This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
YAOUNDE ALSO FOR EMBASSY BANGUI 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:12/16/2012 
TAGS: PREL PBTS SENV EPET EFIS NI CM
SUBJECT:  Bakassi -- Meeting with Ould-Abdallah: Cameroon 
Bound to a Reticent Biya and Nigeria's Commitment Uncertain. 
 
 
REF:  Yaounde 171 (NOTAL) 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASON: 1.5 (D). 
 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action message; see para 10. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary:  Nigeria's approach to its border dispute 
with Cameroon is sophisticated, but its commitment to execute 
what it negotiates less certain, UNSYG representative Ould- 
Abdallah told Ambassador Jeter.  However, the Cameroonians 
understood international boundary law less well and were 
hobbled by Biya's odd combination of micro-management and 
aloofness.  Ould-Abdallah thought continued confidence- 
building measures (CBMs), together with an early Summit of the 
near-moribund Lake Chad Basin Commission, would help advance 
the process.  Ould-Abdallah asked us to encourage Biya to 
visit Nigeria; reftel offers an opening.  See also 
recommendation in para 10.  End Summary. 
 
 
----------------- 
MAKE HASTE SLOWLY 
----------------- 
 
 
¶3.  (C) During a private breakfast meeting at the Residence, 
UNSYG Representative to West Africa Amadou Ould-Abdallah 
February 6 told Ambassador Jeter that Nigerian President 
Olusegun Obasanjo was personally interested in resolving 
border issues affecting Nigeria's relationship with Cameroon. 
However, Obasanjo faced internal pressures that forced him to 
move deliberately.  The reconciliation process needed a firm 
foundation resting on mutual confidence-building measures 
(CBMs); without them, full implementation of the ICJ ruling 
that awarded Bakassi and territory in and around Lake Chad to 
Cameroon would be difficult.  Moreover, the Nigerian press 
could prove especially nettlesome.  The sentiment that 
"Bakassi is ours" prevails in many major Nigerian 
institutions, including the military, the Ambassador also 
noted. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Ould-Abdallah said Obasanjo would have to "go slowly" 
until the national elections were over.  The UN envoy said he 
had proposed an interim exchange of military liaison officers 
but that Nigeria was "not interested for now."  Biya needed to 
visit Abuja before the elections, Ould-Abdallah argued, 
pointing out that Obasanjo had consistently made himself 
available; it was time now for Biya to reciprocate.  The two 
leaders could use their meeting to announce a Summit of the 
near-moribund Lake Chad Basin Commission.  Cameroon's key 
concern, Ould-Abdallah said, was the fate of its citizens 
living in and around Lake Chad.  As the waters of this great 
inland sea have receded over the past 50 years, Nigerians have 
moved into Cameroonian territory, sometimes even receiving 
what purported to be land titles. 
 
 
--------------------- 
IT'S NOT JUST BAKASSI 
--------------------- 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Resolving land tenure issues in the North could 
ultimately prove more difficult than finding solutions for 
Bakassi.  Ould-Abdallah agreed with the Ambassador that most 
permanent residents of Bakassi identified themselves as 
Nigerians.  However, contrary to Nigerian assertions of a 
Bakassi population of 300,000-plus, the permanent residents 
probably numbered 30,000-50,000, and a significant number were 
Ghanaian or Beninois fishermen.  The seasonal surge, almost 
all fishermen, was heavily Ghanaian and Beninois, according to 
Ould-Abdallah. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) In response to the Ambassador's query, Ould-Abdallah 
confirmed that Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who opened the 
Mixed Commission meeting for the GON, had affirmed Nigeria's 
desire to settle the boundary dispute peaceably.  The key 
question, Ould-Abdallah offered, was whether Nigeria would 
stick to its commitments.  The Nigerian delegation was much 
stronger and deeper, with a genuine international expert on 
boundary issues (Prince Bola Ajibola) at its head while the 
Cameroonians were led by a competent but far less expert 
figure, Minister of Justice Amadou Ali.  At least, the UN 
representative commented, Cameroon had had the good sense to 
keep its unhelpful Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, Martin Belinga Eboutou, in New York.  Belinga's 
deadlines and timetables were disruptive and destabilizing. 
Moreover, Ould-Abdallah continued, Belinga was obsessed with 
bringing implementation to conclusion before Cameroon's UNSC 
term ended, falsely fearing that Yaounde would lose leverage 
once 2003 comes to an end.  Biya, however, understood the need 
for patience, grasping that Obasanjo faced elections and did 
not have the freedom to act that Biya himself enjoyed. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
CAMEROONIAN CHARM OFFENSIVE REQUIRED 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶7.  (C) What Biya apparently did not comprehend was that he 
had to reach out to Obasanjo, to follow African diplomatic 
traditions to resolve differences.  While Obasanjo had 
received the Mixed Commission for 40 minutes during its Abuja 
meeting, Biya had been unavailable during the Commission's 
previous meeting in Cameroon.  As the "victor" in the dispute, 
Biya had to make a conciliatory gesture toward Obasanjo.  He 
needed, Ould-Abdallah repeated several times, to visit Abuja 
before Nigeria's elections and to commit himself to attend a 
follow-on extraordinary Lake Chad Basin Commission Summit. 
Would the U.S. please use its influence with Biya to encourage 
him in this direction?, Ould-Abdallah implored. 
 
