This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO FOR POL -- J. MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958 DECL: 1/23/13 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: THE ALEX EKWUEME FACTOR 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. 
REASON: 1.5 (G). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During an extensive January 9 
conversation with Ambassador Jeter, defeated PDP 
contestant Alex Ekwueme did not "recognize" Obasanjo's 
convention victory. Ekwueme contended that Obasanjo's 
victory was the result of bribes, political threats 
and chicanery regarding the actual delegate voting. 
Notwithstanding his displeasure, Ekwueme asserted he 
would remain in the PDP but would retire to the life 
of an elder, inactive statesman. Ekwueme described the 
ANPP convention as even worse than the PDP's and its 
selection of former Head of State Buhari as abysmal. 
No self-respecting Christian would vote for Buhari, he 
declared. His professions of retirement could not mask 
Ekwueme's desire to stay in the game. Rankled by 
Obasanjo's "thefts" of the 1999 and 2003 PDP mandates 
and pressured by supporters, the former Vice President 
will kick up as much dust as he can. On January 15, 
Ekwueme publicly called for another PDP convention; on 
January 23, he filed a lawsuit seeking his unlikely 
dream of a second convention; On January 26, he 
publicly suggested the formation of a broad 
"coalition" of parties to combat the PDP.  End 
summary. 
 
 
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HE DID IT TO ME AGAIN! 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Taking a few days respite from the public 
rostrum in the aftermath of the tumultuous PDP 
convention, former Vice President Ekwueme emerged on 
January 9 for a relaxed morning conversation with the 
Ambassador at the CMR. After the meeting, Ekwueme 
would start in earnest his initial round of post- 
convention consultations with various advisors and 
politicians in and out of the PDP. 
 
 
¶3.   (C) The reserved Ekwueme contended that the PDP 
convention was blatantly unfair; as in 1999, democracy 
and the will of the delegates had been hijacked by the 
influence of money, he lamented.  His major allegation 
was that PDP chairman Audu Ogbeh consorted with the 
Obasanjo campaign by serially numbering the delegate 
ballots. Convention voting was to be conducted by 
secret ballot; however, by numbering the ballots, 
 
SIPDIS 
recording the numbered ballots given each state, then 
having the delegates vote in alphabetical order meant 
that any delegate's vote could be identified; at the 
very least, a state's collective vote could be 
determined.  Ekwueme maintained that this procedure 
effectively eliminated the secrecy of the ballot. 
Coupled with blatant political threats by the 
Presidency, this caused many governors and hundreds of 
delegates to change their minds.  People voted for 
Obasanjo because they feared the consequences, Ekwueme 
explained. (Comment: Hakeem Baba-Ahmed, Secretary of 
the Independent National Electoral Commission, told us 
that INEC had advised the PDP Chairman prior to the 
convention against numbering the ballots. INEC 
correctly thought the numbering would give rise to 
suspicions of vote tracking, Baba-Ahmed recalled. 
INEC observed the PDP and other parties' national 
conventions pursuant to its constitutional mandate to 
monitor party activities. End Comment.) 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Ekwueme claimed he would have sought to 
postpone the convention if apprised beforehand of the 
numbered ballots. However, he had accepted at face 
value PDP Chairman Ogbeh's pre-convention pledge to 
ensure the integrity of the vote. Thus, Ekwueme went 
into the convention confident the balloting would 
truly be secret.  However, he was flabbergasted when 
it was announced that Abia State, the first delegation 
to vote, was given ballots numbered 1-95.  Ekwueme 
sent supporters to find out what was happening.  When 
they reported that the ballots were numbered, he felt 
victimized by cruel deception. At that point, Ekwueme 
had to decide whether to disrupt the convention by 
walking out or to stay put and contain his frustration 
and sense of betrayal. Ekwueme told the Ambassador 
that his sense of decorum ultimately kept him seated. 
Discounting remonstrations that his post-convention 
criticism was nothing but a loser's lament, Ekwueme 
said he did not regret his decision remain at the 
convention. Walking out would have signaled surrender. 
Moreover, Ekwueme argued that the timing of his 
complaint could neither enhance nor diminish its 
validity.  If the vote was unduly influenced, that 
conclusion remained valid regardless of when the hue 
and cry was raised. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Ekwueme mentioned other problems with the 
balloting.  Customarily, contestants appear in 
alphabetical order on the ballot paper. This time, the 
President appeared first despite his surname. 
Additionally, Senator Ike Nwachukwu remained on the 
ballot although he had defected to the NDP (and would 
become that party's presidential nominee.)  Ekwueme 
and Nwachukwu were next to each other on the ballot. 
Because the PDP used photographs of both men in 
traditional Igbo attire, the two challengers may have 
looked the same on the ballot, a potential source of 
confusion for delegates. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Ekwueme was correct that he appeared 
to be ahead early in the convention and that money, 
blandishments and political threats turned his once 
firm position into dust. However, numbered ballots 
were not his downfall. The change had taken place 
before then, on Saturday when VP Atiku let everyone 
know his lot was cast with Obasanjo.  Atiku controlled 
the key governors who, in turn, controlled the 
delegates. With Atiku back in line, the vote would 
become a formality, the numbered ballots a form of 
unneeded insurance. Moreover, Ekwueme's accusations 
downplay some important facts. Ekwueme's campaign was 
not pristine.  Credible reports indicate that his 
supporters were not above giving delegates money and 
making promises in exchange for support.  If Ekwueme's 
team had possessed the tools of political 
intimidation, it probably would have used them. 
Ekwueme played the game but he simply could not play 
it as hard as Obasanjo; thus, it is insufficient to 
state that convention delegates succumbed to 
enticement and coercion. 
 
