Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03COLOMBO170, GSL issues constructive statement re Iraq, as

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03COLOMBO170.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03COLOMBO170 2003-01-28 12:21 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Colombo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000170 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, NEA/NGA, DS/DSS/ITA, 
INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 01-29-13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ASEC ECON CE MV IZ
SUBJECT:  GSL issues constructive statement re Iraq, as 
Gulf situation nets increasing attention 
 
Refs:  (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 281221Z Jan 03 
 
-      (B) 02 Colombo 1879, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by W. Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Sri Lankan government issued a 
constructive statement on January 28, calling on Iraq to 
comply fully with UNSC Resolution 1441.  The statement 
comes as the situation in the Gulf region nets increased 
press and public attention here.  There is some concern 
bubbling up that a possible war could cause oil 
shortages and a collapse in remittances from overseas 
workers.  There is also some worry that a war could 
eclipse the good news re Sri Lanka's peace process.  So 
far, efforts by anti-U.S. elements to mobilize have been 
halting.  Despite the recent spurt in interest, Sri 
Lankans seem preoccupied with their very delicate peace 
process and Iraq does not appear destined to become a 
major issue.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------- 
Constructive GSL Statement 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) The Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued the following public statement re the Iraq 
situation on January 28: 
 
Begin text: 
 
"The Government of Sri Lanka has studied the reports 
submitted by the UN Weapons Inspection Team to the UN 
Security Council on 27th January 2003.  The Government 
takes note of the statement by the Chief UN Weapons 
Inspector that while Iraq is cooperating in the 
inspection process, further vital questions remain 
unanswered and that, therefore, there has not been full 
compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1441. 
The Government of Sri Lanka, therefore, requests Iraq to 
fully comply with the resolution.  Given the human 
political and economic consequences of military 
intervention, the Government calls for intensified and 
early completion of ongoing UN and other diplomatic 
efforts to ensure a peaceful resolution of the 
question." 
 
End text. 
 
3.  (C) In Mission's assessment, the GSL's statement was 
constructive in noting that Iraq was not in "full 
compliance" with UNSC Resolution 1441 and calling for it 
to comply fully.  It was also positive in our estimation 
that the statement in effect underscored that the GSL 
did not want this matter to be dragged out.  Instead, 
the statement stressed that there should be "intensified 
and early completion" of "UN and other diplomatic 
efforts" so as to "ensure a peaceful resolution of the 
question." 
 
------------------- 
Moragoda's Key Role 
------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Senior Minister Milinda Moragoda -- who played a 
major role in crafting the statement --  told DCM early 
January 28 that he wanted it to be helpful to the U.S. 
Moragoda said he had carefully vetted the language with 
Prime Minister Wickremesinghe.  Wickremesinghe had 
approved it, underlining that he wanted the GSL to be on 
the record as "broadly supportive" of the U.S. position 
on this issue before President Bush gave his "State of 
the Union" address later that day.  That way, 
Wickremesinghe told Moragoda, the government would be 
insulated from charges that it was pressured to support 
the U.S. on this matter due to the President's speech. 
5.  (C) During his conversation with the DCM, Moragoda 
also indicated that "one minister" was causing problems 
re the statement.  Moragoda did not name this minister, 
but he indicated that this person thought the GSL 
statement leaned too much toward the U.S. position. 
Mission is not sure which minister Moragoda was 
referring to.  Our guess, however, is that he was 
fingering Foreign Minister Tyronne Fernando or perhaps 
one of the four Muslim ministers in the cabinet. 
Fernando, in particular, could be the culprit to the 
extent that he appears to have bought into the MFA's 
long-standing "G-77," NAM-infected perspectives. 
Specifically re Iraq, Fernando was in the UAE recently 
and while there was quoted as noting "his fear over the 
consequences a war would have on the entire world." 
Fernando has made similar statements regarding Iraq that 
are seemingly focused more on the dangers of a possible 
war, as opposed to the greater danger of Iraqi non- 
compliance. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Iraq issue Bubbles to the Surface 
--------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The GSL's statement comes as the situation in 
the Gulf region nets increased press and public 
attention here.  The press play has been creeping onto 
the front pages of newspapers and to the top of evening 
TV newscasts.  Most of the reporting has been fairly 
straightforward and balanced, factually reviewing the UN 
inspections and the discussions in New York.  Of late, 
there has also been more editorial and op-ed comment. 
THE ISLAND, one of the three major English-language 
newspapers, for example, carried an editorial recently 
calling on the U.S. not to go to war with Iraq.  The 
editorial was relatively balanced and was not caustic. 
In terms of the op-ed's, most have decried U.S. policy. 
As is common with international issues here, most of 
these op-ed's were plucked from foreign (and left- 
leaning) sources, such as the GUARDIAN newspaper in the 
UK and ASIA TIMES.  There has also been a clutch of 
op-ed's attacking U.S. policy written by Sri Lankans, 
but not many. 
 