 
¶8.  (U) COMMENT:  In this letter to President Bush (reftel), 
Biya states, inter alia, "I would like you in person and your 
country to help Nigeria and Cameroon to comply with and 
enforce...the ruling.  Cameroon has been striving to show a 
sense of moderation and patience so as to give peace and 
justice a chance." 
 
 
¶9.  (C)  Biya's assertion is valid up to a point.  The 
Nigerians, however, remain annoyed because they accepted 
compulsory ICJ jurisdiction in the sixties while, they say, 
Cameroon waited to do so until it was ready to file a case. 
They see more studied calculation than goodwill in Yaounde's 
behavior, and a decision in Cameroon's favor on key points in 
the case magnifies their distrust.  We concur in Ould- 
Abdallah's assessment, both that Obasanjo wants to resolve the 
dispute with Cameroon peaceably and that he will be hard- 
pressed to go further without a high-profile gesture from 
Cameroon.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
¶10.  (C)  ACTION REQUESTED:  That President Bush's response to 
Biya explicitly urge him to pay a visit to Abuja before the 
mid-April elections in order to give his Nigerian counterpart 
the political cover he needs to take next steps, and that Biya 
also be encouraged to engage Nigeria in the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission.  END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
 
---------------- 
OTHER NEXT STEPS 
---------------- 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Ould-Abdallah heard hopeful notes in Vice President 
Atiku Abubakar's opening remarks.  The proposal to include 
Equatorial Guinea in discussion about the demarcation of the 
southern end of the maritime boundary bodes well for better 
cooperation on resource management in the Gulf of Guinea.  The 
call for "withdrawal of administrative and security personnel 
of both countries in areas that are ceded to the other" hinted 
at Nigerian willingness to let go of Bakassi, Ould-Abdallah 
believed, cautioning once again that Nigeria's readiness to 
stick with commitments might have to be tested. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶12.  (C) Ould-Abdallah clearly finds himself more at ease with 
the Nigerian side.  He finds them more competent technically 
and more engaged in the back-and-forth needed to discover the 
foundations of compromise and to build them into fully-fledged 
proposals.  His annoyance at Biya's detachment from the 
process was also evident, as was his conviction that Biya 
needed to practice the personal diplomacy traditional among 
African Heads of State.  If the SYG's representative feels 
this way, how much more so might the Nigerians, and how much 
more useful even than Ould-Abdallah believes might be a visit 
by Biya to Abuja.  Ould-Abdallah is right to be cautious when 
the GON undertakes a commitment.  The solution is not 
cynicism, however; it is to examine the proposed commitment 
from every possible angle, avoiding exploitable gray areas. 
 
 
¶13.  (C)  Obasanjo has told the Ambassador that he will not 
meet with Biya again outside of the African Continent.  A Biya 
visit to Abuja would build trust, and we believe, give 
considerable impetus to peaceful resolution of the Bakassi 
issue. 
JETER