadu Buhari shared his plans for winning the 
April election and elaborated on the reported rapprochement 
between him and former military ruler Ibrahim Babangida. 
Buhari gave his views on communal conflict, the economy, 
Nigeria's role in West Africa, and the country's 
relationship with the U.S.  Despite Christian antipathy 
toward Buhari, the Northern Muslim Presidential hopeful 
thought former Senate President Chuba Okadigbo's presence 
on his ticket would begin to attract support in the 
predominantly Christian South.  While Buhari questioned the 
wisdom of Nigerian peacekeeping deployments when government 
finances are in disarray, he acknowledged that regional 
stability was of paramount importance.  Nigeria under 
Buhari therefore could be counted on to help maintain peace 
and security in the sub-region.  The Ambassador emphasized 
Nigeria's importance to African stability and prosperity. 
He also assured Buhari of the USG's commitment to work with 
any democratically elected government.  Sule Y. Hamma, the 
National Coordinator for the Buhari campaign, also attended 
the meeting. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
 
------------------ 
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 
------------------ 
 
 
¶2.  (C) During a 90 minute meeting with Ambassador Jeter on 
January 30, Buhari said he would win the election by 
"working from the ground up" in every state to engage the 
ordinary Nigerian.  When asked about the Christian- 
dominated South, Buhari said his Vice Presidential 
candidate, former Senate President Chuba Okadigbo, a 
Christian from the Southeast, would be the "key" to his 
victory.  While he recognized that religion worked against 
him in the South, Buhari thought this difficulty could be 
surmounted. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) When Ambassador brought up the reported mid-January 
rapprochement between Buhari and Babangida, Buhari became 
palpably agitated.  Buhari said he met Babangida in Sokoto 
where the traditional leader of all Nigerian Muslims, the 
Sultan of Sokoto, encouraged the two men to make amends. 
Though the two supposedly parted on good terms, Buhari 
still seemed miffed.  Since Babangida had wronged him (the 
1985 coup and Buhari's nearly four-year incarceration), 
Buhari felt it was incumbent on Babangida to be contrite. 
Nonetheless and despite their troubled history, Buhari 
expected IBB's public support. Buhari said, however, he did 
not expect his former rival to help finance his campaign, 
although he would be grateful if he did. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
COMMUNAL CONFLICT AND THE POLITICIZATION OF RELIGION 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Buhari castigated President Obasanjo's handling of 
communal violence.  Buhari said none of the recent 
outbreaks in Jos and Kaduna was large enough to warrant 
military intervention.  The retired general gave three 
levels of police engagement before the government should 
consider using the army.  First, riot police, armed only 
with batons, should be called to disperse crowds and keep 
the peace.  If ineffective, police with firearms should be 
called.  If neither prove effective in quelling violence, 
then Mobile Police (MOPOL), with their superior training 
and firepower, should be deployed.  Only after ratcheting 
up civilian police deployment should the military be 
summoned.  Citing the 2001 massacres in Benue, Buhari 
criticized Obasanjo for being too quick to "use the 
sledgehammer" of the military.  Buhari said Nigeria needed 
an organized approach to containing communal violence and 
conflict. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Noting that communal strife is sometimes based in 
religious conflicts and expressing USG concerns over the 
politicization of religion, Ambassador asked Buhari about a 
statement attributed to him in which he called on Muslims 
to vote only for Muslims.  Showing agitation again, Buhari 
called the attribution a misrepresentation then provided 
his version of what happened.  Attending a book launch in 
Sokoto last April, Buhari told the audience that before the 
advent of British colonialism, Shari'a was the law of the 
North.  Even during British rule, Shari'a remained part of 
the North's legal fabric.  Speaking in Hausa, Buhari told 
his Sokoto audience that under Shari'a, their area had been 
stable and peaceful.  Now that Shari'a had found its way 
back into the Nigerian legal system, he implored Nigerians 
to vote for candidates who would uphold their traditional 
values.  Buhari said a reporter, for "This Day", who 
neither spoke Hausa nor was present, misquoted him in an 
article published in "This Day" on the book launch. 
According to Buhari, when the reporter was subsequently 
asked why he said Buhari called on Muslims to vote only for 
Muslims the reporter replied the statement was what "he 
thought (Buhari) meant." 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Buhari said he had no interest in politicizing 
religion and that he wanted to avoid election-related 
violence.  He was interested in signing an electoral Code 
of Conduct and he liked the idea of publicly condemning 
political violence in a joint statement with the other 
parties.  Buhari thought the Independent Election 
Commission (INEC) should coordinate such a statement. 
(NOTE: In a published statement a week later, Buhari called 
on his supporters to eschew violence in the election 
campaigns.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
BLAME OBASANJO FOR FOUNDERING ECONOMY 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Turning to the economy, Buhari condemned Obasanjo's 
lack of leadership.  "Despite receiving more revenue than 
any previous government, (Obasanjo) has failed," Buhari 
argued.  Buhari cited government waste and corruption as 
primary causes of Nigeria's economic woes.  Expressing 
disgust with the Obasanjo Administration, Buhari said "We 
don't need 25 Ministers and 60 Advisers with 5-10 cars 
each.  We are too wasteful."  He then wondered how Obasanjo 
could justify such expenses when the GON "cannot afford to 
pay soldiers and police." 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Buhari said his Administration would immediately 
reform the GON.  Ambassador noted that 80% of the GON's 
budget in 2002 went to civil service salaries and 
maintaining the government.  Sule Hamma responded by saying 
a Buhari government would monetize many of the entitlements 
going to senior civil servants.  For example, instead of 
providing cars and drivers or residences and household 
staff for senior officials, the GON would increase their 
salaries.  This would reduce administrative costs by 
reducing the number of GON employees and allowing the GON 
to function more cost efficiently. 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Buhari said reforming the petroleum industry was 
also high on his list of priorities.  He pointed to massive 
inefficiencies under the current government and questioned 
why refineries were idle and in disrepair.  He wondered 
aloud whether official corruption had a hand in this, 
asking if "Abacha was once blamed for this, who is 
responsible now?"  Buhari also questioned the slow 
development of Nigeria's natural gas fields, noting that 
Nigeria has no more trains today than it did in 1984. 
(COMMENT: This, obviously, is not true.  END COMMENT.) 
 
