This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000351 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:12/16/2012 
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS NI IV FR ECOWAS
SUBJECT:  NIGERIA: OULD ABDALLAH ON COTE D'IVOIRE 
 
Ref:  Abidjan 271 
-     USUN 314 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5(d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Amadou Ould-Abdallah February 6 told 
Ambassador Jeter that several factors had engendered the 
post-Marcoussis disarray.  Ould-Abdallah thought Kufuor 
would be more effective as ECOWAS Chairman than Wade had 
been.  The French had leverage but were losing a little 
every day by failing to use it.  Ould-Abdallah said Albert 
Tevoedjre's appointment was a positive step but felt the 
Beninois relied too heavily on prayer rather than 
diplomacy.  Nigeria could and should play a useful role, 
but Gbagbo's prevarications early on had discouraged them. 
End Summary. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Over breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence on 
February 6, UN West Africa Special Representative Amadou 
Ould-Abdallah told Ambassador Jeter that he had been 
spending a disproportionate share of his time on Cote 
d'Ivoire.  He thought the appointment of Benin's Albert 
Tevoedjre would allow him more time for other issues, such 
as advancing implementation of the ICJ ruling on the 
Nigeria-Cameroon border dispute (septel).  Ould-Abdallah 
called Tevoedjre experienced and learned but commented that 
the Beninois sometimes put too much faith in the power of 
prayer to bring antagonists together. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Ould-Abdallah thought Ghana's John Kufuor would be 
a more effective ECOWAS Chairman than Senegalese President 
Abdoulaye Wade had been.  Kufuor "speaks frankly, but he is 
friendly and not lecturing."  While Wade had a strong sense 
of the issues at play in Cote d'Ivoire, he presumed too 
much as a result of his title as ECOWAS Chairman, signing 
letters in that capacity without having first thoroughly 
vetted them with his colleagues, for example.  But his 
heart was in the right place, and he sought a just outcome. 
Ould-Abdallah was less sure of Eyadema's motivations. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Ould-Abdallah sharply criticized Eyadema's efforts 
to undermine Wade.  The Ivoirian had wanted international 
mediation "to become African under Eyadema."  This was a 
"very cheap" ploy that had been intended to "play African 
against African."  Ould-Abdallah thought that Kufuor's 
accession to the ECOWAS Chairmanship would eventually 
reduce Eyadema's role as Gbagbo had more confidence and 
trust in Kufuor than in Wade. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Ould- 
Abdallah contended that Gbagbo and others had not focused 
on the implications of the rebels' request for the Defense 
and Interior Ministries.  "Bedie and Gbago wanted the money 
portfolios - Agriculture, Finance and Works," Ould-Abdallah 
said.  He conceded that the rebels' alacrity in telling the 
media of their coup had aggravated the problem but was not 
the decisive issue.  "Anyway, the demonstrations [by Gbagbo 
backers] were not really spontaneous; we have reason to 
think he (Gbagbo) encouraged them" (see also ref A).  There 
was also the problem of those who rebelled against lawful 
authority in essence now becoming that authority over the 
heads of those who had fought to uphold it, as well as 
personality issues associated with Guillaume Soro and 
Louis-Andre Dakourey.  Finally, Gbagbo's wife, a power in 
Parliament herself, was taking a hard line. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Was there a role for Ouattara?, the Ambassador 
asked.  Ould-Abdallah responded with sharp criticism of 
Ouattara for his failure to "bring people on board" after 
his electoral victory.  Ouattara had scarcely lived in 
Africa and was "too much an international civil servant" to 
identify effectively with the Ivorian people.  However, the 
GOCI and its political allies had "so demonized" Ouattara 
that he was now a symbol of northern resistance. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Ambassador Jeter regretted that contention at the 
highest levels of Ivorian politics, and between Togo and 
Senegal had precluded a quick success for ECOWAS efforts. 
Ould-Abdallah opined that in circumstances that come close 
to civil war, those who can inspire fear and those who can 
offer something to meet a need have leverage.  The French, 
he said, have leverage on both scores but are unable to use 
it effectively.  As a result, their leverage is slowly 
being attenuated.  The Nigerians were the first to come to 
Gbagbo's assistance, but he lied to them, so Obasanjo 
effectively withdrew from the fray.  Ould-Abdallah was 
pleased to see Abuja slowly re-engaging: Nigeria could and 
should play a continuing diplomatic role; it would be 
difficult to find a durable solution without Nigerian 
participation. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT:  We concur in Ould-Abdallah's assessment 
of the need for strong Nigerian engagement on the Cote 
d'Ivoire, and we have done what we can to promote stronger 
and more persistent Nigerian diplomatic engagement. 
Obasanjo and others in the GON now seem to be paying close 
attention to Cote d'Ivoire.  Gbagbo may be more comfortable 
with Kufuor as ECOWAS Chairman than he was with Wade in 
that role.  That fact too may facilitate mediation. 
However, alone among ECOWAS states, Nigeria possesses the 
military muscle and political weight to apply real pressure 
to recalcitrant players. 
JETER