This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB/TPP 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2013 
TAGS: PREL PHUM ECON BM ASSK
SUBJECT: WHAT'S BEST FOR BURMA? UNCLEAR. 
 
REF: RANGOON 45 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. During a conversation with David Rockefeller 
at the Chief of Mission's residence on January 12th, Aung San 
Suu Kyi talked about the need for a speedy transition, the 
dangerous state of the nation's education system, and her 
growing public support outside Rangoon.  Unfortunately, ASSK 
had little to say to Mr. Rockefeller's repeated question: 
"what can we do to help?"  However, she made it evident that 
she still opposed "engagement," though additional blanket 
sanctions were also not the answer.  She did tout working 
with the International Labor Organization (ILO) to identify 
and punish export-focused factories with unacceptable working 
conditions.  However until there is a clear public 
pronouncement from her, we see little chance that the 
international community will alter its varied interpretations 
of what's "best" for Burma.  End summary. 
 
Mr. Rockefeller Comes to Rangoon 
 
¶2. (SBU) David Rockefeller and his traveling party came to 
Burma for a 10-day tourist trip throughout the country. 
While here he took the opportunity to meet with local 
business leaders and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), and plans 
to meet with Secretary One, General Khin Nyunt.  ASSK joined 
the Rockefeller party at the Chief of Mission's residence for 
an informal Sunday tea and discussion about the current 
situation in Burma. 
 
Sanctions: Psychological Not Economic Damage 
 
¶3. (C) Three times David Rockefeller, and other members of 
his party, pressed ASSK about "what the United States 
could/should be doing" to help expedite change here.  Though 
ASSK was adamant that "speedy change" was essential, she did 
not give specific prescriptions for how U.S. policy could 
force the issue.  She mentioned only that there should be 
better policy coordination between nations and between 
international organizations. 
 
¶4. (C) On sanctions, ASSK was more specific.  She insisted 
that while sanctions caused minimal economic damage to the 
regime, the "psychological impact" has been significant.  She 
pointed to the informal boycott of tourism as helping to foil 
the regime's ballyhooed efforts to make Burma a major tourist 
destination.  Such a boycott, she said, also has an impact on 
the government's pocketbook and has the residual benefit of 
preventing Burma from being a country over reliant on tourism 
for hard currency earnings.  ASSK did admit that there was 
some benefit to travelers coming to Burma if they take the 
time to "learn as much as possible about the country." (Note: 
despite ASSK's support of the informal boycott, she has told 
us on several occasions she opposes an outright tourism ban. 
We note that despite her reluctance to have Burma become 
reliant on tourism, currently the industry provides one of 
the very few relatively well-paying job opportunities for 
English speaking young people.) 
 
¶5. (C) On the question of textile sanctions, ASSK was a bit 
less sanguine about their benefits.  She does not support 
full-scale sanctions because of the disproportionate damage 
they would cause to working people.  Instead, she said, more 
creative solutions were needed to focus as much as possible 
on helping the workers while attacking the regime.  One idea, 
she suggested, was to team up with the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) to require inspections of all 
export-producing garment factories in Burma.  Only those that 
the ILO certified as providing healthy working environments 
would be allowed to export to the United States.  She added 
that exports could be banned outright from the few factories 
that were controlled in whole or in part by the government. 
(Note: we'd heard indirectly of this proposal before, but it 
was the first time she'd mentioned to us directly.  It shows 
a clear position of ASSK against broad trade sanctions that 
would hurt labor-intensive industries.  However, as 
inspections are not part of the ILO's mandate here we will 
have to follow up with the local ILO representative to assess 
the feasibility of this idea.) 
International Community is Losing its Way 
¶6. (C) ASSK had sharp words for countries that she saw moving 
toward policies of engagement with the SPDC regime.  She said 
that engagement with the regime helped its efforts to justify 
its own existence and policies, making it harder to convince 
the SPDC to step down.  She singled out Japan and Australia 
for having "less than helpful" attitudes.  Specifically she 
criticized Japan's "reluctance to offend" and recent decision 
to forgive $1.3 billion in debt (see reftel).  She said this 
move, along with China's offer to give $200 million in soft 
loans to Burma, will give a large psychological (though not a 
large economic) boost to the regime.  Australia, she said, 
while giving "lip service" to democracy is actually more 
"ASEAN than ASEAN" in its relations with the regime and its 
reluctance to rock the boat.  (Note: ASSK was likely 
referring to the Australians' work with the regime on a human 
rights training program.) 
 
