This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000105 
 
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STATE FOR D, NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA, IO/UNP 
GENEVA FOR STONECIPHER 
LONDON FOR GOLDRICH 
PARIS FOR OFRIEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL KPOW IZ KU ICRC
SUBJECT: (C) GULF WAR MISSING:  1/22 MEETING WILL BE THE 
TEST 
 
REF: 02 KUWAIT 5611 
 
Classified By: (U) AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION:  Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq held a meeting of the Technical Sub-Committee (TSC) of 
the Tripartite Commission on Gulf War POWs and Missing (TPC) 
January 8 in Amman, Jordan.  The process got off to a 
reasonably constructive start but will only begin to tackle 
substance at the next meeting, in Amman on January 22.  At 
that time, the parties are to discuss specific cases, 
respecting the previously-agreed quotas.  They also agreed to 
identify in advance which cases to discuss, selecting the 
ones most likely to yield results, with input from the 
investigating party.  Areas of disagreement remain:  Iraq 
refuses to hold subsequent meetings at the border, and the 
Kuwaitis refuse to meet in Baghdad or Kuwait City, but Riyadh 
remains a possible venue.  Kuwait wants TSC meetings every 
two weeks through mid-April, whereas Iraq wants 3 weeks 
between meetings to allow more time for preparation.  In the 
face of heavy media interest, the parties respected the 
confidentiality required by the Rules of Procedure.  END 
 
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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 
 
¶2.  (C) PolChief discussed the January 8 TSC meeting with 
ICRC Regional Representative Michel Meyer and, separately, 
with Rabea al-Adsani, Director General of Kuwait's National 
Committee for Missing and POW Affairs (NCMPA), both of whom 
participated in the Amman meeting.  Both assessed that the 
process had gotten off to a reasonably constructive start. 
Meyer added that the atmosphere warmed during the meeting, so 
that by the end, the Kuwaitis and Iraqis were speaking to 
each other during breaks, and even shook hands on parting. 
That said, both Meyer and Adsani acknowledged that it is not 
yet possible to judge whether Iraq is serious about making 
substantive progress, because the meeting -- the first in 
over four years -- was strictly procedural.  The test will 
come on January 22, when the parties are to discuss specific 
cases.  These cases are to be selected on the basis of being 
especially promising, i.e. cases for which the investigating 
party has material information.  At Kuwait's suggestion, the 
investigating party is to propose certain cases; this is an 
attempt to avoid past problems in which the submitting party 
raises a case, only to be told the other side has no 
information on it. 
 
¶3.  (C) Adsani explained that he was extremely busy because 
January 13 is the date by which all three countries, in their 
capacity as investigating parties, are to provide ICRC their 
selected cases for half the quotas.  (NOTE:  as previously 
agreed, the quotas (maximum numbers of cases) for any TSC 
meeting are:  24 Kuwaiti cases, 10 Iraqi cases, and 6 Saudi 
cases, for a total of 40.  Under the new arrangement, by 
January 13 Iraq is to select 12 Kuwaiti and 3 Saudi cases; 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are to select between them 5 Iraqi 
cases.  Kuwait will select 3 of the 5, Saudi the other 2 (out 
of a total of 102 Iraqi cases that have been submitted to the 
TSC:  68 submitted to Kuwait, 34 to Saudi Arabia). 
 
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¶4.  (C) By January 15, Adsani continued, the submitting 
parties are to respond to these proposed selections, either 
approving them or substituting different cases.  Thus, on 
January 22 all parties should be prepared to delve into the 
substance of the most promising cases.  That, according to 
Adsani, will be the litmus test of Iraq's intentions. 
Adsani assured that Kuwait will be able to show real progress 
on at least 3 Iraqi cases, which it continued to work on over 
the past four years even though Iraq was boycotting the 
entire TPC process. 
 
¶5.  (C) As reported reftel, Kuwait wanted to hold a total of 
seven TSC meetings before the next TPC meeting April 16, and 
wanted most of the sessions to take place on the border, 
partly because this would make it easier to bring witnesses 
to testify before the TSC.  The Iraqis did not accept to meet 
at either border (Kuwaiti or Saudi), claiming that US 
military action has cut off communication links between the 
border and Baghdad, but their delegation head gave assurances 
that it would bring witnesses to whatever venue was selected. 
 Interestingly, it was Iraq that proposed holding subsequent 
TSC meetings in the respective capitals.  According to Meyer, 
 
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the Kuwaiti delegation said it was not empowered to make a 
decision on that; Adsani subsequently told PolChief that it 
is "out of the question" to meet in Baghdad or Kuwait City. 
The GOK has no objection to Riyadh if the Saudis accept, but 
there is no ICRC office there, and according to Meyer, the 
Iraqis only agreed to meet at ICRC premises. 
¶6.  (C) Kuwait pressed for follow-up TSC meetings every two 
weeks, but the Iraqis wanted three weeks between meetings, to 
allow more time for preparation.  Thus, the only thing that 
has been decided regarding future meetings is to hold the 
next one in Amman on January 22.  Adsani said he suggested 
holding one meeting in Geneva piggy-backing on the worldwide 
conference on missing persons that ICRC is hosting February 
19-21.  (NOTE:  We understand the USG is invited to that 
conference and will send a delegation from Washington.  END 
NOTE.)  Adsani said he also suggested holding a TSC meeting 
in Geneva just before the April 16 TPC, in hopes that this 
might entice the Iraqis to attend the TPC rather than 
participate remotely as they did December 18. 
 
¶7.  (C) Meyer noted that the January 8 meeting drew heavy 
media attention.  He estimated that between 50 and 100 
reporters, photographers and cameramen staked out the ICRC 
office.  He noted approvingly that despite the media crush, 
the parties respected the confidentiality of the substance of 
the TSC meeting, as required by the Rules of Procedure. 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT:  The Iraqis garnered favorable publicity 
just by participating in the January 8 meeting.  Given the 
confidentiality rule, it should be easy for them to continue 
 
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to reap p.r. benefits without acting in good faith, but 
thanks to Kuwait's ingenious suggestion to have the 
investigating party propose some cases, the January 22 
meeting should provide a strong indication of whether Baghdad 
has any intention of making progress towards resolving any of 
these humanitarian cases.  For our part, we have already laid 
down the marker that extension of the temporary rule 
suspension under which the TSC is meeting depends on it 
yielding substantive results. 
JONES