This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KU
SUBJECT: (U) DEPUTY SPEAKER ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: KUWAIT 0015 
 
Classified By: (U) DCM Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  In a January 5 meeting Deputy Speaker 
Meshari al-Anjari gave his readout on recent developments in 
Kuwait,s National Assembly, the status of a possible 
"grilling" of a Minister charged with corruption, and his 
version of a military timeline for Iraq.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Poloffs and Pol FSN met with Kuwaiti National Assembly 
Deputy Speaker Meshari al-Anjari on January 5, after a long 
holiday weekend during which local media had reported that MP 
Abdulla al-Naibari was preparing to subject one of two 
government ministers to parliamentary "grilling" for their 
role in a suspect land development deal, in which 64 square 
kilometers of public land were sold at rock-bottom prices to 
one developer, without a bidding process. 
 
Whom to grill? 
 
¶3. (C) To explain confusing news reports that either the 
Minister of Finance, Dr. Yousef al-Ibrahim, or Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of State for National Assembly Affairs 
Mohammad Dheifallah Sharar would be grilled, al-Anjari said 
that MP al-Naibari had three choices:  he could grill the 
Prime Minister and Crown Prince, Shaykh Saad al-Abdullah 
al-Sabah who was ultimately responsible for the deal, but not 
of sound health (Grilling the Crown Prince is a nonstarter 
given the CP,s extremely poor physical and mental health, 
and Kuwaiti society,s veneration of him), he could grill 
Minister al-Ibrahim, who signed the contract, or he could 
grill Minister Sharar.  MP al-Naibari had not yet formally 
submitted his grilling request, but al-Anjari said it 
appeared the grilling would be directed towards Sharar. 
 
¶4. (C) Al-Anjari hoped the matter would be dealt with 
shortly, because it will not go away.  He said the last 6 
months of every National Assembly session were "stormy," and 
this would be a good time for the government to resolve the 
issue, leaving a clean slate for the new assembly. 
 
 
Elections 
 
¶5. (C) The National Assembly's term expires in mid-July. 
Al-Anjari said the Council of Ministers had asked the 
Constitutional Court to confirm whether elections can be held 
anytime during the last two months of the term.  If so, the 
government would want the date to be in early June; otherwise 
it would be in July.  "We hope for June," he added. 
(Comment:  While seemingly insignificant, a June vs. July 
election could considerably impact voter turnout.  By July, 
many Kuwaitis have left for cooler and more comfortable 
climes, giving the remaining voters more weight.  Liberals 
are seen as more likely to leave Kuwait than Islamists or 
Tribalists.  End Comment. ) 
 
Fewer Islamists after Elections 
 
¶6. (C) Al-Anjari, a liberal, predicted the new assembly would 
include fewer Islamists, owing to a number of factors. 
First, he said, Kuwaiti sympathy for America had increased 
since 9/11/01.  Second, Kuwaitis recall that during the Iraqi 
occupation, some Islamists (specifically, The Muslim 
Brotherhood) had opposed relying on the U.S., preferring to 
pin their hopes on "muslim armies."  Third, the fact that 
Islamists had met with Saddam since 9/11 had not endeared 
them to the general population.  Finally, he said, Islamists 
had not presented any significant legislative plan to the 
Assembly, but had spent much of their time on "grillings," 
notably that of Minister al-Ibrahim, which took place in July 
of 2002. 
 
What about Iraq? 
 
¶7. (C) Moving to the subject of the hour, the possibility of 
conflict with Saddam, al-Anjari asked if the US could prove 
that Saddam had WMD.  PolChief responded that this would be 
the story of the next few weeks. Besides, any serious 
government knows Saddam is lying when he denies having any 
WMD.  Al-Anjari agreed, saying that Kuwaitis know Saddam is a 
liar, because he also denied the existence of Kuwaiti POW's. 
It is "easier to hide WMD than POW's," he said.  "We hope you 
can prove this to the world," he added. 
 
¶8. (C) Al-Anjari also gave his version of how the Iraqi 
situation will play out.  "President Bush has decided Saddam 
should disarm, which means war," he said.  On January 27, 
Hans Blix will give his initial report. On January 28, Israel 
will hold elections.  The Hajj will occur the second week of 
February, then the moon will be full, "so you will not attack 
then."  February 26 was the date of the Gulf War ceasefire, 
and that is when the U.S. will attack, to underscore that the 
reason is Saddam's violation of the ceasefire conditions. 
 
Post-Saddam Concerns 
 
¶9. (C) In talking about Iraq, Al-Anjari stressed that 
Kuwaitis were not concerned so much about a possible 
conflict, as the &day after.8  PolChief assured him that 
the USG was working with the international community to 
ensure that the transition to a post-Saddam Iraq was peaceful 
and that Iraq maintains its territorial integrity.  Al-Anjari 
reminded that Kuwait was still interested in ensuring it 
received war reparation payments. "Don,t forget about 
compensation," he said.  "The passage of years should not 
equal forgiveness."  That said, if principles were 
maintained, Kuwait would take steps to help the people of 
Iraq. 
JONES