¶7. (C) ASSK was less critical of ASEAN members and China. 
She said that none of these countries actively supports 
democracy in Burma, but at least they are "honest" about 
their true positions.  Twice she mentioned the PRC, saying 
that while it is no friend of democracy, it is very pragmatic 
and appreciates stability.  She thought it would be 
worthwhile to work with China to convince them to take "a 
more pragmatic approach" at least to border issues (e.g., 
drug production and smuggling).  It will also be important, 
she said, to include China in international cooperative 
efforts to make change here. 
 
¶8. (C) She was slightly less charitable about Malaysian 
leader Dr. Mahatir, who was not given permission to see ASSK 
during his latest trip to Rangoon.  She said that she was 
unhappy he did not take the initiative to come and see her, 
instead asking the regime for permission.  In addition, it 
was a "pity," she said, that following his visit Dr. Mahatir 
did not come out publicly to express his disappointment about 
his treatment by the regime. 
 
Political Situation: Improving, But too Slow 
 
¶9. (C) The Rockefeller group was interested generally in the 
current political state of play.  She said that repression of 
the people has decreased since she and the SPDC began their 
"exchange of views" in September 2000.  She was also 
encouraged by seeing on her travels the amount of grassroots 
support for her and the NLD.  On her recent trips to Shan and 
Arakan States, she said that she was received even more 
warmly than she had been during her travels in 1988-89, just 
prior to the 1990 elections.  Another difference from '88-'89 
is the increased support she's noticed from young people and 
members of various ethnic nationalities.   On a negative 
note, she insisted that the regime's talk of change is only 
superficial, aimed cynically only at improving its 
international image. 
 
¶10. (C) Despite the positives, ASSK was very concerned that 
change was coming far too slowly.  She joked about those who 
advise her to be "patient" or "go slow," saying "slow is one 
thing, a snail's pace is another."  The longer change takes, 
she warned, the more difficult it will be to restart the 
country under a new government.  She said that this was a 
particular problem because of the current state of the 
education system.  Very few young people today, except those 
affiliated with the military or those who can study abroad, 
are getting a quality education.  There is a very real 
concern that Burma will soon become a country of "uneducated 
people," with terrible consequences for the nation's 
political and economic future.  She said that the current 
regime's hostility toward education and economic reform is 
the primary reason that Burma cannot develop along the lines 
of other previously military-ruled Asian nations (namely 
Taiwan and South Korea), where government support for 
education remained strong. 
 
Policy Changes Apparent, but Not Public 
 
¶11. (C) Based on this discussion, and others we've had with 
her in recent months, ASSK's position may be shifting ever so 
slightly.  She recognizes the increasing humanitarian 
catastrophe that is occurring here because of the regime's 
neglect.  She is skittish of additional sanctions because of 
their huge economic impact on the people, and limited 
economic impact on the regime.  One of ASSK's economic 
advisors has told us privately that he is pushing her hard to 
publicly open up for additional international assistance 
(carefully monitored and disbursed so as to avoid the 
government) for education and basic healthcare.  ASSK did 
not, however, take the opportunity of having a supportive and 
sympathetic Mr. Rockefeller on hand to clearly propose any 
significant new directions.  We have told ASSK, and will 
continue to do so, that it is essential that she speak out 
directly if she wants the international community to follow 
her lead in revising its collective Burma policies.  End 
comment. 
Martinez