 
¶7. (C)  Comment Cont: Moreover, the total number of 
ballots nullified because Nwachukwu's name was 
selected numbered fewer than 20. Obasanjo defeated 
Ekwueme by nearly 2000 votes.  In the final analysis, 
Ekwueme entered the race late and briefly scented 
victory because of widespread unhappiness with 
Obasanjo. If Ekwueme's support had been firmer, more 
delegates would have stuck with him despite the 
pressure applied by Obasanjo. Last, one of Ekweume's 
big problems was that many political elites in the PDP 
did not trust him on the delicate question of 
Nigerian's territorial integrity. Because Ekweume is 
an Igbo, the historical specter of Biafra came into 
play.  We have heard many politicians state that 
Nigeria is not yet ready for an Igbo President. End 
Comment. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Finally, Ekwueme acknowledged that his failure 
to persuade Atiku to abandon Obasanjo was a severe 
blow.  He and Atiku passed messages several times 
during the convention, with Ekwueme offering Atiku the 
second spot on his ticket.  At first, Atiku apparently 
wanted to run himself but was precluded because he 
never filed a nomination form, Ekwueme told the 
Ambassador.  Atiku then seemed ready to explore 
teaming with Ekwueme.  Denying press reports that he 
tried to seduce Atiku by pledging to retire in mid- 
term, Ekwueme said his desire would have been to 
resign from the Presidency around his 74th birthday 
(November 2006) with 5-6 months left in office.  He 
would have done all he could by then, he offered.  In 
stepping aside, he would make room for a smooth 
transition by making it clear he would not seek re- 
election.  (Comment: No matter how the scheme is 
described or what motives are ascribed, the practical 
result of an early resignation would be Atiku 
ascending to the Presidency and running as the 
incumbent in 2007. There is no way around the fact 
that Ekwueme dangled the early retirement option to 
entice Atiku.   End Comment.) 
 
 
¶9. (C) In the end, Atiku was too frightened that 
Obasanjo would destroy him politically, Ekwueme 
believed.  The former Vice President also discounted 
rumors that NSA Aliyu Mohammed had been a potential 
running mate.  Ekwueme stated that he never talked to 
Mohammed about this possibility.  He attributed the 
speculation of a link between him and Mohammed to the 
latter's close ties with former Head of State 
Babangida.  Ekwueme said he had received tentative 
support from Babangida but very strong support from 
former Head of State Abdulsalami Abubakar, Babangida's 
close friend.  Ekwueme observed that Babangida's 
support was lukewarm because of Babangida's obsession 
for maintaining all his options for as long as 
possible.  Babangida hated to choose a sole course of 
action unless absolutely sure of success.  While this 
craftiness might work in military government, it was 
not well suited for a more democratic environment 
where others, simply by acting, took advantage of the 
space opened by Babangida's indecision. (Comment: In 
the end, Ekwueme was abandoned by Babangida and 
Abdulsalami who was conveniently abroad during the PDP 
convention. End Comment.) 
 