----------------- 
Economic Concerns 
----------------- 
 
7.  (C) In discussions with contacts, there are also 
some Sri Lanka-specific concerns, which basically 
revolve around the potential harm that could be done to 
the country's economy by a possible war.  The issues 
most often flagged re the economy include: 
 
-- Oil:  According to reports, Sri Lanka only has 30 
days of petroleum in reserve.  The worry is that a war 
could cause a huge spike in prices that would disrupt 
the country's economy. 
 
-- Budget:  The GSL based its 2003 budget on a price of 
USD 20 per barrel of petrol.  A surge in the price -- 
which has already occurred to some extent -- would cause 
serious budgetary dislocations. 
 
-- Overseas Workers:  There are over 700,000 Sri Lankan 
nationals working in the Middle East, and a war could 
mean that some might lose their jobs and have to stream 
home.  Remittances are important to the economy and Sri 
Lanka might lose some of that income, in addition to 
having new unemployed workers to deal with. 
 
-- Tea:  Over 54 percent of Sri Lanka's tea exports go 
the Middle East, including a small amount to Iraq via 
the UN's oil-for-food program.  There is fear that this 
important market for a key export industry could be 
disrupted. 
(((Note:  The primary concern in the Maldives re a 
possible war is also economic in thrust.  GoRM 
interlocutors have told us that they worry that the 
country's tourist industry, a key source of income, 
would be negatively affected, as happened in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001.  In addition, the 
Maldives was largely shunned by tourists during the 1991 
Gulf War.))) 
 
-------------------------- 
Worry about being Eclipsed 
-------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Another concern, though it is a bit inchoate, is 
that a possible war could eclipse Sri Lanka's brief role 
in the international limelight.  Making this point, 
Jehan Perera, the head of the National Peace Council, a 
local NGO, told us that Sri Lankans for many years had 
gotten used to being ignored by the international 
community, save for the attention paid to Tamil Tiger 
terrorist attacks.  The situation had changed with the 
advent of the peace process, as Sri Lanka began to 
receive positive press coverage and attention from 
important governments for the first time in years.  A 
war in the Middle East would probably put Sri Lanka on 
the backburner again.  Moreover, Perera remarked, a war 
could hurt by allowing the LTTE and elements in the 
south to take steps against the peace process out of the 
belief that there is no longer international scrutiny. 
Another variant on this overall point is that the 
aftermath of a war in Iraq could absorb huge amounts of 
development assistance funds that might otherwise be 
focused on Sri Lanka. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Anti-U.S. Elements try to Mobilize 
---------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) So far, efforts by anti-U.S. elements to 
mobilize against a possible war have been halting.  As 
reported in Ref B, there have been some anti-peace 
process rallies in Colombo and elsewhere in which vague 
sounds have also been made against U.S. Iraq policy.  In 
general, the rallies against the peace process have not 
been particularly well-attended and the addition of the 
Iraq element has not appeared to increase their drawing 
power. 
 
10.  (C) Two groups that have made opposition to U.S. 
Iraq policy part of their political planks include the 
Sinhalese extremist Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 
party and the small network of Muslim extremists. 
(Note:  Muslims are roughly 8 percent or so of the 
population.)  Kethesh Loganathan, an analyst at the 
Center for Policy Alternatives, a local think-tank, told 
us that he did not think the JVP or the Muslims could 
make a big play out of Iraq "unless a war turned out to 
be longer and bloodier" than expected.  With respect to 
the major parties, Loganathan commented that some 
governing United National Front MP's, especially those 
that are affiliated with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, 
might make noises against the war.  The same is true 
with some MPs in the president's People's Alliance. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11.  (C) Despite the recent spurt in interest, Sri 
Lankans seem preoccupied with their very delicate peace 
process and Iraq does not appear destined to become a 
major issue here.  If a possible war is longer and 
bloodier than expected, the situation could change, 
however; in particular, the Muslim population might take 
umbrage toward the U.S.  That said, the Muslim community 
is so split over the peace process and under so much 
pressure from the Tamil Tigers, it is questionable what 
it could do to show its displeasure.  In any case, as 
its public statement made clear, the U.S. has a friend 
in the Sri Lankan government.  We are quite certain the 
GSL will try to be helpful to the U.S. in the coming 
weeks and months to the full extent it can do so.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
12.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS