This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT WITHIN ZANU-PF 
 
REF: 02 HARARE 2829 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER KIMBERLY JEMISON FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) A 
ND (D). 
 
 SUMMARY 
--------- 
 
¶1. (C) Concern and frustration with Zimbabwe's worsening 
economic and other crises are mounting among senior ZANU-PF 
officials, many of whom blame Robert Mugabe.  No one appears 
willing or able to nudge the Zimbabwean President into 
retirement, however.  Internal discussions of succession 
scenarios focus predominantly on how to preserve the ruling 
party's hold on power in a post-Mugabe era, and none that we 
know of envision a voluntary retirement by Mugabe prior to 
2005, or reconciliation and cooperation with the opposition 
MDC.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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DISSENSION WITHIN ZANU-PF 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In a January 8 conversation with ruling party 
politburo member Solomon Mujuru, the Ambassador asked about 
recent public allegations by opposition leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai that armed forces chief Vitalis Zvinavashe was 
 
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working with the British and South African governments on a 
plan to replace Mugabe with Speaker of Parliament Emmerson 
Mnangagwa.  Mujuru said he doubted that Zvinavashe would have 
done anything more than informally sound out ideas with 
Tsvangirai through Colonel Dyck, and that Mugabe certainly 
 
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would not have made proposals for succession without first 
vetting it through the appropriate ZANU-PF channels.  Mujuru, 
who is close to the armed forces and opposed to Mnangagwa's 
ambitions, declined to comment on Mnangagwa's future role. 
 
¶3.  (C) Asked to predict how the political situation would 
unfold, Mujuru surmised that parliamentary elections in 2005 
would likely go ahead as scheduled.  He was confident that 
ZANU-PF would regain a two-thirds majority, then move to 
change the constitution to allow the President to appoint a 
successor who would serve out the remainder of his mandate 
(the constitution currently provides that an election must be 
held within 90 days of the presidency being vacated.). 
Shortly thereafter, Mujuru thought Mugabe would appoint a new 
vice-president or two, then step down.  If the constitution 
were not amended, Mujuru believed Mugabe would step down 
anyway and would allow the required election to proceed 
within 90 days.  Even if Morgan Tsvangirai and the opposition 
MDC won, Mujuru pointed out,  they would likely have to work 
with a ZANU-PF majority in Parliament.  Mujuru acknowledged 
that further economic deterioration would be inevitable in 
the two years until then and that risks of a political 
explosion were growing, but he appeared stymied by Mugabe's 
own objections to addressing the political crisis at this 
time. 
 
¶4. (C) In a separate meeting, senior ZANU-PF parliamentarian 
and elder party statesman Eddison Zvobgo confirmed to us the 
existence of a group of dissatisfied party cadres, comprising 
both young and more longstanding members, including himself, 
that is trying to distance itself from Mugabe. Zvobgo implied 
that their goal is forcing Mugabe out, but they have not 
devised any plan to accomplish this and their uncertainty 
about the sort of political dispensation that would obtain 
after Mugabe's departure is giving many of them pause.  In 
any case, Zvobgo plans a trip soon to Atlanta, Chicago, and 
New York to raise funds for this dissident group, presumably 
to give them some flexibility and financial heft. 
 
¶5. (C) ZANU-PF deputy political commissar Sikhanyiso Ndlovu 
confirmed to polchief on January 2 that resentment with 
Mugabe's leadership is growing among politburo members, 
including himself.  He said he was increasingly concerned 
about Zimbabwe's economic implosion and its impact on the 
educational institutes he owns around the country, and he did 
not want his reputation tarred by some of the GOZ's decisions 
and policies.  At the same time, Ndlovu said a new election 
was out of the question, and he dismissed the MDC as a 
British puppet organization.  Many of his politburo 
colleagues, he continued, simply want Mugabe out of office, 
but they have not contemplated who or what might follow him. 
Ndlovu claimed that strong U.S. criticism of Mugabe makes the 
Zimbabwean leader more determined to hold on to power, as 
Mugabe is afraid that we would press for his prosecution if 
he leaves office.  Ndlovu asked whether the USG would be 
willing to fund creation of something like a prestigious 
educational foundation and support Mugabe to head it, if such 
an arrangement might convince the Old Man to step down. 
Polchief was noncommittal. 
 
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Reconciliation Talks 
-------------------- 
¶6. (C) With the Ambassador, Mujuru repeated the common ruling 
party refrain that Zimbabwe's disagreements with the United 
Kingdom were at the root of this country's problems, and that 
normalization of that relationship would make the internal 
political crisis easier to resolve.  The Ambassador replied 
that he could not speak for the British, but emphasized that 
it would not be possible to come to an understanding with the 
United States unless Zimbabwe's political crisis and the 
other crises which flowed from it were addressed in a way 
acceptable to most Zimbabweans. 
¶7. (C) Asked whether resumption of the dialogue between 
ZANU-PF and the MDC was possible, Mujuru noted the high level 
of distrust between the parties and parroted the party line 
that dialogue would be difficult so long as the MDC continues 
to pursue its court challenge of the presidential election 
results.  In addition, convincing Mugabe to resign, the MDC's 
publicly stated precondition for any political solution, 
would be "the hardest part." 
 
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Food distribution 
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¶8.  (C)  The Ambassador commented to Mujuru that ZANU-PF has 
believed that controlling distribution of scarce food 
supplies is a huge political advantage, but he noted 
increased infighting within the party over access to -- and 
authority to distribute -- those supplies.  A strong GOZ move 
to facilitate food distributions on an impartial basis would 
make a favorable impression with the international community 
and could help restore trust within Zimbabwe.  Some steps, 
the Ambassador suggested, might include allowing private 
sector food imports, inviting the United Nations to monitor 
Grain Marketing Board distributions, and involving the MDC in 
monitoring food distributions.  Mujuru was noncommittal. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9. (C) An increasing number of ruling party insiders are 
beginning to acknowledge the depths of Zimbabwe's political 
and economic crises and are increasingly convinced that 
Mugabe's departure is the solution.  Recognizing the 
existence of a problem is, of course, the first step to 
resolving it.  It is clear, however, that the growing 
frustration among those party cadres appears motivated not by 
a genuine concern for the welfare of their once prosperous 
country but, rather, by the deleterious impact on their 
continued access to the gravy train.  Our sense is that those 
around Mugabe are scrambling to figure out a way to get rid 
of the Old Man without jeopardizing ZANU-PF's maintenance of 
power.  None of the discussions of which we are aware have 
focused on the need for political reconciliation and 
cooperation with the MDC. 
 
SULLIVAN