 
¶10.  (C) On a more positive note, Buhari thought Nigeria 
and the Gulf of Guinea region could provide the United 
States with a more reliable supply of petroleum than the 
Persian Gulf States.  In recognition of this potential, he 
hoped U.S. companies would share in the costs of increasing 
Nigeria's production capacity. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
GIVE US DEBT RELIEF BUT NO IMF 
------------------------------ 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Asked how he would handle Nigeria's debt and 
issues of economic reform, Buhari again maligned the 
Obasanjo Administration's performance.  The President had 
been completely ineffective in gaining relief for Nigeria's 
foreign debt, he declared.  Buhari said Obasanjo had 
forgotten the lessons of his term as military Head of State 
and was, once again, leading Nigeria down the road to 
greater debt and insolvency. 
 
 
¶12.  (C) Calling on the international community to help 
Nigeria with its debt, Buhari said, "Unless creditor states 
help us, we cannot develop."  The Ambassador noted the USG 
holds less than USD 1 billion of Nigeria's USD 30 billion 
debt.  Because of its small portfolio, USG leverage on 
other creditors was correspondingly slight.  Moreover, the 
USG and more significant creditors would not take up 
Nigeria's cause until Nigeria clearly enacted reform.  If 
Nigeria hoped to get relief, it would have to make visible 
reforms enhancing transparency, tackling corruption and 
increasing accountability.  The GON would have to renew its 
formal arrangement with the IMF. 
 
 
¶13.  (C) Buhari and Hamma reacted negatively to the 
prospect of another round of IMF negotiations.  Hamma 
called the IMF's structural adjustment programs a "policy 
of impoverishment."  He remarked that the IMF based its 
advice on numbers cooked up in Washington and New York.  He 
said the IMF should devise their programs for economic 
revitalization using case specific information and keeping 
in mind a particular country's political and socio-economic 
context.  Buhari interjected that, during his term as 
military Head of State, he neither followed IMF 
recommendations to devalue the Naira nor attempted to 
liberalize the economy.  Ambassador Jeter told Buhari that 
before granting any sort of relief, creditor states would 
require credible reform, and the IMF's stamp of approval 
would lend credibility.  Finally, Ambassador said debt 
relief would only be possible if the GON demonstrated that 
the money saved would lead to poverty reduction among the 
rural and urban poor. 
 
 
--------------------- 
WARY OF PRIVATIZATION 
--------------------- 
 
 
¶14.  (C) Buhari expressed misgivings about privatization. 
He was uncomfortable with the privatization of some state- 
owned enterprises.  In all cases there was a need for 
competent regulatory agencies to prevent the "drive for 
profit from wrecking the economy", and further 
impoverishing the people.  Buhari felt that, in the end, 
good regulation would attract more capital than premature 
privatization. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
GON FINANCIAL WOES WILL LIMIT BUT NOT END FOREIGN 
DEPLOYMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
¶15.  (C) Turning to foreign policy, Ambassador Jeter 
characterized Nigeria as the "indispensable player in West 
African security" and expressed worry over the fate of an 
ECOWAS force in Cote d'Ivoire that did not have Nigerian 
military support.  Buhari asked that the USG "understand 
the reality of the Nigerian economy."  Calling Nigeria 
"bankrupt", Buhari said the country could not afford to 
expend resources on foreign ventures when there was so much 
work to be done at home.  However, Buhari noted that when 
"absolutely necessary" Nigeria would act to help insure 
sub-regional stability. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Buhari took pains to assure the Ambassador he had 
no intention of exploiting Nigeria's religious divide as an 
election issue. However, Buhari has waited a very long time 
to clear his name regarding the "vote Muslim" statement, 
which will make his explanation seem like an election ploy. 
Convinced he has a lock on the Northern electorate, Buhari 
hopes he can win by convincing Southerners that he is not a 
religious bigot, but a force for reform in government. 
However, his formulae for getting the government and the 
economy back on track appear out-dated and statist. 
Buhari's reputation for fighting corruption is second to 
none in Nigeria.  His antipathy for the IMF probably 
indicates an inability to work with that institution. 
 
 
¶17.  (C) Overall, Buhari is optimistic about his election 
prospects.  Despite his claims to the contrary, most 
Southerners and Christians believe he is an instrument of 
the North.  Many also find his staunch support for Sharia 
worrisome.  While he did not come across as an extremist, 
he will be portrayed as one by his opponents in the South. 
His reputation as a stern disciplinarian will prove a 
double-edged sword, drawing support from those who feel 
Nigeria is drifting without purpose but pushing those who 
believe that Nigeria has more freedom under Obasanjo 
despite the incumbent's shortcomings.  END COMMENT. 
JETER