 
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ANPP TO THE RESCUE 
------------------ 
 
 
¶10. (C) Both Obasanjo and the PDP were politically 
wounded by the conduct of the convention.  However, 
the ANPP convention helped salve those wounds.  First, 
the ANPP erred by trying to force through a 
"consensus" candidate who was the choice of the ANPP 
governors rather than the party's grassroots.  Ekwueme 
chuckled that the ANPP confab was made to look more 
contrived than the PDP when the Southern candidates 
left after the ANPP hierarchy had tapped Buhari. 
Moreover, Buhari's selection made matters worst by 
confirming the widespread impression that the ANPP was 
Northern dominated.  Marking Buhari a religious bigot, 
Ekwueme said no decent Christian would vote for him. 
Ekwueme did not think Buhari had a chance of winning 
because he lacked support in the South and his running 
mate Chuba Okagidbo would not attract much. Ekwueme 
commented that, although he would not campaign 
actively for Obasanjo, he would vote for the President 
not Buhari. Still, Ekwueme rued that Nigeria's two 
main parties had settled on two former military 
leaders with autocratic dispositions.  With the 
emergence of Buhari, Ekwueme feared the presidential 
campaign could acquire combative religious, regional 
and ethnic overtones. 
 
 
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WHAT NEXT GENTLEMAN ALEX 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶11. (C) Although not ready to toss his towel into the 
ring and publicly concede victory to Obasanjo, Ekwueme 
told the Ambassador that he would withdraw from active 
politics, return to Anambra state and "do nothing" for 
a while. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶12. (C) Despite the clear statement that he would 
retire,  Ekwueme did not appear ready to leave the 
playing field. His quiet demeanor could not mask the 
fight still left in him. After having lost two 
consecutive conventions to Obasanjo, it should not be 
surprising that Ekwueme would harbor resentment and 
might be planning ways to scuttle Obasanjo's 
ambitions.  Instead of an early retirement, we believe 
Ekwueme will do his best to stir the pot, either to 
win concessions from the PDP or, as a last resort, to 
strengthen the challenge that other parties may 
present the President. Recent events have borne out 
these expectations. 
 
 
¶13. (C) Earlier this month, Ekwueme filed a lawsuit 
seeking a second convention; few people give this 
quixotic lawsuit a chance. Trying to increase the 
political pressure on the PDP, Ekwueme told supporters 
after meeting the UNPP's flagbearer Senator Jim 
Nwobodo in Enugu that Nigerians should "make the 
necessary sacrifice to get the country back on the 
track of democracy."  "Sacrifice could come in 
different ways, including the formation of coalitions 
by the political parties to ensure that democracy was 
achieved in the country," Ekwueme reportedly said. 
While Ekwueme probably does not intend to campaign 
against Obasanjo, he is sending a signal to the 
President that he must not be ignored. 
 
 
¶14. (C) While many think Ekwueme will bolt from the 
PDP, it is more likely that he may be fishing for 
political concessions from Obasanjo, such as 
appointments for key supporters. This is something 
Ekwueme did not do in 1999.  If this is his ploy and 
if successful, it will enable him to maintain 
influence in the party and the government. 
 
 
¶15. (C) Ekwueme's actions have little leverage unless 
they carry the implicit threat that he might defect. 
Thus, defection remains possible. During his 
conversation with the Ambassador, Ekwueme downplayed 
his relationship with Babangida and NSA Aliyu 
Mohammed. He might be working more closely with them 
than he would have us believe. However, Ekwueme is not 
a Babangida fan; their relationship would be an anti- 
Obasanjo marriage of convenience that Ekwueme would 
have no pride in acknowledging. Babangida and Mohammed 
may or may not have encouraged Ekwueme to file the 
lawsuit.  However, they probably will encourage 
Ekwueme to leave the PDP if the suit fails.  Babangida 
neither wants Atiku to be Vice President nor does he 
want Buhari to become head of State in 2003. Thus, IBB 
must find a credible alternative. Alex Ekwueme could 
help forge one if not become that alternative himself. 
While his mind knows that challenging Obasanjo in the 
general election would be a steep challenge, Ekwueme 
could be persuaded to become a leading member of an 
anti-Obasanjo coalition if he does not receive some 
political concessions from the PDP. 
JETER